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Abstract	  This	   thesis	   examines	   and	   contextualises	   the	   early	   writings	   of	   Kanai	   Mieko,	  concentrating	   on	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   they	   instigate	   challenges	   to	   conventional	  inscriptions	   of	   gender,	   love,	   and	   text	   through	   a	   deployment	   of	   avant-­‐garde	  narrative	   techniques.	   The	   first	   chapter	   argues	   that	   Kanai’s	   early	   writings	  interrogate	  and	  problematise	  conventional	  inscriptions	  of	  identity	  and	  gender:	  her	   short	   stories	   ‘Rabbits’	   and	   ‘Rotting	  Meat’	   borrow	   the	   form	   of	   paradoxical	  concepts	   that	   arise	   out	   of	   various	   surrealist	   avant-­‐garde	   theories	   (such	   as	  Okamoto’s	   polaroppositionalism	   and	   Sakaguchi’s	   ‘Discourse	   on	   Decadence’)	  and	   can	   be	   read	   as	   a	   commentary	   upon	   the	   collective	   endeavours	   by	  contemporary	  feminists	  and	  women	  writers	  to	  create	  a	  written	  ‘feminine’.	  	  The	  second	  chapter	  further	  explores	  the	  subversive	  potential	  of	  Kanai’s	  writings.	  	  It	  argues	   that	   Kanai’s	   debut	   novella,	   Love	   Life,	   addresses	   the	   crisis	   of	  representation	  of	  the	  late	  1960s	  by	  constructing	  two	  constellatory	  matrices	  of	  literary	  meaning:	  Ai-­‐body-­‐presence	   and	  F-­‐narrative-­‐absence.	   	  The	   first	  of	   these	  matrices,	  Ai-­‐body-­‐presence,	   is	   discernible	   in	   the	   inscription	   of	   the	   protagonist	  Ai’s	   physical	   origin	   as	   abject	   and	   can	   be	   read	   as	   a	   specific	   critique	   and	  enactment	   of	   how	   the	   crisis	   of	   representation	   affected	   the	   female	   body.	   	   The	  second,	  F-­‐narrative-­‐absence,	   is	  present	   in	  Ai’s	   attempts	   to	   inscribe	  her	  absent	  husband	  F,	  enabling	  her	  to	  pursue	  an	  understanding	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  love.	  	  The	   final	   chapter	   examines	   another	   matrix	   of	   literary	   meaning	   in	   Kanai’s	  writings	   in	   which	   text	   is	   described	   as	   if	   it	   is	   a	   body	   possessed	   of	   a	  consciousness,	   which	   Kanai	   herself	   refers	   to	   in	   her	   essay,	   ‘Text/Reality/The	  Body’,	   as	   the	   ‘corporeal	   text’.	   	   It	   contends	   that	   the	   ‘corporeal	   text’	   acts	   as	   a	  challenge	   to	   conventional	   understandings	   of	   both	   the	   relationship	   between	  body	  and	  consciousness,	  and	  between	  the	  reader	  and	  a	  given	  text.	  	  In	  so	  doing,	  it	  pursues	  a	  deliberate	   textual	   strategy	   to	   transform	  the	  reader	   into	  an	  active	  creator	  of	  meaning.	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   If	  I	  am	  ever	  going	  to	  prove	  that	  I	  am	  ‘the	  author’	  to	  her,	  I	  suppose	  I	  will	  have	  do	  so	  by	  writing	  an	  essay	  or	  a	  literary	  work.	  I	  came	  to	  know	  her	  –	  although	  in	  this	  case,	  I	  really	  don’t	  know	  whether	  the	  word	   ‘know’	   is	   applicable	   –	   anyway,	   I	   began	   my	   strange	  relationship	  with	  her	  after	  writing	  my	  first	  story.	  Letters	  would	  arrive	  which	  opened	  with	   the	   line	   ‘I	   am	   the	  person	  who	  wrote	  the	  story	  published	  under	  your	  name.’	  Letters	  with	  this	  opening	  mounted	   up;	   there	   were	   exactly	   the	   same	   number	   of	   them	   as	  stories	  I	  had	  written;	  and	  while	  I	  tried	  to	  ignore	  them,	  in	  truth,	  I	  was	  completely	  unable	  to	  do	  so.	  Whenever	  I	  continued	  to	  write,	  she	  would	  always	  be	  with	  me.	  	  Because	  there	  was	  no	  address	  or	  name	   on	   the	   letters,	   how	   was	   I	   supposed	   to	   be	   able	   to	   say	  anything	  back	   to	   the	  writer:	   ‘the	   real	   author’?	  The	   relationship	  between	  us	  was	  completely	  one	  directional.	  	  Of	  course,	  it	  is	  only	  from	  my	  point	  of	  view	  that	  it	  was	  ‘one	  directional’,	  she	  might	  not	  think	  so;	  but	  at	  any	  rate,	  I	  didn’t	  even	  know	  whether	  it	  was	  a	  she	  whose	  hand	  had	  written	  those	  letters.	  Kanai	  Mieko,	  ‘Puratonteki	  ren’ai’	  (‘Platonic	  Love’)	  
Kanai	  Mieko’s	  short	  fiction	  ‘Platonic	  Love’	  contains	  a	  central	  enigma:	  who	  is	  the	  mysterious	   person	   who	   keeps	   writing	   letters	   to	   the	   story’s	   narrator	   –	   an	  ostensible	   version	   of	   Kanai	   herself	   –	   claiming	   to	   be	   ‘the	   real	   author’	   of	   her	  writings?	   	  Any	   initial	   speculation	   that	   the	   self-­‐styled	   ‘real	   author’	   is,	   in	   fact,	   a	  demented	   reader	   (which,	   of	   course,	   would	   be	   the	   most	   straightforward	  interpretation,	  which	  is	  to	  say	  the	  most	  plausible	  interpretation,	  which	  is	  to	  say	  the	   most	   realist[ic]	   interpretation), 1 	  is	   problematised	   when	   the	   narrator	  eventually	   receives	   the	   manuscript	   of	   a	   short	   story	   from	   the	   ‘real	   author’,	  entitled	  ‘Platonic	  Love’;	  a	  manuscript	  which	  our	  protagonist	  has	  been	  planning	  to	  write.	  Any	  reader	  still	  determined	  to	  provide	  the	  most	  straightforward	  (most	  
                                            1	  ‘Realistic’	  refers	  to	  that	  textual	  quality	  of	  being	  representationally	  accurate	  (or	  ‘true	  to	   life’);	   ‘realist’	   refers	   to	   the	  mode	   of	  writing	   that	   is	   responsible	   for	   such	   apparent	  representational	  accuracy.	  
 2 
plausible,	  most	  realist[ic])	  reading	  of	  the	  story	  now	  has	  to	  account	  for	  ‘the	  real	  author’	  differently:	  perhaps	  as	  a	  fictional	  construct	  of	  our	  (paranoid)	  narrator.	  But	   even	   this	   ‘straightforward’	   account	   becomes	   difficult	   for	   the	   reader	   to	  unpack.	  If	  ‘the	  real	  author’	  is	  created	  by	  the	  narrator	  of	  the	  story,	  it	  is	  because,	  as	   Amy	   Vladeck	   Heinrich	   has	   written,	   the	   narrator	   is	   racked	   with	   –	   and	   is	  enacting	  –	  the	  fear	  that	  ‘the	  producer	  is	  not	  one’s	  real	  self’’.2	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  ‘Platonic	   Love’,	   the	   narrator,	   when	   signing	   her	   own	   name	   to	   her	   writings,	   is	  worried	   that	   any	   assumption	   (by,	   say,	   future	   readers)	   of	   an	   ontological	  association	  or	  link	  between	  text	  and	  text	  writer	  (or,	  in	  Heinrich’s	  terms	  the	  text	  ‘producer’)	   –	   the	   assumption,	   in	   other	   words,	   that	   the	   writing	   stands	  
metonymically	   for	   the	   writer	   –	   would	   necessarily	   falsify	   the	   identity	   of	   the	  writer.	  The	  central	  enigma	  of	  the	  story,	  therefore,	  quickly	  becomes	  metonymic	  itself	   for	   the	  general	  enigma	  that	   is	   the	  relationship	  between	  author	  and	   text.	  For	   any	   author,	   to	   assign	   one’s	   name	   to	   a	   text	  might	   –	   by	   definition	   –	   lend	   a	  putative	  authority	  to	  that	  text;	  but	  to	  assert	  that	  authority	  is	  also	  to	  claim	  that	  the	   version	   of	   oneself	   that	   you	   are	   asking	   to	   be	   inferred	   from	   that	   text	   is	  somehow	  the	  correct	  one.	  But	  what	  assurance	  has	  one,	  in	  so	  doing,	  that	  one	  has	  
implied	  oneself	  accurately?	  
To	  call	  these	  interpretive	  difficulties	  and	  complexities	  ‘straightforward,’	  then,	  might	   seem	  wilfully,	   perversely	  oxymoronic.	  Nonetheless,	   they	  have	   the	  advantage	  for	  the	  reader	  of	  making	  the	  story	  safely	   ‘about’	  something:	   ‘about’	  authorial	  anxieties;	  ‘about’	  the	  difficulties	  of	  being	  a	  writer;	  ‘about’	  the	  stresses	  of	   the	   literary	   life	   etc.	   In	   other	   words,	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   story’s	   postmodern	  
                                            2	  Amy	   Vladeck	   Heinrich,	   'Double	  Weave:	   The	   Fabric	   of	   Japanese	  Women’s	  Writing',	  
World	  Literature	  Today,	  62	  (1988),	  408-­‐14,	  p.	  412.	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convolutions,	   they	   can	   ultimately	   be	   accounted	   for	   within	   an	   interpretive	  framework	   that	   has	   as	   its	   basis	   a	   deeply	   conventional	   conception	   of	   both	  ‘author’	  and	  ‘reader’.	  No	  matter	  how	  dizzyingly	  complicated	  the	  story	  might	  be,	  if	  we	  can	   ‘only’	  untangle	   it	   (and,	  when	  we	  deploy	   such	  a	  deeply	   conventional	  conception	  of	  the	  ‘reader’,	  and	  of	  that	  reader’s	  relationship	  to	  the	  text,	  then	  we	  
can	   ‘only’	   untangle	   it),	   then	   we	   will	   be	   able	   to	   ascertain	   what	   Kanai	   really	  meant.	   And	   then	   our	   reward	   for	   such	   a	   successful	   disentanglement	   is	   a	  heightened	  sense	  of	  our	  own	  critical	  faculties.	  
However,	   let	   us	   pursue	   another	   reading	   of	   ‘Platonic	   Love’,	   a	   reading	  which	   might	   be	   rather	   more	   unsettling	   for	   the	   literary	   critic	   (and	   more	  unsettling	   still	   for	   the	   student	   contemplating	   the	   submission	   of	   a	   doctoral	  thesis	   on	   the	   early	   writings	   of	   Kanai	   Mieko):	   in	   this	   reading	   (there	   are,	  doubtless,	  many	  more)	   ‘the	  real	  author’	   is	   the	  metaphorical	  personification	  of	  every	   instance	   whereby	   a	   literary	   critic	   describes	   the	   writer	   and/or	   their	  attributes	   (his/her	   talents,	   knowledge,	   aesthetic	  preferences,	   career,	   personal	  history,	  social	  context,	  hobbies,	  personal	  beliefs)	  as	   the	  true	  source	  of	  a	  given	  text.	  	  In	  such	  cases,	  the	  ‘writer’,	  or	  at	  least	  their	  name	  and	  the	  set	  of	  attributes	  which	  the	  critic	  attaches	  to	  that	  name	  (which	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  similar	  to	  the	  writer’s	  own)	  is	  no	  more	  than	  a	  textual	  construct	  which	  we	  may	  refer	  to	  as	  ‘the	  real	   author’.	   ‘The	   real	   author’	   is	   thus	   a	   given	   writer’s	   critics’	   attempts	   to	  account	  for	  and	  explain	  a	  text	  by	  using	  ‘the	  writer’	  as	  a	  parameter	  of	  the	  text’s	  meaning	  as	  if	  both	  text	  and	  writer	  are	  fixed,	  knowable,	  and	  definable	  entities.	  
Although	   such	   a	   textual	   construct	  may	   at	   first	   seem	   innocuous,	   in	   the	  same	   way	   that,	   in	   ’Platonic	   Love’,	   the	   letters	   from	   the	   ‘real	   author’	   seem	  ‘ignorable’	   to	   the	   narrator,	   it	   actually	   commits	   two	   highly	   intrusive,	   if	   not	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violent,	  literary	  acts.	  	  The	  first	  is,	  effectively,	  the	  theft	  of	  identity:	  by	  creating	  a	  textual	   construct	   which	   goes	   by	   the	   writer’s	   name,	   the	   critic	   creates	   an	  imposter	  who	  challenges	  the	  writer’s	  authorship	  of	  a	  given	  text,	  just	  as	  ‘the	  real	  author’	   in	   ‘Platonic	   Love’	   challenges	   the	   narrator’s	   authorship.	   The	   second	   is	  the	  defacement	  of	  the	  text:	  by	  pronouncing	  that	  the	  text	  has	  a	  meaning	  which	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  writer	  of	  the	  text,	  the	  critic	  first	  imposes	  a	  limit	  upon	  it,	  and	  then	  reinscribes	   the	   text	   with	   his/her	   own	   interpretation,	   just	   as	   the	   writer	   in	  ‘Platonic	  Love’	  is	  eventually	  presented	  with	  a	  manuscript	  that	  she	  didn’t	  write.	  Of	   course,	   one	   might	   then,	   in	   turn,	   find	   problematic	   these	   two	   pejorative	  metaphors	  that	  I	  have	  just	  introduced	  –	  identity	  theft	  and	  defacement	  –	  as	  the	  former	  might	  be	  taken	  to	  imply	  that	  the	  only	  alternative	  to	  such	  deviant	  critical	  behaviour	  is	  for	  the	  critic	  to	  remain	  in	  a	  state	  of	  permanent	  obeisance,	  not	  only	  to	   the	   ‘work’	   but	   also	   to	   the	   ‘author’	   who	   ‘created’	   it,	   while	   the	   latter	  might	  suggest	   that	   for	   the	   critic	   to	   presume	   only	   to	   tease	   out	   the	   author’s	   ‘true’	  meaning	   is	   actually	   to	   marginalise,	   through	   disavowing,	   the	   multitude	   of	  potential	  other	  meanings	   that	   a	   given	   text	  might	  generate.	   In	  other	  words,	   to	  conclude	   with	   our	   two	   criminalising	   metaphors,	   ‘identity	   theft’	   is	   the	  consequence	  of	  a	  critical	  manoeuvre	  that	  is	  fundamentally	  disrespectful	  to	  the	  authority	   of	   the	   author;	   while	   ‘defacement’	   is	   the	   consequence	   of	   a	   critical	  manoeuvre	  that	  is	  fundamentally	  disrespectful	  to	  the	  textuality	  of	  the	  text.	  
Returning	   to	   ‘Platonic	  Love’,	  we	  can	  see	   that	   it	   repeatedly	   interrogates	  the	  respective	  roles	  and	  functions	  of	  the	  categories	  ‘author’,	  ‘reader’	  and	  ‘text’;	  and,	  as	  such,	  it	  is	  representative	  of	  much	  of	  Kanai’s	  literary	  output.	  As	  Sharalyn	  Orbaugh	  writes,	  Kanai	  is	  preoccupied	  in	  numerous	  writings	  with	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the	  relationship	  between	  writer,	  reader,	  and	  text	  -­‐	  or,	  rather,	  she	  is	  concerned	   with	   the	   impossibility	   of	   distinguishing	   these	   roles	  according	  to	  some	  unique	  function.	  	  The	  reader	  of	  a	  story	  ‘writes’	  it	  as	   she	   reads;	   the	   writer	   of	   a	   story	   ‘gets	   it’	   from	   somewhere	  impossible	  to	  identify	  and	  claim	  as	  her	  own	  (perhaps	  even	  from	  the	  letters	   of	   ‘the	   real’	   author,	   the	  woman	  who	   continually	   claims	   to	  have	  originated	  the	  writer's	  stories	  in	  […]	  ‘Platonic	  Love’);	  and	  the	  story	   itself	  exists	  only	   in	  the	  mise-­‐en-­‐abyme	  sense	  of	  a	  production	  that	   is	  constantly	  reproduced,	  and	  differently,	  by	  each	  reader	  and	  has	  no	  existence	  outside	  that	  unceasing	  re-­‐production.3	  	  Orbaugh	   is	   undoubtedly	   correct	   in	   her	   assessment;	   and,	   as	   we	   shall	   see	  repeatedly	   in	   the	   course	   of	   this	   thesis,	   Kanai’s	   writings,	   in	   their	   constant	  metafictional	  self-­‐interrogation,	  bring	  to	  the	  fore	  questions	  of	  what	  it	  is	  to	  be	  a	  writer,	  what	   it	   is	   to	  be	  a	  reader	  and	  what	   it	   is	   to	  be	  a	  text.	   	  However,	   there	   is	  potentially	   consequent	   danger	   here,	   too,	   for	   anybody	   seeking	   to	   examine	  Kanai’s	  writings;	  and	  that	  is	  the	  danger	  of	  consigning	  them	  to	  some	  critical	  cul-­‐de-­‐sac,	  wherein,	  once	  we	  have	  pointed	  out	  a	  given	  text’s	  metatextuality,	  we	  can	  no	  longer	  say	  anything	  else,	  as	  there	  is	  literally	  nothing	  else	  to	  which	  it	  refers.	  
How,	   then,	   shall	   we	   discuss	   Kanai’s	   writing?	   The	   answer	   is	   surely	   to	  locate	   some	   of	   the	  multiplicity	   of	   potential	   contexts	   for	   her	   writings;	   thence,	  having	  done	  so,	  and	  without	  privileging	  one	  such	  context	  over	  another,	  to	  try	  to	  examine	  what	   readings	  might	  be	   fruitfully	  generated	   therein.	  After	  all,	   a	  brief	  examination	   of	   Kanai’s	   output	   quickly	   reveals	   just	   how	   multiple	   this	  multiplicity	   of	   potential	   contexts	   actually	   is.	   Not	   only	   does	   her	   output	   span	  nearly	   five	  decades,	   it	   also	   traverses	   a	  plethora	  of	  different	   literary	   genres	  of	  writing:	   literary	   and	   film	   criticism;	   social	   commentary;	   novels;	   short	   stories;	  poetry.	   The	   range	   of	   topics	   her	   writings	   encompass	   is	   also	   eclectic	   in	   the	  
                                            3	  Sharalyn	   Orbaugh,	   'Arguing	   with	   the	   Real:	   Kanai	   Mieko',	   in	   Ōe	   and	   Beyond,	   ed.	  Stephen	   Snyder	   and	   Philip	   Gabriel	   (Hawai’i:	   University	   of	   Hawai'i	   Press,	   1999)	   pp.	  245-­‐77,	  p.	  249.	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extreme:	  alongside	  serious	  intellectual	  discussions	  about	  gender	  and	  feminism,	  for	   instance,	  sit	  entire	  essay	  collections	  devoted	  to	  cats.	   Indeed,	   it	   is	   this	  very	  prolificness	  that	  makes	  it	  so	  difficult	  to	  account	  for	  Kanai’s	  output	   in	  terms	  of	  its	   being	   a	   coherent,	   unified	   body	   of	   work	   which	   derives	   and	   achieves	   such	  cohesiveness	   and	   unity	   from	   its	   creative	   wellspring,	   ‘the	   real	   author’:	   Kanai	  Mieko.	  
The	   remarkable	   diversity	   of	   Kanai’s	   output,	   the	   equally	   numerous	  artistic	  influences	  which	  it	  references,	  her	  output’s	  familiarity	  with	  theoretical	  discourses	  across	  a	  spectrum	  of	  disciplines,	  and	   its	  perceived	  mastery	  of	  very	  different	   genres,	   are	   all	   features	  which	   have,	   from	   the	   very	   beginning	   of	   her	  career,	   been	   recognised	   and	   reviewed	   positively,	   and	   have,	   no	   doubt,	  contributed	  to	  Kanai’s	  acceptance	   into	  the	  elite	  circle	  of	   the	   Japanese	   literati.4	  	  However,	   her	   acceptance	   into	   the	   very	   institution	   which	   contrives	   to	   shape	  public	   opinion	   belies	   her	   career’s	   radical	   and	   countercultural	   beginnings.	   	   At	  the	  time	  of	  her	  debut	  in	  1967,	  she	  was	  the	  first	  woman	  writer	  of	  her	  generation	  of	  post-­‐war	  baby-­‐boomers	  to	  break	  onto	  the	  literary	  scene	  with	  a	  succession	  of	  radical	   and	   acclaimed	   avant-­‐garde	   texts	   that	   challenged	   and	   irrevocably	  changed	  the	  Japanese	  literary	  tradition	  of	  which	  they	  have	  since	  become	  a	  part.	  	  The	   late	   1960s	   through	   to	   mid-­‐1970s	   was	   a	   time	   of	   social	   and	   political	  upheaval	  in	  Japan:	  the	  Japanese	  government’s	  tacit	  support	  of	  the	  United	  States	  had	  increasingly	  polarised	  public	  sentiment;	  while	  left-­‐wing	  protest	  groups	  had	  
                                            4	  See	  for	  instance	  Nakagami	  Kenji	  ‘Kōshitsu	  no	  kagayaki	  o	  hanatsu	  kotoba’	  [‘Language	  That	  Gives	  Off	  a	  Hard	  Radiance’]	  in	  Kanai	  Mieko:	  Zentanpenshū	  Vol.	  1	  (insert)	  (Tokyo:	  Nihon	   bungeisha,	   1992);	   Suga	   Hidemi	   'Kanai	   Mieko:	   Hito	   to	   Sakuhin’	   [Kanai	   Mieko:	  People	  and	  Art’]	  in	  Shōwa	  Bungaku	  Zenshū	  31	  (Tokyo:	  Shōgakukan,	  1988)	  pp.	  961-­‐64;	  and	   Orbaugh’s,	   'Arguing	   with	   the	   Real:	   Kanai	   Mieko'	   (in	   which	   she	   mentions	  Nakagami’s	  review).	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become	  more	  and	  more	  radicalised	  and	  extreme	  in	  response.	  	  The	  avant-­‐garde	  scene,	  in	  which	  Kanai	  was	  immersed,	  offered	  a	  means	  of	  critiquing	  both	  ends	  of	  this	   political	   spectrum.	   	   Kanai’s	   writings	   of	   this	   time	   employ	   surrealist	  techniques	   and	   theories	   to	   subvert	   the	   conceptions	   of	   ‘truth’	   and	   ‘reality’	  underpinning	   modern	   Japanese	   cultural	   identities.	   	   In	   particular,	   as	   they	  recognise	   identity	   as	   a	   construct	   of	   language,	   or	   rather	   as	   a	   narrative	  which	  covers	   over	   the	   fragmented	   and	   changeable	   essence	   of	   being,	   they	   lay	   a	  challenge	  not	  only	  to	  the	  literary	  status	  quo,	  but	  also	  to	  feminist	  discourse	  and	  women’s	   writing	   by	   critiquing	   ‘woman’s	   construction	   of	   woman’	   through	  writing.	   	   It	  is	  this	  early	  persistent	  critique	  of	  the	  ‘written	  feminine’,	  this	  thesis	  argues,	   that	   distinguishes	   Kanai’s	   early	   writings	   from	   those	   of	   her	  contemporaries	   (such	   as	   Takahashi	   Takako,	   Tsushima	   Yūko	   and	   Kurahashi	  Yumiko)	  who	  were	  also	  engaged	  in	  subverting	  gender	  binaries.	  	  
As	   five	   decades	   of	   prolific	   and	   disparate	   writings	   by	   Kanai	   cannot	   be	  adequately	   summarised,	   defined	   or	   otherwise	   constrained	   by	   any	   grand	  interpretive	   narrative,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   acknowledge,	   at	   the	   outset,	   that	   this	  thesis	   in	   no	   way	   strives	   for	   any	   illusory	   ‘completeness’;	   in	   its	   discussion	   of	  Kanai,	  it	  offers	  itself	  neither	  as	  a	  synthesising	  account	  of	  Kanai’s	  output,	  nor	  as	  a	  
synoptic	   one.	   Rather,	   it	   has	   a	   self-­‐imposed	   limitation:	   it	   focuses	   on	   a	  comparatively	  small	  number	  of	  Kanai’s	  early	  writings;	  it	  then	  chooses	  to	  situate	  this	   select	   number	   of	   essays	   and	   literary	   texts	  within	  multiple	   contemporary	  contexts	   (literary,	   social,	   theoretical,	   political,	   scientific,	   cultural)	   all	   of	  which	  overlap	  and	  none	  of	  which	  can	  be	  claimed	  as	  definitive.	  
If	   we	   thus	   choose	   to	   locate	   Kanai’s	   writings	   within	   a	   plurality	   of	  contemporary	   contexts,	   it	   is	   partly	   because	   those	   contemporary	   contexts	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identified	   themselves	   in	   terms	  of	  such	  plurality.	   Indeed,	   the	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  saw	   the	   emergence,	   across	   a	   broad	   spectrum	   of	   scientific,	   philosophical	   and	  critical	   discourses,	   of	   fundamental	   challenges	   to	   their	   respective	  epistemological	   certainties:	   a	   resurgence	   of	   critical	   interest	   in	   the	   Theory	   of	  Relativity	   after	   the	   discovery	   of	   exotic	   astronomical	   phenomena	   such	   as	  quasars	  (1963),	  the	  3-­‐Kelvin	  microwave	  background	  radiation	  (1965),	  and	  the	  first	   black	   hole	   (1971),	   for	   instance,	   paralleled	   the	   emergence	   of	   key	  poststructuralist	  texts	  such	  as	  Jacques	  Derrida’s	  ‘Structure,	  Sign,	  and	  Play	  in	  the	  Discourse	   of	   the	   Human	   Sciences’	   (1966),	   Roland	   Barthes’	   ‘The	   Death	   of	   the	  Author’	   (1967),	   and	  Luce	   Irigaray’s	  Speculum	  of	  the	  Other	  Woman	   (1974).5	  	   If	  the	   nascent	   theories	   from	   these	   very	   different	   disciplines	   had	   something	   in	  common,	   it	   lay	   in	   their	   identification	   and	   foregrounding	   of	   plurality	   and	  instability,	  their	  decisive	  exploration	  into	  the	  as-­‐yet-­‐unknown	  and	  the	  infinite,	  and	   their	   concomitant	   problematisation	   of	   any	   absolute	   knowable	   source	   or	  origin.	   	   For	   instance,	   the	   identification	   of	   3-­‐Kelvin	   microwave	   background	  radiation	   as	   the	   thermal	   and	   audial	   remnant	   of	   the	   Big	   Bang	   and	   thus	   as	   a	  present-­‐time	  echo	  of	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  universe	  which	  continues	  ever	  to	  morph	  and	  reverberate	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  destabilise	  the	  very	  notion	  of	   ‘origin’	  itself.	  So,	  too,	   the	   discovery	   of	   quasars	   (extremely	   distant	   active	   galactic	   nuclei	   first	  identified	  by	  their	  infrared	  radiation)	  led	  to	  their	  being	  posited	  as	  evidence	  for	  the	   hypothesis	   that	   the	   universe	   is	   continually	   expanding.	   Similarly,	   the	  
                                            5	  These	   dates	   refer	   to	   the	   original	   French	   sources.	   	   Their	   translations	   into	   English	  which	   this	   thesis	  has	   consulted	  are:	   Jacques	  Derrida,	   'Structure,	   Sign	  and	  Play	   in	   the	  Discourse	  of	  the	  Human	  Sciences',	  in	  Writing	  and	  Difference	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1978)	  pp.	  278-­‐93;	  Roland	  Barthes,	   'The	  Death	  of	  the	  Author',	   in	  Image,	  Music,	  Text	  (London:	  Fontana,	  1977);	  Luce	  Irigaray,	  Speculum	  of	  the	  Other	  Woman.	  trans.	  Gillian	  Gill	  (Ithaca,	  New	  York:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1985).	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recognition	   of	   black	   holes	   in	   the	   astronomical	   landscape	   led	   to	   a	   range	   of	  theories	  about	  what	  happens,	  as	  density	  of	  matter	  and	  the	  curvature	  of	  space-­‐time	  becomes	   infinite,	   to	   the	  meaning	   –	   and	   the	   stability	   of	  meaning	   –	   of	   the	  previously-­‐‘known’	   truths	   and	   concepts	   about	   the	   universe. 6 	  Meanwhile,	  Derrida	  described	  an	  irreconcilable	  polarisation	  in	  the	  discourse	  of	  the	  human	  sciences.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  there	  existed	  studies	  which	  sought	  a	  singular	  ‘truth’	  or	   ‘origin’.	   	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   there	   were	   those	   which,	   in	   a	   ‘Nietzschean	  
affirmation’,	   delighted	   in	   the	   infinite	   ‘play’	   of	   symbols	   that	   elude	   such	   ‘origin’	  and	  therefore	  required	  the	  repeated	  and	  ‘active	  interpretation’	  of	  the	  reader.7	  	  Similarly,	   Barthes	   put	   forward	   that	   rather	   than	   the	   Author’s	   constituting	   the	  limit	  of	  the	  text,	  the	  text	  far	  exceeds	  the	  control	  of	  the	  Author,	  constituting,	  as	  it	  does,	   a	   ‘multiplicity’	   of	   other	   texts	   and	   cultures	   and	   entering	   into	   its	   own	  dialogue	   with	   texts	   around	   it	   through	   parody	   and	   contestation,	   so	   that	   its	  meaning,	  or	  ‘unity’	  rests	  with	  an	  anonymous	  and	  unknowable	  readership;	  and	  Irigaray	   argued	   that	   all	   gender	   and	   sexuality	   had	   hitherto	   been	   linguistically	  constructed	  around	  a	  uniform	   ‘masculine’	  desire,	  and	   that	   there	  needed	   to	  be	  an	   exploration	   and	  writing	   of	   the	   ‘feminine’,	   of	   a	   completely	   ‘alterior’	  way	   of	  conceiving,	   defining	   and	   desiring	   which	   yet	   asserted	   itself	   to	   ‘presence’,	   and	  was	  not	  merely	  contrived	  to	  be	  the	  ‘absence’	  of	  the	  masculine.8	  
                                            6	  For	   a	   description	   of	   these	   exotic	   astronomical	   phenomena	   see:	   Heilbron,	   J.	   L.,	  The	  
Oxford	  Companion	   to	   the	  History	  of	  Modern	  Science	   (Oxford:	   Oxford	   University	   Press,	  2003).	  7	  Derrida,	   'Structure,	  Sign	  and	  Play	   in	   the	  Discourse	  of	   the	  Human	  Sciences'	  pp.	  292-­‐293.	  8	  Barthes,	   ‘The	  Death	  of	  the	  Author’,	  pp.142-­‐148;	  Irigaray	  outlines	  how	  psychological	  (Freudian)	  models	  of	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  have	  contrived	  woman	  through	  an	  assumed	  symmetry	  to	  man	  in	  her	  first	  doctoral	  thesis	  and	  puts	  the	  case	  forward	  for	  developing	  a	  notion	  of	  ‘alterity’	  through	  gender	  in	  subsequent	  works	  which	  explore	  the	  divine,	  the	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These	  scientific	  and	  theoretical	  pluralities	  extend	  also	  to	  the	  immediate	  sociocultural	   context	  of	  post-­‐war	   Japan:	   specifically,	   the	   Japanese	  avant	  garde	  movement	  and	  its	  positive	  harnessing	  of	  the	  politico-­‐cultural	  potential	  offered	  by	  new	  theories	  on	  the	  semiotic	  production	  of	  identities	  which	  recognised	  that	  conventional	  oppositional	  protest	  politics	  not	  only	  fed	  into	  the	  agenda	  of	  state	  authority,	  but	  also	  stifled,	  rendered	  stagnant	  and	  obscured	  statements	  of,	  and	  debates	   about,	   an	   ever-­‐proliferating	   cultural	   plurality.9 	  	   The	   avant	   garde	  movement	   channelled	   young	   political	   energy	   into	   subversive	   art	   forms	   and	  maintained	   a	   profound	   scepticism	   of	   those	   grand	   narratives	   that	  maintained	  essentialist	  and	  universalising	  binary	  conceptions	  of,	  say,	  authority/individual,	  artist/audience	  and	  man/woman.	  Such	  binaries,	  the	  avant	  garde	  	  perceived,	  lie	  at	   the	  heart,	   not	  only	  of	   the	  values	  of	   the	  mainstream	  who	  were	   increasingly	  accepting	  of	  Liberal	  Democratic	  Party	  promises	  of	  higher	  standards	  of	  living	  in	  substitution	   for	  a	  varied	  democratic	  voice,	  but	   also	  of	   the	  values	  of	   the	  many	  protest	   groups	   who	   sought	   liberation	   and	   equality	   from	   the	   post-­‐occupation	  authorities.10	  	   It	   therefore	   set	  out	   to	  deconstruct	   the	  oppositionalism	  of	   such	  political	  categories;	  and,	  through	  parody	  and	  a	  postmodernist	  ‘play’,	  to	  critique	  
                                                                                                                           cosmic,	   space	   and	   time,	   the	   elements	   and	   Greek	   Mythology.	   	   For	   the	   former	   see	  Irigaray,	  Speculum	  of	  the	  Other	  Woman,	  pp.	  11-­‐33;	  and	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  latter	  see:	  Luce	   Irigaray,	   This	   Sex	  Which	   Is	   Not	   One	   trans.	   Catherine	   Porter	   and	   Carolyn	   Burke	  (Ithaca,	   New	   York:	   Cornell	   University	   Press,	   1985);	   and	   Luce	   Irigaray,	   An	   Ethics	   of	  
Sexual	  Difference	  trans.	  Carolyn	  Burke	  and	  Gillian	  Gill	  (London:	  Continuum,	  2004).	  9	  All	   of	   the	   following	   texts	   describe	   and	   discuss	   the	   importance	   of	   non-­‐oppositional	  methods	   of	   protest	   among	   avant-­‐garde	   artists	   and	   contemporary	   protest	   groups.	  Steven	  Ridgely,	   Japanese	  Counterculture:	  The	  Antiestablishment	  Art	  of	  Terayama	  Shūji	  (Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  2010);	  William	  Marotti,	  'Japan	  1968:	  The	  Performance	  of	  Violence	  and	  the	  Theater	  of	  Protest',	  American	  Historical	  Review,	  114	  (2009),	  97-­‐135;	  Setsu	  Shigematsu,	  Scream	  from	  the	  Shadows:	  The	  Women's	  Liberation	  
Movement	  in	  Japan	  (Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  2012).	  10	  John	  Dower,	   'Peace	   and	  Democracy	   in	   Two	   Systems:	   External	   Policy	   and	   Internal	  Conflict',	   in	   Postwar	   Japan	   as	   History,	   ed.	   Andrew	   Gorden	   (California:	   University	   of	  California	  Press,	  1993).	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both	   ends	   of	   the	   spectrum,	   while	   working	   to	   complicate	   the	   debate	   on	  subjectivity,	   to	   reclaim	   the	   right	   for	   freedom	   of	   expression	   and	   extend	   the	  boundaries	  of	  identity	  formation.	  
Such	  specific	  cultural	  contexts	  include	  (to	  name	  but	  a	  few):	  the	  slogans	  that	   characterised	   contemporary	   Japanese	   feminism,	   the	   head-­‐to-­‐head	  discussion	  on	  women’s	  writing	  between	  Tsushima	  Yūko	  and	  Takahashi	  Takako;	  Okamoto	  Tarō’s	  theory	  of	  polaroppositionalism,	  Sakaguchi	  Ango’s	  ‘Discourse	  of	  Decadence’	   and	   the	   avant	   garde’s	   deployment	   of	   the	   atomic	   bomb	   as	   an	  aesthetic	   trope;	   the	   deliberations	   of	   the	   1967	  Dazai	  Osamu	  Prize	   Committee;	  the	   respective	   theories	   of	   Julia	  Kristeva	   and	   Luce	   Irigaray;	  Hijikata	   Tatsumi’s	  rigorously	  experimental	  dance	  form,	  butō;	  the	  New	  Age	  science	  of	  Fritjof	  Capra	  and	  David	  Bohm;	   the	  writings	   of	  Mishima	  Yukio,	   Franz	  Kafka,	  Hans	  Christian	  Andersen	  and	  Lewis	  Carroll;	  Disney’s	  Pinocchio;	  and	  the	  engravings	  of	  Gustave	  Doré.	   It	   is	   within	   these	   various	   contexts,	   then,	   that	   our	   discussion(s)	   situate	  Kanai’s	   writing,	   in	   order	   to	   examine	   such	   readings	   and	   meanings	   that	   may	  thereby	  be	  generated	  (by	  us)	  from	  each	  text	  under	  discussion.	  
Specifically,	  Chapter	  One	  proposes	  that	  the	  writings	  of	  Kanai	  Mieko	  can	  be	   read	   as	   constituting	   a	   response	   to	   the	   dilemma	   that	   creating	   a	   written	  
feminine	   (by	   for	   instance	   deciding	   to	   speak	   and	   write	   collectively,	   in	   a	  representationalist	   idiom)	   reifies	   the	   category	   of	   ‘woman’	   and	   defines	   her	   in	  opposition	   to	   ‘man’,	   thus	   reproducing	   the	   premises	   upon	  which	   a	   hegemonic	  patriarchal	  order	  organises	   itself.	   	   It	   starts	  by	  considering	  Kanai’s	  1972	  essay	  ‘What	  is	  “a	  Woman”	  to	  a	  Woman?’	  which	  sets	  out	  how,	  in	  separate	  ways,	  both	  feminists	  and	  women	  writers	  were	  perpetuating	  gender	  division	  through	  their	  discursive	  constructions	  of	  woman.	  Turning	  to	  Kanai’s	  early	  short	  fiction	  works	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‘Rotting	  Meat’	   and	   ‘Rabbits’,	  Chapter	  One	  next	   contends	   that	   these	   stories,	  by	  forming	   themselves	   around	   avant-­‐garde	   tropes	   such	   as	   Okamoto’s	  polaroppositionalism	   and	   the	   concept	   of	   decay	   in	   Sakaguchi’s	   ‘Discourse	   on	  Decadence’,	   dismantle	   established	   categories	   of	   gender	   and	   sexuality	   by	  overturning	   the	   framework	   through	   which	   such	   categories	   are	   irrevocably	  shaped.	  
Chapter	  Two	  argues	  how,	  in	  Kanai’s	  novella	  Love	  Life,	  the	  representation	  of	  its	  protagonist,	  Ai,	  can	  be	  situated	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  cultural	  output	  of	  1960s	  Japanese	  avant-­‐gardism,	  and	  seen	  as	  an	  exemplar	  of	  the	  various	  crises	  of	  representation	  that	  such	  avant-­‐gardism	  critiqued	  or	  enacted.	  Specifically,	  Love	  
Life	  critiques	  (and	  enacts)	  how	  that	  crisis	  of	  representation	  affected	  the	  female	  body;	  and	  the	  prism	  through	  which	  such	  critique	  is	  refracted	  is	  an	  interrogation	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  love	  and	  to	  be	  in	  love.	  	  To	  this	  end	  the	  chapter	  posits	  how	  Kanai	  deploys	  the	  textual	  strategy	  of	  using	  a	  constellatory	  fictive	  technique	  that	  constructs	   twin	   matrices	   of	   literary	   meaning.	   The	   first,	   Ai-­‐body-­‐presence,	  derives	   from	   the	   narrative	   inscription	   of	   Ai’s	   abjected	   physiological	   origin,	  which	   assails	   her	   when	   she	   attempts	   to	   eat,	   recalling	   images	   of	   parasites,	  corpses	  and	  the	  dismembered	  maternal	  body.	  	  The	  second,	  F-­‐narrative-­‐absence,	  is	  discernible	  in	  Ai’s	  attempts	  to	  describe	  (or,	  rather,	   inscribe)	  her	  husband,	  F,	  and	   her	   relationship	   with	   him,	   attempts	   which	   seek	   to	   render	   his	   physical	  
absence	  from	  her	  narrative	  account	  as	  a	  textual	  presence.	  
Chapter	   Three	   considers	   how	   Kanai’s	   subsequent	   writings	   further	  explore	   the	   relationship	   between	   these	   various	   phenomena,	   specifically	   by	  examining	  how	  Kanai	  repeatedly	  sets	  in	  play	  a	  different	  constellatory	  matrix	  of	  meaning:	   text-­‐body-­‐mind.	  Again	  and	  again,	  Kanai	   elides	   the	   three	   through	  her	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repeated	   descriptions	   of	   text	   as	   though	   it	   is	   a	   physical	   body	   possessed	   of	   a	  
consciousness.	   This	   new	   matrix	   features	   significantly	   as	   a	   trope	   in	   Kanai’s	  writings,	  a	  trope	  which	  Kanai	  refers	  to	  as	  ‘the	  corporeal	  text’.	  	  Focusing	  on	  two	  of	   Kanai’s	   essays,	   'Nikutairon	   e	   josetsu	   dai’ippo'	   (‘Towards	   a	   Theory	   of	  Corporeality’,	   1969),	   'Kotoba/genjitsu/nikutai'	   (‘Text/Reality/The	   Body’,	  1984),	   and	  a	  piece	  of	   short	   fiction.	   'Kūki	  otoko	  no	  hanashi'	   (‘The	  Story	  of	   the	  Inflated	  Man’,	   1974);	   Chapter	  Three	   aims	   to	   show	  how	   the	  dissolution	  of	   the	  conceptual	   discreteness	   of	   each	   constituent	   member	   of	   our	   new	   matrix	  operates	   in	   these	   writings	   as	   a	   fundamental	   challenge	   both	   to	   conventional	  notions	  of	  the	  acts	  of	  reading	  and	  writing	  and,	  specifically,	  to	  the	  conventional	  situation	  of	  the	  reader	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  given	  text.	  
In	  her	  afterword	  (atogaki)	  to	  Platonic	  Love	  (the	  collection	  takes	  its	  name	  from	  the	  story),	  Kanai	  writes:	  
Considering	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  person	  reading	  a	  text	  will	  shave	  away	  some	  parts	  by	  skipping	  over	  them,	  and	  will	  write	  in	  new	  things	  by	   reading	  words	   that	   aren’t	   there,	   it	   is	   not	  merely	   the	   person	  called	  the	  writer	  who	  writes	  a	  text,	  the	  reader	  also	   ‘produces’	  a	  text.	  	  The	  writer	  of	  the	  resulting	  story	  is	  certainly	  not	  ‘I’.11	  	  This	   insight,	   then,	   this	   framing	   of	   the	   text	   as	   being	   ultimately	   and	  inevitably	   forever	   in	   an	   attitude	   of	   interpretive	   oblation	   towards	   the	   reader,	  offering	   itself	   up	   as	   an	   entrance	   into	   a	   network	   of	   potential	   textual	   and	  intertextual	  meanings;	  this	  is	  the	  outcome	  to	  which	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  thesis	  brings	  us.	   In	  other	  words,	   the	   thesis	   concludes	   that	  Kanai’s	   conception	  of	   the	  
                                            11	  Kanai	   Mieko,	   Kanai	   Mieko:	   Zentanpenshū	   [Kanai	   Mieko:	   A	   Complete	   Short	   Story	  
Collection]	   Vol.	   3	   (Tokyo:	   Nihonbungeisha,	   1992)	   pp.	   602-­‐603,	   trans.	   Sharalyn	  Orbaugh,	   'Arguing	  with	   the	  Real:	  Kanai	  Mieko',	   in	  Ōe	  and	  Beyond,	  ed.	  Stephen	  Snyder	  and	  Philip	  Gabriel	  (Hawai’i:	  University	  of	  Hawai'i	  Press,	  1999)	  pp.	  245-­‐77,	  p.	  249.	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corporeal	  text	   is	  not	  merely	  a	  bespoke	  theory	  confected	  simply	  to	  account	  for	  ‘The	  Story	  of	   the	  Inflated	  Man’;	  rather,	   it	   is	  a	   theoretical	  prism	  through	  which	  we	  can	  read	  not	  only	  the	  other	  Kanai	  texts	  discussed	  in	  this	  thesis,	  and	  not	  only	  Kanai’s	  other	  literary	  writings,	  but	  arguably,	  Writing	  itself.	  	  Kanai’s	  deployment	  of	   the	   corporeal	   text	   is	   a	   deliberate	   act	   that	   is	   designed	   to	   transform	   the	  reader’s	   experiential	   relationship	   with	   the	   text	   from	   being	   that	   of	   a	   passive	  recipient	  to	  one	  of	  an	  active,	  engaged	  creator	  of	  meaning.	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Chapter	  One	  
Reading	  ‘Rotting	  Meat’	  and	  ‘Rabbits’	  through	  the	  Paradoxes	  of	  Surrealism	  
Foucault	   points	   out	   that	   juridical	   systems	   of	   power	   produce	   the	  subjects	  they	  subsequently	  come	  to	  represent.	  […]	  	  If	  this	  analysis	  is	   right,	   the	   juridical	   formation	   of	   language	   and	   politics	   that	  represents	  women	  as	  ‘the	  subject’	  of	  feminism	  is	  itself	  a	  discursive	  formation	  and	  effect	  of	  a	  given	  version	  of	  representational	  politics.	  	  And	  the	  feminist	  subject	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  discursively	  constituted	  by	  the	   very	   political	   system	   that	   is	   supposed	   to	   facilitate	   its	  emancipation.	  Judith	   Butler,	   Gender	   Trouble:	   Feminism	   and	   the	   Subversion	   of	  
Identity	  	  
What	   remains	   to	   be	   done,	   then,	   is	   to	   work	   at	   ‘destroying’	   the	  
discursive	   mechanism.	   	   Which	   is	   not	   a	   simple	   undertaking….	   For	  how	   can	   we	   introduce	   ourselves	   into	   such	   a	   tightly-­‐woven	  systematicity?	  Luce	  Irigaray,	  This	  Sex	  Which	  Is	  Not	  One	  
	  
Introduction	  
The	   fundamental	   premise	  of	   all	   feminisms	   is	   that	   there	   is	   a	  division	  between	  the	  genders,	  and	  that	  women	  are	  subordinated	  and	  oppressed	  within	  a	  system	  of	  male	  dominance.	  	  However,	  as	  Judith	  Butler	  points	  out	  in	  the	  epigraph	  above,	  if	   we	   are	   to	   assume,	   after	   Foucault,	   that	   this	   system	   establishes	   its	   power	  through	   channels	   which	   include	   the	   discursive	   construction	   of	   our	   own	  identities,	  then	  these	  feminisms’	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  fundamental	  premise	  upon	  which	  they	  are	  constructed	  serves	  only	  to	  affirm	  and	  reify	  that	  system’s	  reality. 1 	  	   Feminist	   critics	   and	   women	   writers	   who	   accept	   Butler’s	  
                                            1	  Butler	  is	  here	  referring	  to:	  Michel	  Foucault,	   'Right	  of	  Death	  and	  Power	  over	  Life',	   in	  
The	  History	  of	  Sexuality,	  Volume	  1,	  An	  Introduction	  (New	  York:	  Vintage,	  1980).	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understanding	  of	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  identity	  is	  forged	  are	  thus	  faced	  with	  an	  enormous	   challenge	   in	   attempting	   to	  write	   against	   it;	   for,	   as	   the	   epigraph	   by	  Luce	   Irigaray	   asks,	   how	   is	   it	   possible	   to	   destroy	   a	   system	  of	   language	  within	  which	   the	   subject	   is	   always	   already	   constituted	   without	   reiterating,	   and	  thereby	  reaffirming,	  its	  terms?	  
This	  chapter	  proposes	  that	  the	  writings	  of	  Kanai	  Mieko	  not	  only	  display	  an	  awareness	   of	   this	   specific	   dilemma,	   but	   also	   can	   be	   read	   as	   constituting	   a	  
response	  to	  it.	  	  This	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Kanai,	  in	  marked	  contrast	  to	  other	   woman	   writers	   and	   feminist	   intellectuals	   in	   Japan	   at	   the	   time,	   was	  extremely	   careful	   in	   her	   early	   non-­‐fiction	   not	   to	   formulate	   a	   definition	   of	  ‘woman’,	  but	   rather	   to	  question	   those	  who	  did.	   	  For	  example,	  her	  1972	  essay	  ‘Onna	  ni	  totte	  onna	  to	  wa	  nani	  ka?’	  (‘What	  is	  “a	  Woman”	  to	  a	  Woman?’)	  sets	  out	  how,	   in	  separate	  ways,	  both	   feminists	  and	  women	  writers	  were	  perpetuating,	  rather	   than	   interrogating,	   discrimination	   and	   gender	   division	   through	   their	  discursive	   constructions	   of	   woman.2	  	   In	   the	   essay,	   Kanai	   criticises	   a	   broad	  range	  of	  targets:	  the	  Japanese	  ribu	  (women’s	  lib	  movement);	  the	  efforts	  of	  those	  of	   her	   female	   contemporaries	   in	   Japan	   who	   were	   attempting	   to	   distance	  themselves	  from	  the	  category	  of	  ‘woman’	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  an	  intellectual	  status;	  and	  (what	  she	  perceives	  as)	  the	  essentialism	  of	  Simone	  de	  Beauvoir’s	  apparent	  insistence	   that	   only	   women	   can	   write	   authentically	   about	   being	   a	   woman.	  	  Contrasting	   this	   and	   Kanai’s	   other	   early	   essays	   with	   those	   of	   her	   female	  contemporaries,	   this	   chapter	   argues	   that,	   taken	   together,	   they	   constitute	   a	  critique	  of	  joseiron	  (the	  collective	  endeavour	  to	  define	  womanhood,	  and	  hence	  
                                            2	  Kanai	  Mieko,	  'Onna	  ni	  totte	  onna	  to	  wa	  nani	  ka'	  [‘What	  is	  “a	  Woman”	  to	  a	  Woman’]	  in	  
Kōza	  onna	  1:	  Naze	  onna	  ka?	  (Tokyo:	  Chikuma	  shobō,	  1972)	  pp.	  68-­‐83.	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to	  produce	  a	  written	  feminine)	  while	  illustrating	  her	  distance	  from,	  rather	  than	  her	   alignment	  with,	   their	   discourse.	   	   This	   is	   not	   to	   assert	   that	   her	   early	   non-­‐fiction	  writings	  are	  ‘anti-­‐feminist’,	  but	  rather	  to	  claim	  that	  they	  are	  attempts	  to	  advance	   the	   debate	   on	   gender	   and	   sexuality	   beyond	   the	   boundaries	   of	   what	  was	  commonly	  and	  contemporaneously	  understood	  to	  be	  ‘feminism’.	  
Turning	   to	   Kanai’s	   early	   short	   fiction	   works	   ‘Funiku’	   (‘Rotting	   Meat’,	  1972)	  and	  ‘Usagi’	  (‘Rabbits’,	  1972),	  this	  chapter	  next	  outlines	  how	  these	  stories	  simultaneously	   dismantle	   established	   categories	   of	   gender	   and	   sexuality	   by	  overturning	  the	  dichotomising	  and	  hierarchical	  framework	  through	  which	  such	  categories	   are	   irrevocably	   shaped,	   while	   forming	   themselves	   around	   avant-­‐garde	  tropes	  which	  offer	  alternative	  value	  systems.3	  	  Both	  stories	  depict	  female	  characters	  whose	  twin	  modes	  of	  living	  and	  being	  are	  informed	  by	  patterns	  and	  cycles	  of	  death	  and	  socially-­‐transgressive	  sexual	  desire;	  each	  story	  culminates	  in	  the	  female	  characters’	  killing	  of	  their	  sexual	  partners,	  while	  the	  self-­‐exclusion	  from	  society	  and	  its	  norms	  that	  is	  the	  lot	  of	  the	  nameless,	  murderous	  prostitute	  in	  ‘Rotting	  Meat’	  is	  echoed,	  more	  extremely,	  in	  the	  self-­‐mutilation	  and	  death	  of	  the	   rabbit-­‐girl	   in	   ‘Rabbits’.	   	   And	   yet,	   both	   stories	   also	   locate	   these	   female	  narratives	   within	   the	   narrative	   of	   an	   anonymous,	   framing	   primary	   narrator,	  which	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  reinforcing	  the	  textual	  materiality	  of	  each	  narrative.	  
                                            3	  ‘Funiku’	  (‘Rotting	  Meat’)	  was	  first	  published	  in	  1972	  in	  the	  May	  edition	  of	  the	  literary	  magazine,	  Nami;	  ‘Usagi’	  (‘Rabbits’)	  was	  first	  published	  the	  following	  month,	  in	  the	  June	  edition	   of	   the	   literary	  magazine	   Subaru.	   Both	   stories	  were	   reprinted	   in	   Kanai’s	   first	  short-­‐story	   collection,	  Kanai	   Mieko,	   Usagi	   [Rabbits]	   (Tokyo:	   Chikuma	   shobō,	   1973).	  These,	  and	  other	  works	  in	  this	  collection,	  notably	   ‘Ai	  aru	  kagiri’	  (‘As	  Long	  as	  There	  is	  Love’),	   ‘Kikan’	   (‘The	  Return’),	   ‘Boshizō’	   (‘A	   Figure	   of	  Mother	   and	   Child’),	   ‘Chimamire	  Marī’	   (‘Bloody	   Marie’),	   ‘Mimi’	   (‘The	   Ear’),	   ‘Yamamba’	   (‘The	   Mountain	   Witch’)	   and	  ‘Kōtansai	  no	  yoru’	  (‘Christmas	  Night’),	  present	  the	  reader	  with	  disturbing	  narratives	  of	  bloody	  violence,	  incestuous	  or	  (what	  Kristeva	  might	  have	  termed)	  jouissant	  acts	  of	  sex	  (in	   that	   they	   invoke	   death),	   or	   describe	   isolated	   individuals	   in	   relationships	   with	  eternally	  absent	  lovers.	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Because	   of	   these	   stories’	   unnerving	   juxtaposition	   of	   death,	   slaughter,	  mutilation,	   and	   sexual	   activity	   (as	   well	   as	   their	   constant	   problematisation	   of	  conventional	   male-­‐ness	   and	   female-­‐ness),	   and	   also	   because	   they	   reveal	   the	  processes	   of	   gender	   and	   identity	   construction	   to	   be	   akin	   to	   the	   process	   of	  writing	  fiction,	  it	  is	  perhaps	  not	  surprising	  that,	  out	  of	  the	  four	  different	  critics	  who	   have	   written	   most	   extensively	   about	   these	   stories,	   three	   of	   them	   have	  situated	  the	  stories	  within	  a	  feminist	  framework.4	  (The	  fourth,	  Takeuchi	  Kayō,	  even	   while	   challenging	   the	   relevance	   of	   feminist	   criticism	   to	   ‘Rabbits’,	  nonetheless	   still	   situates	   the	   story	  within	   debates	   surrounding	   sexuality	   and	  identity	   through	   the	   application	   of	   queer	   theory.)5	  	   However,	   this	   chapter	  (even	   as	   it	   addresses	   these	   various	   critical	   interpretations)	   argues	   that,	  although	   ‘Rotting	  Meat’	   and	   ‘Rabbits’	   are	  undeniably	   relevant	   to	   feminist	   and	  gender	   theories,	   the	   critical	   application	   of	   such	   theories	   and	   theoretical	  frameworks	   to	   both	   stories	   –	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   interpret	   them	   –	   effectively	   (if	  implicitly)	   undermines	   their	   deconstruction	   and	   rewriting	   of	   categories	   of	  
                                            4	  These	  three	  critics	  and	  their	  respective	  essays	  are:	  Mary	  Knighton,	  'Writing	  the	  Body	  as	  Meat:	  Kanai	  Mieko's	  "Rotting	  Meat"	  as	  Surreal	  Fable',	  in	  Japanese	  Studies	  around	  the	  
World	  2004.	  Observing	  Japan	  from	  Within:	  Perspectives	  of	  Foreign	  Scholars	  Resident	   in	  
Japan,	  ed.	  James	  Baxter	  (International	  Research	  Centre	  for	  Japanese	  Studies,	  2004)	  pp.	  161-­‐88;	  Mary	  Knighton,	  'Down	  the	  Rabbit	  Hole:	  In	  Pursuit	  of	  Shojo	  Alices,	  from	  Lewis	  Carroll	   to	   Kanai	  Mieko',	  U.S.-­‐Japan	  Women's	   Journal	  40	   (2011)	   49-­‐89;	   Kitada	   Sachie,	  'Usagi:	   Hito	   to	   bungaku'	   [‘Rabbits:	   People	   and	   Literature’]	   in	   Tanpen	   Josei	   Bungaku:	  
Gendai,	  ed.	  Yabu	  Teiko,	  Watanabe	  Sumiko	  and	  Imai	  Yasuko	  (Tokyo:	  Ōfū,	  1993)	  pp.	  153-­‐60;	  Kitada	  Sachie,	  'Kanai	  Mieko	  ni	  okeru	  "shōjo"	  to	  "boken"'	  [‘The	  “Young	  Woman”	  and	  “Maternal	  Rights”	  in	  Kanai	  Mieko’s	  Works’]	  in	  Haha	  to	  musume	  no	  feminizumu:	  Gendai	  
kazoku	  o	  koete,	  ed.	  Kitada	  Sachie,	  Mizuta	  Noriko	  and	  Hasegawa	  Hiroshi	  (Tokyo:	  Tahata	  shōten,	   1996)	   pp.	   140-­‐56;	   Sharalyn	   Orbaugh,	   'The	   Body	   in	   Contemporary	  Women's	  Fiction',	   in	   The	  Woman's	  Hand:	   Gender	   and	   Theory	   in	   Japanese	  Women's	  Writing,	   ed.	  Paul	  and	  Walker	  Schalow,	  Janet	  (Stanford,	  California.:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1996)	  pp.	  119-­‐64.	  5	  Takeuchi	   Kayō,	   'Kanai	  Mieko	   “Usagi”	   o	  meguru	   kuia	   –	   “shōjo”	   no	  monogatori	   kara	  “watashi”	  no	  monogatari	  e'	  [‘The	  Queer	  in	  Kanai	  Mieko’s	  “Rabbits”:	  From	  the	  Story	  of	  the	  “Shōjo”	  to	  the	  Story	  of	  “Watashi”]	  Shōwa	  bungaku	  kenkyū	  2008,	  pp.	  163-­‐84.	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gender	   and	   sexuality	   by	   reapplying,	   rather	   than	   destroying,	   the	   discursive	  formations	  through	  which	  the	  subject	  of	  feminism	  is	  constituted.	  
In	   order	   to	   better	   illustrate	   Kanai’s	   early	   attempts	   to	   deconstruct	  categories	  of	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  and	   find	  alternative	  models	   through	  which	  to	  express	   identity,	   this	   chapter	   seeks	   to	   foreground	   the	  destabilising	  of	   such	  categories,	   and,	   rather	   than	   reclaiming	   these	   texts	   as	   ‘feminist	   texts’,	   instead	  turns	  to	  the	  theories	  and	  writings	  of	  Kanai’s	  avant-­‐garde	  peers.	  In	  re-­‐analysing	  these	   stories	   within	   such	   multiple	   contexts,	   the	   chapter	   posits	   that	   Kanai’s	  awareness	   and	   use	   of	   postmodern,	   surrealist	   techniques	   and	   literary	   forms	  facilitates	  and	  frames	  her	  critique	  –	  through	  the	  medium	  of	  fiction	  –	  of	  joseiron.	  Again,	  although	  it	  is	  the	  chapter’s	  hypothesis	  that	  Kanai’s	  writings	  constitute	  a	  critique	  of	  women’s	  discourses,	  this	  in	  no	  way	  suggests	  that	  they	  are	  somehow	  non-­‐,	  or	  a-­‐political,	  or	  even	   that	   they	  are	   ‘unconnected’	   to	   feminism	  (as	   some	  critics	  have	  stated),	  but	  rather	   that	   they	  can	  be	  read	  as	  an	  attempt	   to	  use	   the	  techniques,	   paradoxes	   and	   narrative	   strategies	   of	   avant-­‐garde	   surrealism	   to	  continue	  and	  advance	  debates	  on	  gender	  and	  sexuality.6	  
	  
Kanai’s	  Early	  Critique	  of	  Joseiron	  
Kanai’s	   scepticism	   towards	   the	   second-­‐wave	   feminist	   movement	   can	   be	  fruitfully	   situated	   alongside	   the	   avant-­‐garde’s	   dislike	   of	   oppositional	   and	  
                                            6	  It	  was	  originally	  Suga	  Hidemi	  who	  commented	   that	  Kanai	  was	   ‘unconnected	   to	   the	  school	   of	   feminism	   in	   every	   possible	   way’	   in	   Suga	   Hidemi,	   'Kanai	   Mieko,	   Hito	   to	  sakuhin',	   in	  Shōwa	  Bungaku	  Zenshū	  Vol.	  31	  (Tokyo:	  Shōgakukan,	  1988)	  pp.	  961-­‐64,	  p.	  961.	  However	  Takeuchi	  cites	  Suga	  in	  disputing	  claims	  that	  ‘Rabbits’	  is	  a	  feminist	  text	  in	  Takeuchi,	  'Kanai	  Mieko	  “Usagi”	  o	  meguru	  kuia	  –	  “shōjo”	  no	  monogatori	  kara	  “watashi”	  no	  monogatari	  e',	  p.	  163.	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antagonistic	  discourse	  such	  as	  that	  which	  typified	  the	  speeches	  and	  writings	  of	  the	  protest	  movements	  of	  the	  time.	  	  Her	  1970	  essay	  ‘Shinribunseki	  o	  kirau’	  (‘A	  Hatred	   of	   Psychoanalysis’)	   professes	   a	   disdain	   for	   ‘texts	   that	   commodify	  women’	   (onna	  o	  urimono	  ni	   suru	  bunshō),	   whether	   ‘women’s	   lib	   texts’	   (ūman	  
ribu	   no	   bunshō),	   or	   texts	   that	   effectively	   construe	   the	   writer	   to	   be	   a	  ‘psychoanalysed’	   or	   ‘confessional’	   subject	   (shinribunsekiteki,	   kokuhakuteki	  
bunshō),	   irrespective	   of	   whether	   they	   aim	   at	   ‘revolution’,	   or	   not	   (kakumei,	  
hankakumei	  o	  towazu).7	  	  The	  essay’s	   critique	  of	  women’s	  writing	   implies	   that	  Kanai	   holds	   subjectivity	   to	   be	   a	   construct	   of	   language;	   and	   that	   women,	   by	  writing	  texts	  that	  typically	  attempt	  to	  define	  the	  self	  (such	  as	  psychoanalytical	  and	   confessional	   texts)	   create	   an	   image	   of	   ‘woman’	   which	   affirms	   (even	   if	  unwittingly)	   the	   notion	   that	   the	   female	   identity	   is	   fixed	   and	   subordinated	  within	   an	   established	   set	   of	   hierarchical	   binary	   oppositions	   (such	   as	  men/women,	  author/reader).	  	  Kanai’s	  1972	  essay	  entitled	  ‘What	  is	  “a	  Woman”	  to	   a	  Woman?’’,	   reiterates	   this	   critique	  of	   the	  women’s	   lib	  movement	   in	   Japan	  and	  of	  other	  female	  writers.	  	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  former,	  Kanai	  asserts:	  
The	   biggest	   mistake	   brought	   forth	   by	   the	   concept	   of	   so-­‐called	  ‘equality	  of	  men	  and	  women’	  is	  that	  women	  have	  tended	  to	  think	  in	  terms	  which	  makes	  being	  the	  same	  as	  men,	  or	  rather	  being	  ‘equal’	  to	  men,	   the	   highest	   objective.	   	   There	   is	   no	  mistaking	   that	   such	   a	  way	   of	   conceiving,	   giving	   unlimited	   reverence	   to	   and	   placing	  unconditional	  value	  on	  being	  the	  same	  as	  men	  […]	  produces	  (lit.	  is:	  
sono	  mama)	  an	  underlying	  complex	  towards	  men.8	  	  The	   ‘underlying	   complex’	   to	   which	   Kanai	   refers	   here	   is	   women’s	   own	  prejudices	   against	   themselves,	   or	   against	   other	   women,	   which	   are	   then	   re-­‐
                                            7	  Kitada	   Sachie	   (1996)	   p.	   140.	   	   	   Kitada	   here	   cites	   from	   Kanai’s	   essay,	   which	   she	  references	  as:	  ‘Shinribunseki	  o	  kirau’	  [‘A	  Hatred	  of	  Psychoanalysis’]	  1970.	  	  8	  Kanai,	  'Onna	  ni	  totte	  onna	  to	  wa	  nani	  ka',	  p.	  82.	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presented	  as	  ‘striving	  for	  equality	  with	  men’.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  second-­‐wave	  feminist	   movement	   was,	   in	   Kanai’s	   view,	   setting	   itself	   up	   as	   a	   category	   that	  defined	   itself	   through	   competition	  with,	   and	   in	   adversity	   to,	   an	   ‘other’,	   and	   it	  thereby	  (re)produced	  a	  discourse	  that	  ultimately	  could	  only	  serve	  to	  maintain	  the	   very	   differences	   and	   inequalities	   that	   they	   wished	   to	   dismantle.	   	   Kanai’s	  attitude	   towards	   the	   women’s	   lib	   movement	   in	   Japan	   seems	   to	   echo	   the	  (contemporaneous)	   avant-­‐garde	   movement’s	   insight	   that	   the	   adoption	   of	   a	  political	   position	   which	   assumes	   the	   government’s	   violent	   repression	   leads	  inexorably	   to	   violent	   repression,	   just	   as,	   to	   use	   an	   instance	   from	   the	   times,	  students	  carrying	  staves	  during	  the	  Anpo	  protests	  served	  to	  justify	  authority’s	  use	  of	  force	  to	  implement	  law	  and	  order	  to	  end	  the	  university	  sit-­‐ins.9	  
However,	  Kanai’s	   rejection	  of	   joseiron	   did	  not	  mean	   that	   she	   sought	   to	  deny	  her	  identity	  as	  a	  woman.	  	  	  As	  she	  further	  notes,	  with	  regard	  to	  intellectuals	  and	  women	  writers	  of	  her	  time,	  
                                            9	  William	   Marotti,	   'Japan	   1968:	   The	   Performance	   of	   Violence	   and	   the	   Theater	   of	  Protest',	  American	  Historical	  Review,	   114	   (2009),	   pp.	  97-­‐135.	   	  Marotti	   argues	   that	  by	  carrying	   staves	   on	   campus,	   students	   played	   into	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   police	   who	   had	  wanted	   the	   students	   to	   be	   perceived	   as	   the	   instigators	   of	   violence	   and	   that	   further	  police	   tactics	  were	   to	   practice	   restraint	   in	   protests	   from	  October	   1968	   and	   that	   this	  again	  was	   broadcast	   through	   the	  media	   and	   helped	   to	   secure	   public	   support	   for	   the	  eventual	  suppression	  of	  the	  student	  protest	  movement.	  	  (See	  pp.	  128-­‐135).	  	  As	  Ridgely	  also	   notes	   on	   1960s	   avant-­‐garde	   ‘countercultural’	   resistance:	   ‘The	   term	  “counterculture”	   itself	   may	   be	   misleading	   […	   since	   the	   manoeuvres	   it	   makes	   are]	  better	   visualised	   as	   a	   90-­‐degree	   turn	   away	   from	   the	   square	   establishment	   than	   as	   a	  180-­‐degree	   reversal,	   which	   comes	   off	   as	   a	   reactionary	   inversion	   and	   is	   easily	  dismissed	   as	   a	   childlike	   rejection	   of	   adult	   society.	   	   	   […]	   It	   is,	   in	   fact,	   recognition	   of	  power’s	  need	   for	  opposition	   to	   justify	   its	  reign	   that	  may	  have	   led	   to	  counterculture’s	  refusal	   to	   become	   that	   sort	   of	   predictable,	   and	   welcomed,	   frontal	   attack.	   	   The	   90-­‐degree	  turn	  literally	  turns	  the	  tables,	  and	  the	  power	  center	  suddenly	  has	  to	  give	  chase,	  but	   by	   the	   time	   they	   find	   these	   pockets	   of	   counterculture	   (now	   scattered	   in	   every	  direction),	   it	   is	   counterculture	   that	   is	   in	   the	   position	   of	   defending	   its	   own	   territory	  against	   invasion,	   a	   useful	   boost	   for	   morale’.	   See	   Steven	   Ridgely,	   Japanese	  
Counterculture:	  The	  Antiestablishment	  Art	  of	  Terayama	  Shūji	   (Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  2010)	  pp.	  XIV-­‐XV.	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[i]t	   is	   said	   that	   from	   a	   man’s	   perspective	   the	   most	   vile	   shade	   of	  verbal	  abuse	  in	  which	  women	  partake	  is	  when	  women	  are	  spoken	  ill	   of,	   and	   the	   intelligent	   woman	   is	   delighted,	   and	   the	   more	   he	  criticises	  women,	   the	  more	   she	   agrees	   (while	  making	   a	   face	   that	  shows	  she	  has	  escaped	  all	  of	  women’s	  defects,	  and	  writing	  herself	  as	   the	   very	   model	   of	   an	   intelligent	   woman)	   –	   that	   it	   is	   true	   –	  women	   are	   hateful,	   which	   in	   turn	   allows	   him	   to	   succeed	   in	  impressing	  even	  more	  strongly	  how	  women	  are	  shallow,	  fickle,	  and	  selfish,	   lack	   self-­‐awareness	   […]	   and	   hold	   a	   despicable	   hatred	   of	  their	  own	  sex.	  	  The	  denial	  of	  what	  is	  said	  to	  constitute	  ‘woman’	  (or	  the	   various	   characteristics	   that	   it	   is	   said	   that	   men	   who	   are	  infatuated	  with	  women	  attribute	  to	  them)	  is	  the	  most	  indispensible	  passport	  that	  the	  intelligent	  woman	  possesses	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  being	  intelligent	  […].10	  	  Although	   Kanai’s	   comments	   here	   critique	   both	   men	   and	   women’s	   discourse	  around	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  woman,	  they	  seem	  to	  be	  specifically	  addressing	  a	  trend	  in	  women’s	  writing	  in	  which	  women	  writers	  seek	  to	  distance	  themselves	  from	   the	   category	   of	   ‘woman’.	   	   The	   intelligent	   woman’s	   construction	   of	   her	  identity	  (by	  disavowing	  what	   is	  said	   to	  constitute	   ‘woman’)	   is	  shown	  to	  be	  as	  counter-­‐effective	  as	   the	  women’s	   lib	  movement’s	  desire	   to	  be	  equal	   to,	  or	   the	  same	   as,	   men.	   	   In	   both	   instances,	   women	   are	   here	   subscribing	   to	   the	   same	  binary	   and	   hierarchical	   system	   of	   language,	   in	  which	  women	   are	   irrevocably	  defined	   in	  antithesis,	  and	  as	  subordinate,	   to	  men.	   	   In	  holding	  an	  awareness	  of	  language	   as	   a	   binary	   and	   hierarchical	   system	   of	   categorisation,	   Kanai	   seeks	  through	   her	   essays	   and	   her	   early	   short	   stories,	   to	   expose	   its	   inherent	  contradictions,	  to	  call	  the	  entire	  system	  into	  question,	  and	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  identity	   is	  a	   fiction	  forever	  susceptible	  to	  being	  constructed	  on	  an	  antithetical	  model.	  
                                            10	  Kanai,	  'Onna	  ni	  totte	  onna	  to	  wa	  nani	  ka',	  p.	  81	  .	  
 23 
Many	  of	  Kanai’s	   contemporaries	  by	   contrast,	   even	   those	   renowned	   for	  subverting	  gender	  norms	  in	  their	  fictional	  writings,	  such	  as	  Takahashi	  Takako,	  Tsushima	  Yūko,	  and	  Kurahashi	  Yumiko,	  were	  not	  as	  consistent	  or	  as	  thorough	  as	   Kanai	   in	   questioning	   the	   role	   of	   language	   in	   forming	   gendered	   identities.	  This	   is	   notable	   in	   their	   non-­‐fiction	   essays	   and	   round-­‐table	   discussions	  throughout	   the	   1960s	   and	   1970s.	   Second-­‐wave	   feminism	   had	   deployed	   a	  rhetoric	  which,	  despite	  depending	  on	  the	  very	  value-­‐systems	  that	  it	  ultimately	  wished	   to	   dismantle,	   nonetheless	   professed	   solidarity	   with	   other	   women	  through	   its	   cause.	   Women	   writers	   contemporaneous	   with	   Kanai’s	   literary	  debut,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  openly	  expounded	  their	  belief	  that	  females,	  because	  of	   the	   language	   that	   they	  used	   and	   the	   social	   function	   (rearing	   children)	   that	  they	   fulfilled,	   were	   not	   ‘intellectual’.	   Some	   women	   writers	   differentiated	  themselves	   from	   their	   own	   gender	   by	   stating	   that	   they	   were	   prone	   to	   using	  more	   ‘masculine’	   language,	   and	   claiming	   that	   they	   themselves	   were	   more	  intellectual	   than	   physical.	   Eventually,	   some	   took	   to	   aggrandising	   the	  ‘corporeality’	  of	  women,	  and	  by	  extension	  of	  women’s	  writing,	  in	  order	  to	  claim	  greater	   ‘authenticity’	   than	  male	  writers	  were	   capable	   of,	   in	   the	   inscription	   of	  the	   body,	   and	   thereby	   in	   their	   contributions	   to	   nikutaibungaku	   (carnal	  literature).11	  
                                            11	  	  During	  the	  occupation	  of	  Japan,	  censorship	  over	  depictions	  of	  the	  sexual	  body	  was	  lifted,	  and	  owing	  to	  this,	  many	  stories	  appeared,	  both	  populist	  and	  intellectual,	  which	  gave	  graphic	  depictions	  of	  the	  body.	  	  As	  we	  shall	  later	  discuss	  in	  further	  detail,	  writers	  such	   as	   Sakaguchi	   Ango	   (and	   others	   such	   as	   Noma	   Hiroshi	   and	   Tamura	   Tajirō),	  inscribed	  the	  body	  as	  an	  origin	  of	  the	  self	  as	  a	  means	  of	  critiquing	  the	  Japanese	  state.	  	  Douglas	   N.	   Slaymaker,	   The	   Body	   in	   Postwar	   Japanese	   Fiction	   (London:	   Routledge	  Curzon,	  2004)	  offers	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  postwar	  nikutaibungaku	  (‘carnal	  literature’	  or	  ‘literature	  of	  the	  flesh’).	  	  	  Many	   texts	   that	   discuss	   the	   differences	   between	   male	   and	   female	   writers	   were	  produced	  from	  the	  late	  1960s.	  	  Of	  these,	  this	  chapter	  examines	  two	  essays:	  Kurahashi	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Setting	  Kanai’s	  writings	  aside	  for	  the	  moment,	  we	  should	  look	  in	  greater	  detail	   into	   how	   other	   women	   writers	   were	   representing	   themselves	   and	  ‘woman’	  generally.	  	  Takahashi’s	  contributions	  to	  the	  debate,	  for	  example,	  are	  a	  prime	  illustration	  of	  how	  women	  writers	  trod	  a	  precarious	  path,	  attempting	  to	  infiltrate	   the	   ‘intellectual’	   arena	  which	  had	  previously	  been	   reserved	   for	  men	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  while	  asserting	  women’s	  (and	  their	  own)	  marginalisation	  as	  ‘carnal	   beings’	   on	   the	   other,	   thus	   ring-­‐fencing	   and	   elevating	   their	   own	  literature.	   	   In	   an	   essay	   entitled	   ‘Onnagirai’	   (‘Woman-­‐hating’,	   1975)	   she	   starts	  out	   by	   explaining	   how	   the	   Japanese	   word	   ‘onnakodomo’	   (the	   women	   and	  children)	  had	  always	  struck	  her	  as	  a	  curious	  one:	   ‘why’,	   she	  wonders,	   ‘should	  women	   and	   children	   be	   stuck	   together	   as	   one?’	   (naze,	   onna	   to	   kodomo	   ga	  
kuttsuketearu	   no	   darō).12	  	   Growing	   up	   with	   a	   particular	   curiosity	   towards	  words,	   she	   had	   imagined	   that	   this	   term	   held	   some	   special	   meaning;	   for	  example,	  an	  implication	  that	  all	  children	  were	  in	  some	  way	  feminine,	  or	  that	  it	  was	  a	  reference	  to	  ‘effeminate’	  (memeshī)	  children	  only.13	  	  However,	  her	  essay	  goes	   on	   to	   say	   that	   while	   she	   subsequently	   came	   to	   understand	   that	   such	   a	  category	  was	  created	  and	  spoken	  or	  written	  of	  by	  ‘men’,	  she	  nevertheless	  was	  able	   to	   comprehend	   this	   category	   as	   a	   coherent	   one,	   even	   though	   it	   was	   a	  
                                                                                                                           Yumiko,	   'Dokuyaku	   toshite	  no	  bungaku'	   [‘Poisionous	  Literature’]	   in	  Dokuyaku	  toshite	  
no	  bungaku	  (Tokyo:	  Kōdansha	  bungei	  bunko,	  1999)	  pp.	  68-­‐77	  (originally	  published	  in	  
Warera	   no	   bungaku	   [Our	   Literature]	   21	   (1966));	   and	   Takahashi	   Takako,	   'Onnagirai'	  [‘Woman	  Hating’]	  in	  Tamashi	  no	  inu	  (Tokyo:	  Kōdansha,	  1975)	  pp.	  229-­‐32;	  and	  a	  head-­‐to-­‐head	   discussion:	   Takahashi	   Takako	   and	   Tsushima	   Yūko	   'Onna	   no	   sei	   to	   otoko	   no	  me',	  Waseda	  bungaku,	   30	   (1978)	   4-­‐14;	   translated	   as	   'Female	   Sexuality	   and	   the	  Male	  Gaze:	   A	   Dialogue	   between	   Takahashi	   Takako	   and	   Tsushima	   Yūko',	   trans.	   Maryellen	  Tomon	  Mori	  in	  Woman	  Critiqued,	  ed.	  Rebecca	  Copeland	  (Hawai'i:	  University	  of	  Hawai'i	  Press,	  2006)	  pp.	  119-­‐34.	  12	  Takahashi,	  ‘Onnagirai’,	  p.	  229.	  	  13	  Ibid.,	  p.	  229.	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category	   she	   felt	   to	   be	   outside	   of	   herself	   and	   from	   which	   she	   felt	   a	   huge	  disassociation,	   a	   disassociation	   rooted	   in	   fear.14	  Takahashi	   attributes	   her	  alienation	   to	   this	   category	   to	   the	   ‘physiological	   […]	   corporeal	   language’	   of	  women	   which	   she	   purports	   to	   have	   discovered	   when	   writing	   a	   particular	  novel.15	  	  She	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  in	  this	  way	  that	  women’s	  language	  is	  approximate	  to	   the	   language	   of	   children,	   and	   that	   it	   is	   precisely	   this	   which	   renders	   it	  impossible	  for	  men	  to	  feel	  comfortable	  in	  all-­‐female	  environments,	  such	  as	  the	  hairdressers,	  or	  public	  baths,	  where	  intimate	  physical	  details	  are	  discussed	  as	  matter-­‐of-­‐fact.16	  	  Talking	  about	  the	  intent	  behind	  her	  novel	  that	  led	  her	  to	  the	  discovery,	  she	  asserts:	  
I	   wanted	   to	   go	   as	   far	   as	   to	   say	   that	   it	   is	   the	   carnal	   language	   of	  women	  which	  makes	   it	   impossible	   for	  men	   to	   be	  with	  women.	   	   I	  wanted	   to	   go	   as	   far	   as	   to	   say	   I	   could	   only	   think	   that	   men	   and	  women	   were	   like	   different	   races	   in	   their	   possession	   of	   different	  languages.17	  	  
Takahashi’s	  self-­‐professed	  project	  in	  writing	  in	  this	  essay	  thus	  appears	  to	  be	  to	  expose	  women’s	  linguistic	  configuration	  as	  a	  physiological,	  carnal,	  marginalised	  under-­‐class,	  and	  by	  extension,	  as	  intimately	  linked	  to	  their	  sociological	  function	  of	   producing	   and	   rearing	   the	   young.	   	   Takahashi’s	   writings’	   challenge	   to	   the	  validity	   of	   such	   categories	   in	   this	   instance	   is	   thus	   solely	   through	   her	   own	  
                                            14	  Ibid.,	  p.	  229-­‐32.	  15	  Ibid.,	  p.	  231.	  	  16	  Ibid.,	  p.	  230.	  17	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  230-­‐231	  .	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experience	   of	   dislocation,	   as	   an	   exception	   to	   those	   ‘women	   and	   children’.18	  	  Nonetheless,	  her	  essay	  describes	  her	  external	  position	  as	   ‘male’	  and	  therefore	  (unlike	  Kanai’s	  early	  essays	  that	  we	  have	  discussed	  above),	  does	  not	  seek,	  or	  is	  unable,	   to	   reframe	   her	   own	   subjectivity	   in	   a	   non-­‐binary	   dynamic,	   or	   even	  (unlike	   the	   second-­‐wave	  movement)	   to	   challenge	   the	  pejorative	   connotations	  of	   the	   carnality	   of	   women	   and	   children.	   	   Indeed,	   her	   essay	   concludes	   by	  declaring	   that	  her	  respect	  and	   longing	   for	   the	   ‘mental	   superiority’	   (seishinteki	  
yūi)	  and	  ‘independence’	  (dokujisei)	  of	  ‘men’	  will	  be	  with	  her	  for	  life.	  19	  
Conversely	   however,	   three	   years	   later,	   Takahashi	   would	   be	   aided	   by	  Tsushima	   in	  a	  head-­‐to-­‐head	  discussion	   ‘Onna	  no	  sei	   to	  otoko	  no	  me’	   (‘Female	  Sexuality	   and	   the	   Male	   Gaze’,	   1978)	   in	   inverting	   the	   hierarchy	   that	   she	   had	  formerly	   established	   in	   her	   essay.20	  	   In	   this	   discussion,	   while	   women	   are	  consistently	   aligned	  with	   the	   physiological,	   and	  men	   are	   consistently	   aligned	  with	  the	   intellectual,	  women’s	  superiority	  over	  men	   is	   installed	  by	  attributing	  positive	   value	   to	  women’s	   putative	   ‘passive’	   and	   ‘physiological’	   nature,	  while	  men’s	   ‘ideological’	   stance	   is	   presented	   as	   somehow	   lacking,	   as	   the	   following	  excerpt	  illustrates:	  
Tsushima:	  [w]hen	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  mundane	  aspects	  of	  caring	  for	  a	  dying	   person,	   the	   people	   who	   nurse	   the	   sick	   in	   hospitals	   are	  women,	   and	   those	   who	   make	   funeral	   arrangements	   are	   women.	  	  
                                            18	  Without	   seeking	   a	   psychobiographical	   explanation,	   we	   might	   also	   note	   that	   her	  writings	   display,	   at	   the	   very	   least,	   a	   distaste	   for	   motherhood;	   and	   infanticide,	   both	  fantasised	  and	  enacted,	  is	  the	  theme	  of	  Takahashi’s	  works	  throughout	  the	  1970s.	  	  See,	  for	   instance:	   'Byōbō'	   [‘Endless	   Expanse’]	   in	   Kanata	   no	   mizuoto	   (Tokyo:	   Kōdansha,	  1971)	  pp.	  113-­‐64;	  Sora	  no	  hate	  made	  [To	  the	  End	  of	  the	  Sky](Tokyo:	  Shinchōsha,	  1973);	  and	  'Ningyō	  ai'	  [‘Doll	  Love’]	  in	  Ningyō	  ai	  (Tokyo:	  Kōdansha,	  1978).	  19	  Takahashi,	  ‘Onnagirai’,	  p.	  231-­‐32.	  20	  Takahashi	   Takako	   and	   Tsushima	   Yūko	   'Onna	   no	   sei	   to	   otoko	   no	   me',	   Waseda	  
bungaku,	  30	  (1978),	  4-­‐14.	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It’s	  usually	  women	  who	  handle	  the	  physical	  tasks	  related	  to	  those	  occasions.	  	  Because	  of	  that,	  women	  don’t	  think	  about	  either	  life	  or	  death	   separately,	   in	   a	   linear	   fashion.	   	   We	   think	   of	   them	   as	   a	  circuitous,	  amorphous	  whole.	   	  A	  woman	  seems	   to	  view	  the	  world	  as	  a	  system	  that	  she’s	  powerless	  to	  influence,	  and	  she	  instinctively	  adapts	  herself	  to	  that.	  	  
Takahashi:	   That’s	   right.	   	   Female	   physiology	   is	   embedded	   in	   that	  universal	   physiology	   that	   encompasses	   life	   and	   death.	   	   So	   in	   a	  sense,	  women	  don’t	   think	  of	   life	  and	  death	  as	   separate	   from	  each	  other.	   	   Men	   tend	   to	   think	   of	   life	   and	   death	   in	   a	   conceptual	   way.	  	  They	   consider	   them	   in	   the	   context	   of	   an	   ideological	   system.	   	   But	  women’s	   physiology	   is	   deeply	   enmeshed	   in	   those.	   	   That’s	   a	  difference.	  	  Tsushima-­‐san,	  you’re	  regarded	  as	  an	  intellectual	  writer	  and	   so	   am	   I.	   	   Even	   so,	  when	   I	   think	   and	  when	   I	  write,	  my	  whole	  body	   is	   involved	   in	   those	  processes.	   	   I	   think	  this	   is	   fundamentally	  different	  from	  a	  male	  writer’s	  approach.21	  	  Their	  mode	  of	  discussion	  in	  this	  debate	  was	  to	  mark	  something	  of	  a	  precedent	  for	   women	   writers	   and	   intellectuals	   in	   critiquing	   and	   analysing	   the	   literary	  tastes	   and	   standards	   of	   esteemed	   male	   writers,	   including	   those	   writers’	  depiction	  of	  women	  in	  literature.	  	  Just	  over	  a	  decade	  later,	  in	  1989,	  a	  number	  of	  such	   discussions	   between	   Ōgura	   Chikako,	   Ueno	   Chizuko	   and	   Tomioka	   Taeko	  began,	   eventually	   culminating	   in	   a	   larger	   publication	   entitled	   Danryū	  
bungakuron	   (On	   Men’s	   Literature,	   1992)	   which	   mocked	   established	   male	  writers	   such	   as	  Mishima	   Yukio,	   Tanizaki	   Jun’ichiro	   and	  Murakami	  Haruki	   for	  their	  depiction	  of	  sex,	  sexuality	  and	  gender.22	  	  Kanai,	  as	  we	  have	  already	  noted,	  in	   turn	   counter-­‐critiqued	   such	  work	   in	   various	   early-­‐career	   essays,	   and	   later	  became	   infamous	   for	   distancing	   herself	   from	   ‘feminist’	   readings	   of	   literature	  
                                            21	  'Female	   Sexuality	   and	   the	  Male	   Gaze:	   A	  Dialogue	   between	   Takahashi	   Takako	   and	  Tsushima	  Yūko'	  (trans.	  Maryellen	  Tomon	  Mori)	  p.	  125.	  22	  Ogura	  Chikako,	  Tomioka	  Taeko,	  and	  Ueno	  Chizuko,	  Danryū	  bungakuron	  [Male-­‐stream	  
Literature]	  (Tokyo:	  Chikuma	  shobō,	  1992),	  selections	  from	  chapter	  3	  also	  translated	  as	  ‘On	   Men’s	   Literature:	   Ueno	   Chizuko,	   Ogura	   Chikako	   and	   Tomioka	   Taeko’	   trans.	  Maryellen	  Tomon	  Mori	  in	  Woman	  Critiqued,	  ed.	  Rebecca	  Copeland	  (Hawai'i:	  University	  of	  Hawai'i	  Press,	  2006)	  pp.	  210-­‐234.	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and	  for	  producing	  her	  own	  monograph	  in	  1984,	  which	  again	  critiqued	  joseiron,	  with	  the	  title	  Obasan	  no	  disukūru	  (The	  Discourse	  of	  Ladies).23	  
Takahashi	  and	  Tsushima’s	  intent,	  however,	  was	  not	  explicitly	  to	  belittle	  male	  writers,	  as	  was	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  feminist-­‐led	  discussions	  by	  Ueno	  et	  al;	  they	  commence	  by	  discussing	  male	  writers	  who	  skilfully	  portray	  women	  (albeit	  as	  an	   ‘object’	   not	   subject),	   and	   continue	   by	   talking	   about	   their	   own	   works,	  including	   Takahashi’s	   1976	   work	   Yūwakusha	   (The	   Seducer)	   and	   Tsushima’s	  1978	  work	  Chōji	  (Child	  of	  Fortune)	  and	  the	  themes	  and	  ideas	  that	  their	  female	  peers	  such	  as	  Ōba	  Minako	  and	  Saegusa	  Kazuko	  pursue	  relating	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  women’s	  identity.	  It	  is	  notable	  that	  Takahashi	  here	  performs	  a	  complete	  volte	  
face	   and	  either	   agrees	  with	  Tsushima,	  or	  herself	   asserts	   the	   following	  points:	  that	   having	   no	   individuality	   gives	   a	   woman	   ultimate	   strength,	   even	  ‘independence’;	   that	   the	   impulse	   behind	   obedience	   to	   a	   higher	   power	   is	  effectively	  a	   ‘physiological’	  drive	  and	  one	  which	  is	  familiar	  to	  all	  women	  (and,	  this	   time,	  she	   includes	  herself	   in	  such	  a	  category);	   that	   the	   female	  body	   is	   the	  source	   of	   the	   female	   intellect;	   and	   that	   women’s	   writing,	   whether	   starkly	  intellectual	   or	   more	   aligned	   with	   the	   postwar	   carnal	   literature	   movement,	  emanates	  from	  their	  whole	  bodies.24	  	  Through	  their	  discussion,	  they	  create	  an	  image	  of	  ‘woman’	  as	  stronger,	  more	  independent,	  and	  more	  deeply	  or	  internally	  connected	   to	   an	   intellect	  which	   has	   roots	  within	   their	   physiology	   than	   ‘man’.	  	  By	  prioritising	   the	  body	  over	   the	  mind,	  and	  moreover	   imbuing	   the	  body	  with	  
                                            23	  Kanai,	  M.	  Obasan	  no	  disukūru	  (Tokyo:	  Chikuma	  shobō,	  1984).	  24	  Takahashi	  and	  Tsushima	  'Onna	  no	  sei	  to	  otoko	  no	  me',	  p.	  8.	  Takahashi	  here	  argues:	  ‘Chiteki	  ni	  hyōgen	  shiteiru	  baai	  ni	  mo,	  chiteki	  na	  mono	  ni	  nikutaiteki	  ni	  kakawatteiru’	  (‘Even	  when	   I’m	   expressing	  myself	   intellectually,	   there’s	   a	   corporeal	   element	   in	  my	  intellectual	   formulations’)	   (trans.	  Maryellen	   Tomon	  Mori)	   'Female	   Sexuality	   and	   the	  Male	  Gaze:	  A	  Dialogue	  between	  Takahashi	  Takako	  and	  Tsushima	  Yūko',	  p.125.	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‘intellectual’	   sensibilities,	   Takahashi	   and	   Tsushima	   usurp	   the	   usual	   modern	  hierarchical	   relationship	  of	  men	  and	  women,	  and	  of	  male	  and	   female	  writers.	  	  Moreover,	   by	   entering	   the	   ring	   of	   sharp,	   prosaic	   ‘masculine’	   discourse	   and	  muddying	   the	   distinctions	   between	   mind	   and	   body,	   they	   lay	   claim	   to	   a	  subversive	   ‘intellectual’	   territory	   (the	   female	   body)	  which	   excludes	  men,	   and	  thus	  they	  extend	  the	  boundaries	  of	  what	  ‘being	  a	  woman’,	  and	  moreover,	  ‘being	  a	  woman	  writer’,	  signifies.	  
Reconfiguring	   ‘woman’	  as	  a	  hybrid	  of	  previously	   conceived	   ‘masculine’	  and	   ‘feminine’	   attributes	   is	   something	   which	   Kurahashi	   also	   manages	   in	   her	  essay	   ‘Dokuyaku	   toshite	  no	  bungaku’	   (‘Poisonous	  Literature’,	  1975).25	  	  While	  maintaining	   a	   tongue-­‐in-­‐cheek	   tone	   throughout,	   which	   pokes	   fun	   at	   the	  stereotyping	  of	  both	  sexes	  and	  ages,	  she	  writes:	  
In	   my	   twenties	   I	   had	   to	   write	   fiction	   as	   a	   hermaphrodite,	  somewhere	   between	   the	   ‘girl’	   and	   ‘young	  man’,	   and	   perform	   the	  role	  of	  a	  ‘young	  witch.’	   	  My	  fiction	  is	  therefore	  a	  cooperative	  work	  of	   this	   ‘girl’	   and	   this	   ‘young	   man.’	   	   However,	   one	   cannot	   be	   an	  authentic	   ‘girl’	   after	   one	   turns	   twenty.	   	   Furthermore,	   the	   ‘young	  man’	   is	   also	   the	   Other	   in	  myself,	   as	   I	   am	   not	  male.	   	   I	   have	   been	  growing	  the	  Other	  inside	  myself	  while	  writing	  fiction.	  	  The	  secret	  of	  my	  literature	  is,	  psychoanalytically	  speaking,	  the	  desire	  to	  become	  masculine.	  26	  	  Kurahashi’s	   words,	   like	   Takahashi	   and	   Tsushima’s	   discussion,	   insist	   on	   the	  blurring	  of	  genders	  (and	  in	  Kurahashi’s	  case,	  ages)	  within	  subjectivities,	  and	  to	  this	  extent	  mount	  a	  challenge	  to	  gender	  essentialism.	  	  However,	  as	  all	  of	  these	  
                                            25	  Kurahashi	   Yumiko,	   'Dokuyaku	   toshite	   no	   bungaku'	   [‘Poisonous	   Literature’]	   in	  
Dokuyaku	  toshite	  no	  bungaku	  (Tokyo:	  Kōdansha	  bungei	  bunko,	  1975)	  pp.	  68-­‐77.	  	  26	  Ibid.,	   pp.	   68-­‐69.	   	   The	   translation	   of	   this	   particular	   citation	   is	   taken	   from	   Sakaki	  Atsuko,	   'Kurahashi	  Yumiko's	  Negotiations	  with	   the	  Fathers'	   (trans.	  Sakaki	  Atsuko)	   in	  
The	   Father-­‐Daughter	   Plot:	   Japanese	   Literary	   Women	   and	   the	   Law	   of	   the	   Father,	   ed.	  Rebecca	   L.	   Copeland	   and	   Esperanza	   Ramirez-­‐Christensen	   (Honolulu:	   University	   of	  Hawai'i	  Press,	  2001)	  pp.	  302-­‐303.	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writers	   set	   out	   to	   delineate	   new	   terms	   for	   what	   ‘being	   a	   woman	   (writer)’	  signifies,	  they	  inevitably	  hold	  onto	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  two	  genders,	  even	  if	  the	  two	  have	  become	  greatly	  complicated	  as	  categories.	  	  While	  Takahashi	  and	  Tsushima	   conclude	   that	   whether	   linguistically,	   sociologically	   or	   physically	  rooted,	   the	   differences	   between	   men	   and	   women	   are	   ‘irreconcilable’	  (dōshiyōmonai),	   both	   Kurahashi	   and	   Takahashi	   in	   their	   respective	   essays	  reiterate	   that	   they	   themselves	   sought	   in	   some	   way	   to	   emulate	   men,	   or	  internalise	  and	  demonstrate	  an	  objectivity	  towards	  ‘femaleness’.27	  	  The	  1960s	  and	   1970s	   thus	   heralded	   the	   rise	   of	   women’s	   writing	   in	   Japan,	   and	   yet	   in	  attempting	   to	  define	   themselves	  and	   their	  purpose	   in	  writing,	   this	  movement	  arguably	   compounded	   notions	   of	   difference,	   and	   even	   at	   times	   reinstated	   a	  patriarchal	   hierarchy	   of	   terms	  wherein	   being	   ‘masculine’	   not	   only	   equates	   to	  being	  possessed	  of	  ‘intellectual’	  qualities,	  but	  also	  of	  an	  alleged	  ‘superiority’.	  
Returning	   to	   Kanai,	   we	   can	   see	   that,	   in	   her	   comments	   about	   second-­‐wave	   feminism	   and	   women’s	   writing,	   for	   example,	   she	   interrogates	   the	  framework	  underpinning	   the	  question	  of	  what	   ‘being	   a	  woman’	   signifies,	   and	  views	  the	  making	  of	  clear-­‐cut	  distinctions	  between	  the	  genders	  with	  suspicion,	  even	  (perhaps	  particularly)	  if	  those	  distinctions	  are	  made	  by	  women.	  	  In	  ‘What	  Are	  Women	  to	  a	  Woman’,	  Kanai	  expresses	  her	  dislike	  of	  attempts	  to	  distinguish	  between	  male	   and	   female	  ways	  of	  writing	   about	  women	  and	   starts	   by	   taking	  Simone	   de	   Beauvoir	   to	   task	   for	   what	   Kanai	   perceives	   to	   be	   the	   former’s	  pragmatic	   literary	   analysis	   of	   male	   writers	   that	   sought	   to	   expose	   gender	  
                                            27	  See	   Takahashi	   and	   Tsushima,	   'Onna	   no	   sei	   to	   otoko	   no	   me',	   p.	   14;	   Kurahashi,	  'Dokuyaku	  toshite	  no	  bungaku'	  p.	  69.	  (‘Danseika	  no	  ganbo,	  kore	  ga	  seishin	  bunsekiteki	  ni	   mita	   watashi	   no	   bungaku	   no	   himitsu	   nano	   desu’	   ‘The	   secret	   of	   my	   literature	   is,	  psychoanalytically	   speaking,	   the	   desire	   to	   become	   masculine’);	   and	   Takahashi,	  ‘Onnagirai’,	  pp.	  231-­‐232.	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inequality.28	  	   Kanai	   argues	   that	   Beauvoir’s	   analysis	   seeks	   to	   condemn	  works	  from	   writers	   as	   diverse	   as	   Paul	   Claudel	   and	   André	   Breton	   over	   a	   single	  ‘moralistic’	   point:	   that	   they	   depict	   women	   ‘poetically’	   (as	   objects)	   and	   not	  ‘realistically’	  in	  their	  works.29	  	  Kanai	  outlines	  how	  for	  her,	  Beauvoir’s	  dislike	  of	  Breton’s	  work	  Nadia	  appears	  to	  rest	  solely	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  Nadia	  is	  a	  woman,	  and	  that	  Beauvoir	  (or	  other	  female	  readers)	  are	  clearly	  women,	  yet	  the	  writer	  is	  a	   man	   who	   does	   not	   understand	   Nadia	   as	   Nadia	   would	   understand	   herself;	  Kanai	  notes	   it	   ‘could	  almost	  be	  thought	  that	  [Beauvoir’s]	  dissatisfaction	  arises	  from	   the	   fact	   that	   Nadia	   herself	   isn’t	   the	   author’	   (Najia	   jishin	   ga	   sakka	  denai	  
koto	  ga,	  maru	  de	  fuman	  de	  aru	  ka	  no	  yō	  ni	  omowareru).30	  
This	  claim,	  which	  Kanai	  asserts	  Beauvoir	  makes,	  and	  which	  as	  we	  have	  noted	   above,	   both	   Takahashi	   and	   Tsushima	   make	   in	   their	   head-­‐to-­‐head	  discussion,	  that	  there	  is	  a	  women’s	  writing	  that,	  because	  of	  its	  authenticity,	  can	  
realistically	   represent	  women’s	  experience,	   is	  a	  claim	  which	  reduces	  women’s	  representation	  to	  the	   literal,	   to	  the	  physical,	  and	  here,	  to	  the	  autobiographical.	  	  It	  is	  precisely	  this	  which	  irritates	  Kanai	  because,	  one	  might	  argue,	  she	  views	  all	  written	   identities	   as	   verbal	   fabrications,	   as	   fictions.	   	   Her	  writings	   see	   gender	  essentialism	  as	  frustrating,	  even	  ridiculous,	  in	  its	  inability	  to	  appreciate	  ‘fiction’	  or	   indeed	   utilise	   it	   as	   a	   creative	   space	   for	   the	   expansion	   and	   exploration	   of	  meaning	  and	  identity.	  	  Her	  1972	  essay	  continues:	  
                                            28	  See	  the	  section	  ‘Bōbowāru	  e	  no	  gimon’	  (‘Questions	  for	  Beauvoir’)	  in	  Kanai,	  'Onna	  ni	  totte	  onna	  to	  wa	  nani	  ka',	  pp.	  68-­‐73.	  	  29	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  69-­‐73.	  30	  Ibid.,	  p.	  72.	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When	   it	   is	   said	   that	   it	   is	   important	   that	   I,	   as	   a	   ‘woman’,	   should	  speak	   my	   experience	   while	   another	   ‘woman’	   listens,	   this	   is	  probably	  because	  it	  is	  thought	  that	  by	  probing	  into	  this	  together	  as	  women,	   the	   problems	   that	   are	   presented	   by	   being	   a	   ‘woman’	  become	  clear,	  whereas	  for	  men,	  behaviour	  such	  as	  probing	  into	  and	  narrating	   the	   experiences	   of	   the	   self	   is	   at	   once	   considered	   to	   be	  that	   of	   a	   novelist.	   	   Although	  male	   novelists	   who	  write	   about	   the	  experience	  of	  the	  self	  are	  not	  at	  all	  interesting,	  it	  is	  rather	  that	  the	  point	  of	  their	  writing	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  investigating	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  what	   it	   means	   to	   be	   a	   ‘man’.	   	   Why	   is	   it	   that	   only	   women	   must	  continue	   to	  write	   about	  being	   a	   ‘woman’?	   	   	   Is	   it	   perhaps	  because	  they	  have	  nothing	  better	  to	  write	  about?31	  	  Kanai	   thus	   argues	   that	   those	   female	   narratives	   which	   explore	   personal	  experience	   (which	  here	   include	  both	  women	  sitting	  down	   in	  a	   round-­‐table	  or	  head-­‐to-­‐head	   discussion,	   or	   narrating	   experiences	   in	   a	   realistic,	   confessional	  literary	  form,	  such	  as	  the	  shishōsetsu	  (‘I	  novel’))	  always	  create	  a	  dichotomy	  by	  defining	   the	   ‘self’	   against	   ‘other’	   and	   therefore	   fall	   back	   on	   conventional	  patterns	  of	  expression.	  	  Moreover,	  whereas	  male	  writers	  are	  at	  least	  afforded	  a	  certain	  breadth	  of	  definition	  when	  discussing	  their	  individual	  identity	  against	  a	  plurality	  of	  other	  individuals	  and	  influences,	   in	  women’s	  writing,	  this	  range	  of	  describing	   the	   ‘self’	   is	   invariably	   limited	   to	   the	   task	   of	   picking	   out	   the	  differences	   between	   two	   gendered	   categories.	   	   Kanai’s	   radical	   rejection	   and	  subversion	  of	   the	   system	  of	  modern	  dualistic	   signification	   in	  her	  early	   career	  correlate	  first	  to	  her	  identification	  of	  women’s	  discussions	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	   a	   woman,	   and	   of	   realistic	   and	   confessional	   modes	   of	   fiction,	   as	   both	  operating	   within	   such	   a	   system,	   and	   second	   to	   her	   perception	   of	   women’s	  writing	   as	   being	   even	   more	   reductive	   in	   inscribing	   the	   female	   self,	   than	   the	  conventional	  tropes	  and	  narrative	  clichés	  deployed	  by	  male	  writers.	  
                                            31	  Ibid.,	  p.	  73.	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Kanai’s	  Literary	  Critique	  of	  Gender	  Categories	  
A	   decade	   after	   Kanai’s	   comments	   above,	   Karatani	   Kōjin	   identified	   the	  confessional	  mode	  as	  an	  origin	  of	  modern	  Japanese	   literature	   in	  his	   landmark	  work,	   Nihon	   kindai	   bungaku	   no	   kigen	   	   (Origins	   of	   Modern	   Japanese	  
Literature). 32 	  	   Karatani	   develops	   a	   post-­‐structuralist	   reading	   of	   modern	  Japanese	   literature	   by	   asserting	   that	   the	   creation	   of	   modern	   subjectivity	   in	  Japan	   was	   constituted	   in	   language,	   and	   concomitant	   with	   a	   new	   mode	   of	  writing	   called	   genbun	   itchi	   (the	   unification	   of	   speech	   and	   writing)	   in	   late	  nineteenth-­‐century	   Japan.33	  	   By	   mimicking	   the	   voice,	   genbun	   itchi	   in	   turn	  facilitated	   the	  concept	  of	  an	   ‘interior	   self’	   (or	   inner	  voice).	  However,	  Karatani	  claims	   that	   the	   aim	   of	   genbun	   itchi	   was	   not	   to	   ‘[bring]	   “writing”	   (bun)	   into	  conformity	  with	   “speech”	   (gen),	   or	   speech	   into	   conformity	  with	  writing,	   as	   is	  usually	   maintained.	   Rather,	   Genbun	   itchi	   represented	   the	   invention	   of	   a	   new	  conception	  of	  writing	  as	  equivalent	  with	  speech.’34	  	  Moreover,	  as	  the	  mode	  of	  confession	   in	   literature	   necessarily	   entails	   the	   exploration	   of	   a	   set	   of	  supposedly	  hidden,	  private	  or	  repressed	  thoughts	  and	  feelings	  that	  are	  at	  odds	  with	  a	  person’s	  external	  countenance,	   it	   thus	  became	  a	  vehicle	   for	  expressing	  the	  writer’s	  ‘interiority’	  and	  was	  fundamental	  for	  the	  fabrication	  of	  the	  modern	  subject	  in	  Japan.35	  
                                            32	  Karatani	  Kōjin	  Nihon	  Kindai	  Bungaku	  No	  Kigen	  (Tokyo:	  Kodansha,	  1980)	  translated	  as	  Origins	  of	  Modern	   Japanese	  Literature.	   trans.	   Brett	   de	   Bary	   (Durham	   and	   London:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  1993).	  33	  Karatani,	  Origins	  of	  Modern	  Japanese	  Literature	  (See	  Ch.	  2,	  pp.	  11-­‐75	  in	  particular.)	  34	  Ibid.,	  p.	  39.	  35	  Ibid.	  (see:	  Ch.	  3,	  pp.	  76-­‐96	  in	  particular.)	  	  
 34 
Feminist	   critic	   Kano	   Ayako	   has	   since	   refuted	   the	   importance	   of	  ‘interiority’	  for	  women’s	  fiction.36	  	  Kano	  argues	  that,	  as	  Karatani’s	  exploration	  of	  modern	  Japanese	  literature	  excludes	  female	  writers	  and	  fictional	  characters,	  the	   concept	   of	   ‘interiority’	   is	   necessarily	   ‘ungendered,	   but/and/therefore	  assumed	   to	   be	  male’	   and	   that	   Karatani	   ‘avoids	   the	   question	   of	   how	   language	  and	   writing	   might	   construct	   subjectivity	   differently	   for	   women’.37	  	   Kano’s	  thesis	  that	  women	  express,	  through	  literature,	  a	  different	  (modern)	  subjectivity	  to	  men,	  refers	  back	  to	  the	  same	  period	  of	  the	  early	  modernising	  and	  militarising	  Japanese	   state	   as	  Karatani,	  which	   she	   too	   considers	   fundamental	   for	   cultural,	  social	   and	   linguistic	   configurations.	   	   She	  writes	   that	   ‘the	  modern	  nation-­‐state	  produced	   the	   category	   of	   “woman”	   as	   quite	   separate	   from	   that	   of	   “man	   =	  human”’	  and	  points	  out	  that	  the	  two	  sexes	  were	  segregated,	  that	  women	  were	  subordinated	  to	  men	  and	  trained	  to	  be	  ‘good	  wives,	  wise	  mothers’,	  and	  used	  a	  different	   linguistic	  register	   to	  men,	  which	  defined	  their	   identity.38	  	  Kano	  thus	  suggests,	  as	  Takahashi	  also	  argues	  in	  ‘Woman-­‐hating’,	  that	  this	  female	  register	  was,	  and	  continued	  to	  be,	  the	  locus	  of	  their	  (collective)	  identity	  and	  the	  cause	  of	  their	  subordination.39	  
                                            36	  Kano	  Ayako,	   'Toward	  a	  Critique	  of	  Transhistorical	  Feminity',	   in	  Gendering	  Modern	  
Japanese	  History,	  ed.	  Barbara	  Molony	  and	  Kathleen	  Uno	  (Harvard:	  Harvard	  University	  Asia	  Center,	  2005)	  pp.	  520-­‐54.	  	  37	  Ibid.	  pp.	  525-­‐526.	  38	  Ibid.,	  p.526.	  39	  Tomioka	  Taeko,	  a	  famous	  woman	  writer	  and	  feminist	  commentator,	  also	  published	  an	  article	  in	  her	  serialised	  column	  in	  Fujin	  kōron	  (Woman’s	  Forum)	  which	  discusses	  the	  differences	   between	   ‘men’s	   language’	   and	   ‘women’s	   language’.	   	   See	   Taeko	   Tomioka,	  '“Onna	  no	  kotoba”	  to	  “kuni	  no	  kotoba”',	  Fujin	  kōron,	  7	  (1983),	  470-­‐79;	  also	  translated	  as	   ‘Woman’s	   Language	   and	   the	   National	   Language:	   Tomioka	   Taeko’	   trans.	   Joan	   E.	  Ericson	   and	   Yoshiko	   Nagaoka	   in	  Woman	   Critiqued,	   ed.	   Rebecca	   Copeland	   (Hawai'i:	  University	  of	  Hawai'i	  Press,	  2006)	  pp.	  119-­‐34.	  In	  this	  article	  Tomioka	  points	  out	  that,	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And	  yet,	   if	   it	   is	   specifically	  women’s	   register	  which	   is	   to	  be	  considered	  the	  key	  determining	   factor	  of	  women’s	  subordination	  and	  therefore	  their	   lack	  of	  interiority,	  then	  surely	  the	  shift	  effected	  by	  the	  likes	  of	  Takahashi,	  Tsushima	  and	  Kurahashi	   into	   ‘masculine’	   intellectual	  discourse,	   their	   appropriation	   and	  use	  of	  what	   they	   themselves	   term	  as	   ‘masculine’	   forms	  of	   language,	  and	   their	  concomitant	  representations	  of	  ‘bad	  wives	  and	  worse	  mothers’	  constituted	  not	  only	   their	  subversion	  of	   the	  patriarchal	  hierarchy	  but	  also	   the	  materialisation	  of	   their	  own	  (individual)	   interiority.40	  	   Indeed,	  Kurahashi’s	  assertion	  that	  she	  had	   ‘been	   growing	   the	   Other	   inside	   [herself]	   while	   writing	   fiction’,	   and	  Takahashi	   and	   Tsushima’s	   comments	   that	   their	   writing	   emanated	   from	   their	  entire	   bodies,	   all	   indicate	   that	   they	   conceived	   the	   origin	   of	   their	   writing	   as	  arising	   internally,	   and	   therefore	   as	   the	   manifestation	   of	   psychic	   ‘interiority’.	  	  However,	  Kano	  does	  not	  touch	  upon	  this	  movement	  in	  women’s	  literature,	  and	  her	   argument,	   by	   fixing	   on	   a	   single	   point	   in	   time	   and	   by	   not	   addressing	  subsequent	  evolutions	  of	  that	  language	  and	  subjectivity	  into	  the	  late	  twentieth	  century,	  is	  necessarily	  limited	  in	  scope	  in	  its	  concept	  of	  women’s	  literature,	  and	  essentialist	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   it	   identifies	   an	   unchanging	   linguistic	   origin	   for	  women’s	  identity.	  
                                                                                                                           whereas	   the	   former	   is	   used	   in	   formal	   situtations	   such	   as	   news	  broadcasts	   and	  post-­‐primary	   education,	   the	   latter	   encompasses	   regional	   dialect,	   and	   pertains	   to	   the	  individual’s	   mother-­‐tongue	   and	   advocates	   that,	   rather	   than	   attempting	   to	   master	  masculine	   language,	  women	   and	   speakers	   from	   regions	  with	   a	   strong	   dialect	   should	  form	  a	  kind	  of	  Esperanto,	  which	  can	  skilfully	  bridge	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  two.	  	  40	  The	   introduction	   to	   Julia	   Bullock,	   The	   Other	   Women's	   Lib:	   Gender	   and	   Body	   in	  
Japanese	  Women's	  Fiction	   (Hawai'i:	  University	  of	  Hawai’i	  Press,	  2009)	  is	  entitled	   ‘Bad	  Wives	  and	  Worse	  Mothers?	  Rewriting	  Femininity	  in	  Postwar	  Japan’.	  	  Bullock’s	  thesis	  is	  that	  by	  creating	  protagonists	  who	  were	  ‘bad	  wives	  and	  worse	  mothers’	  at	  a	  time	  when	  ‘Japanese	   society	  was	   experiencing	   a	   resurgence	   of	   the	   prewar	   “good	  wife	   and	  wise	  mother”	   ideology’,	   women	   writers	   (Bullock	   examines	   the	   works	   of	   Kono	   Taeko,	  Takahashi	   and	   Kurahashi)	   resisted	   normative	   gender	   roles,	   pre-­‐empting,	   through	  literature,	  the	  Japanese	  women’s	  liberation	  movement	  of	  the	  1970s.	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Surely	  the	  crux	  of	   the	  matter	   is	   that	   it	   is	  not	   the	  women’s	  register	  that	  confines	   the	   woman	   when	   writing	   to	   a	   collective	   and	   subordinated	   identity;	  but,	  rather,	  as	  Kanai	  points	  out,	  it	  is	  the	  decision	  to	  speak	  and	  write	  collectively,	  in	   a	   representationalist	   idiom,	   which	   reifies	   the	   category	   of	   ‘woman’,	   and	  defines	  her	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  category	  of	  ‘man’.	  	  Most	  women	  writers	  around	  the	  time	  of	  Kanai’s	  debut,	  even	  those	  who	  held	  an	  awareness	  of	   ‘woman’	  as	  a	  constructed	  linguistic	  category,	  and	  who	  deployed	  elements	  of	  the	  fantastic	  and	  the	  surreal	  in	  their	  works	  such	  as	  Kurahashi,	  Takahashi	  and	  Tsushima,	  were,	  as	  we	   have	   been	   examining,	   involved	   in	   such	   projects	   through	   their	   essays	   and	  head-­‐to	  head	  discussions;	  certainly,	  Kanai’s	  choice	  to	  refuse	  to	  engage	  in	  such	  endeavours,	   to	  reject	   the	  techniques	  and	  assumptions	  of	  realist	   fiction,	  and	  to	  resist	   being	   subsumed	   by	   any	   autobiographical	   (or	   pseudo-­‐autobiographical)	  account	   of	   herself	   sets	   her	   apart	   from	   her	   contemporaries.41	  	   Nevertheless,	  making	   this	   choice	  provided	  her	  with	   the	  opportunity	   to	  critique,	   rather	   than	  join	   in	  with	   the	   construction	  of	   the	  written	   feminine	   through	  her	   essays,	   and	  deconstruct,	  rather	  than	  reify,	  gender	  categories	  through	  her	  fiction.	  
But	  it	  is	  not	  just	  the	  decision	  to	  avoid	  certain	  representationalist	  modes	  of	  writing	  which	  distinguishes	  Kanai’s	  early	  writings.	  	  It	  is	  also	  the	  notion	  that	  writing	   is	   ‘fragmentary’,	   both	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   its	   being	   an	   object	  which	   exists	  within	   a	   fragment	   of	   time	   and	   space,	   and	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   the	   process	   of	  writing	   simultaneously	   requires	   the	   writer’s	   gathering	   of	   various	   texts	   and	  
                                            41	  Kanai	  does	  discuss	  her	  upbringing	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  her	  literature	  in	  Kanai	  Mieko,	  
Kanai	  Mieko	   shishū	   [Kanai	  Mieko:	  Collected	  Poetry]	   Vol.	   55,	  Gendai	   shi	  bunko	   (Tokyo:	  Shinchōsha,	   1973)	   pp.	   128-­‐34.	   	   Even	   here,	   however,	   she	   starts	   with	   the	   disclaimer,	  ‘jiden	  nado	  kaku	  ki	  wa	  mōtō	  nai’	  (‘I	  have	  not	  a	  shred	  of	  desire	  to	  write	  a	  biography’)	  and	   goes	   on	   to	   write	   about	   how	   she	   doesn’t	   remember	   much	   about	   her	   young	   life	  (having	  burned	  all	  her	  diaries	  out	  of	  embarrassment).	  (See	  p.128.)	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ideas	  (fragments)	  into	  a	  whole,	  and	  that	  the	  reader’s	  reading	  and	  interpretation	  inevitably	   re-­‐fragments	   those	   texts	  and	   ideas.	   	  This	   conception	  of	   the	   literary	  text	   (as	   discussed	   in	   greater	   detail	   in	   Chapter	   Three,	   where	   we	   term	   it	   ‘the	  corporeal	  text’)	  is	  evident	  within	  many	  of	  Kanai’s	  early	  fictional	  works	  and	  non-­‐fiction	   essays,	   and	   is	   the	   theme	   of	   her	   1984	   essay	   ‘Kotoba/genjitsu/nikutai’	  (Text/Reality/The	  Body).42	  	  It	  is	  also	  the	  persistent	  theme	  of	  her	  early	  poetry,	  including	   her	   1968	   debut	   poem	   ‘Hanputi	   ni	   katarikakeru	   kotoba	   ni	   tsuite	   no	  omoimegurashi’	   (‘A	   Journey	   of	   Thought	   Upon	   Humpty	   Dumpty’s	   Narrative	  Train’)	   which	   Suga	   Hidemi	   claimed	   ‘encapsulated	   the	   ethos	   of	   the	   avant-­‐garde’.43	  	  The	  poem	  begins:	  
Oh	  Humpty	  Dumpty!	  Oh!	  Poet	  Secretly	  I	  remember	  you.	  When	  the	  first	  mouthful	  of	  apricot	  tasting	  tobacco	  Is	  coughed	  up	  from	  my	  stomach,	  And	  a	  new	  sour	  granulation	  flutters	  on	  the	  edge	  of	  my	  stomach	  I	  think	  of	  you	  my	  darling.	  The	  word	  ‘word’,	  that	  unsolidifiable	  mucous	  Oh!	  Humpty,	  break	  it	  into	  pieces	  Go	  around	  the	  edge	  in	  reverse	  We	  see	  you	  falling!	  The	  word	  ‘word’	  is	  yet	  again	  complicated	  Yet	  again	  dissected	  –	  by	  you!44	  
                                            42	  'Kotoba/genjitsu/nikutai',	  in	  Obasan	  no	  disukūru	  (Tokyo:	  Chikuma	  shobō,	  1984)	  pp.	  62-­‐68.	  43	  Hidemi	   Suga,	   'Kanai	   Mieko,	   Hito	   to	   sakuhin',	   in	   Shōwa	   bungaku	   zenshu	   (Tokyo:	  Shōgakukan,	  1988)	  pp.	  961-­‐64,	  p.	  961.	  44	  Kanai	   Mieko,	   ‘Hanputi	   ni	   katarikakeru	   kotoba	   ni	   tsuite	   no	   omoimegurashi’	   [‘A	  Journey	   of	   Thought	  Upon	  Humpty	  Dumpty’s	  Narrative	  Train’]	   in	  Kanai	  Mieko	  shishū,	  Vol.	  55,	  Gendai	  shi	  bunko	  (Tokyo:	  Shinchōsha,	  1973)	  pp.	  10-­‐11.	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  Humpty	  Dumpty,	  of	  course,	  as	  he	  figures	  in	  Lewis	  Carroll’s	  Through	  the	  Looking	  
Glass	   (1872),	   claims	   to	   be	   the	   ‘master’	   of	   words,	   and	   declares	   in	   his	  conversation	  with	  Alice	  ‘When	  I	  use	  a	  word,	  […]	  it	  means	  just	  what	  I	  choose	  it	  to	  mean	   –	   neither	  more	   nor	   less.’45	  	   To	   this,	   Alice	   replies	   ‘The	   question	   is,	   […]	  whether	   you	   can	  make	   words	   mean	   so	   many	   different	   things.’46	  	   Humpty	  interprets	   the	   first	   verse	   of	   the	  nonsensical	   ‘Jabberwocky’	   (‘’Twas	  brillig,	   and	  the	  slithy	  toves	  …’	  etc.)	  by	  claiming	  that	  many	  of	  the	  words	  are	  portmanteaus	  (with	  ‘two	  meanings	  packed	  up	  into	  one	  word’).47	  	  He	  also	  produces	  a	  poem	  of	  his	   own	   in	  which	   he	   describes	   attempting	   to	   convey	   an	   urgent	  message,	   but	  without	  ever	  divulging	  the	  message’s	  content,	  thus	  ensuring	  the	  reader’s	  focus	  is	   on	   the	   textual	   materiality	   of	   the	   message	   rather	   than	   on	   its	   referent,	   the	  message	   itself.48	  	   Kanai’s	   poem	   recalls	   this	   by	   the	   speaker	   metaphorically	  inscribing	  her	  own	  phlegm,	  tasting	  as	  it	  does	  of	  the	  twin	  flavours	  of	  apricot	  and	  tobacco,	   as	   a	   physicalised	   metaphor	   for	   a	   portmanteau	   word	   (and	   hence	  reminding	   us,	   again,	   that	   words	   are	   not	   only	   descriptors	   of	   things,	   but	   also	  material	   entities	   in	   their	   own	   right)	  which	   then	   produces	   something	   new:	   ‘a	  new	   sour	   granulation	   flutters	   on	   the	   edge	   of	   my	   stomach’.	   However,	   the	  speaker	  challenges	  the	  illusory	  wholeness	  of	  the	  lump	  of	  phlegm	  which,	  despite	  its	   physical	   presence,	   is	   nonetheless	   ‘unsolidifiable’.	   Hence,	   we	   might	   read	  
                                            45	  Lewis	   Carroll,	   Through	   the	   Looking-­‐Glass	   and	   What	   Alice	   Found	   There	   (London:	  Macmillan	  London	  Limited,	  1978)	  p.	  130.	  46	  Ibid.,	  p.	  130.	  47	  Ibid.,	  p.	  133.	  	  (for	  instance	  ‘slithy’	  means	  ‘lithe	  and	  slimy’)	  48	  Ibid.,	  ‘Jabberwocky’	  is	  on	  pp.	  22-­‐23,	  and	  Alice’s	  full	  encounter	  with	  Humpty	  Dumpty	  is	  described	  in	  Chapter	  6,	  pp.	  119	  –	  42.	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Humpty	   Dumpty	   himself,	   as	   he	   is	   figured	   in	   the	   poem,	   as	   a	   metaphor	   for	   a	  postmodern,	  avant-­‐garde	  textuality,	  and	  whom,	  owing	  to	  our	  prior	  knowledge	  of	   his	   fall,	   we	   always	   already	   know	   to	   be	   an	   embodiment	   of	   fragments.	   The	  poem	  invokes	  his	  inevitable	  fall,	  prompting	  the	  reader	  to	  imagine	  his	  fracturing	  and	  reconstitution	  and	  this	   is,	  perhaps,	  readable	  as	  an	  extended	  metaphor	  for	  our	  losing	  grasp	  of	  concepts	  (the	  fall),	  their	  becoming	  complicated	  (fractured),	  and	   finally	   our	   re-­‐constituting	   their	   meaning.	   	   Moreover,	   precisely	   because	  Kanai’s	   texts	  hold	  an	  awareness	  of	   identity	  as	  being	  contingent	  on	  words	  and	  our	  understanding	  of	  them,	  this	  process	  relates	  to	  the	  underpinning	  formation	  of	   our	   own	   identities	   which	   is	   in	   constant	   process	   of	   being	   undone	   and	  reimagined.	  	  Mary	  Knighton	  writes	  that	  for	  early	  wave	  feminists	  (feminists	  for	  whom	  gender	   inequality	  was	  an	  empirical	   fact	  which	  they	  wished	  to	  overturn	  or	   write	   against),	   Kanai’s	   early	   approach	   alienated	   them.49	  	   Because	   Kanai’s	  writings	  were	   perceived	   as	   dismissive	   of	   prevalent	   sexist	   practices	   and	   ideas	  perpetuated	  by	  men	  by	   the	  status	  quo	   that	  was,	   they	  were	   felt	   to	  be	   too	   lofty	  and	   abstruse	   to	   function	   usefully	   as	   a	   feminist	   critique.	   Yet	   Kanai’s	   writings	  show	  clearly	  an	  awareness	  that	  women	  were	  responsible	   for	  the	  formation	  of	  their	  identities	  and	  part	  of	  her	  own	  ‘practical’	  solution	  was	  to	  question	  women	  writers’	   signification	  of	   ‘woman’	   through	  her	  non-­‐fiction.	   	   In	  her	  early	   fiction,	  accordingly,	  woman	  is	  often	  depicted	  in	  graphic	  terms	  as	  a	  material,	  corporeal	  and	  sexual	  entity,	  whose	  reality	  is	  often	  stark,	  peculiar	  and	  lonely,	  while	  at	  the	  
                                            49	  Mary	  Knighton,	  'Writing	  the	  Body	  as	  Meat:	  Kanai	  Mieko's	  "Rotting	  Meat"	  as	  Surreal	  Fable',	   in	   Japanese	   Studies	   around	   the	   World	   2004:	   Observing	   Japan	   from	   Within:	  
Perspectives	   of	   Foreign	   Scholars	   Resident	   in	   Japan,	   ed.	   James	   Baxter	   (International	  Research	  Centre	  for	  Japanese	  Studies,	  2004)	  pp.	  161-­‐88,	  p.	  164,	  n.	  8.	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same	   time	   this	   depiction	   of	   woman	   is	   satirised,	   critiqued	   and	   deconstructed	  through	  her	  narratives’	  use	  of	  black	  humour	  and	  metafictional	  technique.	  
Because	  of	  this,	  the	  four	  critics	  whose	  detailed	  analyses	  of	  ‘Rabbits’	  and	  ‘Rotting	  Meat’	   are	   discussed	   in	   detail	   below	   each	   interpret	   the	   feminism	   (or	  non-­‐feminism)	   of	   Kanai’s	   writing	   very	   differently.	   	   However,	   all	   of	   their	  interpretations	  examine	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  stories	  support	  what	  I	  term	  a	  ‘materialist	   feminist	  perspective’,	  by	  depicting	  the	   literal,	  physical	  oppression,	  privation	   and	   disenfranchisement	   of	   female	   sexuality.	   	   These	   readings	   also	  consider	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  these	  stories	  support	  what	  I	  broadly	  term	  a	  ‘post-­‐structuralist	   feminist	   perspective’,	   by,	   for	   instance,	   effecting	   a	   ‘victory’	   for	  feminism(s)	   through	   the	   narrative’s	   use	   of	   language.	   Predominance	   of	   one	   of	  these	  two	  positions	  is	  then	  given	  over	  the	  other	  as	  each	  of	  these	  critics	  reaches	  their	   respective	  conclusion.	   	  But	  before	  we	  discuss	   these	  critical	   responses	   in	  detail,	  we	  might	  note	   that	   a	  brief	   account	  of	   each	   story	  which	   focuses	  on	   the	  central	  female	  characters’	  narrative	  amply	  demonstrates	  a	  materialist	  feminist	  reading.	   	   	   In	   both	   of	   their	   narratives,	   the	   subversiveness	   of	   the	   female	  characters’	  modes	  of	  being	  and	  living	  inexorably	  leads	  to	  their	  isolation	  and/or	  death,	   appearing	   to	   suggest	   that	   woman’s	   physical	   oppression	   and	  marginalisation	  is	  the	  price	  to	  be	  paid	  for	  transgressing	  patriarchal	  values	  and	  rules.	   	   And	   yet	   an	   equally	   brief	   consideration	   of	   the	   anonymous	   frame	  narratives	   around	   the	   internal	   female	   characters’	   stories	   permits	   a	   post-­‐structuralist	  feminist	  reading	  by	  exposing	  all	  narrative	  as	  fiction,	  and	  moreover	  fiction	  which	  delights	  in	  upturning	  narratives	  of	  female	  subjugation.	  
In	   ‘Rotting	  Meat’,	   for	  example,	   the	  ageing	  prostitute	  whose	  first-­‐person	  narrative	  constitutes	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  story,	  relates	  that	  she	  has	  never	  desired	  a	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conventional	  married	  life	  and	  has	  been	  happy	  servicing	  her	  many	  customers,	  all	  of	  whom	  repay	  her	  with	  either	  gifts	  or	  money	  which	  they	  tactfully	  stuff	   in	  the	  base	   of	   the	   bedside	   lamp.	   	   However,	   one	   day	   she	   attracts	   the	   attentions	   of	   a	  butcher,	  who	  is	  so	  violent	  in	  his	  use	  of	  her	  body	  that	  she	  becomes	  too	  tired	  to	  continue	   seeing	   her	   other	   customers.	   	   To	   her	   distaste	   (because	   it	   seems	   to	  comment	  on	  her	  profession	  too	  directly)	  and	  inconvenience,	  the	  butcher	  leaves	  her	   a	   piece	   of	   meat	   (indeed,	   a	   whole	   piglet)	   in	   return	   for	   her	   services.	   	   Not	  knowing	  what	  to	  do	  with	  it,	  she	  stuffs	  it	  under	  the	  bed.	  	  However,	  so	  forceful	  is	  the	  butcher	  in	  his	  intent	  to	  marry	  her,	  a	  fate	  she	  resists,	  not	  because	  she	  doesn’t	  love	  him,	  but	  because	  she	  feels	  marriage	  constitutes	  a	  pretence,	   that	  she	  feels	  impelled	  to	  kill	  him.	  	  When	  the	  anonymous	  framing	  narrator	  (known	  to	  us	  only	  by	  the	  masculine	  first-­‐person	  pronoun	  boku)	  realises	  that	  the	  stench	  of	  rotting	  meat	  that	  had	  been	  bothering	  him	  ever	  since	  he	  entered	  her	  room	  is	  emanating	  from	  the	  butcher	  and	  not	  the	  piglet,	  he	  flees,	  leaving	  her	  alone	  in	  a	  closet,	  in	  a	  foul-­‐smelling	  apartment,	  with	  a	  rotting	  corpse	  under	  her	  mattress.	  This	  sense	  of	   the	  woman’s	   isolation	   is	   heightened	  by	  boku’s	   assertion	   that	   he	   knew	   that	  ‘leaving	   here	  means	   never	   being	   able	   to	   return’	   	   (koko	  o	  dechimaeba,	  nido	   to	  
koko	  ni	  modotte	  kuru	  koto	  ga	  dekinakunaru	  koto).50	  
It	   is	   comparatively	   straightforward,	   then,	   as	   we	   assemble	   a	   putative	  materialist	   feminist	  reading	  of	   ‘Rotting	  Meat’	  which	  aims	  to	  illustrate	  how	  the	  story	   describes	   (albeit	   allegorically)	   how	   women	   are	   oppressed	   within	   a	  hegemonic	  patriarchal	  order,	  to	  account	  for	  the	  prostitute’s	  actions	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  being	  transgressive	  as	  they	  are	  an	  affront:	  to	  the	  senses	  (the	  act	  of	   living	  
                                            50	  Kanai	  Mieko,	   'Funiku',	  Kanai	  Mieko:	  Zentanpenshū	  Vol.	  1	  (Tokyo:	  Nihon	  bungeisha,	  1992)	  pp.	  515-­‐21,	  p.	  515.	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with	  the	  stench	  of	  a	  corpse);	  to	  conventional	  bourgeois	  sensibilities	  (opposing	  marriage	   in	   favour	   of	   taking	   multiple	   sexual	   partners);	   or	   to	   a	   broader	  socioethical	  code	  (committing	  murder).	  	  Even	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  woman	  is	  no	  longer	   young,	   which	   is	   suggested	   by	   the	   metaphor	   for	   ‘ageing	   prostitute’	  implicit	   in	   the	   title	   ‘Rotting	  Meat’,	   can	   be	   taken	   as	   an	   affront	   to	   conventional	  literary	   notions	   of	   feminine	   sexual	   desirability.51	  A	   feminist	   interpretation	  focused	   on	   the	   realities	   of	   female	   subjugation	   and	   oppression	   thus	   may	  conclude	  that	  the	  inevitable,	  even	  tragic,	  consequences	  of	  these	  multiple	  acts	  of	  transgression	   might	   then	   be	   the	   prostitute’s	   exile	   from	   a	   surrounding	   social	  framework	  that	  cannot	  accommodate	  her.	  
However,	   this	   feminist	   reading	   is	   complicated	  not	   only	   by	   the	   farcical,	  surrealist	   and	   comedic	   qualities	   of	   the	   woman’s	   narrative,	   qualities	   which	  render	   attempts	   to	   read	   it	   as	   a	   serious	   commentary	   on	  women’s	   subjugation	  problematic,	   but	   also	   by	   the	   narrative	   of	   the	   frame	   narrator,	   boku,	   through	  whom	   her	   story	   is	   told.	   	   He	   introduces	   her	   tale	   by	   informing	   the	   reader,	  enigmatically,	   that,	   ‘I	   knew	   that	  once	   I	   had	   left	   [the	  woman’s	   room],	   even	   if	   I	  tried	  searching,	  I	  wouldn’t	  even	  be	  able	  to	  find	  the	  estate	  agent	  who	  had	  shown	  me	   around’.52	  	   Her	   tale	   is	   then	   narrated	   up	   to	   the	   point	   where	   the	   woman	  explains	  how	  she	  has	  been	  given	  a	  piglet	  by	  the	  butcher,	  which	  she	  has	  stuffed	  under	  the	  bed.	  	  The	  narrative	  then	  returns	  to	  boku	  who	  relates	  how	  the	  woman	  does	   not	   seem	   to	   lament	   her	   current	   situation,	   but	   instead	   talks	   about	   her	  
                                            51	  Indeed,	   this	   implied	  metaphor	   is	   rendered	  explicit	  during	   the	   course	  of	   the	   story,	  when	   the	  prostitute	  herself	   discusses	  niku	   (meat)	   as	  being	   coterminous	   for	  both	   the	  dead	  flesh	  of	  animals	  and	  for	  the	  body	  of	  prostitutes.	  	  52	  Kanai,	  ‘Funiku’,	  p.	  515.	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memories	  of	  all	   the	  various	  men	  she	  has	  had	  in	  her	  bed	  until	   the	  sun	  sets.	  He	  then	  explains	  how	  he	  has	  stumbled	  across	  her.	  	  Of	  course,	  originally	  he	  wanted	  ‘a	  house’	  of	  his	  own,	  but	  realising	  this	  was	  an	  overreaching	  ambition,	  he	  decides	  to	  settle	  for	  a	  ‘room’.53	  	  He	  explains	  that	  upon	  finding	  this	  room,	  it	  was	  his	  wish	  to	  do	  absolutely	  nothing:	  
Once	   there,	   I	   would	   live…	   no,	   I	   would	   do	   nothing,	   absolutely	  nothing,	  I	  intended	  to	  live	  as	  simply	  as	  possible.	  	  The	  truth	  was	  that	  I	   wanted	   to	   run	   away	   from	  writing;	   run	   to	   the	   very	   polar	   of	   not	  writing,	   and	   live	   life	   poised	   for	   death	   to	   come	   in	   the	   guise	   of	   a	  young	  girl	  exactly	  like	  me,	  but	  a	  thousand	  times	  more	  beautiful.54	  	  He	  finds	  an	  estate	  agent,	  whose	  breath	  stinks	  badly	  of	  rotting	  meat	  and	  he	  rents	  a	  furnished	  room.	  	  Boku	  doesn’t	  realise	  that	  the	  room	  itself	  had	  smelt	  so	  badly	  until	  his	  nose,	  which	  had	  been	  paralysed	  by	  the	  bad	  breath	  of	  the	  estate	  agent,	  recovers	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  night.	  	  On	  searching	  for	  the	  smell	  he	  opens	  up	  the	  closet	  only	  to	  find	  the	  woman	  lying	  on	  a	  double	  bed	  inside.	   	  He	  interrupts	  her	  story	   to	   attempt	   to	   persuade	   her	   of	   his	   situation,	   namely,	   that	   it	   is	   now	   his	  room,	  but	  she	  takes	  no	  notice	  and	  simply	  tells	  him	  that	  he	  has	  been	  tricked	  by	  the	  estate	  agent,	  who,	  she	  explains,	  is	  her	  pimp.	  	  When	  boku	  asks	  whether	  it	  is	  the	   rotting	  piglet	   causing	   the	   terrible	   smell,	   the	  woman	   replies	   that	   they	  had	  eaten	  that	  long	  ago,	  and	  that	  it	  was	  coming	  from	  the	  butcher	  who	  has	  asked	  her	  to	  marry	  him,	  a	  request	  which	  forces	  her	  to	  kill	  him.	  	  She	  pulls	  back	  the	  cover	  to	  reveal	  what	  we	  now	  realise	   to	  be	   the	  source	  of	   the	  smell	  of	   rotting	  meat:	   the	  butcher’s	   rotting	   corpse.	   	  At	   this	  point	  boku	   flees,	   but	   regrets	   this,	   explaining	  
                                            53	  Ibid.,	  p.	  518.	  54	  Ibid.,	  p.	  518.	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that	  ever	  since	  then	  he	  has	  been	  attempting	  to	  go	  back,	  find	  and	  marry	  her,	  and	  become	  a	  slice	  of	  rotting	  meat	  to	  be	  digested	  through	  her	  intestines.	   	  It	   is	  this	  reverie	  that	  fills	  him	  with	  warmth.	  	   	  However,	  recently	  he	  gets	  the	  feeling	  that	  he	  too	  is	  rotting	  from	  the	  innards,	  and	  this	  smell	  is	  mixed	  with	  his	  breath	  to	  the	  point	  where	  it	  makes	  him	  nauseous.	  
Similarly,	  it	  is	  relatively	  simple	  to	  construct	  a	  post-­‐structuralist	  feminist	  reading	   of	   ‘Rotting	   Meat’	   which	   aims	   to	   illustrate	   how	   the	   story	   subverts	  narratives	   of	   woman’s	   subjugation,	   instead	   enabling	   her	   revenge	   upon	   men	  through	   the	  use	  of	   language.	   	  By	   explaining	   that	   the	  woman	  exists	   in	   a	   space	  (‘her	   room’)	   for	   which	   he	   has	   no	  material	   evidence	   or	   connection	   (doubting	  even	  that	  he	  would	  be	  able	  to	  find	  the	  estate	  agent),	  and	  to	  which	  he	  can	  never	  physically	  return,	  boku’s	  introduction	  to	  the	  story	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  removing	  the	  woman’s	  story	  from	  any	  plane	  of	  realisticness.	  	  Instead,	  the	  prostitute’s	  story	  is	  rendered	   a	   figment	   of	   his	   mind	   and	   the	   subject	   of	   his	   writing;	   far	   from	  representing	  woman’s	  material	   condition,	   it	   becomes	   a	   fiction;	   its	   status	  as	   a	  narrative	  becomes	  heightened.	  	  Moreover,	  as	  boku	  states	  that	  it	  is	  his	  desire	  ‘to	  run	  to	  the	  very	  polar	  of	  not	  writing’,	  we	  might	  infer	  that	  at	  present	  he	  is	  unable	  to	   escape	  writing.55	  	   (Indeed,	   any	  narrative	   that	   tries	   to	   relate	   the	  narrator’s	  escape	  from	  writing,	  fails	  by	  definition).	  	  Thus,	  her	  narrative	  could	  be	  construed	  as	   boku’s	   allegory	   for,	   and	   commentary	   upon	   the	   process	   of	  writing.	   	   In	   this	  allegory,	   her	   ageing	   body	   represents	   the	   writing	   body,	   which	   plays	   host	   to	  numerous	  ‘guests’,	  or	  narratives	  whose	  stories	  she	  must	  write.	  	  The	  survival	  of	  the	   writing	   body	   is	   threatened	   when	   one	   particular	   narrative	   (the	   butcher)	  
                                            55	  Ibid.,	  p.	  518.	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overwhelms	  her,	  consuming	  all	  her	  energy,	  and	  preventing	  her	  from	  attending	  to	  any	  other	  narratives	  (or	  guests).	   	   In	  order	   to	  physically	  survive	  as	  a	  writer	  the	  prostitute	  must	  therefore	  ‘kill’	  the	  butcher	  and	  turn	  him	  into	  ‘rotting	  meat’	  (the	   very	   thing	   that	   has	   hitherto	   denoted	  her)	   so	   that	   his	   narrative	   becomes	  subsumed	   into	   hers.	   	   The	   fact	   that	   boku	  also	   becomes	   consumed	   by	   her	   and	  notices	  his	  innards	  turning	  into	  rotting	  meat	  could	  be	  considered	  to	  represent	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  woman,	  or	  writing	  body,	  has	  taken	  revenge,	  even	  on	  the	  supposed	   governing	   narrator	   of	   her	   story.	   	   Indeed,	   considered	   in	   the	   light	   of	  women’s	  writing	  in	  the	  1970s	  which,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  reclaims	  the	  female	  body	  as	   a	   subversive	   intellectual	   territory,	   the	   short	   story	   can	   be	   thus	   read	   as	   an	  allegory	   that	   affirms	   this	  by	  depicting	  woman	  as	  not	  only	  able	   to	  narrate	  her	  own	   narratives	   about	  men,	   but	   also	   able	   to	   infiltrate,	   and	   eventually	   assume	  control	   over	  masculine	   narratives	   about	   her.	   	   An	   interpretation	   of	   this	   short	  story,	   focused	   on	   the	   need	   for	  woman’s	   reclamation	   of	   the	  manner	   in	  which	  narratives	   are	   told,	   might	   thus	   conclude,	   in	   complete	   contradiction	   to	   the	  materialist	  feminist	   interpretation,	  that	  the	  voice	  of	  the	  woman-­‐as-­‐writer	  is,	   if	  not	  dominant,	  then	  a	  constant	  source	  of	  destabilisation	  for	  the	  man-­‐as-­‐narrator.	  
The	  same	  potential	  to	  elicit	  contrasting	  feminist	  readings	  exists	  through	  the	  dual	  narratives	   in	   ‘Rabbits’	  which	  again	  presents	  us	  with	  a	  secondary	  but	  central	   female	   narrator	   within	   a	   frame	   provided	   by	   an	   anonymous	   primary	  narrator.	   	   In	   ‘Rabbits’,	   it	   is	   the	   first	   person	   narrative	   of	   the	   ‘shōjo’	   (a	   young	  woman,	   or	   girl56)	   called	   Sayuri	   (Little	   Lily)	   which,	   like	   the	   prostitute’s	  
                                            56	  The	   term	   shōjo	   specifically	   describes	   females	   between	   the	   ages	   of	   early	   puberty,	  until	   their	   coming	   of	   age	   at	   twenty,	   or	   their	  marriage;	   therefore	   shōjo	   is	   sometimes	  translated	  as	   ‘girl’,	  and	  sometimes	  as	   ‘young	  woman’.	   	   In	   ‘Rabbits’	   the	  shōjo	   is	  still	  at	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narrative	  in	  ‘Rotting	  Meat’,	  constitutes	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  story	  and	  relates	  Sayuri’s	  progressive	   estrangement	   from	   society.	   Sayuri’s	   deviance	   from	   conventional	  life	  commences	  with	  her	   twice-­‐monthly	  enjoyment	  of	   feasting	  with	  her	   father	  on	   the	  rabbits	  which	  he	  rears,	   slaughters,	   stuffs	  and	  cooks.	   	  These	   feasts,	  and	  the	   killings	   that	   they	   necessitate,	   repulse	   her	   mother	   and	   brother	   to	   such	   a	  degree	   that	   they	   leave	   the	   family	   home.	   	   Free	   to	   enjoy	   such	   indulgences	   at	  home,	  the	  father	  and	  Sayuri	  stop	  going	  to	  work	  and	  school,	  and	  concentrate	  on	  creating	  a	  new	  culinary	  speciality	  every	  day.	  	  The	  father	  soon	  becomes	  so	  obese	  that	  he	   is	   bed-­‐ridden,	   and	   the	   shōjo	   takes	  on	  his	   role,	  which	   she	  has	  hitherto	  just	  observed,	  of	  slaughtering	  the	  rabbits.	   	  Although	  she	  at	  first	  finds	  this	  task	  disgusting,	  she	  soon	  derives	  great	  pleasure	  from	  it,	  and	  ends	  up	  performing	  the	  ritual	   naked,	   even	  bathing	   in	   the	  blood	  of	   the	   rabbits	   and	   rubbing	   it	   into	  her	  pubic	  hair.	  	  She	  creates	  a	  rabbit	  suit	  out	  of	  the	  skins	  with	  the	  design	  to	  surprise	  her	   father	   on	   his	   birthday;	   she	   practices	   hopping	   around	   like	   a	   rabbit;	   and	  writes	  a	  placard	  that	  reads	  ‘stuff	  me	  and	  eat	  me	  please’.57	  	  But	  on	  seeing	  Sayuri	  in	   her	   costume,	   the	   father	   thinks	   she	   is	   the	   ghost	   of	   all	   of	   the	   rabbits	   he	   has	  killed	  resurrected	  to	  kill	  him.	   	  He	  throws	  an	  alarm	  clock	  at	  her	  which	  shatters	  her	  pink	  sunglasses,	  piercing	  and	  blinding	  one	  of	  her	  eyes.	   	  He	   then	  suffers	  a	  heart	   attack	   and	   dies,	   leaving	   Sayuri	   alone.	   	   She	   is	   transfixed	   by	   the	   sight	   of	  herself	  with	  one	  eye	  gouged	  out	  and	  consequently	  decides	  to	  take	  out	  the	  eyes	  
                                                                                                                           school,	   and	   prepares	   a	   special	  meal	   for	   her	   and	   her	   father	   of	   sekihan	   (rice	  with	   red	  beans,	  traditionally	  eaten	  to	  mark	  a	  young	  woman’s	  first	  mensturation)	  and	  decorates	  the	  table	  with	  strawberries	  and	  radishes	  after	  discovering	  that	  her	  mother	  and	  brother	  have	  left,	  which	  suggests	  that	  she	  started	  menstruating	  that	  day.	  	  As	  the	  term	  shōjo	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  a	  female	  throughout	  the	  period	  in	  which	  the	  body	  transitions	  from	  being	  a	  girl,	  or	  child,	  into	  a	  woman,	  it	  holds	  the	  connotations	  of	  ‘metamorphic	  power’	  and	  for	  this	  reason	  occupies	  a	  special	  cultural	  and	  literary	  status	  in	  Japan.	  	  	  57	  Kanai	  Mieko,	  'Rabbits',	  Kanai	  Mieko:	  Zentanpenshū	  Vol.	  1	  (Tokyo:	  Nihon	  bungeisha,	  1992)	  pp.	  522-­‐40,	  p.	  536.	  .	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of	  all	  of	   the	  rabbits.	  When	  the	  primary	  narrator	   locates	  the	  shōjo	  again,	  she	   is	  lying	  dead	  in	  her	  rabbit	  suit,	  in	  her	  house,	  which	  is	  now	  lined	  from	  wall	  to	  wall	  with	  white	  rabbit	  fur,	  and	  surrounded	  by	  blind	  rabbits.	  	  Her	  lips	  are	  curled	  into	  a	  smile,	  having	  pierced	  her	  other	  eye	  and	  completely	  blinded	  herself.	  
As	  with	  ‘Rotting	  Meat’,	  the	  process	  of	  constructing	  a	  putative	  materialist	  feminist	   reading	   of	   ‘Rabbits’	   by	   identifying	   the	   transgressiveness	   of	   Sayuri’s	  acts,	  and	  illustrating	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  they	  contribute	  to	  her	  isolation	  from	  a	   wider	   social	   fabric,	   and	   hence	   to	   her	   tragic	   demise,	   is	   relatively	  straightforward.	   	   Sayuri’s	   enjoyment	   first	   of	   the	   eating,	   and	   then	   of	   the	  slaughtering	  of	   sweet	   and	   innocent	   animals	  which	   a	   girl	   her	   age	  might,	  more	  conventionally,	   keep	   as	   pets,	   acts	   to	   destabilise	   any	   socio-­‐cultural	   belief	   that	  ordinary	   schoolgirls	   might	   themselves,	   like	   their	   rabbits,	   be	   sweet	   and	  innocent.	  	  Sayuri	  acknowledges:	  
Thinking	  back,	  until	  the	  fourteenth	  of	  the	  month	  several	  years	  ago,	  I	   lived	   as	   a	   normal	   human	   being.	   	   Until	   that	   time,	   I	  was	   like	   any	  other	   regular	   schoolgirl,	   I	   did	   everything	   to	   hide	   my	   father’s	  strange	   tastes	   –	   the	   fact	   that	   he	   killed	   and	   cooked	   rabbits	   –	  although	   I	   can’t	   say	   that	   I	   don’t	   feel	   slightly	   guilty	   about	   having	  eaten	  them.	   	   If	  my	  classmates	  had	  known	  that	   I	  had	  eaten	  rabbits	  which	  I	  had	  raised	  myself	  without	  turning	  a	  hair	  they	  would	  surely	  have	  nicknamed	  me	  ‘Tiger	  Lily’.	   	  Yes,	  I	  have	  lost	  one	  eye,	  but	  they	  are	   completely	  blind;	   even	  hearing	   the	  word	   ‘kill’	  would	   turn	   the	  colour	  on	  the	  dull,	  expression-­‐less	  faces	  of	  those	  stupid	  donkey-­‐like	  girls.58	  	  Expressing	   her	   fundamental	   disassociation	   with	   her	   contemporaries,	   Sayuri	  describes	   them	   as	   ‘baka	   na	   roba	   no	   yō	   na	   shōjotachi’	   (stupid	   donkey-­‐like	  girls).59	  	   However,	   instead	   of	   using	   the	   most	   commonly	   used	   characters	   for	  
                                            58	  Kanai,	  'Usagi',	  p.	  538.	  59	  Ibid.,	  p.	  538.	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donkey	  (??)	  or	  its	  equally	  common	  transliteration	  into	  katakana	  (??),	  she	  uses	   the	   characters	   ‘??’	   (lit.	   ‘rabbit-­‐horse’),	   indicating	   the	   reading	   ‘roba’	   in	  
furigana	   over	   the	   top.60	  	   By	   equating	   her	   school	   friends	   to	   the	   passive,	  unknowing	  rabbits	  that	  she	  kills	  and	  eats,	  Sayuri’s	  transgression	  in	  killing	  and	  eating	  rabbits	  is	  symbolically	  elevated	  to	  murder	  and	  cannibalism.	  Her	  further	  transgression	   of	   staying	   at	   home	  with	   her	   father	   in	   order	   to	   indulge	   in	   their	  deviant	  pastime	  actively	  completes	  this	  disassociation	  between	  herself	  and	  her	  peers,	   removing	  her	   completely	   from	   their	  wider	   social	   sphere.	   But	   over	   and	  above	  her	  violence	  towards	  innocence,	  the	  sexual	  nature	  of	  her	  enjoyment	  (at	  first	   connoted	   through	   her	   depiction	   of	   the	   voluptuousness	   of	   feasting,	   and	  later	  made	  more	   explicit,	   even	   cruel,	   in	   her	   naked	   performance	   of	   her	   ritual	  slaughtering	  of	  the	  rabbit)	  renders	  her	  actions	  pornographically	  obscene.	  	  And	  then	  there	  is	  the	  suggestion,	  for	  instance,	  through	  Sayuri’s	  complicity	  with	  her	  father’s	   ‘strange	  tastes’,	   their	  shared	  delight	  in	  the	  sensuous	  act	  of	  eating,	  and	  most	  of	  all	  in	  her	  attempts	  to	  surprise	  him	  by	  dressing	  up	  as	  a	  rabbit	  for	  him	  to	  ‘stuff’	  and	   ‘eat’	  on	  his	  birthday,	   that	  her	  sexual	  desire	   is	  directed	   towards	  her	  father	   (although	   its	   consummation	   is	   never	   made	   explicit),	   and	   is	   therefore	  transgressive	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	   gestures	   towards	   that	   which	   Claude	   Levi-­‐Strauss	  identified	  as	  the	  founding	  taboo	  of	  modern	  society,	  incest.61	  	  As	  it	  is	  a	  narrative	  about	   incestuous	  desire,	  an	   interpretation	  of	   the	  shōjo’s	  narrative	   in	  ‘Rabbits’	  might	   contend	   that	   the	   story	   is	   a	   feminist	   rewriting	  of	  Oedipus,	   and	  Sayuri’s	   exile	   from	  society,	   her	  putting	  out	  her	  own	  eyes	  and	  her	   subsequent	  
                                            60	  Owing	   to	   its	   long	   ears,	   another	   term	   for	   ‘donkey’	   in	   Japanese	   is	   usagiuma	   (lit:	  rabbit-­‐horse).	  	  61	  Claude	  Levi-­‐Strauss,	  The	  Elementary	  Structures	  of	  Kinship	   trans.	   John	  von	  Sturmer	  James	  Bell,	  and	  Rodney	  Needham	  (Boston:	  Beacon	  Press,	  1969).	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death	   are	   all	   metaphorical	   for	   the	   tragic,	   yet	   inevitable,	   consequences	   of	  woman’s	  transgression	  of	  patriarchal	  laws.	  
However,	   as	   with	   ‘Rotting	   Meat’,	   any	   attempts	   to	   read	   the	   shōjo’s	  narrative	   as	   a	   serious	   commentary	   on	   women’s	   subjugation	   are	   rendered	  problematic	  both	  by	  its	  surrealism	  and	  black	  humour,	  but	  also	  by	  the	  narrative	  of	   the	   frame	   narrator,	   who	   this	   time	   is	   both	   anonymous	   and	   ambiguous	   of	  gender,	  deploying	  as	   it	  does	   the	  gender-­‐neutral	   first	  person	  pronoun	  watashi.	  	  
Watashi	  commences	  the	  story	  by	  making	  an	  entry	  into	  a	  diary,	  which	  reads:	  
The	   act	   of	   writing	   includes	   not	   writing,	   but	   above	   all	   writing,	  therefore	  there	  is	  no	  escape;	  to	  write	  must	  be	  my	  fate.62	  	  S/he	   then	   decides	   to	   go	   for	   a	   walk	   to	   cure	   an	   on-­‐going	   condition	   of	   being	  assailed	  by	  a	   feeling	  as	   if	   living	   in	  a	  waking	  nightmare.	   	  Watashi	  explains	  that	  this	   feeling	   is	   formless	   like	   a	   smell,	   or	  more	   specifically,	   a	   ‘kind	  of	   nausea’	   in	  that	   it	   seems	   to	  be	  arising	   from	  her/his	  body.63	  	   It	   is	  while	  watashi	   is	   sitting	  down	  to	  rest	  on	  a	  rock	  that	  s/he	  sees	  a	  large	  rabbit,	  which	  is	  approximately	  the	  same	   size	   as	   herself/himself	   run	   past.	   	  Watashi	   runs	   after	   the	   rabbit	   before	  falling	   down	   a	   hole.	   	   On	   gaining	   consciousness	  watashi	   realises	   the	   rabbit	   is	  sitting	   nearby	   and	   staring	   at	   her/him.	   	   On	   questioning	   and	   scrutinising	   this	  rabbit	  a	  little	  more,	  it	  becomes	  apparent	  that	  the	  rabbit	  is	  actually	  a	  girl	  dressed	  in	   a	   rabbit	   suit.	   	  Watashi	   asks	   how	   she	   became	   a	   rabbit,	   and	   the	   girl	   then	  narrates	  her	  story.	   	  When	  watashi	   stumbles	  across	  the	  rabbit	  girl	  again	  she	   is	  dead	  in	  the	  woods	  having	  blinded	  herself	  in	  the	  other	  eye.	  	  Watashi	  dresses	  in	  
                                            62	  Kanai,	  ‘Usagi’,	  p.	  522.	  63	  Ibid.,	  p.	  523.	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the	   rabbit	   suit	   and	   ‘remained	   still	   and	  did	   not	   try	   to	  move’	   	   (jittoshita	  mama	  
ugokō	  to	  shinakatta).64	  
Thus,	   as	   with	   ‘Rotting	   Meat’,	   the	   process	   of	   constructing	   a	   post-­‐structuralist	  feminist	   reading	   of	   ‘Rabbits’	   by	   identifying	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   woman’s	  subjugation	   within	   a	   system	   of	   patriarchal	   dominance	   is	   overturned	   by	   her	  reclamation	   of	   language	   is	   largely	   uncomplicated.	   	   As	   was	   noted	   above	   with	  regard	  to	   the	   frame	  narrator	   in	   ‘Rotting	  Meat’,	   the	   frame	  narrator	   in	   ‘Rabbits’	  serves	  to	  remove	  the	  internal	  female	  narrative	  from	  the	  plane	  of	  the	  literal	  and	  real,	   thereby	   heightening	   its	   status	   as	   narrative.	   	   That	   the	   frame	   narrator’s	  function	  is	  to	  convert	  the	  material	  to	  the	  fictional	   is	  at	  first	   intimated	  through	  the	   symbolism	   which	   surrounds	   her/him;	  watashi	   experiences	   her/his	   body	  through	   sensations	   and	   smells	   akin	   to	   nausea,	   thus	   transfiguring	   the	  physiological	   into	   that	   which	   is	   ‘formless’	   and	   potentially	   imaginary	   or	  fantastical.	  Watashi’s	   narrative	   also	   effects	   this	   conversion	   by	  mimicking	   the	  famous	   opening	   of	   Lewis	   Carroll’s	  Alice’s	  Adventures	   in	  Wonderland	   in	   which	  Alice	  sees	  a	  rabbit,	  chases	  after	  it,	  and	  falls	  down	  a	  hole,	  when	  introducing	  the	  
shōjo.	   	   This	   seems	   to	   suggest	   that,	   like	   Alice,	   the	   narrator	   of	   ‘Rabbits’	   is	   in	   a	  waking	  dream,	  and	   the	   ‘wonderland’	   that	  s/he	   is	  navigating	  (the	  world	  of	   the	  
shōjo	  and	  her	  narrative)	  is	  part	  of	  that	  dream.	  	  This	  suggestion	  is	  reinforced	  by	  the	  way	  in	  which	  watashi	  (again	  in	  similarity	  to	  boku	  in	  ‘Rotting	  Meat’)	  informs	  us	  that	  s/he	  is	  a	  writer;	  that,	  ‘to	  write	  must	  be	  my	  fate’.65	  	  Thus,	  the	  story	  of	  the	  
shōjo’s	  transition	  into	  a	  rabbit	  via	  her	  raising,	  eating	  and	  killing	  of	  rabbits	  and	  
                                            64	  Ibid.,	  p.	  540.	  65	  Ibid.,	  p	  522.	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eventual	   attempted	   seduction	   of	   her	   father,	   can	   be	   read	   as	   the	   fiction	   of	   our	  frame	  narrator,	  and	  the	  very	  graphic	  and	  realistic	  depictions	  of	  events	  that	  lead	  to	   Sayuri’s	   sad	   isolation	   from	   the	   world,	   rather	   than	   pertaining	   to	   woman’s	  ‘literal’	   alienation	   and	   subjugation	   within	   a	   patriarchal	   social	   order,	   instead	  pertain	  to	   figments	  of	  the	  writer’s	   imagination.	   	  The	  notion	  that	  the	  shōjo	  and	  her	  life	  are	  symbolic	  of	  the	  life	  that	  a	  writer	  chooses	  is	  suggested	  by	  the	  way	  in	  which	  watashi	   climbs	   into	   her	   rabbit	   suit	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   short	   story	   and	  remains	   still.	   	   Thus	   again,	   as	   was	   the	   case	   with	   ‘Rotting	   Meat’,	   a	   post-­‐structuralist	   feminist	   interpretation	   focused	   on	   the	   frame	   narrative’s	  fictionalisation	   of	   the	   internal	   narrative	   may	   conclude	   the	   very	   reverse	   of	   a	  materialist	   feminist	   interpretation	  and	  assert	  that	  the	  short	  story	  affirms	  how	  female	  identities,	  such	  as	  the	  shōjo’s,	  elude	  their	  inscription	  as	  victims	  within	  a	  patriarchal	  hegemony	  through	  the	  act	  of	  writing.	  As	  is	  evident	  from	  these	  brief	  synopses	   and	   the	   corresponding	   materialist	   and	   post-­‐structuralist	   analyses	  which	  arise	  from	  them,	  the	  form	  of	  these	  stories	  seems	  to	  encourage	  polarised	  readings	  through	  their	  use	  of	  external	  and	  internal	  narrators,	  and	  thus	  sets	  up	  paradoxes	   between	   the	   material	   and	   the	   figurative	   which	   seem	   irresolvable.	  	  So,	  how	  have	  the	  four	  main	  critics	  of	  these	  narratives	  interpreted	  them,	  and	  in	  what	  way	  have	  they	  considered	  them	  to	  be	  (or	  not	  to	  be)	  ‘feminist’?	  
Kitada	   Sachie	   is	   the	   first	   of	   these	   four	   critics	   to	   place	   Kanai’s	   early	  writings	  in	  general	  (and	  ‘Rabbits’	  specifically)	  within	  a	  feminist	  framework.	  	  In	  1993	  Kitada	  notes,	  as	  our	  materialist	  feminist	  reading	  above	  has	  outlined,	  how	  the	   shōjo	   narrator’s	   various	   acts	   of	   transgression	   result	   in	   her	   increasing	  isolation:	   alienating	   her	   mother	   and	   brother;	   separating	   her	   from	   her	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classmates;	  and	  killing	  her	  father.66	  	  However,	  she	  does	  not	  read	  this	  trajectory	  as	   one	   which	   suggests	   woman’s	   experience	   of	   violent	   marginalisation	   in	  response	   to	  her	   transgressions	  of	  patriarchal	   rules,	  but	   as	   an	  allegory	   for	   the	  
shōjo’s	  emancipation	  through	  fiction.	  	  She	  points	  out	  that	  the	  shōjo	  is	  a	  feminine	  literary	   trope	  which	   represents	   an	   androgynous,	   unconscious,	   pre-­‐sexualised	  state	  of	  being,	  and	  therefore	  engenders	  the	  possibilities	  of	  transformation	  and	  metamorphosis.67	  	  This	  is	  a	  point	  which	  Kitada	  expands	  in	  her	  1996	  essay,	   in	  which	  she	  argues	  that	  in	  Kanai’s	  early	  non-­‐fiction,	  Kanai	  selects	  the	  trope	  of	  the	  
shōjo	   as	   a	  means	   to	   overcome	   the	   limitations	   imposed	  upon	  women	   living	   in	  patriarchal	   societies.68	  	  Thus,	   for	  Kitada,	  Sayuri’s	   transformation	   is	  a	  positive	  event,	   which	   demonstrates	   how	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   retrieve	   an	   active	   identity,	  realise	   profound	   personal	   fulfilment	   and	   discover	   a	   positive	   sexuality	   via	  initiation	   into	   the	   world	   of	   fantasy	   and	   literary	   creation.	   She	   concludes	   her	  1993	  essay	  by	  writing	  that	  Sayuri’s	  disassociation	  with	  her	  contemporaries,	  her	  mother,	   brother	   and	   the	   silent	   ‘rabbits’	   parallels	   Kanai’s	   disaffection	   with	  conventional	  society	  and	  its	  options,	  and	  that	  Sayuri’s	  transformation	  can	  also	  be	  expressed	  as	  a	  profound	  personal	  ‘awakening’	  (jikaku),	  similar	  to	  that	  which	  
                                            66	  Kitada	   Sachie,	   'Usagi:	  Hito	   to	  bungaku',	   in	  Tanpen	   josei	  bungaku:	  Gendai,	   ed.	   Yabu	  Teiko,	   Watanabe	   Sumiko	   and	   Imai	   Yasuko	   (Tokyo:	   Ōfū,	   1993)	   pp.	   153-­‐60.	   	   Kitada	  numbers	  Sayuri’s	  acts	  of	  transgression	  from	  one	  to	  five,	  linking	  them	  to	  events	  which	  increase	  her	  isolation.	  See	  pp.	  158	  –	  9.	  	  	  67	  Ibid.,	  p.	  160.	  68	  Kitada	   Sachie,	   'Kanai	   Mieko	   ni	   okeru	   "shōjo"	   to	   "boken"',	   in	  Haha	   to	  musume	   no	  
feminizumu:	   Gendai	   kazoku	   o	   koete,	   ed.	   Kitada	   Sachie,	   Mizuta	   Noriko	   and	   Hasegawa	  Hiroshi	  (Tokyo:	  Tahata	  Shōten,	  1996)	  pp.	  140-­‐56.	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Kanai	  experienced	   in	  wanting	   to	  pursue	  a	  solitary	   life	  of	  writing	  at	   the	  age	  of	  nineteen.69	  
In	  contrast,	  Sharalyn	  Orbaugh’s	  1996	  article,	  ‘The	  Body	  in	  Contemporary	  Japanese	  Women’s	   Fiction’,	   which	   has	   been	   greatly	   influential	   in	   anglophone	  universities,	  uses	  the	  examples	  of	  ‘Rabbits’	  and	  ‘Rotting	  Meat’,	  along	  with	  ‘The	  Return’	  and	  ‘A	  Figure	  of	  Mother	  and	  Child’,	  to	  argue,	  as	  our	  materialist	  feminist	  interpretation	   above	   sets	   out,	   that	  Kanai’s	   early	   short-­‐fiction	  uses	   allegory	   to	  foreground	  the	  material	  damage	  suffered	  by	  women	  through	  the	  body	  by	  their	  role	  in	  sustaining	  patriarchal	  rule.70	  	  She	  writes:	  
Kanai’s	  stories	  do	  not	  propose	  a	  model	  for	  women’s	  reclamation	  of	  a	   specifically	   female-­‐subjectivity	   and	   centrality;	  we	   are	   not	   being	  asked	   to	   empower	   ourselves	   by	   dressing	   up	   in	   rabbit	   suits	   and	  fantasizing	  about	  how	  daddy	  will	  kill	  and	  eat	  us.	   	  [….]	  The	  women	  in	  these	  stories	  do	  not	  fulfil	  some	  (Judeo	  Christian)	  romantic	  ideal	  of	  escape	  and	  healing.	  	  But	  by	  appropriating	  aspects	  of	  the	  gender-­‐based	   power	   economies	   and	   inverting	   them,	   collapsing	   them,	  twisting	   them,	   and	   particularly	   by	   exaggerating	   them	   through	  rendering	   them	   literal,	   Kanai	   [among	   others]	   makes	   obvious	   the	  grotesqueries,	   absurdities,	   and	   actual	   dangers	   to	  women	   that	   are	  glossed	  over	  by	  abstract,	  intellectualized	  narratives	  of	  power.	  	  71	  	  For	  Orbaugh,	  Kanai’s	  narratives	  contribute	  to	  feminism	  chiefly	  in	  their	  detailing	  the	   complex	   implications	   for	   all	   women	   and	   their	   bodies	   who	   live	   within	   a	  global	   culture	   structured	   through	  patriarchal	   economies	   of	   power.	   	  However,	  here	   Orbaugh	   is	   careful	   to	   state	   that	   they	   do	   so	   without	   resorting	   to	   the	  simplistic	   equation	   that	  women	   are	   the	   victims	   and	  men	   are	   the	   victimisers,	  
                                            69	  Kitada,	  'Usagi:	  Hito	  to	  bungaku',	  p.	  159.	  70	  Sharalyn	  Orbaugh,	   'The	  Body	   in	  Contemporary	  Women's	  Fiction',	   in	  The	  Woman's	  
Hand:	  Gender	  and	  Theory	  in	  Japanese	  Women's	  Writing,	   ed.	  Paul	  and	  Walker	  Schalow,	  Janet	  (Stanford,	  California.:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1996)	  pp.	  119-­‐64.	  71	  Ibid.,	  p.153.	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which,	   she	  asserts,	   is	   ‘ultimately	  not	  useful	   [to	   feminism],	   except	   insofar	  as	   it	  keeps	   us	   from	   forgetting	   specific	   instances	   of	   injustice’.72	  	   In	   so	   doing,	   she	  states,	   Kanai’s	   works	   should	   be	   considered	   alongside	   the	   works	   of	   other	  Japanese	  women	  writers	  (Orbaugh	  mentions	  Kōno	  Taeko,	  Ōba	  Minako,	  Ariyoshi	  Sawako,	   Takahashi	   Takako,	   Kurahashi	   Yumiko,	   Tomioka	   Taeko,	   Tsushima	  Yūko)	   who	   also	   write	   about	   the	   body	   in	   a	   way	   that	   involves	   it	   ‘directly	   and	  violently’	  during	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s.73	  	  	  In	  stories	  by	  these	  writers,	  women’s	  subversion	   of	   patriarchy	   resides	   in	   their	   return	   to	   (and	   therefore	   their	   re-­‐appropriation	   of	   power	   over)	   the	   personal	   and	   the	   physical,	   and	   in	   their	  challenge	   to	   the	   gender	   hierarchy	   through	   performance.	   	   Orbaugh	   notes,	  ‘[i]nstead	   of	   being	   silent,	   women	   can	   speak;	   instead	   of	   being	   the	   objects	   of	  others’	   gaze,	   they	   can	   use	   their	   eyes;	   instead	   of	   being	   killed,	   they	   can	   kill;	  instead	  of	  being	  dominated,	  they	  can	  dominate.’74	  	  She	  balances	  her	  materialist	  feminist	   reading	   with	   the	   statement	   that	   these	   literary	   subversions	   are	   not	  necessarily	   tragic	  because	   they	   install	  a	   lasting	  reversal	  of	  gender	  hierarchies	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  fantasy	  and	  fiction.	  	  Nonetheless,	  she	  concludes,	  they	  are	  at	  best	  ‘equivocal’	  victories,	  and	  serve	  to	  illustrate	  how	  both	  ‘men	  and	  women	  are	  still	  relentlessly	  trapped	  within	  [patriarchal	  power	  structures]’.75	  
In	  her	  2004	  paper	  on	  ‘Rotting	  Meat’,	  Mary	  Knighton	  counters	  Orbaugh’s	  materialist	   feminist	   reading	   of	   Kanai’s	   early	   short	   fiction	   by	   instead	   putting	  forward	   a	   poststructuralist	   feminist	   reading,	   and	   arguing	   that	   Kanai’s	   works	  
                                            72	  Ibid.,	  p.	  154.	  73	  Ibid.,	  p.	  127.	  74	  Ibid.,	  p.	  123.	  75	  Ibid.,	  p.	  154.	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achieve	  their	  relevance	  to	   feminism,	  not	   in	   the	  graphic	  depiction	  of	   the	   literal	  and	  the	  physical,	  but	  through	  their	  reclamation	  of	  woman’s	  access	  to	  the	  mind	  and	  to	  language,	  within	  a	  context	  of	  war	  between	  male	  and	  female	  definitions:	  
Orbaugh	  writes	   that	  writers	  such	  as	  Kanai	  write	  social	  critique	  of	  gender	   relations	   by	   making	   ‘the	   body’	   literal	   in	   their	   texts,	   an	  effective	  means	  of	  countering	  the	  intellectual	  abstraction	  of	  (male)	  ‘narratives	   of	   power’.	   	   As	   a	   feminist	   literary	   critic	   myself,	   I	  sympathize	  with	  the	  desire	  to	  make	  women	  writers’	  fiction	  socially	  ‘useful’	  for	  feminist	  politics,	  but	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Kanai	  I	  would	  have	  to	  question	   this	   particular	   project:	   that	   is,	   it	   is	   not	   in	   making	   ‘the	  body’	   literal	   that	   Kanai	   subverts	   patriarchal	   power	   or	   narrative	  structures	   but	   in	   writing	   the	   female	   body	   ‘as	   meat’	   –	   not	   at	   all	  ‘literal,’	  as	  Orbaugh	  suggests,	  but	  rather	  well	  within	  the	  domain	  of	  the	   Symbolic	   and	   signification’s	   endless	   proliferation	   and	  regeneration	  of	  signifiers	  –	  that	  Kanai	  refuses	  to	  give	  up	  the	  female	  mind’s	   access	   to	   language	   in	   exchange	   for	   the	   plenitude	   of	   ‘the	  body.’76	  	  
For	  Knighton,	  Orbaugh’s	  interpretation	  of	  the	  conclusion	  of	  ‘Rotting	  Meat’	  as	  an	  ultimately	  unhappy	  one	   for	   the	  prostitute	   (who	   ends	  up	   stuck	   in	   a	  wardrobe	  with	   a	   piece	   of	   rotting	   meat	   under	   her	   bed)	   does	   not	   do	   justice	   to	   Kanai’s	  project	  to	  challenge	  the	  gender	  hierarchy	  through	  language.	  	  By	  considering	  the	  short	  story’s	  use	  of	  metonymy	  and	  metaphor,	  Knighton	  instead	  illustrates	  how	  the	   woman	   is	   able	   to	   exact	   her	   revenge	   on	   a	   Levi-­‐Straussian	   homosocial	  economy	   of	   exchange	   in	   which	   she	   is	   configured	   as	   an	   object.	   	   For	   instance,	  Knighton	  points	  out	  that	  ‘rotting	  meat’	  at	  first	  denotes	  the	  woman	  (by	  seeming	  to	   be	   her	   smell),	   but	   by	   the	   end	   of	   her	   narrative	   we	   realise	   it	   refers	   to	   the	  butcher	  she	  murdered	  who	  is	  rotting	  under	  her	  bed,	  and	  even	  to	  the	  male	  frame	  narrator,	   whose	   innards	   are	   rotting,	   and	   whose	   mouth	   is	   therefore	   made	   to	  
                                            76	  Mary	  Knighton,	  'Writing	  the	  Body	  as	  Meat:	  Kanai	  Mieko's	  "Rotting	  Meat"	  as	  Surreal	  Fable',	   in	   Japanese	   Studies	   around	   the	   World	   2004.	   Observing	   Japan	   from	   Within:	  
Perspectives	   of	   Foreign	   Scholars	   Resident	   in	   Japan,	   ed.	   James	   Baxter	   (International	  Research	  Centre	  for	  Japanese	  Studies,	  2004)	  pp.	  161-­‐88,	  p.	  177.	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‘savor	   of	   her	   own	   pungently	   “meaty”	   presence’.77	  	   The	   rotting	   of	   the	   frame	  narrator’s	   innards,	   Knighton	   posits,	   is	   metaphorical	   for	   how	   the	   woman	   has	  taken	  over	  the	  telling	  of	  his	  story,	  and	  has	  thus	  managed,	  through	  language,	  to	  reformulate	  her	  relationship	  within	  the	  economy	  of	  exchange	  so	  that	  she	  is	  the	  victor.	  
The	   final	   of	   the	   four	   critics	   of	   these	   stories,	   Takeuchi	   Kayō,	   balances	  materialist	   and	   post-­‐structuralist	   readings	   throughout,	   but	   her	   conclusion	  supports	  a	  materialist	  reading	  of	  Kanai’s	  literature.	   	  She	  commences	  her	  2008	  essay	  by	  pointing	  out	   how,	   from	   the	   very	  beginning	  of	   her	   career,	  Kanai	  was	  openly	  critical	  of	  the	  divisive	  language	  used	  both	  by	  the	  Japanese	  women’s	  lib	  movement	  and	  in	  contemporary	  discursive	  constructions	  of	  ‘woman’.78	  	  Thus,	  she	   asserts,	   citing	   from	   two	   different	   sources,	   Kanai	   can	   be	   considered	   as	  ‘unconnected’	   (muen)	   to	   feminism,	   and	   should	   instead	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   ‘an	  investigator	  of	  gender	  who	  uses	  independent	  methods’	  (dokuji	  no	  hōhō	  ni	  tatsu	  
jendā	  no	  tankyūsha).79	  	  Instead,	  Takeuchi	  argues,	  ‘Rabbits’	  is	  better	  considered	  
                                            77	  Ibid.,	  p.	  179.	  78	  Takeuchi	  Kayō,	   'Kanai	  Mieko	  “Usagi”	  o	  meguru	  kuia	  –	   “shōjo”	  no	  monogatori	  kara	  “watashi”	  no	  monogatari	  e',	  Shōwa	  bungaku	  kenkyū	  2008,	  pp.	  163-­‐84,	  p.	  163.	  79 	  Takeuchi	   writes:	   ‘From	   the	   time	   that	   she	   made	   her	   debut,	   [Kanai]	   was	  “unconnected”	  to	  “the	  school	  of	  “feminism”,	  being	  “an	  investigator	  of	  gender	  who	  used	  independent	  methods”’.	   	   (‘[Kanai]	  wa	  debyū	   tōsho	  kara,	   “feminizumu”	  naru	   ryūha	   to	  wa’	   ‘muen’	  no	   ‘dokuji	  no	  hōhō	  ni	   tatsu	   jendā	  no	   tankyūsha’	  de	  atta’).	   Ibid.,	  p.	  163.	   In	  this	   statement,	   Takeuchi	   picks	   out	   quotes	   from	   two	  major	   critics	   on	   Kanai	   in	   Japan	  who	  are	  actually	  at	  odds	  with	  each	  other	  in	  their	  interpretations	  of	  her	  works	  and	  their	  relation	   to	   feminism.	   	   Interestingly,	   the	   first	   two	   citations	   here	   (that	   Kanai	   was	  ‘unconnected’	  to	  ‘the	  school	  of	  “feminism”’)	  are	  taken	  from	  Suga	  Hidemi,	  'Kanai	  Mieko:	  Hito	   to	   sakuhin'	   [‘Kanai	   Mieko:	   People	   and	   Art’]	   in	   Shōwa	   bungaku	   zenshū	   (Tokyo:	  Shōgakukan,	   1988)	   pp.	   961-­‐64,	   in	  which	   Suga	   praises	  Kanai’s	   literary	   achievements,	  which	  he	  claims	  transcend	  all	  transient	  literary	  trends	  such	  as	  ‘feminism’.	  	  The	  second	  citation	  here,	  that	  Kanai	  is	  ‘an	  investigator	  of	  gender	  who	  used	  independent	  methods’,	  is	  from	  Kitada,	  'Kanai	  Mieko	  ni	  okeru	  "shōjo"	  to	  "boken"',	  p.144.	  	  However,	  in	  her	  1993	  paper,	   Kitada	   criticises	   Suga	   for	   his	   comment	   that	   Kanai	   was	   ‘unconnected’	   to	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as	  an	  early	  example	  of	  ‘queer	  literature’.80	  	  Takeuchi	  then	  proceeds	  to	  analyse	  Sayuri’s	  acts	  of	  transgression	  by	  applying	  Butler’s	  theory	  of	  performativity	  (in	  which	   the	   founding	   principles	   of	   ‘queer	   theory’	   are	   set	   out)81	  and	   seeks	   to	  demonstrate,	   at	   first	   similarly	   to	   Orbaugh,	   how	   the	   shōjo’s	   activities	   can	   be	  viewed	  as	  gender	  performances	  which	  reverse,	   thereby	  posing	  a	  challenge	   to,	  patriarchal	   configurations.	   	   However,	   Takeuchi	   takes	   Orbaugh’s	   line	   of	  argument	   further	   to	   contend,	   for	   instance,	   that	   the	   shōjo’s	   assumption	   of	   the	  father’s	   role	   in	   butchering	   the	   rabbits,	   and	   subsequent	   transition	   to	   a	  performed	  passivity	  in	  dressing	  up	  for	  her	  father	  as	  a	  rabbit	  ‘demonstrates	  the	  transformability	   and	   plurality	   of	   gender	   and	   disrupts	   the	   binaries	   of	  modern	  patriarchy’	   (jendā	   no	   kahensei/tayōsei	   o	   shimeshi,	   nibunhōkihan	   o	   kakuran	  
suru).82	  	   Sayuri’s	   repeated	   transgressions	   thus	   ‘deconstruct	   the	   fixedness	   of	  identity’	   (aidentitī	  no	  koteisei	  o	  datsukōchiku	   suru).83	  	   But	   Takeuchi	   does	   not	  wish	  to	  read	  Sayuri’s	  transgressive	  actions	  simply	  as	  the	  actions	  of	  a	  subversive	  woman,	  because	  this	  would	  be	  to	  reassert	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  gender	  binaries	  
                                                                                                                           feminism	   and	   describes	   his	   understanding	   of	   feminism	   as	   ‘shallow’.	   	   (See	   Kitada,	  'Usagi:	  Hito	  to	  bungaku',	  p.	  156.)	  80	  Takeuchi,	   'Kanai	   Mieko	   “Usagi”	   o	   meguru	   kuia	   –	   “shōjo”	   no	   monogatori	   kara	  “watashi”	  no	  monogatari	  e',	  p.	  164.	  Takeuchi	  explains	  that	  the	  term	  ‘queer’,	  originally	  meaning	  ‘strange’	  or	  ‘weird’,	  used	  to	  be	  a	  derogatory	  term	  for	  gay	  men	  in	  the	  UK,	  but	  that	  from	  the	  1990s	  it	  was	  reappropriated	  by	  the	  gay	  community.	  	  Eventually	  the	  term	  infiltrated	   the	  mainstream,	   even	  being	  used	  by	   academia	   for	   studies	   that	   investigate	  gay	  and	   lesbian	   cultures,	   and	   the	   challenges	   that	   they,	   and	   feminist	  writers,	  make	   to	  heterosexual,	  patriarchal	  hegemonies.	  81	  According	   to	   Judith	   Butler’s	   theory	   of	   performativity,	   subjectivity	   (and	   therefore,	  gender)	   is	   not	   fixed	   or	   pre-­‐determined,	   but	   established	   and	   re-­‐established	   through	  every	   performance,	   which	   includes	   every	   gesture	   and	   speech	   act	   that	   the	   individual	  makes.	  	  	  	  82	  Takeuchi,	   'Kanai	   Mieko	   “Usagi”	   o	   meguru	   kuia	   –	   “shōjo”	   no	   monogatori	   kara	  “watashi”	  no	  monogatari	  e',	  pp.	  163-­‐64.	  83Ibid.,	  p.	  164.	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that	   Kanai’s	   text	   appears	   so	   keen	   to	   dismantle.	   Takeuchi	   instead	   emphasises	  how,	  in	  ‘Rabbits’,	  it	  is	  the	  shōjo’s	  over-­‐active	  sexuality	  (illustrated	  by	  her	  taking	  over	  of	  the	  butchering	  role),	  and	  not	  her	  gender,	  which	  governs	  her	  behaviour	  and	   leads	   to	   her	   isolation.84	  	   Therefore,	   Takeuchi	   contends,	   the	   shōjo	   in	   this	  work	  should	  be	  considered	  a	  motif	  for	  queer	  identity.	  Furthermore,	  she	  argues,	  the	  frame	  narrator	  watashi’s	  genderlessness	  and	  anonymity	  enables	  her/him	  to	  assume	   different	   genders	   and	   identities,	   and	   therefore	   s/he	   should	   also	   be	  considered	   a	   motif	   for	   queer	   identity.	   	   The	   frame	   narrator’s	   alignment	   with	  ‘queer’	  identities	  is	  further	  confirmed	  by	  the	  way	  in	  which	  s/he	  dresses	  in	  the	  
shōjo’s	  rabbit	  suit.	   	  To	  conclude,	  Takeuchi	  argues	  that	   ‘the	  scarred	  body	  of	  the	  
shōjo	  and	  the	  silence	  of	  the	  rabbits	  are	  symbolic	  of	  oppression	  and	  defeat’	  and	  therefore	   that	   ‘Rabbits’	   serves	   to	   highlight	   the	   literal,	   physical	   and	   material	  damage	   done	   to	   dispossessed	   genders	   and	   sexualities,	   illustrating	   the	  oppressiveness	  of	  patriarchy.85	  
Finally,	   in	   the	   most	   recent	   critical	   reading	   of	   ‘Rabbits’,	   Knighton	  responds	  to	  interpretations	  of	  the	  trope	  of	  the	  shōjo	  which,	  she	  contends,	  have	  been	  ‘neatly	  polarized’	  into	  those	  who	  reject	  ‘the	  angry,	  demonic,	  and	  vengeful	  “girl”	   as	   the	   true	   literary	   and	   cultural-­‐historical	   version	   of	   Japan’s	   shōjo’,	   and	  those	   who	   revel	   in	   this	   image.86	  	   ‘Rabbits’,	   she	   asserts,	   is	   a	   work	   which	  complicates	   this	   debate	   by	   revealing	   the	   shōjo	   to	   be	   as	   innocent	   as	   she	   is	  grotesque	   and	   perverse,	   and	   thus	   reclaims	   a	   fuller	   range	   of	   terms	   through	  
                                            84	  Ibid.,	  See	  pp.	  167-­‐168.	  85	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  170-­‐171.	  86	  Mary	   Knighton,	   'Down	   the	   Rabbit	   Hole:	   In	   Pursuit	   of	   Shōjo	   Alices,	   from	   Lewis	  Carroll	  to	  Kanai	  Mieko',	  U.S.-­‐Japan	  Women's	  Journal	  40	  (2011),	  49-­‐89.	  pp.	  50	  –	  51.	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which	   to	   represent	   her,	   illustrating	   again	   that	   Kanai’s	   feminist	   agency	   is	  achieved	   through	   her	   skilful	   deployment	   of	   language.	   	   And	   yet,	   Knighton	  explains,	  textual	  analysis	  of	  ‘Rabbits’	  has	  hitherto	  also	  been	  polarised	  into	  those	  critics	  who	   frame	  the	  shōjo’s	  narrative	  as	  one	  of	   ‘sweetly	  erotic’	  desire	  (Eros),	  and	  those	  who	  frame	  it	  as	  ‘sacrificial	  desire’	  (pathos).87	  	  Further,	  regardless	  of	  which	  emphasis	  critics	  elect,	  all	  readings	  have	  interpreted	  the	  shōjo’s	  sexuality	  as	   the	   result	   of	   ‘the	   violent	   “repression”	   of	   incest	   or	   rape’.88	  	   	   However,	  Knighton	   argues,	   the	   narrative	   of	   the	   shōjo	  expresses,	   rather	   than	   represses,	  her	  story	  of	   incest;	   it	   is	   ‘an	  open	  secret’	   for	  anyone	  who	  can	  read	  the	  signs.89	  	  As	   incest	   is	   not	   always	   the	   same	   story,	   these	   signs	   are	   important	   to	  understanding	   the	   shōjo’s	   plight,	   and	   through	   reading	   them	   it	   is	   possible	   to	  discover	  what	  kind	  of	  story	  of	  incest	  the	  shōjo	  wishes	  to	  tell.	  	  Knighton’s	  article	  also	  points	  out	  many	  ways	   in	  which	  Kanai	   (along	  with	  other	  members	  of	   the	  1970s	  Japanese	  avant-­‐garde	  scene)	  recycles	  symbolism	  from	  Alice’s	  Adventures	  
in	  Wonderland,	  and,	  in	  contrast	  to	  Kitada	  who	  stresses	  the	  differences	  between	  Alice	  and	   the	  shōjo	  in	   ‘Rabbits’,	  highlights	   the	  parallels	  between	   the	   two	  girls,	  writing	   that	   ‘Rabbits’	   implements	   the	   ‘return	  of	  Alice’.90	  	  For	   instance,	   just	  as	  some	   of	   the	   imagery	   in	  Alice’s	  Adventures	   in	  Wonderland	  explicitly	   sexualises	  Alice	  (as	  exemplified	  by	  her	  sexualised	  association	  with	  the	  striking	  red	  Tiger	  Lily)	  so	  too,	  Kanai’s	  ‘Rabbits’	  charts	  the	  shōjo’s	  transition	  into	  a	  ‘Demonic	  Tiger	  
                                            87	  Ibid.,	  p.	  50.	  88	  Ibid.,	  p.	  50.	  89	  Ibid.,	  p.	  60.	  90	  Ibid.,	  See	  pp.	  61–66.	  
 60 
Lily’,	   who	   bathes	   in	   the	   blood	   of	   the	   innocent	   rabbits.91	  	   Knighton	   thus	  concludes	   that	   by	   creating	   a	   grotesque	   and	   parodic	   narrative	   of	   normative	  sexuality,	   ‘Rabbits’	  formulates	  an	  image	  of	  the	  shōjo	  which	  is	  able	  to	  move	  her	  beyond	  simplistic	  and	  polarised	  representations	  as	  either	  angel	  or	  whore	  which	  often	  beleaguer	   feminist	   critics	   in	   their	   analyses,	   and	   thus,	   as	   a	   text,	   it	   is	   still	  able	   to	   challenge	   the	   dichotomisation	   of	   discourses	   surrounding	   the	   shōjo	  today.	  
The	   seeming	   dichotomy	   between	   materialist	   readings	   and	   post-­‐structuralist	  readings	  leads	  us	  back	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether,	  or	  how	  far,	  the	  purely	   textual/aesthetic	   is	   inevitably	   disengaged	   from	   the	   political.	   	   Put	  another	   way,	   one	   needs	   to	   be	   wary	   of	   even	   claiming	   that	   such	   a	  materialist/post-­‐structuralist	   dichotomy	   exists,	   not	   least	   because	   the	  motivating	   logic,	   as	   it	  were,	   of	   post-­‐structuralism	   is	   to	   disavow	   the	   frame	   or	  containment	  implicit	  in	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  (singular)	  reading.	  	  If	  there	  are	  only	  ever	  multiple	  readings,	  then	  the	  conceptual	  separation	  of	  readings	  one	  from	  another	  (where	   we	   might	   more	   fruitfully	   regard	   their	   [inter-­‐]	   relationship	   as	  constellatory)	  becomes	  impossible	  to	  sustain.	  
	  
Reading	  ‘Rabbits’	  as	  a	  Polaroppositionalist	  Text	  
Returning	   to	   the	   various	   contexts	   within	   which	   we	   might	   wish	   to	   situate	  Kanai’s	  writings,	  we	  can	   formulate	   the	  above	  question	  more	   specifically:	  how	  far	   can	   we	   claim	   that	   Kanai’s	   deployment	   of	   techniques	   gleaned	   from	   the	  Japanese	   avant-­‐garde,	  which	   she	  wrote	   alongside,	   resist	   being	   categorised	   as	  
                                            91	  Ibid.,	  p.	  71.	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mere	   surrealist	   jeux	  d’esprit	   (if	   they	   ever	  were	   so	   categorised);	   and	   can	   such	  techniques	  be	  read	  more	  productively	  as	  being	  instrumental	  to	  a	  fundamental	  socio-­‐political	   engagement	   with	   questions	   of	   gender	   and	   identity?	   As	   an	  exemplar	  of	  these	  techniques,	  let	  us	  turn	  first	  to	  the	  cultural	  output	  of	  Okamoto	  Tarō.	  
Okamoto	   reached	   celebrity	   status	   in	   Japan	   during	   the	   1980s	   for	   his	  numerous	   TV	   appearances	   on	   variety	   shows,	   commercials,	   and	   for	   the	  catchphrase	  that	  encapsulated	  his	  philosophy:	  ‘Geijutsu	  wa	  bakuhatsu	  da!’	  (‘Art	  is	   an	   explosion!’).	   These	   mainstream	   media	   appearances	   and	   Okamoto’s	  contribution	  of	  Taiyō	  no	  tō	  (Tower	  of	  the	  Sun)	  to	  Expo	  ’70	  (an	  exhibition	  under	  the	  theme	  of	  ‘The	  Progress	  and	  Harmony	  of	  Mankind’	  which	  was	  already	  widely	  felt	   among	   avant-­‐garde	   artists	   to	   have	   been	   symbolic	   of	   a	   selling	   out	   of	  ‘radicalism’	  for	  a	  nationalist	  project	  that	  smoothed	  over	  Japan’s	  turbulent	  past)	  seem	   to	  have	  obscured	   the	   subversiveness	  of	  Okamoto’s	   intent.92	  	  As	   several	  critics	   have	   recently	   argued,	   the	   contribution	   of	   the	   Tower	   of	   the	   Sun	   was	  actually	   an	   ‘anti-­‐expo’	   act;	   Okamoto	   had	   wanted	   to	   create	   a	   ‘hideous	   thing’	  (berabō	  na	  mono)	   to	   penetrate	   the	   big	   roof	   of	   the	   expo	   (initially	   proposed	   to	  encase	   and	   cover	   the	   entire	   exhibition	   compound)	   and	   destroy	   its	   symbolic	  unifying	   and	   harmonising	   effect. 93 	  	   This	   sculpture	   has	   also	   been	  
                                            92	  C.	   Cassegard,	   'Japan's	   Lost	   Decade	   and	   Its	   Two	   Recoveries:	   On	   Sawaragi	   Noi,	  Japanese	   Neo-­‐Pop	   and	   Anti-­‐War	   Activism',	   in	   Perversion	   and	   Modern	   Japan:	  
Psychoanalysis,	   Literature,	   Culture,	   ed.	   Nina	   Cornyetz	   and	   J.	   Keith	   Vincent	   (London:	  Routledge,	  2010)	  pp.	  38-­‐59,	  p.	  46.	  93 	  Ibid.,	   p.	   51.	   This	   rejuvenated	   interest	   perhaps	   stems	   not	   only	   from	   the	  commemoration	  of	  Okamoto’s	  100th	  birthday	  in	  March	  2011,	  which	  prompted	  a	  special	  edition	   dedicated	   to	  Okamoto	   in	  Bijutsu	  Techō,	   but	   also	   from	   renowned	   avant-­‐garde	  artist	   Sawaragi	  Noi’s	   book,	   Sawaragi	  Noi,	  Kuroi	   taiyō	   to	  akai	  kani	   -­‐	  Okamoto	  Tarō	  no	  
Nihon	   [Black	   Suns	   and	   Red	   Crabs:	   Okamoto	   Tarō	   ‘s	   Japan]	   (Tokyo:	   Chūō	   Kōronsha,	  2003),	  which	  Cassegard	  examines	  in	  detail	  in	  his	  article.	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recontextualised	  within	   the	   importance	   of	   his	   contribution	   to	   postwar	   avant-­‐garde	  surrealist	  movement	  discussions	  on	  the	  future	  of	  art	  through	  his	  theory	  of	  polaroppositionalism	  (taikyokushugi).94	  
Since	  his	   time	   in	  Paris	   in	   the	  1930s,	  where	  he	  met	  artists	  and	  thinkers	  including	   Breton,	   George	   Bataille,	   and	   Kurt	   Seligmann,	   Okamoto	   had	   been	  intrigued	  by	  the	  increasing	  polarity	  developing	  in	  the	  arts.	  	  He	  understood	  this	  polarity	  as	  a	  rupture	  and	  distancing	  between	  the	  supposedly	  ‘rational’	  art	  form,	  cubism,	   and	   ‘irrational’	   art	   form,	   surrealism.95	  	   The	   notion	   that	   cubism	   and	  surrealism	  were	  polarised	  and	  polarising	  became	  accepted	  among	   intellectual	  circles	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1930s	  onwards.	  	  That	  it	  did	  so,	  can	  be	  partly	  attributed	  to	  the	   work	   of	   the	   American	   art	   historian	   and	   the	   first	   ever	   director	   of	   the	  Museum	   of	   Modern	   Art	   (MoMA)	   in	   New	   York,	   Alfred	   H	   Barr	   Jr.	   	   In	   order	   to	  publicise	  the	  exhibition	  of	  ‘Cubism	  and	  Abstract	  Art’	  at	  the	  gallery	  in	  1936,	  Barr	  created	   a	   flow	   chart	   (which	   came	   to	   be	   known	   as	   ‘Barr’s	   Chart’).	   	   The	   chart	  indicated	  whether	  various	  art	  movements	  and	  forms,	  from	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century	   onwards,	   such	   as	   neo-­‐impressionism,	   futurism,	   dadism,	   or	   Japanese	  prints,	  fed	  into	  the	  category	  of	  ‘non-­‐geometrical	  abstract	  art’	  (arts	  which	  depict	  organic	  shapes),	  or	  ‘geometrical	  abstract	  art’	  (those	  in	  which	  lines	  and	  colours	  are	   themselves	   the	   focus	   of	   the	   work),	   or	   both.96	  	   As	   many	   contemporary	  
                                            94	  Cassegard,	  'Japan's	  Lost	  Decade	  and	  Its	  Two	  Recoveries:	  On	  Sawaragi	  Noi,	  Japanese	  Neo-­‐Pop	  and	  Anti-­‐War	  Activism',	  	  It	  was	  resituated	  in	  this	  context	  by	  Sawaragi,	  whose	  stance	  Cassegard	  notes.	  95 	  Otani,	   S.,	   'Okamoto	   Tarō	   no	   "taikyokushugi"	   no	   seiritsu	   o	   megutte'	   [‘On	   the	  Formation	   of	   Okamoto	   Tarō’s	   Polaroppositionalism’]	   18-­‐36.	   Otani	   argues	   that	  Okamoto’s	   polaroppositionalism,	   whilst	   constituting	   a	   unique	   and	   increasingly	  crystallised	  vision	  of	  the	  author	  throughout	  his	  career,	  contained	  ideas	  shared	  among	  other	  thinkers	  both	  in	  Europe	  and	  Japan	  from	  the	  1930s	  onwards.	  96	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  24-­‐26.	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artists	  were	  concerned	  either	  with	  surrealism,	  which	  was	  decisively	  placed	   in	  the	   former	   category,	   or	   with	   cubism,	   which	   was	   most	   representative	   of	   the	  latter	  category,	   the	  chart	  became	  more	  commonly	  known	  as	  an	   illustration	  of	  their	  respective	  genealogies.	  
Barr’s	  depiction	  of	   the	  genealogies	  of	   surrealism	  and	  cubism	  gradually	  polarising	   appealed	   to	   many	   members	   of	   the	   avant-­‐garde	   at	   the	   time,	   as	   it	  echoed	  their	  own	  sentiments,	  including	  Okamoto’s,	  who	  brought	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  chart	  back	  with	  him	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  for	  exhibition	  and	  discussion	  in	   Japan. 97 	  In	   his	   1948	   publication,	   Gabunshū	   avangyarudo	   (Avant-­‐garde	  
Pictures	  and	  Letters),	  Okamoto	  writes	  that	  the	  conceptual	  polarisation	  of	  these	  two	   arts	   was	   a	   positive	   development.98	  	   He	   describes	   how	   the	   synthesis	   of	  paradoxes	  during	  the	  late	  1920s	  and	  1930s	  in	  Japan	  had	  led	  to	  a	  nihilism	  that	  emphasised	  the	  lack	  of	  meaning,	  or	  power,	  of	  art	  and	  language,	  and	  constituted	  a	   weakening	   of	   surrealist	   philosophy.99	  	   For	   Okamoto,	   this	   weakening	   of	  surrealist	   philosophy	   in	   Japan	   had	   in	   turn	   seen	   some	   surrealists	   succumb	   to	  patriotism,	   or	   to	   a	   rhetoric	   which	   rendered	   the	   realities	   of	   war	   abstract	   or	  
                                            97	  Ibid.,	   p.	   24.	   Otani	   explains	   that	   Barr’s	   chart	   appeared	   first	   in	   an	   avant-­‐garde	  magazine	  in	  Japan	  in	  1936,	  translated	  by	  Terada	  Takeo,	  and	  was	  discussed	  by	  others	  at	  the	  time	  as	  an	  important	  paradigm.	  	  It	  reappeared	  with	  Okamoto	  after	  the	  war	  in	  both	  his	   1948	   publication	  Gabunshū	   avangyarudo,	   and	   in	   various	   exhibitions	   designed	   to	  discuss	  the	  importance	  of	  art	  immediately	  after	  the	  war.	  98	  Okamoto	   Tarō,	   Gabunshū	   avangyarudo	   (Japan:	   Getsuyō	   shoten,	   1948)	   pp.123-­‐24.	  This	  book	   is	  so	  rare	   that	   it	  has	  now	  become	  a	  collector’s	   item	  and	  I	  was	  only	  able	   to	  view	   a	   copy	   of	   it	   by	   visiting	   the	   National	   Diet	   Library	   in	   Tokyo.	   	   The	   closer	   textual	  analysis	  that	  I	  make	  in	  this	  chapter	  are	  from	  excerpts	  which	  Otani	  cites	  in	  the	  original	  Japanese	  and	   from	  Nariai	  Hajime,	   'Taikyokushugi:	  Mujun	  toiu	  hikisakareta	  kizuguchi'	  ‘Polaroppositionalism:	  The	  Paradox	  of	  the	  Torn	  Wound’,	  Bijutsu	  techō,	  63	  (2011),	  56-­‐57.	   Both	   articles	   discuss	   how	   Okamoto	   was	   focused	   on	   the	   positive	   aspects	   of	  polarisation	  in	  the	  arts.	  99	  Nariai,	  'Taikyokushugi:	  Mujun	  toiu	  hikisakareta	  kizuguchi'	  p.	  57.	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unreal.100	  Instead,	   in	   his	   theory	   of	   polaroppositionalism,	   Okamoto	   proposed	  that	  maintaining	  tensions	  between	  two	  unresolvable	  and	  paradoxical	  positions	  was	  essential	  to	  developing	  a	  healthy	  post-­‐war	  avant-­‐garde	  culture.	  
Although	  an	   important	  voice	  among	  post-­‐war	  art	   critics,	  Okamoto	  was	  not	   the	  only	  member	  of	   the	  avant-­‐garde	   to	  have	  been	  profoundly	  dissatisfied	  with	  the	  ability	  of	  Japanese	  surrealism	  to	  sustain	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  war.	  	  In	  1970,	  artist	  and	  critic	  Tsuruoka	  Yoshihisa	  criticised	  the	  ‘weak’	  nihilism	  of	  the	  pre-­‐war	  work	   of	   surrealist	   Kitasono	   Katsue	   (among	   others),	   who	   had,	   in	   Tsuruoka’s	  view,	   rendered	  art	   and	   language	  devoid	  of	   the	  power	   to	   resist	  or	  protest.101	  	  Kitasono	  had	  proclaimed	  that	  his	   ‘paradoxical’	  surrealist	  symbol	  of	  the	  1930s,	  ‘The	  Vacuum	  Tube’	  denoted	  the	   ‘essence	  of	  art’	  which	  was	   ‘nothing	  at	  all’.102	  	  As	  Miryam	  Sas	  writes,	  Kitasono’s	  use	  of	  the	  vacuum,	  a	  sign	  which	  drew	  on	  both	  scientific	  notions	  of	  ‘absence’,	  and	  a	  Buddhist	  aesthetic	  of	  mu	  (the	  void),	  and	  his	  ‘double	   negative’	   signification	   of	   the	   vacuum	   (‘nanimono	  mo	  nai’	   ‘the	   nothing	  working	   in	   nothingness’),	   has	   been	   considered	   a	   ‘dangerous	  moment	   for	   the	  stability	  of	  social	  understanding	  and	  the	  construction	  of	  individual	  or	  personal	  identity’.103	  	  This	  is	  because	  it	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  negate	  the	  importance	  of	  art	  to	  ‘reality’,	   and	   to	  deny	   its	  own	  potential	   and	   the	  potential	  of	   individual	   lives	   to	  achieve	  lasting	  meaning,	  or,	  to	  imply	  that	  the	  greatest	  achievement	  in	  life	  lay	  in	  transcendence	  of	   ‘reality’	   through	  death.	   	  That	  surrealism	   in	   this	   time	  offered	  
                                            100	  Ibid.	  p.	  56-­‐57.	  Also	  see:	  Okamoto,	  Gabunshū	  avangyarudo,	  pp.	  123-­‐24.	  	  101	  Miryam	   Sas,	   Fault	   Lines:	   Cultural	   Memory	   and	   Japanese	   Surrealism	   	   (Stanford,	  California:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1999)	  p.	  53.	  102	  Ibid.,	  p.	  68.	  103	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  68-­‐71.	  
 65 
an	   ideology	  which	  evinced	   apathy	   to	  political	   life	   can	  be	   read	  as	   a	   significant	  comment	  on	  Japanese	  surrealists’	  wartime	  relationship	  to	  authority.	  	  It	  indeed	  suggests,	  as	  Okamoto	  intimates,	  that	  surrealism	  was	  used	  as	  a	  means	  to	  escape	  reality,	  rather	  than	  contest	  or	  critique	  it.	  
Although	   Okamoto	   initially	   formulated	   his	   theory	   of	  polaroppositionalism	  during	  the	  1930s,	   it	  was	  not	  until	   the	  end	  of	   the	  Second	  World	  War	  that	  he	  was	  able	  to	  openly	  propound	  it	  in	  Japan.104	  	  In	  so	  doing,	  he	  sought	  to	  expose	  hidden,	  contentious,	  even	  irreconcilable	  grievances	  in	  history.	  	  By	  bringing	  grievances	  to	  the	  fore	  through	  art	  and	  language,	  Okamoto	  wished	  to	   create	   a	   ‘loud	   and	   discordant	   sound’	   (fukyōwaon)	   which,	   in	   contrast	   to	  Kitasono’s	  peace	  and	  nothingness,	  could	  be	  used	  as	  a	  weapon	  against	  political	  complacency.105	  	  Okamoto	   therefore	  presents	   the	  very	  reverse	  non-­‐ideology-­‐ideology	  to	  that	  of	  Kitasono.	  As	  he	  writes	   in	  his	  1948	  publication	  Avant-­‐garde	  
Pictures	  and	  Letters:	  
	   […]	  we	   should	   not	   compromise	   either	   [polarity]	   in	   contrast	  we	  should,	  in	  our	  despair,	  deepen	  the	  abyss	  of	  paradox,	  and	  progress	  in	  the	  midst	  of	   its	   tensions.	  Today,	  our	  restless	  souls	  should	  not	  use	  the	  rational	  or	  the	  irrational	  to	  deflect	  one	  with	  the	  other	  in	  finding	  spiritual	  transcendence.	  Nor	  should	  we	  fuse	  those	  two	  to	  create	  a	  lukewarm	  cocktail.	  	  As	  if	  with	  the	  tension	  of	  loud	  suction	  and	  repulsion,	  our	  spiritual	  way	  is	  the	  fierce	  light	  of	  the	  fireworks	  that	   fire	   from	   the	   interval	  of	   the	  poles,	   like	   the	   torn	  mouth	  of	   a	  wound,	  it	  is	  the	  extremes	  of	  raw	  horror.	  106	  	  
                                            104	  Otani,	  'Okamoto	  Tarō	  no	  "taikyokushugi"	  no	  seiritsu	  o	  megutte	  ',	  p.	  24.	  105	  Okamoto,	  Gabunshū	  avangyarudo,	  pp.	  123-­‐24.	  106	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  123-­‐24.	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The	  passage	  quoted	  above	  invites	  us	  to	  think	  of,	  and	  locate,	  our	  own	  existence	  and	   temporality	   within	   a	   temporal	   context	   so	  massive	   that	   it	   disrupts	   –	   and	  forever	   problematises	   –	   the	   implied	   linearity	   that,	   for	   instance,	   conventional	  narrative	   accounts	   utilise	   (and,	   indeed,	   depend	   on)	   to	   provide	   an	  epistemological	   framework	   within	   which	   to	   order	   and	   understand	   human	  experience.	   	   Thus,	   in	   contradistinction	   to	   Kitasono’s	   vacuum,	   which	   is	  paradoxical	   in	   its	   double	   negative,	   creating	   a	   black	   hole	   of	   meaninglessness,	  Okamoto’s	   ‘abyss’	   is	   paradoxical	   in	   its	   drawing	   two	   polarised	   concepts	  together.	   	   These	   ‘polarities’	   are	   at	   one	   extreme,	   the	   universe’s	   explosive	  creation,	   and	   at	   the	   other,	   its	   inevitable	   collapse.	   	   Our	   fragile,	   experienced	  ‘present’	  lies	  in	  what	  he	  terms	  ‘the	  fierce	  light	  of	  the	  fireworks	  that	  fire	  from	  the	  interval	  of	  poles’.107	  	  This,	   then,	   is	   the	   ‘tension’	   in	   the	  darkness	  of	  Okamoto’s	  abyss;	   it	   appears	   to	   represent	   all	   potential	   meaning	   where	   nothing	   and	  everything	  are	  simultaneously	  possible,	  and	  it	  therefore	  constitutes	  an	  implicit	  critique	  of	  Kitasono’s	  spiralling	  of	  ‘the	  nothing	  working	  in	  nothingness’.	  108	  
But	   it	   is	  moreover	  here	   that	  Okamoto’s	  polaroppositionalism	  borrows,	  as	   it	   were,	   the	   ‘form’	   of	   atomic	   explosions	   to	   create	   expressions	   which	  demonstrate	  art	  and	   language’s	  potential	   to	  enact	   ‘real’	  or	   threatening	  action.	  Through	  his	   theory	  of	  polaroppositionalism	  and,	   as	  discussed	  below,	   through	  his	   art,	   Okamoto	   is	   able	   to	   retrieve	   a	   postmodern	   identity	  whose	   very	   origin	  relates	   to	   Japan’s	   nuclear	   holocaust,	   or	   rather,	   which	   assumes	   this	   ‘othered’	  experience	   in	   postwar	   Japanese	   history	   as	   its	   own,	   as	   its	   sign,	   or	   even	   as	   its	  
                                            107	  Ibid.,	  pp.124.	  108	  Sas,	  Fault	  Lines:	  Cultural	  Memory	  and	  Japanese	  Surrealism,	  p.	  68.	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locus.	   	   Indeed,	   as	   the	   passage	   quoted	   above	   demonstrates,	   it	   connects	   this	  origin	  to	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  universe.	  	  This	  act	  in	  itself	  marks	  a	  powerful	  paradox	  because,	  as	  Sas	  has	  noted	  about	  other	  avant-­‐garde	  artists	  who	  drew	  on	  the	  A-­‐bomb’s	  status	  as	  an	  ‘originary	  event’	  in	  the	  immediate	  postwar	  era,	  the	  A-­‐bomb	  signifies	   the	   ‘destruction	   of	   the	   present	   reality’	   and	   the	   ‘impossibility	   of	  return’.109	  	   	  As	  origin,	   it	   is	  therefore	  simultaneously	  the	  eternal	  displacement	  of	   origin,	   highlighting	   the	   fragility	  of	   the	  moment,	   a	   constant	   reminder	  of	   the	  ‘raw	  horror’	  of	  war.	  
A	   nuclear	   bomb,	   such	   as	   those	   used	   on	   Hiroshima	   and	   Nagasaki,	  compacts	  either	  uranium	  235	  or	  plutonium	  239	  with	  an	  outer	   casing	  of	  TNT.	  	  Upon	  the	   ignition	  of	   the	  TNT,	  the	  uranium	  or	  plutonium	  atoms,	  which	  usually	  repel	   each	   other,	   are	   forced	   into	   extreme	   proximity	   until	   a	   uranium	   or	  plutonium	   nucleus	   absorbs	   a	   neutron	   from	   another	   uranium	   or	   plutonium	  nucleus.	   	  This	   temporarily	  swells	  and	  excites	   the	  atom,	  before	  splitting	   it	   into	  several	   faster	  moving	   lighter	   elements.	   	   These	   elements	   are	   absorbed	  by	   and	  split	   into	   further	   atoms,	   resulting	   in	   a	   rapid	   chain	   reaction,	   which	   is	  accompanied	   by	   the	   release	   of	   a	   huge	   amount	   of	   energy. 110	  Polaroppositionalism	  similarly	  brings	  together	  two	  concepts,	  or	  traits,	  such	  as	  ‘rationality’	   and	   ‘irrationality’,	   which	   cannot	   be	   reconciled,	   and	   which	   are	  oppositionally	  placed.	  In	  so	  doing,	  it	  affirms	  the	  existence,	  and	  validity,	  of	  both,	  neither	  ‘deflect[ing]	  one	  with	  the	  other’	  thereby	  negating	  the	  importance	  of	  one	  
                                            109 	  Miryam	   Sas,	   Experimental	   Arts	   in	   Postwar	   Japan:	   Moments	   of	   Encounter,	  
Engagement,	  and	  Imagined	  Return	  (London:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2011)	  p.	  130.	  110	  The	  Committee	  for	  the	  Compilation	  of	  Materials	  on	  Damage	  Caused	  by	  the	  Atomic	  Bombs	  in	  Hiroshima	  and	  Nagasaki,	  Hiroshima	  and	  Nagasaki:	  The	  Physical,	  Medical,	  and	  
Social	   Effects	   of	   the	   Atomic	   Bombings.	   trans.	   Eisei	   Ishikawa	   and	   David	   L.	   Swain	  (London:	  Hutchinson,	  1981).	  	  See	  pp.	  30-­‐34.	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extreme,	   nor	   ‘fus[ing]’	   the	   two,	   in	   a	   manner	   which	   might	   compromise	   the	  integrity	  of	  both;	  creating	  a	  ‘lukewarm	  cocktail’.	  	  Instead,	  it	  creates	  an	  immense	  and	   powerful	   explosion.	   	   The	   ‘loud	   suction	   and	   repulsion’	   of	  which	  Okamoto	  writes	  again	  appears	  to	  allude	  to	  this	  trope.	  In	  an	  atomic	  explosion,	  there	  is	  first	  ‘repulsion’	  as	  the	  blast	  winds	  spread	  outwards	  faster	  than	  the	  speed	  of	  sound.	  However,	   when	   the	   initially	   high	   air	   pressure	   near	   the	   hypocentre	   of	   the	  nuclear	  blast	  drops	  low,	  there	  is	  a	  counter	  action	  of	  high	  suction	  winds,	  which	  blow	  backwards,	  compounding	  the	  damage.111	  By	   likening	  the	   ‘spiritual	  way’	  forward	  for	  Japan	  in	  this	  immediate	  postwar	  document	  to	  ‘the	  torn	  mouth	  of	  a	  wound’,	  Okamoto	  clearly	  sets	  out	  his	  intention	  to	  use	  such	  artistic	  expressions	  to	  counteract	  the	  burying	  of	  traumatic	  experiences	  and	  a	  return	  to	  a	  rhetoric	  of	  ‘peace’	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  decades.	  
Yoake	   (Daybreak),	   a	   painting	   which	   Okamoto	   completed	   shortly	   after	  writing	   the	   above	   in	   Avant-­‐garde	   Pictures	   and	   Letters	   in	   1948,	   further	  demonstrates	  his	  borrowing	  of	  the	  form	  of	  atomic	  explosions	  in	  order	  to	  create	  a	  subversive	  postmodern	  identity.112	  	  The	  title	  itself	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  bombings	  of	  Hiroshima	  and	  Nagasaki,	  during	  which	  the	  bright	  flash	  and	  fireball	   that	  momentarily	  hung	  on	   the	  horizon,	  was	  so	  enormous,	   it	  displaced	  the	   morning	   sun.	   	   The	   painting	   recalls	   polaroppositionalism	   by	   repeatedly	  presenting	  us	  with	  two	  extremes,	  or	  poles,	  which	  are	  simultaneously	  brought	  to	  the	  fore.	  	  	  
                                            111	  Ibid.,	  See	  pp.	  37-­‐39.	  112	  Okamoto	   Tarō,	   'Yoake'	   	   (Tokyo:	   The	   Tokyo	   National	   Museum	   of	   Modern	   Art,	  1948).	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Fig.	  1	  Yoake	  (Daybreak)	  by	  Okamoto	  Tarō	  
	  For	   instance,	   the	   painting	   contrasts	   the	   organic	   curves	   of	   a	   surrealist	  landscape,	  with	   the	  defined	   lines	   and	  primary	   colour	   contrasts	   for	  which,	   for	  instance,	   the	  art	  works	  of	  cubist	  painter	  Piet	  Mondrian	  are	  renowned.	   	   It	  also	  contrasts	  darkness	  and	  light,	  suggesting	  a	  fragment	  of	  time	  in	  which	  night	  and	  day	   exist	   simultaneously.	   	   The	   collision	   of	   shade	   and	   tone	   is	   depicted	   as	   an	  explosion	  of	  sharp	  shards,	  in	  a	  range	  of	  hues.	  	  Some	  of	  these	  shards	  fit	  together	  to	  form	  various	  flat	  primitivist	  shapes	  and	  are	  evocative	  of	  images	  of	  man	  and	  woman,	   and	   bird	   and	   beast.	   Primitivism	   mimics	   the	   art	   works	   of	   ancient	  cultures,	   evoking	   the	   theme	   of	   ‘origin’.	   	  Many	   surrealists,	   including	  Okamoto,	  employed	   primitivism	   as	   a	   means	   of	   asserting	   a	   pre-­‐civilised,	   illogical,	   non-­‐modern	  origin,	  or	   self,	   as	  a	  means	  of	   challenging	   the	  modern	  prioritisation	  of	  the	   supposedly	   rational	   facets	   of	   humankind	   (such	   as	   the	   conscious	   realm,	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rational	   discourse,	   and	   social,	   moral	   and	   legal	   codes).113	  	   For	   Okamoto,	  primitivism	  was	  also	  a	  means	  of	   locating	  an	  historic	   Japanese	  origin	   that	  was	  alternative,	   not	   only	   to	   Japan’s	   recent	   origins	   as	   a	  modern	  militarised	   nation	  state,	  but	  also	   to	   the	  mythical	  origins	   that	   this	   state	  had	  aestheticised	   for	   the	  purposes	   of	   war	   propaganda. 114 	  However,	   as	   the	   primitivist	   shapes	   in	  
Daybreak	  double	  as	   fragments	  of	   splintering	   light	   and	  darkness	  and	   illustrate	  the	   obliteration	   of	   both	   night	   and	   day,	   here,	   the	   ‘origin’	   that	   the	   primitivist	  shapes	   evoke	   is	   incontestably	   postmodern;	   fractured,	   non-­‐linear,	   and	  momentary.	  
Okamoto’s	   art,	   and	   his	   1948	   discussion	   of	   the	   polarity	   of	   the	   arts	   in	  
Avant-­‐garde	  Pictures	  and	  Letters	  has	  many	  parallels	  with	  Derrida’s	  1966	  lecture	  ‘Structure,	   Sign	   and	   Play	   in	   the	   Discourse	   of	   the	   Human	   Sciences’.	   	   In	   this	  lecture,	   as	  was	  noted	   in	   the	   introduction	   to	   this	   thesis,	  Derrida	  discusses	   the	  increasing	   polarity	   of	   the	   human	   sciences	   between	   those	   ‘humanistic’	  
                                            113	  In	  the	  surrealist	  manifesto,	  Breton	  (who	  was	  a	  trained	  psychologist)	  states	  that	  he	  had	   become	   familiar	   with	   Freudian	   theories	   of	   the	   subconscious	   through	   his	  psychiatric	  studies	  and	  his	  time	  working	  with	  victims	  of	  shell-­‐shock	  in	  a	  neurological	  ward	   in	   Nantes	   during	   The	   Great	   War.	   Breton	   chooses	   to	   understand	   his	   patients’	  responses	   to	   his	   application	   of	   Freudian	   techniques	   as	   evidence	   of	   the	   unconscious	  mind,	  and	  yet,	  as	  valid	  reactions	  to	  the	  arbitrary	  horrors,	  and	  futility	  of	  war	  that	  they	  had	   experienced.	   He	   proposes	   surrealism	   as	   a	   means	   of	   exploring	   the	   realm	   of	   the	  unconscious	   and	   of	   dreams	   through	   practices	   such	   as	   automatic	   writing	   and	  embracing	   ‘insanity’	   (or	   insane-­‐like/idiosyncratic	   behaviour).	   	   This	  was	   a	   departure	  from	  Freud,	  who	  considered	  the	  conscious	  realm,	  rational	  discourse,	  and	  social,	  moral	  and	  legal	  codes	  to	  be	  primary	  in	  describing	  the	  individual	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  state.	  (For	  instance,	  in	  The	  Interpretation	  of	  Dreams	  he	  commences	  by	  outlining	  how	  he	  sought	  to	  rationalise	   dreams:	   ‘In	   the	   following	   pages	   I	   shall	   demonstrate	   that	   there	   is	   a	  psychological	  technique	  which	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  interpret	  dreams,	  and	  that	  on	  the	  application	  of	  this	  technique	  every	  dream	  will	  reveal	  itself	  as	  a	  psychological	  structure,	  full	   of	   significance,	   and	  one	  which	  may	  be	  assigned	   to	  a	   specific	  place	   in	   the	  psychic	  activities	  of	  the	  waking	  state.’	  Sigmund	  Freud,	   'The	  Interpretation	  of	  Dreams	  (1900)',	  in	   Great	   Books	   of	   the	   Western	   World:	   The	   Major	   Works	   of	   Sigmund	   Freud	   (London:	  Encyclopaedia	  Britanica,	  Inc,	  1993)	  pp.	  135-­‐398,	  p.	  135.	  	  114	  Thomas	   R.	   H.	   Havens,	   Radicals	   and	   Realists	   in	   the	   Japanese	   Nonverbal	   Arts:	   The	  
Avant-­‐Garde	  Rejection	  of	  Modernism	  (Hawai’i:	  University	  of	  Hawai'i	  Press,	  2006)	  p.	  77.	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endeavours	  which	  search	   for	  a	  single	  origin,	  and	  studies	  which	  affirm	   infinite	  play.	   	  Towards	  his	   conclusion	  Derrida	  asserts:	   ‘[T]hese	   two	   interpretations	  of	  interpretation	  –	  which	  are	  absolutely	  irreconcilable	  […]	  must	  acknowledge	  and	  accentuate	   their	  difference	  and	  define	   their	   irreducibility.’115	  	   It	   is	   important	  to	   emphasise	   here	   that	   neither	  Okamoto	  nor	  Derrida’s	   subversion	  of	  modern	  narratives	   constitutes	   the	  negation	  or	   suppression	  of	   those	  narratives;	   rather	  their	   inclusion	   is	   crucial	   to	   the	   discourse	   of	   the	   ‘irreconcilability’	  which	   they	  forge.	   	   They	   both	   acknowledge	   its	   presence,	   Derrida	   in	   the	   form	   of	   the	  humanism	   which	   seeks	   for	   a	   single	   origin,	   and	   Okamoto	   in	   his	   decision	   to	  contribute	  (albeit	  irreverently)	  to	  Expo	  ’70,	  or	  in	  the	  shapes	  which	  approximate	  recognisable	   genders	   in	   his	   painting	   Daybreak.	   	   In	   doing	   so,	   they	   both	  knowingly	   endanger	   their	   own	   theories:	   the	   ‘modern’	   always	   attempts	   to	  encompass	   all	   within	   one	   grand	   meta-­‐narrative;	   therefore,	   a	   postmodern	  theory	  which	   includes	   recognition	   of	   the	  modern	   appears	   on	   one	   level	   to	   be	  similarly	   attempting	   to	   create	   such	   a	   meta-­‐narrative.	   	   And	   yet,	   both,	   by	  acknowledging	   a	   state	   of	   permanent	   resistance	   as	   the	   only	   state	   worth	  maintaining,	  manage	   to	   resist	  any	  slide	   into	  a	  newly	  universalised	   theoretical	  position.	  	  By	  not	  succumbing	  to	  a	  dogma	  of	  ‘peace’,	  but	  by	  instead	  proposing	  a	  future	   which	   is	   like	   ‘the	   torn	   mouth	   of	   a	   wound’	   or	   the	   ‘terrifying	   form	   of	  monstrosity’,	  they	  proffer	  its	  significance	  to	  a	  new	  generation.	  It	  is	  specifically	  their	  recognition	  of	  tension,	  of	  suspension	  in	  time	  and	  signification,	  of	  an	  open-­‐endedness	   of	   discourse	  which	   I	   wish	   to	   denote	   as	   political,	   and	   as	   a	   ‘radical	  postmodern’	  move	  to	  embrace	  the	  unknown.	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  Jacques	  Derrida,	  'Structure,	  Sign	  and	  Play	  in	  the	  Discourse	  of	  the	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  Sciences',	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Returning	   to	   Kanai,	   we	   can	   now	   see	   that	   her	   criticism	   of	   the	   feminist	  ideal	  of	  equality	  approximates	  to	  Okamoto’s	  challenge	  to	  post-­‐war	  narratives	  of	  ‘peace’	  and	  ‘harmony’,	  and	  his	  assertions	  that	  they	  merely	  sought	  to	  conceal	  the	  horrors	   of	   the	   war.	   	   Both	   writers	   perceive	   that	   any	   idealisation	   of	   a	   certain	  ‘state’	   of	   existence	   entails	   a	   suppression	   of	   the	   reverse,	   of	   the	   horrors	   and	  human	  complexes	  which	  lie	  beneath.	  	  In	  so	  doing,	  they	  not	  only	  critique	  divisive	  rhetoric,	   but	   also	   the	   mechanism	   behind	   such	   rhetoric.	   Thus	   they	   both,	   like	  Derrida,	  seek	  to	  exacerbate	  the	  irreconcilable	  and	  irreducible	  tensions	  in	  their	  fields,	  and	  bring	  such	  tensions	  to	  the	  fore.	  By	  not	  diametrically	  countering,	  but	  instead	  exposing	  contrasting	  ideas,	  forms,	  or	  interpretations	  of	  interpretations,	  both	   subvert	   that	   which	   can	   be	   described	   as	   ‘modern’	   narratives;	   namely,	  grand,	   synthesising	   explanations	   which	   attempt	   to	   smooth	   over	   conflicting	  views,	  and	  which	  block	  out	  counter	  narratives.	  
With	  this	  in	  mind,	  we	  might	  argue	  that	  ‘Rabbits’	  borrows,	  consciously	  or	  not,	  the	  form	  of	  Okamoto’s	  polaroppositionalism,	  and	  that	  it	  sets	  up	  paradoxes	  by	  being	  structured	  much	  like	  an	  atomic	  bomb,	  with	  an	  external	  shell	  or	  ‘outer’	  narrative	  by	  watashi	  encasing	  that	  of	  the	  ‘inner’	  narrative	  core	  of	  the	  rabbit	  girl.	  The	   respective	   external	   and	   internal	   narratives	   are	   composed	   of	   ‘elements’	  which	  are	  polarised	  to	  each	  other,	  but	  collide	  in	  the	  conclusions	  when	  watashi	  dons	  the	  rabbit	  suit,	  creating	  an	  irreconcilable	  paradox	  and	  resulting	  in,	  to	  coin	  a	   phrase,	   an	   ‘explosion’	   of	  meaning	  which	   the	   reader	  must	   actively	   interpret.	  	  The	   two	  narratives	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  representations	  of	  different	   literary	   forms:	  the	  rabbit	  girl’s	  interior	  narrative	  is	  a	  parody	  of	  modern	  women’s	  fiction	  which	  employs	   a	   confessional	   mode	   and	   enables	   the	   psychoanalysis	   of	   the	   subject;	  
watashi’s	  prologue	  and	  epilogue	  that	  fits	  around	  it	  can	  then	  be	  configured	  as	  a	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postmodern	  critique,	  marking	   the	  edges	  of	  modern	  narrative	  and	  providing	  a	  gap	  through	  which	  to	  view	  them.	  	  ‘Rabbits’	  can	  thus	  be	  read	  as	  complementing	  Kanai’s	   early	   non-­‐fictional	   commentary	   on	   confessional	   women’s	   fiction,	  satirising	   and	   deconstructing	   such	   works	   through	   internal	   and	   external	  narratives	   respectively,	   and	   concluding	   in	   a	   spectacular	   explosion	   of	  modern	  binary	   gender	   codes	   through	   the	   fusion	   of	   both	   narratives	   and	   the	  implementation	  of	  a	  ‘radical	  postmodern’	  identity	  of	  ‘watashi	  in	  the	  rabbit	  suit’.	  The	  rabbit	  girl’s	  parody	  of	   the	  confessional	  mode	   in	  women’s	   fiction	   is	  achieved	  structurally,	  through	  its	  central	  placement	  within	  the	  story	  as	  a	  whole,	  which	  gives	   the	  reader	   the	   illusion	   that	  her	  narrative	   is	   the	  defining	  one,	  and	  that	  she	   is	  a	  conventional	  protagonist	   in	  a	  conventional	   first-­‐person	  narrative	  account.	   	   That	   the	   narrative	   might	   ostensibly	   aspire	   to	   the	   condition	   of	   a	  confession	   is	   compounded	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   rabbit	   girl’s	   ‘exploration	   of	  identity’	   takes	   up	   approximately	   four	   times	   as	   much	   space	   as	   the	   frame	  narrative.	   	   And	   yet,	   its	   very	   centrality	   belies	   its	   adherence	   to	   modern	  confessional	   literary	   forms,	   exposing	   itself	   as	  parody.	   	  Derrida	  describes	  how	  the	   laws	  of	   structure	  dictate	   that	  modern	  narratives	   revolve	  around	  a	  central	  organising	  core	  but	  that	  this	  organising	  core	  is	  displaced	  to	  the	  outside	  where	  it	  cannot	   be	   seen,	   transformed	  or	   ‘interdicted’	   and	   is	   therefore	   able	   to	   stabilise	  meaning	   and	   ensure	   the	   narrative’s	   originality.116	  	   	   If	   we	   are	   to	   assume,	   as	  Derrida	  argues,	  that	  in	  modern	  narrative,	  ‘the	  center	  is	  not	  the	  center’,	  then	  the	  
                                            116	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rabbit	  girl’s	  narrative	  is	  not	  the	  part	  of	  the	  structure	  that	  defines	  the	  story	  in	  its	  totality,	  but	  is	  shaped	  by	  the	  external	  narrator.117	  To	   consider	   the	   rabbit-­‐girl’s	   false	   ‘centrality’	   in	   other	   terms,	   Karatani,	  who	  uses	  Derridean	  theory	  to	  explore	  the	  importance	  of	  phonocentricity	  in	  the	  construction	   of	   modern	   Japanese	   subjectivity	   through	   confessional	   writing,	  outlines	  how	  ‘landscape’,	  a	  space	  or	  scene	  of	  figures	  and	  objects	  which	  has	  been	  alienated	  from	  the	  modern	  self,	  is	  a	  concept	  crucial	  to	  the	  fabrication	  of	  modern	  ‘interiority’.118	  Karatani	  writes:	  Rousseau,	  in	  his	  Confessions,	  describes	  his	  sense	  of	  oneness	  with	  nature	  when	   he	  was	   in	   the	  Alps	   in	   1728.	   	   Although	   the	  Alps	   at	  that	  time	  were	  regarded	  simply	  as	  an	  annoyance	  and	  obstruction	  by	   Europeans,	   they	   began	   to	   flock	   to	   Switzerland	   to	   discover	  what	  Rousseau	  had	  seen.	   	  The	  Alpinist	  was	  a	  virtual	   creation	  of	  literature.	   […]	   	   In	  the	  very	  moment	  when	  we	  become	  capable	  of	  perceiving	   landscape,	   it	   appears	   to	   us	   as	   if	   it	   had	   been	   there,	  outside	   of	   us,	   from	   the	   start.	   	   People	   begin	   to	   reproduce	   this	  landscape.	   	   […]	   	   [L]andscapes	   […]	  were	  not	   ‘out	   there’	   from	   the	  start,	  but	  had	  to	  be	  discovered	  as	  landscapes	  from	  which	  we	  had	  become	  alienated.119	  	  This	  process	  of	  alienation	  and	  rediscovery	  also	  forms	  the	  fundamental	  cathexis	  for	  the	  modern	  confessional	  self.	  	  As	  Karatani	  later	  explains:	  Japanese	  critics	  have	  objected	  to	  the	  conflation	  in	  the	  Japanese	  I-­‐novel	   of	   the	   ‘I’	   who	   confesses	   and	   the	   subject	   of	   confession.	  	  According	   to	   their	   view,	   although	   the	   literary	  work	   is	   a	   form	  of	  self-­‐expression	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  author,	  it	  should	  create	  a	  world	  which	   is	  different	   and	  autonomous	   from	   that	   of	   the	   author’s	   ‘I’;	  by	  conflating	  the	  author’s	  ‘I’	  and	  the	  ‘I’	  of	  the	  work,	  the	  Japanese	  I-­‐novel	   has	   failed	   to	   create	   a	   self-­‐sufficient	   fictional	  world.	   	   […]	  [However,	  their	  criticism	  is	  based	  on	  the	  premise	  that]	  there	  is	  a	  ‘self’	   in	   need	   of	   expression	   whose	   existence	   precedes	   that	   of	  expression	  –	  in	  other	  words	  that	  a	  binary	  distinction	  can	  be	  made	  
                                            117	  Ibid.,	  p.	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  Karatani,	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between	   the	   self	   that	   expresses	   and	   the	   content	   of	   expression.	  […]	  The	  same	  can	  be	  said	  of	  modern	  Japanese	  literary	  confession.	  	  It	  was	  the	  literary	  form	  of	  the	  confession	  –	  confession	  as	  a	  system	  –	  that	  produced	  the	  interiority	  that	  confessed,	  the	   ‘true	  self’.	   	  […	  I]t	   is	   not	   the	   existence	   of	   hidden	   secrets	   that	   necessitates	  confession	   but	   the	   compulsion	   to	   confess	   that	   produces	   an	  ‘interior’	  which	  must	  be	  hidden.120	  	  Landscape,	   for	   Karatani,	   is	   the	   screen	   upon	   which	   the	   writer/main	  narrator/protagonist	   projects	   characters,	   locations	   and	   objects	   that	   are	  constitutive	   of	   his/her	   ‘other/otherness’.	   	   Therefore	   it	   is	   also	   a	   scene	   out	   of	  which	  the	  modern	  self	  emerges.	   	   In	  short,	   it	   is	  a	  realm	  of	  symbols	  against	  and	  through	   which	   the	   writer/main	   narrator/protagonist	   manages	   to	   rediscover	  his/her	   interior	   self.	   Literary	   confession	   is	   an	   exploration	   of	   that	   alienated	  landscape,	  enabling	  its	  reconstitution	  within	  the	  modern	  self.	  Turning	  to	  ‘Rabbits’,	  we	  see	  that,	  as	  watashi’s	  narrative	  begins	  by	  stating	  baldly	  that	  s/he	  is	  a	  writer,	  the	  reader	  is	   led	  at	  first	  to	  think	  of	  watashi	  as	  the	  conflated	  writer/main	  narrator/protagonist	  of	  a	  modern	  Japanese	  confessional	  text.	   Following	  on	   from	  Karatani,	  we	  might	   then	   initially	   configure	   the	   rabbit	  girl	  (plus	  her	  home,	  the	  state	  of	  her	  appearance	  and	  her	  family	  and	  rabbits)	  as	  relating	   to	  watashi’s	   landscape,	   as	   being,	   in	   other	  words,	   alienated	   objects	   of	  
watashi’s	  imagination.	  	  Yet,	  in	  this	  world	  of	  watashi’s	  otherness,	  it	  is	  the	  rabbit-­‐girl	  who	  eventually	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  confessional	  narrative,	  interrogating	  her	  own	  past	  actions	   in	  order	   to	   locate	  her	  present	   identity.	   	   	  Thus	   if	  we	  were	   to	  read	   ‘Rabbits’	   in	   its	   totality	  as	  a	  model	  of	  modern	  confession,	  we	  might	  claim	  that	   it	   transforms	   ‘confession’	   from	   being	   a	   textually	   self-­‐effacing	   conduit	   to	  some	   external	   truth,	   to	   being	   textually	  material.	   In	   this	   respect,	   its	   narrative	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procedures	  resemble	  the	  Humpty	  poem,	  in	  which	  the	  apricot-­‐tobacco	  metaphor	  serves	   to	  make	   the	  word	   ‘word’	  material.	  The	  confessional	  mode,	   in	   ‘Rabbits’,	  has	  been	  objectified,	  alienated	  and	  rendered	  an	  ‘other’.	   	  As	  such,	  the	  narrative	  shifts	   from	   inscribing	  an	  authentic	   self	   (watashi)	   to	   inscribing	  a	   symbolic	   self	  (Sayuri,	   the	   rabbit-­‐girl);	   and	   as	   authenticity	   is	   an	   element	   arguably	   crucial	   to	  modern	   confessional	   forms,	   it	   is	   this	   shift	   away	   from	   such	   authenticity	   that	  allows	   us	   to	   register	   the	   rabbit-­‐girl’s	   narrative’s	   potential	   to	   satirise	   and	  parody.	  The	  conversation	  which	  prompts	  her	  confession	  commences	  thus:	  ‘…	  Are	   you	   a	   rabbit?	   	   Ahem,	   I	  meant:	  May	   I	   address	   you,	  Mrs	  Rabbit?’	  	  ‘Mm,	   I	   certainly	   look	   like	   one,	   don’t	   I?’	   the	   rabbit	   said	   cooing	  happily	   from	   her	   throat.	   	   ‘But	   the	   truth	   is	   that	   I	   am	   human.	  Maybe.	  	  Although	  recently	  it	  occurred	  to	  me	  that	  being	  either	  is	  fine.’121	  	  The	  notion,	  in	  this	  exchange,	  that	  identity	  is	  only	  reducible	  to	  either	  one	  of	  two	  ‘categories’	   (here	   configured	   as	   being	   either	   ‘human’	   or	   ‘rabbit’),	   followed	   by	  the	  rabbit-­‐girl’s	  concession	  that,	  in	  her	  own	  case,	  the	  boundaries	  have	  become	  blurred,	  recalls	   the	  discourse	  of	  women	  writers	  such	  as	  Kurahashi,	  Takahashi	  and	  Tsushima	  (writing	  around	   the	   time	  of	   this	   short	   story’s	   first	  appearance)	  and	   their	   re-­‐negotiation	   of	   male/female	   gender	   categories.	   As	   such,	   the	  exchange	   might	   be	   considered	   as	   being	   parodic	   of	   such	   round-­‐table	  conversation	  and	  debate.	  As	  the	  rabbit-­‐girl’s	  story	  unfolds,	  the	  construction	  of	  her	  hybrid	  identity	  seems	  to	  correlate	  greatly	  to	  that	  of	  women	  writers’	  notions	  of	   their	   own	   ‘hybridised’	   male	   and	   female	   attributes.	   	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   the	  
                                            121	  Kanai,	  ‘Usagi’,	  p.	  524.	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assumption	  at	  work	  in	  their	  discussions	  and	  essays	  is	  that	  their	  role	  as	  writers	  aligns	   them	   with	   a	   masculine	   intellectuality;	   yet	   they	   in	   turn	   embrace	   the	  concepts	   of	   female	   ‘corporeality’	   and	   ‘submissiveness’	   as	   a	  means	   to	   indicate	  their	   ‘otherness’	   to,	   and	   therefore	   their	   subversion	   –	   through	   literature	   –	   of,	  this	   masculine	   territory.	   	   Similarly,	   the	   rabbit-­‐girl	   assumes	   ‘human’	   actions	  through	  her	  role	  of	  keeping	  and	  slaughtering	  the	  rabbits,	  and	  yet	  she	  subverts	  this	  role	  by	  embracing,	  as	  it	  were,	  ‘rabbit-­‐hood’,	  and	  this	  includes	  adopting	  the	  ‘corporeality’	   (the	   appearance,	   mannerisms	   and	   speech	   tics)	   and	   the	  ‘submissiveness’	  (taking	  up	  a	  passive	  role	  by	  offering	  herself	  to	  her	  father	  as	  a	  present	  on	  his	  birthday,	  and	  in	  the	  end	  by	  blinding	  herself	  in	  the	  other	  eye)	  of	  the	   rabbits.	   	   	   If	  we	   read	   it	   in	   this	  way,	   the	   rabbit-­‐girl’s	   story	   appears	   to	   be	   a	  straight	  allegory	  of	  late-­‐postwar	  women’s	  discourse	  as	  exemplified	  by	  the	  three	  writers	   whom	  we	   have	   been	   discussing,	   and	   represents	   woman’s	   infiltration	  into	  and	  subversion	  of	  roles	  or	  ‘spaces’	  previously	  reserved	  for	  men.	  However,	  the	  absurd	  and	  grotesque	  aspects	  of	  the	  rabbit-­‐girl’s	  narrative	  (her	   violent	   and	   bloody	   killing	   of	   rabbits,	   her	   sexual	   enjoyment	   of	   this,	   her	  decision	  to	  make	  a	  full	  rabbit	  suit	  and	  her	  anticipation	  of	  her	  seduction	  of	  her	  father	  which	  elicits	  his	  surprise	  and	  sudden	  death)	  are	  graphically	  related	  and	  constitute	  a	   critique	  of	  woman’s	   construction	  of	  woman.	   	  First,	   it	  hints	  at	   the	  need	   for	   ‘woman’	   to	   alienate	   herself	   from	   ‘women’	   as	   a	   category,	   before	  assuming	   that	   category	   for	   herself,	   just	   as	   the	   rabbit-­‐girl	   populates	   her	  landscape	  with	   ‘rabbits’	   and	   female	  students	  at	  her	   school,	  whom,	  as	  we	  may	  remember,	   she	   describes	   as	   ‘baka	   na	   roba	   no	   yō’	   	   (‘like	   stupid	   donkeys’).	  	  Secondly,	   it	   speaks	   of	   the	   hypocrisy	   and	   violence	   of	   woman’s	   (verbal)	  subjugation	  of	  women;	  of	   their	   rendering	   them	   ‘carnal’,	   just	   as	   the	   rabbit-­‐girl	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butchers	   and	   eats	   the	   rabbits.	   	   Thirdly,	   it	   ridicules	   the	   late	   post-­‐war	  empowered	   woman’s	   performance	   of	   ‘submissiveness’	   and	   her	   attempted	  seduction/inadvertent	   emasculation	   of	   (a	   now	   declining/bed-­‐ridden)	  masculine/patriarchal	   power.	   In	   other	  words,	   her	   narrative	   can	   be	   read	   as	   a	  satire	   upon	   certain	   representations	   of	   ‘truth’	   made	   by	   women	   writers	   and	  feminists	   at	   the	   time,	   exposing	   the	   way	   in	   which	   confessional	   modes	   of	  expression	  in	  women’s	  discourse	  that	  attempt	  to	  reconstitute	  ‘what	  it	  means	  to	  be	   a	   woman’	   are	   necessarily	   dependent	   on,	   and	   created	   by,	   gendered	  dichotomies	  and	  hierarchies.	  Indeed,	  the	  internal	  narrative	  of	  ‘Rabbits’,	  in	  recalling	  the	  Oedipal	  myth	  which	  has	  been	  fundamental	  to	  psychoanalysis	  (forming	  as	  it	  does	  the	  basis	  of	  Freud’s	   theory	   on	   the	   construction	   of	   [male]	   sexuality	   and	   gender),	   has	   (as	  discussed	  above)	  prompted	  a	  number	  of	  critics	  to	  postulate	  that	  it	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  coded	   representation	   for	   the	   development	   of	   late	   postwar	   (woman’s)	   gender	  and	   sexuality.	   	   To	   briefly	   recap,	   for	   Kitada	   it	   relates	   to	   Kanai’s	   personal	  awakening	  to	  her	  own	  unique	  sexual	  identity	  and,	  by	  describing	  the	  process	  of	  estrangement	  with	  one’s	  family	  and	  a	  father’s	  sudden	  death,	  relates	  to	  Kanai’s	  own	  biographical	  story	  and	  her	  decision	  to	  ‘travel	  the	  path	  alone	  and	  write’;	  for	  Orbaugh	  it	  is	  a	  myth	  which	  demonstrates	  how	  woman’s	  retrieval	  of	  their	  sexual	  power	  and	  their	  overturning	  of	  patriarchal	  power	  structures	  is	  accompanied	  by	  their	   tragic	   isolation;	   for	   Takeuchi,	   the	   rabbit-­‐girl’s	   alternate	   assumption	   of	  active,	   then	   passive	   roles	   usurps	   heterosexual	   patterns	   for	   desire	   and	   thus	  makes	  it	  a	  pioneering	  ‘queer	  text’	  through	  which	  we	  witness	  a	  unique	  liberation	  from	   convention.	   Yet,	   despite	   these	   differences	   in	   their	   readings,	   they	  nonetheless	   all	   assume	   the	   internal	   narrative	   to	   be	   representative	   of	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‘confessional’	  literature,	  inasmuch	  as	  it	  allegedly	  pertains	  to	  some	  psychological	  ‘truth’,	  whether	  relating	  to	  social	  or	  personal	  realities,	  even	  if	  on	  an	  ‘allegorical’	  level.	   However,	   the	   rabbit-­‐girl’s	   narrative’s	   positioning	  within	   a	   postmodern	  frame,	   its	   black	   and	   absurd	   humour	   and	   use	   of	   irony	   all	   act	   to	   undermine	  confessional	  and	  psychoanalytical	  representations	  of	  woman	  by	  exposing	  them	  as	   grotesquely	   fictional.	   As	   Karatani	   posits,	   the	   postmodern	   stands	   outside	   a	  modern	   linear	  mode	  of	   discourse,	   creating	   gaps	   in	   such	  narratives,	   operating	  through	   doubt	   and	   questioning,	   and	   instead	   exposing	   the	   world	   as	   one	   of	  surfaces	   or	   fictions.122	  In	   ‘Rabbits’,	   watashi’s	   ‘exteriority’	   can	   be	   understood	  thus,	   in	   the	   way	   in	   which	   his/her	   narrative	   encases	   the	   internal	   narrative,	  forever	  problematising	  any	  attempt	  the	  latter	  makes	  with	  an	  air	  of	  doubt	  which	  corrodes	   empirical	   fact	   and	   material	   reality,	   implementing	   a	   ‘postmodern’	  modus	  operandi	  that	  forces	  the	  reader	  to	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  textuality	  of	  the	  
shōjo’s	  bizarre	  narrative.	  This	   postmodern	   textuality	   is	   perhaps	   primarily	   achieved	   through	  
watashi’s	  anonymity.	  	  As	  noted	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  the	  use	  of	  the	  pronoun	  
watashi,	   which	   is	   conventional	   in	   confessional	   modern	   literary	   forms	   for	   a	  conflated	   author/main	   narrator/protagonist,	   might	   tempt	   us	   to	   make	   an	  association	   between	   the	   ‘real	   writing	   body’	   (Kanai)	   and	   the	   text.	   	   	   And	   yet,	  whereas	   the	   internal	   narrator	   describes	   her	   family	   and	   even	   mentions	   her	  school	  life,	  the	  external	  narrator	  gives	  us	  no	  such	  detail,	  which	  is	  to	  say	  that	  to	  the	   furthest	   extent,	   we	   are	   unsure	   of	   watashi’s	   age,	   gender,	   proper	   name,	  marital	   status,	   geographical	   location	   or	   race.	   	   This	   anonymity	   defies	   the	  
                                            122	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convention	  of	  modern	  confessional	  writing,	  of	  which	   the	  aim	   is	   to	  anchor	   the	  terms	  of	  identity,	  to	  describe	  watashi,	  to	  detail	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  ‘modern	  self’,	  to	  determine	  status	  and	  gender.	   	   Instead,	   these	  gaps	   in	  watashi’s	  narrative	   leave	  the	  reader	  space	  to	  enter	  and	  question,	  to	  doubt	  watashi’s	  connection	  with	  our	  shared	  reality	  and	  to	  view	  him/her	  and	  his/her	  world	  as	  a	  textual	  construct,	  as	  nothing	  more	   (or	   less)	   than	   a	  narrative	  convention.	   	   Indeed,	   it	   is	   because	   the	  external	   narrative	   plays	   so	   teasingly	   with	   the	   conventions	   of	   modern	  confessional	   literature,	   at	   first	   seeming	   to	   affirm	   its	   conventions	   and	   then	  denying	   them,	   that	   it	   acts	   like	   a	   conduit	   for	   the	   reader	   to	   question	   the	   links	  between	   ‘confession’	   and	   ‘reality’,	   and	   perceive	   how	   all	   fictional	   creations,	  whether	   they	   are	   explicit	   or	   not	   about	   the	   details	   of	   their	   characters,	   are	  ‘textual	  fabrications’:	  how	  ‘truth’	  is	  inescapably	  woven	  by,	  and	  not	  represented	  by,	  the	  literary	  convention	  of	  the	  first	  person	  narrative.	  However,	   the	   frame	  narrative	   in	   ‘Rabbits’	  goes	   further	   than	  asking	   the	  reader	  to	  identify	  ‘text’	  as	  fiction;	  it	  asks	  us	  to	  doubt	  the	  materiality	  of	  our	  own	  identities	   just	   as	   we	   doubt	   Sayuri’s,	   to	   see	   our	   own	   identities	   as	   similarly	  constructed,	  read	  and	  reiterative	  realities.	   	   It	   is	  an	   insistence	  on	  referencing	  a	  so-­‐called	  ‘shared	  reality’	  that	  is	  the	  primary	  strategy	  deployed	  by	  realism,	  as	  a	  literary	   mode,	   to	   give	   the	   illusion	   that	   what	   is	   depicted	   is	   true.	   	   Realism’s	  second	   strategy	   is	   then	   to	   refuse	   its	   own	   status	   as	   a	   text.	   	   It	   is	   these	   twin	  strategies	  that	  ‘Rabbits’	  compromises	  at	  the	  outset.	  	  For	  instance,	  all	  references	  to	  the	  readership’s	   ‘shared’	  reality	  are	  textual:	  the	  act	  of	  citing	  Lewis	  Carroll’s	  
Alice’s	   Adventures	   in	   Wonderland	   in	   the	   epigraph	   has	   the	   effect,	   as	   do	   all	  epigraphs,	  of	  leading	  the	  reader	  to	  concretise	  their	  connection	  with	  the	  ‘author’	  through	  a	  shared	  textuality,	  rather	  than	  a	  shared	  reality.	  	  However,	  the	  citation	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itself	   is	   from	  the	  precise	  moment	   in	  Alice’s	  narrative	  where	  Alice’s	   ‘landscape’	  ceases	   to	  be	   that	  which	  would	  relate	   to	  any	  reader’s	  material	   reality:	   it	   is	   the	  point	  wherein	  she	  is	  ‘suddenly’	  drawn	  into	  the	  world	  of	  fantasy,	  chasing	  a	  white	  rabbit	   and	   falling	   down	   a	   hole.	   	   This	   pervasive	   fictionalising	   effect	   is	  compounded	  by	  the	  statement	  with	  which	  the	  short	  story	  opens	  that	  gives	  the	  impression	  that	  watashi	  is	  a	  writer:	  The	   act	   of	   writing	   includes	   not	   writing,	   but	   above	   all	   writing,	  therefore	  there	  is	  no	  escape;	  to	  write	  must	  be	  my	  fate.123	  	  This	   enigmatic	   sentence,	   focusing	   as	   it	   does	   on	   the	   act	   of	   writing	   (and	   not	  writing),	  rather	  than	  on	  the	  status	  of	  watashi	  as	  a	  writer,	   is	  also	  severed	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  narrative	  by	  the	  proceeding	  phrase:	  	  ‘The	  day	  I	  wrote	  that	  in	  my	  diary	   […]’.124	  	   As	   this	   opening	   statement	   stands	   alone,	   it	   seems	   to	   acquire	   a	  special	  status,	  as	  if	  it	  in	  some	  way	  pertains	  to	  an	  eternal	  truth	  which	  lies	  beyond	  the	   fluctuating	   and	   contingent	   truths	   of	   the	   main	   narrative	   trajectory;	   it	  appears	   (to	   quote	   Karatani)	   to	   come	   from	   a	   ‘“transcendental”	   consciousness	  that	   attempts	   to	   bracket	   transcendent	   consciousness	   which	   would	   organize	  history	   [or	   in	   this	   case	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   short	   story]	   within	   the	   unitary	  perspective	   of	   subjectivity’.	   	   Further,	   watashi’s	   narrative	   shift	   from	   present	  tense	   to	   past	   tense,	   manoeuvres	   her/him	   into	   a	   position	   which	   is	   future	  (external)	  to	  and	  observing	  of	  his/her	  every	  move	  (as	  it	  happens	  in	  retrospect),	  thereby	  facilitating	  her/him	  to	  narrate	  his/her	  story	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  However,	  the	  narrative	  extremities	  of	   ‘Rabbits’	   –	   the	  enigmatic	  opening	   line,	   and	   	  watashi’s	  final	  act	  of	  remaining	  still	  among	  the	  rabbits	  –	  defy	  the	  narrative’s	  attempts	  to	  
                                            123	  Kanai,	  ‘Usagi’,	  p.	  522.	  124	  Ibid.,	  p.	  522.	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delineate	  the	  boundaries	  of	  fiction,	  neither	  enabling	  closure.	  	  Instead	  they	  stare	  defiantly	  into	  eternity	  and	  relate	  to	  the	  unknown.	  	  To	  this	  extent,	  whereas	  the	  rabbit-­‐girl’s	  narrative	  has	  been	  distinguished	  by	  her	  quantifiability,	  as	  ‘one’	  life,	  whose	  future	  is	  abruptly	  curtailed	  by	  her	  death	  in	  watashi’s	  narrative,	  watashi	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  extends	  his/her	  existence	  into	  infinity.	  To	  return	  to	  our	  ‘nuclear’	  metaphor,	  then,	  watashi’s	  narrative	  provides	  a	  thick	   fictional	   outer	   casing	   for	   the	   rabbit-­‐girl’s	   inner	   narrative	   and	   each	   is	  composed	   of	   elements	   that	   operate	   in	   polarity	   to	   the	   other,	   the	   external	  narrative	  having	  a	  corrosive	  effect	  on	  the	  truth	  claims	  of	  the	  internal	  narrative.	  	  These	   narratives	   ‘fuse’	   with	   each	   other	  when	   the	   external	   narrator	   dons	   the	  rabbit	   suit	   and	   ‘enters’	   the	   internal	   narrative.	   	   This	   act	  collapses	   the	   internal	  narrative’s	  perceived	  centrality,	  mingling	  its	  production	  of	  a	  psychoanalysable,	  definable	   and	   quantifiable	   female	   subject	   with	   its	   polar	   opposite	   of	   a	  metaphorical	  writing	   body	   and	   an	   ‘ungendered’,	   ‘unsocialised’	   and	   infinite	   ‘I’,	  producing	   an	   uncollapsible	   paradox.	   However,	   whereas	   ‘Rabbits’’	   sharp	   and	  contrastive	  juxtapositions	  between	  modern	  and	  postmodern	  narrative	  produce	  a	  polaroppositionalist	   collision	  of	   elements	   reminiscent	  of	   the	   structure	  of	   an	  atomic	   explosion,	   in	   ‘Rotting	  Meat’,	   it	   is	   as	   if	   the	   narrative	   is	   ‘spread	   around’	  (mirrored	  by	  the	  spreading	  of	  the	  rotting	  smell	  in	  the	  narrative)	  from	  external	  to	   internal	   narrator	   and	   back	   again	   in	   a	   manner	   which	   is	   perhaps	   more	  analogous	  of	  the	  process	  of	  ‘rotting’	  itself.	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Reading	  ‘Rotting	  Meat’	  as	  a	  Discourse	  of	  Decadence	  
Rotting,	   decay	   and	   decadence	   form	   a	   syntactical	   alignment	   through	   Japanese	  avant-­‐garde	  literary	  texts,	  notably	  Sakaguchi	  Ango’s	  ‘Darakuron’	  (‘Discourse	  of	  Decadence’),	  from	  the	  immediate	  post-­‐war.125	  Sakaguchi’s	  essay	  discusses	  the	  destruction	  of	  Japan’s	  cityscapes	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  capitulation,	  and	  the	  subsequent	  demise	  of	  both	  its	  nationalist	  ideological	  stance	  and	  of	  the	  wartime	  identities	  of	  Japanese	   subjects	   and	   argues	   that	   such	   devastation	   and	   loss,	   for	   which	   he	  applies	   the	   term	   ‘daraku’,	   is	   an	   originary	   state.	   In	   Buddhist	   terms,	   daraku	  describes	  humankind’s	  inevitable	  forgetting	  of	  the	  teachings	  of	  the	  Buddha	  and	  of	   their	   descent	   into	   ‘sin’;	   but,	   by	   stripping	   it	   of	   religious	   connotations	   –	  connotations	  which	  would	  imbue	  it	  with	  a	  transcendent	  ideology	  –	  Sakaguchi’s	  text	   conceives	   daraku	   as	   that	   which	   is	   ‘decadent’	   ‘depraved’	   or	   marking	   a	  ‘degeneration’	   of	   status,	   or,	   as	   Sas	   interprets	  his	  use	  of	   the	   term,	   ‘[r]otting	  or	  dissipation	   under	   the	   guise	   of	   an	   amoral,	   banal	   chaos’.126	  ‘Discourse	   of	  Decadence’	  can	  be	  read	  as	  an	  antidote	  to	  wartime	  rhetoric	  and	  as	  a	  text	  which	  seems	  to	  urge	  the	  Japanese	  to	  accept	  a	  broken	  reality	  and	  broken	  identities.127	  	  Sakaguchi	  writes:	  
Can	   it	   not	   be	   said	   that	   the	   kamikaze	   hero	  was	   no	  more	   than	   an	  illusion,	  and	  that	  the	  history	  of	  humanity	  begins	  when	  he	  takes	  to	  black-­‐marketeering?	   	   That	   the	   widow	   as	   angelic	   disciple	   is	   no	  more	   than	   an	   illusion,	   and	   that	   the	   history	   of	   humanity	   begins	  
                                            125	  Sakaguchi	  Ango,	   'Darakuron'	   [‘Discourse	  on	  Decadence’]	   in	  Kindai	  bungei	  hyōron	  
gyosho	  (Tokyo:	  Nihon	  tsusho	  sentā,	  1990).	  126	  Sas,	  Experimental	  Arts	   in	  Postwar	   Japan:	  Moments	  of	  Encounter,	  Engagement,	  and	  
Imagined	  Return,	  p.	  5.	  127	  Sakaguchi,	  ‘Darakuron’.	  	  See	  p.	  132.	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when	  she	  is	  fulfilled	  by	  a	  new	  love?	  And	  might	  it	  also	  not	  be	  said	  that	   the	   emperor	   is	   also	   no	   more	   than	   an	   illusion	   and	   the	  emperor’s	   true	   history	   begins	   when	   he	   becomes	   an	   ordinary	  human	   being?	   […]	   Japan	   has	   lost	   the	  war	   […]	   but	   it	   is	   from	   the	  womb	  of	  decadence’s	  truth	  that	  humans	  are	  born.128	  	  The	   collapse	   of	   the	   fascist	   ideology	   which	   created	   and	   sustained	   wartime	  identities	   results	   in	   their	   shattering,	   and	   ‘real’	   human	   nature	   as	   fallen,	  corruptible	   or	   broken,	   subsequently	   emerges.	   	   As	   a	   text,	   ‘Discourse	   of	  Decadence’	   echoes	   the	   avant-­‐garde	   notion	  which	  we	   have	   been	   discussing	   in	  this	   chapter	   that	   identity	   is	   an	   ‘illusion’	   created	  and	  sustained	  by	   language	   in	  which	   both	   state	   and	   citizens	   are	   complicit.	   	   That	   Sakaguchi’s	   essay	   went	  through	   a	   revival	   and	   became	   a	   best-­‐seller	   in	   1967	   (the	   year,	   incidentally,	   of	  Kanai’s	   literary	   debut)	   would	   therefore	   appear	   to	   be	   a	   comment	   on	   the	  supposedly	  democratic	  post-­‐occupation	  state	  which	  had	  propounded	  the	  ideals	  of	  ‘freedom’,	  ‘suffrage’	  and	  ‘peace’	  throughout	  Japan’s	  reconstruction,	  but	  which	  continued	   to	   lend	   support	   to	   US	   policies	   of	   cold	   and	   hot	   wars	   against	  communism	   (in	   face	   of	   overwhelming	   public	   opposition). 129 	  The	  overwhelming	   popularity	   of	   ‘Discourse	   of	   Decadence’	   at	   this	   time	   is	   another	  indicator	   for	   the	   feelings	   of	   disenfranchisement	   experienced	   by	   the	   Japanese	  people	   on	   the	   discovery	   that	   democracy	   too	  might	   be	   an	   illusion.	   	  Moreover,	  through	   its	   scepticism	   towards	   the	   construction	   of	   (state)	   ideologies	   and	   its	  understanding	  of	   the	  way	   in	  which	  people’s	   identities	  were	   sewn	  up	   through	  the	   process,	   Sakaguchi’s	   ‘Discourse	   of	   Decadence’,	   like	   Okamoto’s	  polaroppositionalism,	   provided	   the	   tools	   to	   the	   late-­‐sixties	   avant-­‐garde	  
                                            128	  Ibid.,	  p.	  7.	  129	  Sas,	   Experimental	  Arts	   in	  Postwar	  Japan:	  Moments	  of	  Encounter,	  Engagement,	  and	  
Imagined	  Return.	  	  See	  pp.	  4-­‐10.	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movement	  to	  critique	  and	  dismantle	  modern	  structures	  which	  were	  restrictive	  to	  them	  and	  to	  discover	  new	  ways	  of	  articulating	  themselves	  and	  their	  identity.	  
Firstly,	   the	   notion	   that	   rotting,	   dissipation	   and	   chaos	   are	   not	   only	  inevitable,	   but	   also	   affirmative	   modes	   of	   existence,	   subverts	   the	   hierarchical	  values	   of	   the	   modern.	   Secondly,	   by	   describing	   the	   modern	   process	   whereby	  humankind	   constructs	   ideologies,	   builds	   nations	   and	   creates	   identities	   as	   a	  cyclical	   and	   not	   linear	   process,	   ‘Discourse	   of	   Decadence’	   challenges	   the	  modern’s	   means	   of	   signification	   at	   once	   negating	   the	   teleological	   notion	   of	  ‘progress’	   implicit	   in	   modern	   linear	   narratives,	   and	   installing	   a	   completely	  alternative	  pattern	  upon	  which	  meaning	   is	  reached.	   	  Suddenly,	   that	  which	  the	  modern	   considers	   permanent	   and	   stable	   achievements	   of	   human	  (re)productivity	   ‘Discourse	   of	  Decadence’	  manages	   to	   present	   as	   illusory	   and	  fragile	  results	  of	  ‘human	  weakness’,	  of	  an	  inability	  to	  not	  construct	  social	  orders	  which	  sanitise	  and	  cover	  over	  the	  cracks	  of	  violence	  and	  trauma.	  	  Whereas	  the	  modern	  symbolic	  order	  aligns	  destruction,	  dissipation	  and	  decay	  with	  death,	  or	  rather	   ‘anti-­‐life’,	   in	   ‘Discourse	   of	   Decadence’	   they	   are	   the	   chaotic	   origins	   of	  humanity;	   they	   are	   its	   ‘womb’	   to	   which	   it	   continually	   returns.	   ‘Discourse	   of	  Decadence’	   thus	   echoes	   polaroppositionalism’s	   avocation	   of	   irreconcilable	  tension	   as	   a	  means	  of	   radical	   postmodern	   resistance.	   	  And	  again,	   similarly	   to	  Okamoto’s	   polaroppositionalism,	   Sakaguchi	   does	   not	   attempt	   to	   pinpoint	   a	  definitive	  origin,	  but	  conceives	  of	  origin	  as	  a	  reverberation	  through	  history,	  as	  peoples,	  movements	  and	  civilisations	  fall.	  
Finally,	   because	   it	   strips	   the	   notion	   of	   ideology	   from	   that	   which	   is	  determined	   as	   ‘human’,	   Sakaguchi’s	   essay	   has	   been	   aligned	   with	   the	   carnal	  literature	   movement,	   a	   movement	   which,	   as	   discussed	   above,	   conceives	   the	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body	   as	   an	   origin	   of	   identity,	   through	   the	   expression	   of	   which	   discourse	  grounded	   in	   abstract	   humanist	   assumptions	   can	   be	   subverted.	   	  However,	   the	  concept	  of	  daraku,	  insofar	  as	  it	  encompasses	  the	  eventual	  disintegration	  of	  the	  body	   through	   rotting,	   and	   insofar	   as	   it	   is	   a	   term	   which	   can	   be	   applied	   to	  buildings,	  cities,	  and	  the	  ethos	  which	  holds	  a	  nation	  together,	  strips	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘human’	  to	  an	  even	  deeper	  and	  more	  radical	  level	  than	  that	  which	  ‘the	  body’	  denotes.	   	   It	   does	   not	   reify	   the	   body	   as	   a	   locus	   or	   origin	   of	   that	   which	   is	  determined	  as	  human	  as	  the	  body	  is	  equally	  susceptible	  to	  degradation,	  decay	  and	   disintegration:	   it	   is	   rather	   that	   it	   is	   the	   process	   of	   disintegration	   and	  reconstruction	  which	  relates	  to	  humans,	  animals,	  and	  inanimate	  and	  ideological	  structures.	   	  This	  process	  of	  fragmentation,	  or	  active	  fracturing	  and	  dissipation	  inherent	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  daraku	   is	  one	  which	  we	  have	  already	  come	  across	  in	  Kanai’s	  prize-­‐winning	  debut	  poem,	  wherein	  Humpty	  Dumpty,	  an	  egg	  which	   is	  always	   already	   known	   to	   be	   ‘falling’	   and	   fragmented	   affirms	   a	   performative	  understanding	  of	   identity,	  wherein	  the	   ‘act’	  rather	  than	  the	   ‘actor’	   is	  signified,	  and	  this	  enables	  new	  postmodern	  ‘subjectivities’	  a	  greater	  scope	  for	  expression.	  This	   interpretation	   of	   daraku	   is	   undoubtedly	   at	   work	   in	   ‘Rotting	   Meat’:	   the	  story	   utilises	   it	   to	   corrupt	   narratives	   that	   construct	   gendered	   identities	   and	  collapse	   the	   divisions	   between	   subject/object,	   human/animal,	  animate/inanimate	  and	  life/death	  through	  the	  trope	  of	  ‘rotting	  meat’.	  
In	  ‘Rotting	  Meat’,	  we	  are	  presented	  with	  four	  characters:	  boku,	  an	  ageing	  prostitute,	   the	   estate	   agent/pimp	   and	   the	   butcher,	   who,	   similarly	   to	   the	  Kamikaze-­‐pilot-­‐turned-­‐black-­‐marketeer,	   the	   widow	   and	   the	   emperor	   of	  ‘Discourse	   of	   Decadence’,	  might	   be	   taken	   to	   represent	   familiar	   types	   of	   their	  age.	  	  The	  first	  three	  of	  these	  four	  in	  particular	  are	  always	  already	  embodiments	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of	   daraku	   shita	   (or	   fallen,	   decadent)	   identities,	   a	   point	   signalled	   not	   only	   by	  their	   syntactic	   alignment	  with	   ageing,	   death	   and	  non-­‐(re)productivity,	   but	   by	  the	  varying	  states	  of	  societal	  disillusionment	  and	  cynicism	  they	  represent.	  	  The	  progression	   of	   their	   years	   appears	   to	   offer	   but	   one	   promise:	   that	   they	   will	  degenerate	   further	   and	   further	   towards	   their	   inevitable	   fate	   of	   becoming	   a	  lump	   of	   rotting	   meat.	   	   In	   contrast,	   the	   butcher,	   the	   only	   character	   amongst	  these	   four	  who	   sets	   himself	   against	   death	   through	  his	   profession	   (as	   the	   one	  who	  kills	  and	  isn’t	  killed),	  and	  whose	  desire	  to	  marry	  the	  prostitute	  marks	  his	  obedience	  to	  modern	  convention,	  meets	  a	  shockingly	  sudden	  and	  grizzly	  end.	  
The	   woman	   appears	   to	   be	   the	   origin	   of	   the	   spread	   of	   decadence,	  inhabiting	   the	   site	   of	   the	   smell	   of	   rotting	   meat,	   and	   located	   (much	   like	   the	  rabbit-­‐girl	   in	   ‘Rabbits’)	  at	   the	  conceptual	  centre	  of	   the	  story,	   inside	  the	  closet,	  inside	  the	  apartment.	  	  That	  the	  external	  narrator	  boku	  uncovers	  her	  by	  tracing	  the	  path	  of	  ‘an	  unsettling,	  seemingly	  nauseating	  stench’	  (fukai	  na	  hakike	  no	  suru	  
yō	   na	   ishū)	   which	   emanates	   from	   a	   physically	   internal	   (this	   time,	   the	   estate	  agent’s)	  kōshū	   (bad	  breath)	  and	  a	  physically	  external	   ishū	   (stench)	  within	   the	  apartment,	   renders	   her	   (again,	   similarly	   to	   the	   rabbit-­‐girl	   in	   ‘Rabbits’)	   as	   a	  symbolic/parodic	   manifestation	   of	   interiority,	   accessed	   through	   a	   layer	   of	  postmodern	   exteriority	   (lent	   this	   time	   by	   the	   anonymity	   of	   the	   external	  narrator	  boku,	  and	  the	  anonymity/ghostliness	  of	  her	  apartment	  which	  boku	   is	  unable	  to	  locate	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  short-­‐story).130	  
She	   begins	   her	   narrative	   by	   listing	   the	   luxurious	   presents	  which	  were	  left	  in	  her	  apartment	  by	  the	  men	  who	  visited	  her	  and	  paints	  a	  picture	  of	  healthy	  
                                            130	  Kanai,	  ‘Funiku’,	  pp.	  518-­‐19.	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abundance;	   ‘Pretty	   lace	   underwear,	   precious	   stones,	   chocolate,	   silk,	   perfume,	  face	  powder,	  butter,	  coffee;	  I	  had	  everything’.131	  	  She	  also	  comments	  that	  some	  men	  left	  certain	  items	  which	  she	  keeps	  for	  them,	  ‘gold	  watches,	  jewel	  incrusted	  cuff-­‐links,	   lighters’,	   and	   that	   by	   looking	   at	   these	   objects	   she	   can	   remember	  everything	  about	  the	  man	  they	  belonged	  to,	  how	  she	  loved	  them	  and	  how	  they	  loved	  her.132	  	  Some	  men	  leave	  her	  money.	  	  However,	  in	  such	  cases,	  to	  avoid	  it	  becoming	  a	  crass	  transaction	  of	  service	  for	  financial	  remuneration,	  the	  money	  is	   tucked	  under	   the	   lamp	  stand	  next	   to	  her	  pillow	   for	  her	   to	   ‘find’	  when	   they	  have	  gone.	  	  Both	  Orbaugh	  and	  Knighton	  note	  that	  the	  woman’s	  narrative	  fulfils	  a	   feminist	   agenda	   by	   inverting	   gender	   hierarchies,	   or	   reversing	   the	   chain	   of	  signification,	   so	   that	   for	   instance,	   she,	   the	  prostitute,	   is	   the	  consumer,	  not	   the	  consumed,	  and	  both	  the	  butcher	  and	  the	  male	  narrator	  are	  reduced	  by	  her	   to	  lumps	  of	   ‘rotting	  meat’.133	  	  Yet	  her	  system	  forms	  a	  totally	  alternative	  pattern	  to	   the	   linear	   trajectories	   of	   the	   modern	   wherein	   ‘men/humans’	   consume	  ‘women/animals/objects’.	  	  Rather,	  as	  her	  customers	  ‘leave’	  presents	  which	  she	  then	  consumes,	  it	  implements	  a	  cyclical	  pattern	  like	  that	  at	  work	  in	  daraku,	  so	  that	  she,	  the	  consumed,	  consumes	  that	  which	  they	  leave	  so	  that	  she	  can	  sustain	  herself	  and	  offer	  her	  body	  for	  consumption	  again.	  
	  
                                            131	  Ibid.,	  p.	  516.	  132	  Ibid.,	  p.	  516.	  133 	  Orbaugh,	   ‘The	   Body	   in	   Contemporary	   Japanese	   Women’s	   Fiction,	   138:	   ‘The	  butcher	  who	  killed	  the	  pig	  and	  consumes	  the	  prostitute	  ends	  up	  replacing	  the	  corpse	  of	  the	  pig	  and	  becoming	  meat	  himself’);	  and	  Knighton,	  ‘Writing	  the	  body	  –	  as	  meat:	  Kanai	  Mieko’s	   ‘Rotting	   Meat’	   as	   Surreal	   fable’	   (p.	   175,	   ‘the	   external	   narrative	   [becomes]	  enclosed	  –	  or	  more	  accurately,	  consumed	  –	  by	  the	  interior	  narrative	  of	  the	  prostitute’).	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That	   the	  woman’s	  pattern	  of	   consumption	  offers	  an	  alternative	  system	  of	   signification	   to	   the	  modern	   similar	   to	   that	   of	   daraku	   is	   further	   confirmed	  when	   she	   concludes	   her	   description	   of	   her	   system	   of	   services	   and	  compensation	  as	   ‘Sore	  de,	  kurashi	  o	  tatete	  ita	  n	  desu	  mono’.134	  	  Here	   ‘kurashi’	  (lifestyle)	   is	   written	   in	   furigana	   (Japanese	   phonetic	   syllabary)	   alongside	   the	  characters	   ‘??’	   (‘seikei’	   livelihood)	   and	   therefore	   can	   be	   translated	   as	   both	  
‘This	  is	  how	  I	  spent	  my	  life/earned	  a	  livelihood’	  simultaneously.135	  	  Because	  of	  the	   very	   nature	   of	   her	   profession	   we	   are	   made	   keenly	   aware	   that	   her	  ‘livelihood/life’	   relates	   to	   her	   body	   as	   a	   resource,	   and	   therefore	   to	   live	   by	  earning	   in	   this	   way	   is	   also	   to	   be	   conceptually	   equivalent	   to	   being	   ‘spent’	   or	  ‘consumed’	   physically,	   and	   appears	   to	   hold	   an	   understanding	   of	   ‘being’	   in	   a	  performative	   sense,	   as	   a	   cyclical	   process	  of	   fragmentation,	   reconstitution	   and	  re-­‐fragmentation,	  of	  simultaneous	  ‘unbeing’	  or	  daraku.	   	  Finally,	  as	   ‘being’	  here	  relates	  to	  a	  physical	  process,	  it	  can	  be	  applied	  equally	  to	  all	  organic	  matter	  and	  is	   indiscriminate	   of	   gender	   and	   categories	   of	   human/animal/the	   inanimate.	  	  Although	   the	   female	   body	  may	   be	   perceived	   as	   the	   origin	   of	   this	   subversive	  identity	  owing	  to	  the	  central	  placement	  of	  her	  narrative	  within	  the	  overall	  short	  story,	  and	  the	  significance	  of	  her	  body	  to	  her	   ‘being’,	  her	  body	   is	  not	   its	   limit.	  	  This	  becomes	  apparent	  when	  the	   ‘vulgar	  hairy	  butcher	  with	  a	  good	  physique’	  (gehin	  de	  taikaku	  no	  ii	  kemukujara	  no	  tosatsunin)	  appears	  on	  the	  scene,	  and	  lays	  challenge	   to	   her	   system.136	  	   He	   is	   oblivious	   to	   the	   woman’s	   more	   subtle	  regenerative	   cycle	   with	   its	   multiple	   sources	   of	   sustenance	   and	   corrosion,	  
                                            134	  Kanai,	  ‘Rotting	  Meat’,	  pp.	  516.	  135	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  516.	  136	  Ibid.,	  p.	  517.	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wherein	   he	   too	   enters	   the	   process	   of	   being	   consumed	   even	   as	   he	   lives.	   	   His	  livelihood	   and	   lifestyle	   absolutely	   depend	   on	   a	   brutal	   hierarchical	   order	   and	  strict	   linear	   trajectories	   of	   need	   and	   desire	   wherein	   he	   kills	   animals	   for	   his	  subsistence	   and	   consumes	   women	   for	   his	   enjoyment.	   	   He	   monopolises	   her	  physically	  with	  such	  vigorous	  sex	   that	  she	   is	   too	   tired	   to	  see	  other	  customers	  afterwards	   and	   has	   to	   turn	   them	   away	   at	   the	   door	   and	   take	   a	   rest.	   	   In	   this	  physical	  monopolisation,	  in	  his	  emotional	  jealousy	  towards	  other	  clients	  and	  in	  his	   proposal	   of	   marriage	   to	   her,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   he	   has	   no	   qualms	   about	  harnessing	  her	  energies	  for	  himself	  exclusively.	  	  His	  impractical	  and	  insensitive	  gift	  of	  an	  un-­‐skinned	  piglet,	  rather	  than	  providing	  a	  means	  of	  subsistence	  to	  the	  woman,	   suggests,	   as	   the	   woman	   herself	   notes,	   that	   he	   is	   rather	   obviously	  reasserting	  his	  hierarchy	  wherein	  the	  ‘meat’	  of	  both	  animal	  and	  woman	  are	  his	  object	   of	   consumption.	   Its	   resemblance	   to	   a	   corpse	   rather	   than	   a	   piece	   of	  butchered	   meat	   allows	   it	   to	   occupy	   a	   liminal	   space	   between	   animate	   and	  inanimate	  which,	  as	  the	  woman	  herself	  explains,	  makes	  her	  uncomfortable	  by	  being	  too	  closely	  metaphorical	  for	  her	  line	  of	  work.	  	  As	  she	  explains,	  
In	   this	   world,	   there	   are	   corpses	   and	   bodies	   for	   which	   it	   is	   more	  apposite	  to	  call	  them	  meat;	  in	  particular,	  calling	  a	  prostitute’s	  body	  ‘meat’	  is	  common,	  but	  however	  you	  looked	  at	  it,	  the	  thing	  that	  the	  butcher	  brought	  round	  was	  the	  skinned	  body	  of	  a	  piglet	  which	  he	  had	   killed.	   	   So	   I	   simply	   wrapped	   the	   body	   of	   the	   piglet	   up	   in	   a	  plastic	  bag	  and	  newspaper	  and	  stuffed	  it	  under	  the	  bed.	  137	  	  The	  piglet	  thus	  at	  first	  provides	  the	  reader	  with	  a	  foil	  for	  the	  woman	  as	  it	  hangs	  in	  this	  liminal	  space	  as	  the	  reader	  is	  kept	  in	  suspense	  as	  to	  whether	  it,	  and	  not	  the	  woman	  as	  we	  first	  were	  led	  to	  believe,	  will	  transpire	  to	  be	  the	  locus	  of	  the	  
                                            137	  Ibid.,	  p.	  517.	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terrible	   smell.	   	   Yet,	   in	   fact,	   it	   is	   upon	   this	   gift	   that	   the	   cycle	   of	   the	   woman’s	  system	  of	  signification	  and	  consumption	  pivots	  and	  seals	  the	  butcher’s	   fate	  as	  she	  must	   now	   somehow	   consume	   the	  meat	   for	   her	   survival,	   and	   in	   doing	   so,	  must	  imagine	  the	  butcher	  as	  his	  gift.	  
That	  it	  is	  the	  butcher	  who	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  the	  piece	  of	  rotting	  meat,	  not	  the	  woman,	  nor	  the	  piglet,	  is	  thus	  designed	  to	  subvert	  narrative	  expectation	  not	  just	  because	  it	  reverses,	  exaggerates	  and	  renders	  ‘physical’	  the	  gendered	  roles	  of	  man	  and	  woman	  as	  Orbaugh	  suggests,	  but	  moreover	  because	  it	  shatters	  the	  illusion	   constructed	   by	   the	   binary	   and	   linear	   modern	   system	   of	   signification	  with	  which	  the	  butcher	  enshrouds	  himself	  and	  reaffirms	  the	  woman’s	  version	  of	   reality	   in	   which	   all	   living	   matter	   is	   in	   a	   continuous	   process	   of	   decay	   and	  fragmentation.	   	   Unfortunately,	   the	   butcher	   only	   ‘realises’	   the	   truth	   of	   the	  originary	  state	  of	  daraku	  subsequent	  to	  his	  death,	  through	  the	  decaying	  of	  his	  body.	  
Boku,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   is	   the	   would-­‐be	   aspiring	   middle-­‐class	  masculine	  subject	  whose	  original	  desire	  to	  acquire	  his	  own	  ‘ie’	  (household)	  and	  spend	  his	  time	  productively	  ‘writing’	  has	  somehow	  been	  compromised	  and	  this	  has	  led	  him	  down	  a	  path	  of	  searching	  for	  an	  apartment	  where	  he	  can	  pursue	  a	  life	   of	   non-­‐productivity	   in	   ‘running	   to	   the	   very	   extremes	   of	   not-­‐writing’	   and	  instead	   ‘waiting	   for	   death’.138	  	   That	   death	   comes	   in	   the	   guise	   of	   a	   young	  woman,	   ‘a	  thousand	  times	  more	  beautiful’	   than	  he	  indicates	  that	  boku	  has	  not	  only	   already	   embraced	   a	   subversive	   identity	   of	   ‘unbeing’,	   but	   that	   he	   greatly	  idealises	   this	  state	  and	  that	  his	  narrative	  also	  confirms	  the	   female	  body	  as	  an	  
                                            138	  Ibid.,	  p.	  518.	  
 92 
originary	  site	  for	  ‘rotting	  meat’/‘death’/the	  process	  of	  ‘daraku’.139	  	  That	  at	  the	  end	  of	  his	  story,	  the	  same	  ‘rotting	  meat’/’death’/’daraku’	  has	  manifested	  itself	  in	   his	   breath	   like	   the	   estate	   agent’s	   suggests	   that	   subversive	   masculine	  ‘interiority’	   correlates	   to	   the	   subversive	   ‘female	   body’.	   	   However,	   just	   as	   the	  piglet	  is	  the	  foil	  for	  the	  woman	  in	  this	  short	  story,	  the	  estate	  agent	  is	  the	  foil	  for	  
boku.	   	   Whereas	   the	   estate	   agent/pimp’s	   subversion	   of	   the	   modern	   and	  alignment	   with	   deterioration	   and	   decay	   is	   through	   his	   parasitic	   function,	  feeding	   off	   the	   respective	   situations	   of	   boku	   and	   the	   woman	   for	   his	   own	  financial	  gain,	  boku	  reverses	  this	  trope	  by	  wanting	  to	  be	  eaten.	   	  His	  encounter	  with	   the	   woman	   has	   not	   resulted	   in	   a	   selfish	   exploitative	   cynicism,	   but	   a	  vibrancy	  and	  warmth	  and	   in	  an	  urgent	   love	  of	   life/death.	   	  The	  characters	  and	  outcomes	   of	   this	   short	   story	   thus	   correlate	   not	   only	   to	   ‘Discourse	   on	  Decadence’,	   but	   also	   to	   polaroppositionalism,	   as	   they	   represent	   the	   constant	  tension	  between	  two	  poles,	  the	  modern	  and	  the	  postmodern,	  male	  and	  female,	  writing	  and	  not	  writing,	  life	  and	  death,	  love	  and	  cynicism.	  	  These	  poles	  cannot	  be	   reduced	   to	   each	   other	   and	   yet	   they	   continually	   threaten	   to	   erase	   the	  presence	  of	  the	  other.	  
	  
Conclusion	  
In	   conclusion,	   Kanai’s	   rejection	   of	   psychologising	   critical	   approaches	   in	   her	  1970	   essay	   and	   her	   linking	   it	   to	   confessional	  modes	   of	   writing	   in	   producing	  ‘woman’	   as	   a	   pre-­‐gendered	   ‘commodity’	   is	   extremely	   radical	   in	   that	  psychoanalysis,	   as	   a	   metanarrative,	   can	   in	   many	   ways	   be	   considered	   a	  
                                            139	  Ibid.,	  p.	  518.	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‘postmodern’	  tool	  as	  it	  attempts	  to	  deconstruct	  representations	  of	  subjectivity.	  	  Returning	   to	   our	   two	   epigraphs,	   in	   her	   efforts	   to	   reconstitute	   women’s	  subjectivity	   into	   positive	   and	   non-­‐‘phallogocentric’	   (modern	   binary)	   terms,	  Luce	  Irigaray	  produced	  her	  own	  psychoanalytic	  terms	  in	  fabricating	  the	  notion	  of	  woman	  as	  an	  ‘alterity’	  to	  man.	  Irigaray	  argues	  that	  rather	  than	  conceiving	  of	  ‘woman’	   as	   a	   symmetrical	   otherness	   which	   is	   necessarily	   elided	   to	   that	   of	   a	  negative	   ‘other’	   of	   ‘man’,	   women	   writers	   should	   make	   a	   concerted	   effort	   to	  form	  a	  metanarrative	  of	  woman	  which	  interweaves	  and	  rewrites	  ancient	  myths,	  creates	   the	  notion	  of	  a	   female	  god,	   and	   is	   therefore	  able	   to	   stand	  as	  a	   cosmic	  and	  infinite	  entity	  which	  is	  never	  completely	  definable,	  and	  not	  reliant	  on	  being	  defined	  in	  opposition	  to	  man.	  To	  this	  extent,	  Irigaray’s	  attempt	  to	  reconstitute	  ‘woman’	   in	   positive	   alternative	   terms,	   and	   through	   different	   value	   systems,	  seems	  to	  have	  much	  in	  common	  with	  Kanai’s	  early	  work.	  	  	  Further,	  by	  insisting	  on	  a	  plurality	  and	  infinity	  of	  meaning,	  constituting	  woman	  as	  the	  polar	  opposite	  of	  man	  which	  has	  been	  suppressed	  in	  modern	  discourse,	  parallels	  can	  also	  be	  drawn	  between	  polaroppositionalism	  and	  Irigarayan	  theory.	  	  Seen	  in	  this	  light,	  the	  creation,	  in	  Kanai’s	  fiction,	  of	  a	  new	  ‘gender’	  that	  is	  plural	  and	  infinite,	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  extremely	  close	  to	  that	  of	  Irigaray’s	  écriture	  feminine.	  
The	  main	  difference	  between	  Kanai	  and	  Irigaray	  is	  that	  the	  former	  does	  not	  allow	  us	  definitively	   to	  assign	   this	  gender	  or	   identity	  as	   ‘woman’,	   thereby	  affirming	  existing	  modern	  binary	  gendered	  terms.	   	  In	  this	  way,	  her	  writing	  on	  gender	   and	   identity	   most	   closely	   aligns	   with	   that	   of	   Judith	   Butler,	   as	   both	  attempt	   to	   eliminate	   gender	   difference	   by	   fragmenting	   linear	   discussions	   of	  gender	  and	  sexuality.	  Butler,	  in	  order	  to	  move	  as	  far	  away	  as	  possible	  from	  an	  ‘essentialist’	   conception	   of	   gender	   and	   identity,	   resurrects	   and	   refines	   the	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theory	  of	   ‘performativity’,	  in	  which	  subjectivity	   is	  achieved	  through	  one’s	  acts	  (or	   performances),	   including	   speech	   acts.140	  	   For	  Butler,	   these	  performances	  ‘foreclose’	  meaning	  around	   the	  self	  within	   the	  given	  space	  and	   time	   that	   they	  are	  enacted	  (for	  example	  Humpty’s	  sitting	  on	  the	  wall	  is	  a	  demonstration	  of	  his	  completed	   subjectivity). 141 	  But	   between	   these	   performances	   are	   ‘gaps’	  wherein	  the	  subject’s	   ‘subjectivity’	   is	  suspended	  (when	  Humpty	   falls	   from	  the	  wall),	   and	   there	   is	   a	   potential	   for	   them	   to	   change	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   they	  (re)signify	  themselves.	  Although	  in	  Kanai’s	  poem	  we	  are	  left	  in	  suspense	  as	  to	  whether	  Humpty	  is	  put	  back	  together	  again,	  his	  being	  reconstituted	  differently	  by	  an	  unknown	  plural	  readership	  or	  through	  re-­‐reading	  is	  implied.	  
In	  Butler’s	  reading,	  as	   in	  Kanai’s	  early	  poetry,	  psychoanalysis	   is	  denied	  the	   linear	  narratives	   requisite	   to	   formulating	  a	   comprehensive	  explanation	  of	  gender	  and	  sexuality;	  instead,	  the	  reader	  of	  behaviour/text	  is	  instead	  forced	  to	  focus	   on	   interpreting	   individual	   performances,	   allowing	   ‘subjects’	   to	   move	  more	   fluidly	   between	   genders	   and	   sexualities,	   eluding	   the	   categories	   of	  ‘woman’	   and	   ‘man’,	   or	   ‘heterosexual’	   and	   ‘homosexual’.	   	   This	   is	   also	   clearly	  evident	   in	   Kanai’s	   short	   fiction	   works	   which	   move	   fluidly	   from	   narrative	   to	  narrative,	   so	   that	   her	   characters	   never	   achieve	   qualities	   of	   ‘interiority’	   or	  recognisable	   selfhood	   with	   a	   stable	   gender,	   name	   and	   realistic	   geographical	  origin/place	   of	   residence	   which	   would	   allow	   them	   the	   three-­‐dimensionality	  that	   the	   term	   ‘character’	   evokes.	   	   Instead	   they	   remind	   us	   of	   Karatani’s	  description	   of	   the	   postmodern	   as	   manifestations	   of	   ‘exteriority’,	   as	  
                                            140	  Butler,	   'Gender	   Trouble:	   Feminism	   and	   the	   Subversion	   of	   Identity'.	   For	   Butler’s	  position	  on	  performativity	  in	  contrast	  to	  Beauvoir,	  Irigaray	  and	  Lacan	  see:	  pp.	  18-­‐46	  .	  141	  Ibid.,	   Ch	   2,	   ‘Prohibition,	   Psychoanalysis,	   and	   Production	   of	   the	   Heterosexual	  Matrix’,	  	  pp.	  85-­‐90.	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interchangeable	   surfaces	   and	   fictions	   which	   stand	   outside	   a	   modern	   linear	  mode	  of	  discourse,	  and	  as	  narratives	  which	  create	  gaps	  in	  the	  metanarratives	  of	  the	   modern	   through	   their	   provisionality	   which	   creates	   doubt	   and	  questioning.142	  
As	   they	   work	   through	   their	   respective	   paradoxes,	   both	   short	   stories	  reject	  the	  streamlined	  definition	  of	  the	  terms	  which	  affirm	  a	  ‘modern’	  narrative	  of	   ‘all	  women’	  writing	   against	   a	   global	   patriarchal	   order	   on	  which	  Orbaugh’s	  argument	   hinges.	   And	   while	   they	   arguably	   rescue	   ‘female’	   desire	   from	   its	  enclosure	  within	   a	   fixed	  modern	   semantic,	   yet	   the	   liberation	   of	   the	   terms	   of	  gender	  mean	  that	  they	  cannot	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  ‘semantic	  victory’	  for	  women	  as	  Knighton	  concludes,	  for	  the	  simple	  reason	  that	  if	  the	  purpose	  of	  these	  texts	  is	  to	   find	   meaning	   beyond	   that	   achieved	   through	   binary	   definition	   then	   its	  ‘victory’	  belongs	  to	  neither	  sex,	  but	  to	  both	  or	  rather	  to	  all	  sexes	  and	  sexualities.	  As	   Kanai	   never	   rebrands	   the	   plurality	   of	   genders	   that	   her	   works	   form	   as	  ‘feminine’,	   they	   seem	  more	   parallel	   in	   discourse	  with	   Butler’s	   performativity	  than	   they	   do	   with	   Irigaray’s	   alterity,	   emphasising	   the	   fragmentation	   and	  corrosion	   of	   coherent	   gendered	   categories	   rather	   than	   aiming	   at	   their	  resurrection.	   	  As	  such	  both	   texts	   implement	   the	  creation	  of	  a	   complex	  debate	  about	   the	   reality	   of	   postmodern	   gender	   and	   sexuality	   and	   their	   continuing	  permutations	   and	   evolutions,	  which	   is	   inclusive,	   or	   parodying,	   of	   absurd	   and	  grotesque	   modern	   histories,	   but	   not	   continuing,	   as	   Takeuchi	   has	   suggested,	  their	  silence	  or	  oppression.	  	  With	  regards	  to	  gender	  discourse,	  they	  underscore	  that	   the	   language	   used	   by	   ‘women’	   about	   themselves	   is	   fundamental	   to	   the	  
                                            142	  Karatani,	  ‘One	  Spirit,	  Two	  Nineteenth	  Centuries',	  p.	  260.	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production	   of	   (women’s)	   identity,	   and	   therefore	   constitutes	   a	   crucial	   starting	  point	  for	  revolution	  and	  change,	  both	  on	  an	  individual	  level	  and	  beyond.	  	  Both	  ‘Rabbits’	  and	  ‘Rotting	  Meat’	  are	  texts	  which	  will	  no	  doubt	  require	  our	  repeated	  re-­‐interpretation	   as	   they	   call	   us	   to	   re-­‐evaluate	   our	   very	  means	   of	   systematic	  categorisation	  and	  challenge	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  define	  gender	  and	  sexuality.
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Chapter	  Two	  
Matrices	  of	  Meaning	  in	  Love	  Life	  
Introduction	  The	   previous	   chapter	   explored	   how	   Kanai’s	   early	   short	   stories	   ‘Rabbits’	   and	  ‘Rotting	  Meat’	   can	   both	   be	   read	   as	   appropriations	   of	   avant-­‐garde	   techniques	  that	  emerged	   in	   the	   immediate	  aftermath	  of	   the	  Second	  World	  War;	  and	  how	  such	  appropriations	  serve	  to	  deconstruct	  and	  parody	  established	  genders	  and	  sexualities,	  revealing	  them	  to	  be	  fragmentary	  and	  fictional.	  	  It	  argued	  that	  in	  so	  doing,	   both	   texts	   can	   be	   seen	   to	   complement	   Kanai’s	   non-­‐fiction	   critique	   of	  those	   narrative	   constructions	   of	   woman	   that	  were	   being	   forged	   by	   feminists	  and	   other	   contemporary	   female	   writers	   during	   her	   early	   career.	   	   Taken	  together,	   then,	   both	   ‘Rabbits’	   and	   ‘Rotting	   Meat’	   constitute	   important	  contributions	   to,	   and	   interventions	   in,	   not	   only	   contemporary	   debates	  surrounding	  gender	  and	  sexuality,	  but	  also	  the	  Japanese	  avant-­‐garde’s	  attempts	  to	  challenge	   the	  sociocultural	   status	  quo	  of	   the	   time.	   	  By	   inscribing	  models	  of	  postmodern	  subjectivities	  born	  of	  plurality	  and	  contradiction,	  each	  story	  is	  able	  to	   defy	   the	   restrictive	   social	   conventions	   and	   normative	   categorisations	   and	  codifications	   of	   female	   subjectivity,	   without	   recourse	   to	   a	   straightforward,	  seemingly	  unproblematic	  discourse	  of	  antagonism	  (such	  antagonism,	  of	  course,	  being	  fundamentally	  reliant	  on	  the	  very	  terms	  and	  categories	  it	  opposes).	  
This	   chapter	   furthers	   this	   exploration	   of	   the	   subversive	   potential	   of	  Kanai’s	  writings,	   by	   analysing	   Kanai’s	   debut	   novella	  Ai	  no	   seikatsu	   (Love	  Life,	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1968).1	  	  Love	  Life	  describes	  a	  day	  in	  the	  life	  of	  its	  Tokyoite	  protagonist,	  Ai;	  and	  its	   catalogue	   of	   incidents	   –	   if	   not	   its	   narrative	   strategies	   –	   can	   be	   quickly	  summarised.	   The	   novella	   commences	   with	   Ai’s	   waking	   up	   in	   the	   apartment	  where	  she	  lives	  with	  her	  husband	  F	  at	  ten	  o’clock	  in	  the	  morning.	  F	  has	  already	  gone	  to	  work,	  but	  Ai’s	  narrative	  describes	  the	  scene	  as	  he	  had	  left	  it,	  noting	  the	  used	  crockery	   in	   the	  sink	  and	   the	   record	  on	   the	   record	  player.	  After	  drinking	  coffee,	   reading	   the	   paper	   and	   tidying	   up,	   Ai	   decides	   to	   go	   into	   town.	   	   Upon	  arriving	  in	  Shinjuku	  she	  goes	  to	  a	  coffee	  shop	  where	  she	  attempts	  to	  contact	  F	  by	  making	  a	  phone	  call	   to	   the	  university	  where	  he	   lectures,	  but	   is	   shocked	   to	  learn	   that	   he	   has	   taken	   absence	   without	   leave.	   	   She	   then	   recalls	   various	  meetings	  with	  her	  acquaintance,	  the	  painter,	  including	  the	  time	  that	  she	  spoke	  impulsively	  to	  him	  in	  his	  atelier.	  	  She	  also	  reads	  a	  letter	  from	  her	  friend	  who	  has	  recently	  been	  transferred	  to	  Kyoto.	  	  Ai	  then	  visits	  a	  popular	  Shinjuku	  Jazz	  Café,	  
Mokuba,	  where	  she	  attempts,	  but	  fails,	  to	  write	  a	  response	  to	  her	  friend’s	  letter.	  	  There,	  she	  encounters	  a	  male	  university	  student	  who	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  one	  of	  F’s	  students.	   	   She	   is,	   by	   now,	   really	   hungry;	   so	   she	   goes	   into	   a	   restaurant	   and	  orders	   food.	   	   However,	   when	   a	   man	   sits	   at	   her	   table	   and	   starts	   to	   eat	   his	  spaghetti	  bolognese,	  she	  finds	  she	  is	  suddenly	  unable	  to	  eat.	  	  In	  the	  restaurant	  she	   experiences	   a	   very	   traumatic	   memory	   of	   being	   surrounded	   by	   pickled	  anatomical	   body	   parts	   in	   her	   aunt’s	   hospital.	   	   She	   leaves	   the	   restaurant	   and	  finds	  another	  public	   telephone	  to	  call	  F’s	   friend	  to	  see	   if	  he	  has	  seen	  him	  that	  day.	   	  The	  friend’s	  wife	  answers	  the	  phone	  and	  informs	  her	  that	  F	   is	  there	  and	  that	  he	  has	  been	  there	  all	  day.	  	  Ai	  is	  at	  first	  angry.	  	  She	  has	  imagined	  the	  worst	  
                                            1	  Mieko	  Kanai,	  Ai	  no	  seikatsu	  [Love	  Life]	  in	  Kanai	  Mieko:	  Zentanpenshū	  (Tokyo:	  Nihon	  bungeisha,	  1992)	  pp.	  7-­‐51.	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(that	   F	   has	  met	  with	   a	   terrible	   accident),	   and	   she	   is	   angry	   that	   she	  had	  been	  living	  with	  this	  hypothesis	  all	  day	  and	  it	  has	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  false.	   	  However,	  her	  anger	  quickly	  disappears	  when	  an	  arguing	  couple,	  who	  are	  walking	   just	  a	  few	   paces	   behind	   her,	   are	   killed	   by	   a	   speeding	   car	   as	   they	   cross	   the	   road	  seconds	   after	   Ai	   herself	   has	   crossed.	   	   Ai	   sees	   that	   the	   book	   that	   the	   girl	  was	  carrying	  is	  discarded	  next	  to	  a	  bucket	  of	  rubbish.	  	  She	  picks	  it	  up,	  gives	  it	  to	  the	  policeman	   on	   the	   scene	   and	   runs	   in	   the	   opposite	   direction	  with	   tears	   in	   her	  eyes.	  
With	  the	  choice	  of	  name	  for	  her	  protagonist,	  Kanai	  immediately	  directs	  the	   reader	   towards	   an	   understanding	   of	   identity	   necessarily	   reliant	   upon	   a	  proliferation	   of	   different	   meanings,	   connotations	   and	   ontologies.	   	   Such	   an	  understanding	   is	  accomplished	  by	  the	  simple,	  but	  effective,	  means	  of	   the	  pun:	  as	  Ai	  means	  ‘love’	  in	  Japanese	  and	  plays	  not	  only	  on	  the	  English	  first	  person	  ‘I’,	  but	  its	  homophone,	  the	  ‘eye’,	  her	  name	  suggests	  an	  active	  viewing	  subject,	  that	  also	   necessarily	   evokes	   the	   concept	   of	   love.	   As	   if	   to	   further	   confirm	   this	  interpretation	   of	   her	   name,	   the	   narrative	   employs	   a	   stream-­‐of-­‐consciousness	  style	   and	   relates	   the	   events	   and	   emotions	   Ai	   experiences	   (including	   that	   of	  being	  in	  love)	  as	  if	  they	  are	  being	  transcribed	  in	  the	  present	  moment.	  	  Ai	  is	  thus	  perpetually	  inscribed	  in	  the	  triple	  acts	  of	  being,	  loving	  and	  seeing.	  
The	  novella’s	  exploration	  of	  identity	  as	  a	  site	  reliant	  upon	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  meanings,	   connotations	   and	   ontologies	   is	   also	   suggested	   by	   its	   title:	  Ai	  no	  
seikatsu	  can	  be	  translated	  into	  English	  as	  Ai’s	  Life,	  The	  Life	  of	  Ai,	  The	  Life	  of	  Love,	  and	  Love	  Life,	  each	  translation	  foregrounding	  a	  different	  set	  of	  nuances	  present	  in	  the	  Japanese	  title.	   	  While	  the	  titles	  Ai’s	  Life	  and	  The	  Life	  of	  Ai	  emphasise	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  novella	  is	  an	  account	  of	  a	  day	  in	  the	  life	  of	  a	  woman	  called	  Ai,	  the	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latter	   title	  here,	  by	  divorcing	   the	  name	  Ai	   from	  the	  possessive	   ‘s’,	   enables	   the	  anglophone	  reader	   to	  more	  easily	  appreciate	   the	  pun	  which	  Ai	  makes	  with	   ‘I’	  and	   ‘eye’,	   highlighting	   her	   inscription	   as	   an	   active,	   viewing	   subject.	  	  Alternatively,	   the	   title	  The	  Life	  of	  Love,	   read	   in	   retrospect	   of	   the	  narrative	   (in	  which,	  as	  was	  noted	  above,	  Ai	  struggles	  through	  various	  encounters,	  traumatic	  memories	  and	  physiological	  experiences,	  and	  encounters	  a	  tragic	  accident),	  can	  be	   taken	   as	   a	   comment	   on	   the	   novella’s	   challenge	   to	   conventional	   notions	   of	  love.	   	   Finally,	   by	  making	   use	   of	   idiomatic	   English,	   the	   title	   Love	  Life,	   which	   I	  have	   opted	   for	   here,	   slightly	   shifts	   or	   stretches	   the	  meaning	   of	   the	   Japanese	  title:	  Ai	  no	  seikatsu	   literally	   translates	   as	   ‘the	  daily,	   or	  day-­‐to-­‐day	   life	   of	   love’,	  and	  is	  not	  a	  phrase	  used	  to	  denote	  a	  given	  person’s	  romantic	  relationships,	  or	  ‘love	   life’.	   	   However,	   this	   title	   draws	   attention	   to	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   the	  protagonist’s	  ‘love	  life’,	  namely	  her	  relationship	  with	  her	  missing	  husband	  F,	  is	  fundamental	   to	   her	   narrative.	   	   It	   therefore	   successfully	   alludes	   to	   both	   the	  novella’s	   challenge	   to	   conventional	   definitions	   of	   love,	   and	   to	   Ai’s	   active	  inscription	  of	  her	  identity,	  thus	  allowing	  a	  range	  of	  interpretations	  comparable	  to	  the	  Japanese	  title	  Ai	  no	  seikatsu.	  
To	   facilitate	   such	   a	   range	   of	   interpretations,	   Kanai	   deploys	   the	   textual	  strategy	   of	   using	   what	   we	   might	   term	   a	   constellatory	   fictive	   technique	   that	  constructs	  twin	  matrices	  of	  literary	  meaning;	  through	  setting	  in	  play	  alongside	  each	  other	  a	  set	  of	  associated	  tropes,	  figures	  and	  references,	  the	  text	  invites	  us	  to	  generate	  meanings	  through	  the	  very	  process	  of	  making	  such	  associations.	  We	  shall	   have	   more	   to	   say	   about	   this	   textual	   strategy	   below	   (and,	   much	   more	  extensively,	  in	  Chapter	  Three).	  For	  the	  moment,	  however,	  let	  us	  begin	  by	  noting	  how,	   throughout	   the	  novella,	   these	   twin	  matrices	  resonate	  and	  alternate	  with	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each	  other,	  as	   they	  seek	  to	   inscribe	  not	  only	  Ai’s	  material	  reality,	  but	  also	  her	  imaginary,	  fictional	  relationship	  with	  her	  husband	  F.	  The	  first	  matrix,	  Ai-­‐body-­‐
presence,	   derives	   from	   the	   narrative	   inscription	   of	   Ai’s	   abjected	   physiological	  origin,	  which	  assails	  her	  when	  she	  attempts	  to	  eat,	  recalling	  images	  of	  parasites,	  corpses	  and	  the	  dismembered	  maternal	  body.	  	  The	  second,	  F-­‐narrative-­‐absence,	  is	  discernible	  in	  Ai’s	  attempts	  to	  describe	  (or,	  rather,	  inscribe)	  her	  husband,	  F,	  and	   her	   relationship	   with	   him,	   attempts	   which	   seek	   to	   render	   his	   physical	  
absence	  from	  her	  narrative	  account	  as	  a	  textual	  presence.	  
	  
The	  Dazai	  Osamu	  Prize	  Committee	  
Before	  we	   discuss	   the	   text	   itself,	  we	   should	   note	   one	   of	   the	  more	   interesting	  literary-­‐critical	   contexts	   in	  which	  Love	  Life	  was	   situated	   after	   its	   publication:	  the	   1967	   Dazai	   Osamu	   Prize. 2 	  	   That	   the	   novella	   was	   radical	   in	   its	  experimentation,	   particularly	   in	   its	   challenge	   to	   conventional	   fictional	  representations	  of	  subjectivity,	  is	  readily	  apparent	  from	  the	  comments	  made	  by	  the	  judges	  on	  the	  panel.	  The	  panel	  was,	  typically	  for	  its	  time,	  comprised	  of	  six	  men;	   and	  might	   be	   considered,	   figuratively,	   to	   be	   a	   rounding	   up	   of	   the	   usual	  suspects.	   	   All	   of	   them	  were	   in	   their	   sixties,	   with	   the	   exception	   of	   Nakamura	  Mitsuo	   (who	  was	   a	  mere	   fifty	   six).	   	   Four	   of	   them	   had	   graduated	   from	   either	  Tokyo	   or	   Kyoto	  University	   and	   had	   subsequently	   pursued	   careers	   as	   literary	  critics,	  writers	  and	  university	  professors.	  	  Collectively,	  the	  judges	  resort	  to	  two	  
                                            2	  Founded	  in	  1964	  by	  the	  publishing	  company,	  Chikuma	  shobō,	  the	  Dazai	  Osamu	  Prize	  is	   an	   annual	   literary	   award	   for	   an	   unpublished	   short	   story	   by	   a	   previously	  unrecognised	  writer.	  	  Scott	  J.	  Miller,	  Historical	  Dictionary	  of	  Modern	  Japanese	  Literature	  
and	  Theatre	   (Scarecrow	  Press:	  2009)	  p.	  19.	   	  For	   the	  selection	  committee’s	  comments	  see:	  Kanai	  Mieko:	  Zentanpenshū.	  Vol.	  1	  (Tokyo:	  Nihonbungeisha,	  1992)	  pp.	  601-­‐605.	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strategies	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  account	  for	  the	  novella:	  one	  is	  to	  criticise	  it	  for	  its	  deviation	   from	  some	  kind	  of	   aesthetic,	   novelistic	  norm	   (and	   to	   lament	   the	  failure	  to	  be	  the	  novella	  they	  think	  Kanai	  should	  have	  written);	  the	  other	   is	  to	  discern	  a	  biographical	  explanation	  for	  its	  narrative	  procedure;	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  to	  point	   out	   either	   the	   fact	   that	   Kanai	   was	   nineteen	   at	   the	   time	   of	   Love	   Life’s	  publication,	  or	  the	  fact	  that	  she	  suffered	  from	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  university	  education,	  or	  the	  fact	  that	  she	  was	  a	  woman.	  	  	  These	  two	  strategies	  then	  come	  together	  in	  a	  single	   charge:	   the	   charge	   of	  aesthetic	   immaturity.	   	   For	   instance,	  Karaki	   Junzō,	  contrasting	  Love	  Life	  with	  the	  actual	  prizewinner,	  Isshiki	  Jirō’s	  Seigenki	  (Visions	  
in	  Azure),	  writes:3	  
The	   talent	   of	   the	  work	   just	   trickles	   out	  without	   control.	   	   	   If	   the	  writer	   had	   been	   unable	   to	   write,	   placed	   a	   brake	   on	   her	   talent,	  allowing	   it	   to	   pool	   and	   stagnate,	   it	   would	   gain	   weight.	   	   But	   I	  suppose	  this	  is	  an	  impossible	  request	  for	  a	  nineteen	  year	  old.4	  	  Kawakami	  Tetsutarō	  similarly	  remarks	  upon	  Kanai’s	  age,	  and	  also	  upon	  on	  her	  lifestyle,	  which	  he	  perceives	  as	  being	  directly	  relevant	  to	  the	  worth	  of	  Love	  Life:	  
Receiving	  honorable	  mention,	  Kanai	  Mieko’s	  Love	  Life	   is	   a	  work	  which	   strikes	   one	  with	   the	   distinctiveness	   of	   a	  writer	  who	   is	   a	  nineteen	  year-­‐old	  half-­‐woman	  living	  the	  lifestyle	  of	  a	  student;	  in	  short	   the	   weakness	   of	   the	   work	   is	   that	   the	   freshness	   that	   we	  should	  highly	  regard	  of	  the	  discoveries	  of	  this	  adolescent	  woman	  
                                            3	  Isshiki	   Jirō,	   Seigenki	   [Visions	   in	   Azure]	   (Tokyo:	   Chikuma	   shobō,	   1967).	   Visions	   in	  
Azure	  describes	  a	  war	  veteran’s	  experiences	  of	  returning	  to	  his	  hometown	  after	  thirty	  years	   have	   elapsed,	   and	   reviving	   his	  memories	   of	   his	  mother,	  who	  died	   young.	   	   The	  novel	  is	  set	  on	  the	  island	  where	  the	  writer	  grew	  up,	  Okinoerabujima,	  which	  is	  situated	  in	   Kagoshima	   Prefecture,	   between	   the	   island	   of	   Kyūshu	   and	   Okinawa’s	  main	   island.	  	  Isshiki	  had	  been	  writing	  since	  the	  mid-­‐1930s	  and	  was	  fifty-­‐one	  when	  he	  won	  the	  prize.	  4	  Karaki	  Junzō,	  in	  Kanai	  Mieko:	  Zentanpenshū.	  Vol.	  1,	  p.	  604.	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who	  stands	  for	  the	  first	  time	  at	  the	  gate	  of	  life	  is,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  a	  handicap.5	  	  Usui	   Yoshimi	   feels	   strongly	   that	   Kanai	   lacks	   the	   education	   required	   to	   be	   a	  writer	  and	  remarks:	  
[….]	  for	  a	  work	  of	  a	  nineteen-­‐year-­‐old	  adolescent,	   it	   is,	  relatively	  speaking,	  markedly	  developed,	  and	  even	  interesting.	  	  However,	  I	  assume	   this	   is	   because	   the	  writer	   has	   read	   interesting	   bits	   and	  pieces	  of	  foreign	  literature	  in	  translation,	  and	  this	  has	  given	  birth	  to	   some	   sensitive	   responses	   and	   reflections.	   	   If	   you	   wish	   to	  become	  a	  writer,	  first,	  pass	  the	  entrance	  exam	  of	  the	  university	  of	  your	  dreams.	  	  Then	  try	  writing	  a	  novel	  in	  five	  or	  ten	  years’	  time.6	  	  Nakamura	   goes	   even	   further	   in	   his	   criticism	   of	   Kanai	   and	   her	   novella	   and	  declares:	  
Miss	   Kanai	   Mieko’s	   ‘Love	   Life’	   is	   a	   work	   of	   a	   nineteen-­‐year-­‐old	  adolescent	  woman	  but,	  although	  it	  shows	  literary	  talent,	  I	  cannot	  think	  that	  it	  is	  any	  more	  than	  a	  simple	  piece	  of	  composition.	  	  After	  stuffing	  her	  head	  full	  of	  literary	  images,	  she	  relied	  on	  her	  wit	  and	  just	  attempted	  to	  write	  something	  akin	  to	  a	  novel;	  its	  moments	  of	  narcissistic	   innocence	  arise	   from	  her	   lack	  of	   life	   experience	  and	  are	  physiological	  in	  basis,	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  you	  might	  say	  that	  her	  cheeks	  are	  rosy	  and	  her	  skin	  is	  pretty.7	  	  One	   can	   hardly	   blame	   judges	   of	   a	   literary	   prize	   for	   making	   comments	   that	  might	  otherwise	  seem	  excessively	  adjudicatory	  in	  tone;	  that,	  of	  course,	  is	  their	  
raison	   d’être.	   	   Instead,	   we	   might	   observe	   that	   one	   of	   the	   inevitable	  consequences	   of	   any	   literary	   prize	   being	   awarded	   (or	   withheld)	   is	   that	   the	  
                                            5	  Kawakami	  Tetsutarō	  in	  Kanai	  Mieko:	  Zentanpenshū.	  Vol.	  1,	  p.	  604.	  6	  Usui	  Yoshimi	  in	  Kanai	  Mieko:	  Zentanpenshū,	  Vol.	  1,	  p.	  604.	  7	  Nakamura	  Mitsuo	  in	  Kanai	  Mieko:	  Zentanpenshū.	  Vol.	  1,	  p.	  605.	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adjudicating	   panel	   is	   necessarily	   drawn	   towards	   utterances	   that	   rest	   on	   the	  assumption	   that	   criticism	   and	   evaluation	   are	   somehow	   coterminous.	   Having	  said	  that,	  we	  might	  also	  forgive	  today’s	  readers’	  gasping	  in	  comical	  horror	  (or,	  indeed,	   righteous	   indignation)	   at	   the	   starkness	   of	   the	   assumptions	   informing	  these	   assessments:	   this	   ill-­‐educated,	   rosy-­‐cheeked,	   prettily-­‐skinned	   ‘half-­‐woman’,	   her	   talent	   ‘trickl[ing]	   out	  without	   control’,	   like	   blood	   from	  a	  woman	  who	   has	   forgotten	   to	   apply	   her	   sanitary	   towel,	   has	   produced	   a	   text	   of	  ‘narcissistic	   innocence’	   which	   is	   clearly	   ‘physiological	   in	   basis’.	   My	   last	  sentence,	  of	  course,	   rather	  unfairly	  homogenises	   the	   four	   into	  a	  single	  critical	  voice.	   Even	   so,	   it	   is	   abundantly	   clear	   that,	   collectively,	   they	   make	   the	   same	  explicit	   assumptions:	   Kanai’s	   youth,	   sex	   and	   education	   (or	   lack	   thereof)	   are	  obvious	  impediments	  to	  her	  being	  able	  to	  produce	  the	  sort	  of	  text	  she	  ought	  to	  have	  done.	  
The	  remaining	  two	  critics	  on	  the	  panel,	   Ibuse	  Masuji	  and	  Ishikawa	  Jun,	  are	  slightly	  more	  nuanced	  in	  their	  readings.8	  	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  those	  of	  the	  Tokyo	  
                                            8	  Both	  Ibuse	  and	  Ishikawa	  had	  won	  significant	  literary	  prizes	  for	  their	  work	  at	  the	  end	  of	   the	   1930s:	   Ishikawa	   had	   won	   the	   Akutagawa	   Prize	   for	   Fugen	   (Tokyo:	   Hangasō,	  1936),	  translated	  as	  The	  Bodhisattva,	  or,	  Samantabhadra:	  A	  Novel.	  by	  William	  Jefferson	  Tyler	  (New	  York	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1990);	  Ibuse	  had	  won	  the	  Naoki	  Prize	  for	  
Jon	  Manjirō	  Hyōryūki	   (Tokyo:	   Kawade	   shobō	   1937),	   translated	   as	   	   John	  Manjiro,	   the	  
Castaway,	  His	   Life	   and	  Adventures,	   trans.	   Hisakazu	   Kaneko	   (Tokyo:	   Hokuseido	   Press	  1941).	   Just	  prior	   to	  Kanai’s	  debut,	   Ibuse	  had	   received	   the	  prestigious	  Noma	  Literary	  Prize	   the	   year	   before,	   for	   his	   seminal	   work	   Kuroi	   ame	   [Black	   Rain]	   based	   on	   the	  experiences	   of	   the	   victims	   of	   the	   atomic	   bombing	   of	   Hiroshima;	  while	   Ishikawa	   had	  just	   published	   Shifuku	   sennen	   [The	  Millenian]	   which	   would	   achieve	   huge	   popularity	  among	  young	  adults	  and	  be	  considered	  by	  many	  as	  a	  masterpiece.	  Kuroi	  ame	  was	  first	  serialised	   in	   the	   literary	   magazine	   Shinchō	   between	   January	   and	   September	   1965,	  before	  being	  published	  as:	   Ibuse	  Masuji,	  Kuroi	  ame	   (Tokyo:	  Shinchōsha,	  1966),	   trans.	  John	   Bester	   (Tokyo:	   Kōdansha	   International,	   1969).	   Ishikawa’s	   Shifuku	   sennnen	  (Tokyo:	   Iwanami	   shoten,	   1967)	  has	  not	   yet	   been	   translated;	   however,	   it	   is	   reviewed	  and	  discussed	  in	  English	  in	  Susan	  Napier,	  The	  Fantastic	  in	  Modern	  Japanese	  Literature:	  
The	  Subversion	  of	  Modernity	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1996),	  	  pp.	  141-­‐178).	  	  For	  a	  lengthier	  discussion	   of	   Ishikawa	   and	   Ibuse’s	   careers,	   see:	   Donald	   Keene,	   Dawn	   to	   the	   West:	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and	  Kyoto	  university	  professors,	  the	  two	  writers’	  respective	  critiques	  of	  Kanai’s	  text	  are	  guided	  far	  less	  by	  conservatism	  and	  elitism.	  	  However,	  Love	  Life	  seems	  to	  have	  challenged	  even	  their	  expectations	  of	  literature.	  	  	  Ibuse	  writes:	  
When	  I	  read	  the	  beginning	  [of	  Love	  Life],	  I	  had	  the	  feeling	  that	  it	  wasn’t	  going	  to	  work.	  	  It	  was	  like	  the	  bewilderment	  I	  have	  felt	  in	  standing	  in	  front	  of	  a	  modernist	  painting.	  	  I	  have	  a	  memory	  of	  my	  heart	  racing.	  	  It	  was	  a	  feeling	  akin	  to	  that.	  However,	  little	  by	  little,	  as	  I	  continued	  to	  read	  on,	  it	  started	  to	  make	  sense.	  	  I	  can	  see	  that	  it	   is	   written	   from	   a	   point	   of	   view	   which	   is	   almost	   completely	  opposite	   to	   that	  adopted	  by	  Visions	  in	  Azure’s	  writer.	   	   I	   came	   to	  the	  meeting	  with	  the	  intention	  that	  if	  the	  selection	  committee	  had	  gone	  cold	  on	  Visions	  in	  Azure,	  I	  would	  cast	  my	  vote	  for	  Love	  Life.9	  	  
However,	  that	  Love	  Life	  came	  runner-­‐up	  in	  the	  prize	  was	  largely	  because	  of	  the	  influence	   of	   Ishikawa,	   who	   commences	   his	   commentary	   by	   stating	   generally	  that,	  although	  there	  were	  so	  many	  applicants,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  world	  of	  literature	   is	   flourishing;	   ‘rather,	   it	   is	   close	   to	   decline’	   (dochira	   ka	   to	   ieba,	  
bunkosuitai	  ni	  chikai).10	  	  He	   remarks	   that	   this	   time	   the	   competition	  was	  very	  close,	  but	   if	  he	  had	   to	   choose	  his	   favourite	  out	  of	   the	   four	   finalists’	  works,	  he	  would	  select	  Kanai’s	  and	  writes:	  
Even	  though	  a	  flash	  of	  talent	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Love	  Life,	  the	  world	  of	  this	  novel	  dies	  before	  it	  has	  taken	  solid	  shape.	   	  We	  leave	  reality,	  but	   before	   even	   gaining	   entrance	   into	   the	   world	   of	   fiction,	  everything	  becomes	  fuzzy.	  	  To	  borrow	  from	  the	  words	  used	  in	  the	  text	  itself,	  it	  does	  not	  result	  in	  dépaysement.	  	  And	  worst	  of	  all,	  the	  writer’s	  feelings	  rise	  up	  and	  are	  exposed.	  	  In	  a	  novel,	  feelings	  are	  
                                                                                                                           
Japanese	   Literature	   of	   the	   Modern	   Era,	   A	   History	   of	   Japanese	   Literature	   (New	   York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1998)	  pp.	  946-­‐49	  and	  pp.	  1087-­‐1102	  respectively.	  9	  Ibuse	  Masuji	  in	  Kanai	  Mieko:	  Zentanpenshū	  Vol.	  1,	  p.	  603.	  10	  Ishikawa	  Jun	  in	  Kanai	  Mieko:	  Zentanpenshū.	  Vol.	  1,	  p.	  603.	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completely	  useless.	  	  […]	  It	  is	  vulgar	  for	  powerful	  elements	  to	  rise	  prominently	   to	   the	   fore,	   but	   the	   fuzziness	   at	   its	   core	   is	  troubling.11	  	  Ishikawa	   concludes	   by	   postulating	   that	   as	   the	   writer	   is	   still	   young,	   there	   is	  room	   for	  her	   to	   find	  herself	   as	   a	  writer,	   and	   therefore	   resolve	   the	   ‘fuwafuwa’	  (‘fuzzy’)	  areas	  of	  her	  writing.12	  
Ignoring	  for	  a	  moment	  the	  fact	  that,	  rather	  than	  the	  text,	  it	  is	  Kanai’s	  lack	  of	  worldly	   experience,	   her	   lack	   of	   higher	   education,	   her	   ‘student	   lifestyle’,	   or	  finally,	  her	  ‘physiology’	  as	  a	  ‘nineteen-­‐year-­‐old	  adolescent	  woman’	  that	  are	  the	  object	  of	  critique	  in	  the	  Tokyo	  and	  Kyoto	  University	  professors’	  comments,	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  text	  that	  appear	  to	  have	  elicited	  their	  disapproval	  are	  linked	  to	  its	   incipient	   challenge	   to	   both	   conventional	   modes	   of	   literature	   and	   the	  conventional	   inscriptions	   of	   selfhood.	   	   As	   we	   saw	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	  modern	  literature	  came	  into	  being	  (according	  to	  Karatani)	  through	  the	  splitting	  of	  the	  self	   from	  landscape	  (and	  the	  realm	  of	  symbols	  which	  constitute	  it),	  and	  through	   the	   discovery	   of	   confession	   as	   a	   system	   via	   which	   the	  writer/narrator/protagonist,	   represented	   by	   a	   literary	  mode	   that	  mimics	   the	  spoken	   word	   and	   thus	   produces	   an	   ‘internal	   voice’,	   is	   able	   to	   explore	   that	  landscape,	   and	   rediscover	   his	   true	   self,	   or	   ‘interiority’.	   	   	   The	   aim	   of	   such	  literature	   is	   to	   produce	   a	   selfhood	   that	   appears,	   through	   a	   rationalisation	   of	  emotional	   struggles,	   or	   an	   unravelling	   of	   a	   private	   history,	   to	   have	   depth	   of	  character.	   	   In	  so	  doing,	   it	  creates	  a	  narrative	  which	   is	   linear,	  chronological,	  or	  systematic,	  in	  showing	  how	  elements	  from	  the	  past	  shape	  the	  present	  character	  
                                            11	  Ibid.,	  p.	  603.	  12	  Ibid.,	  p.	  603.	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of	  the	  narrator.	  	  	  The	  text	  which	  was	  awarded	  the	  Dazai	  Osamu	  Prize	  that	  year,	  
Visions	   in	   Azure,	   an	   autobiographically	   inspired	   account	   of	   a	   war	   veteran’s	  return	  to	  his	  hometown	  (a	  landscape	  that	  had	  been	  alienated	  from	  him	  through	  the	  passage	  of	  time,	  which	  he	  rediscovers	  by	  recounting	  and	  resolving	  private	  memories	  of	  his	  childhood	  and	  mother),	  might	  thus	  be	  taken	  to	  be	  archetypal	  of	  this	  literary	  mode;	  thus,	  also,	  the	  critics’	  overwhelming	  endorsement	  of	  Visions	  
in	   Azure	   is	   also	   further	   revelatory	   of	   their	   conventional	   literary	   preferences.	  	  However,	  Love	  Life,	  as	  Ibuse	  remarks,	  is	  written,	  ‘from	  a	  point	  of	  view	  which	  is	  almost	   completely	   opposite	   to	   that	   adopted	   by	   Visions	   in	   Azure’s	   writer’.	   	   In	  other	  words,	  Love	  Life	  produces	  a	  narrative	  which	  not	  only	  does	  not	  conform	  to	  such	   conventional	  modes,	   but	  which	   calls	   their	   relevance	   to	   the	   new	   cultural	  identities	  of	  Kanai’s	  generation	  into	  question.	  It	  manages	  this	  by	  replacing	  any	  ‘coherent’	   internal	   voice	  with	   a	   stream-­‐of-­‐consciousness	   narrative	   technique,	  so	   that	   the	   textual	   sections	   that	   pertain	   to	   Ai’s	   decisions,	   recollections,	  observations,	  and	  descriptions	  do	  not	  form	  a	  chronological,	  linear	  narrative,	  as	  would	  a	  conventional	  ‘internal	  voice’.	  
Virginia	   Woolf,	   in	   a	   famous	   modernist	   statement	   of	   aesthetic	   intent,	  argued	   forcefully	   the	   case	   for	   stream-­‐of-­‐consciousness	   as	   a	   narrative	   mode,	  even	  as	  she	  pointed	  out	  the	  tiredness	  of	  the	  naturalistic	  conventions	  she	  sought	  to	  challenge,	  interrogate	  and	  displace:	  
The	   writer	   [of	   naturalist	   fiction]	   seems	   constrained,	   not	   by	   his	  own	  free	  will	  but	  by	  some	  powerful	  and	  unscrupulous	  tyrant	  who	  has	  him	   in	   thrall,	   to	  provide	  a	  plot,	   to	  provide	  comedy,	   tragedy,	  love	  interest,	  and	  an	  air	  of	  probability	  embalming	  the	  whole	  […].	  But	  sometimes,	  more	  and	  more	  often	  as	  time	  goes	  by,	  we	  suspect	  a	   momentary	   doubt,	   a	   spasm	   of	   rebellion,	   as	   the	   pages	   fill	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themselves	  in	  the	  customary	  way.	  Is	  life	  like	  this?	  Must	  novels	  be	  like	  this?	  Look	  within	   and	   life,	   it	   seems,	   is	   very	   far	   from	   being	   “like	  this”.	   Examine	   for	   a	   moment	   an	   ordinary	  mind	   on	   an	   ordinary	  day.	  The	  mind	  receives	  a	  myriad	  impressions	  –	  	  trivial,	  fantastic,	  evanescent,	   or	   engraved	   with	   the	   sharpness	   of	   steel.	   From	   all	  sides	  they	  come,	  an	  incessant	  shower	  of	  innumerable	  atoms;	  and	  as	   they	   fall,	  as	   they	  shape	  themselves	   into	   the	   life	  of	  Monday	  or	  Tuesday,	  the	  accent	  falls	  differently	  from	  of	  old	  […].	  Life	  is	  not	  a	  series	   of	   gig	   lamps	   symmetrically	   arranged;	   life	   is	   a	   luminous	  halo,	   a	   semi-­‐transparent	   envelope	   surrounding	   us	   from	   the	  beginning	   of	   consciousness	   to	   the	   end.	   Is	   it	   not	   the	   task	   of	   the	  novelist	   to	   convey	   this	   varying,	   this	   unknown	   and	  uncircumscribed	  spirit,	  whatever	  aberration	  or	  complexity	  it	  may	  display,	   with	   as	   little	   mixture	   of	   the	   alien	   and	   external	   as	  possible?	  We	  are	  not	  pleading	  merely	   for	  courage	  and	  sincerity;	  we	  are	  suggesting	  that	  the	  proper	  stuff	  of	   fiction	  is	  a	   little	  other	  than	  custom	  would	  have	  us	  believe	  it.13	  	  The	   radical	   potential	   of	   such	   a	   narrative	   challenge	   is	   evident,	   in	   the	   above	  passage,	   in	   Woolf’s	   governing	   metaphors	   of	   tyranny	   and	   rebellion	   (and	   one	  wonders	  how	  much	  the	  comments	  from	  the	  Dazai	  Osamu	  panel	  members	  were	  designed	   precisely	   to	   quell	   such	   incipient	   rebelliousness	   they	   each	  may	   have	  discerned	   in	  Kanai’s	   novella);	   the	   ‘myriad	   impressions’	  made	  on	   ‘an	   ordinary	  mind	   on	   an	   ordinary	   day’	   do	   not	   naturally	   order	   themselves	   into	   coherent,	  linear	   narrative	   forms.	   	   If	   one’s	   experience	   of	   life	   is	   thus	   fundamentally	  
impressionistic,	   then	   it	   follows	   that	   a	   priori	   methods	   of	   shaping	   such	  impressions	   (plot,	   causality,	   incident)	   are,	   inevitably,	   as	   retrospective	   as	   they	  are	  falsifying.	  Such	  shaping	  necessarily	  entails	  a	  re-­‐writing	  of	  one’s	  experience	  according	   to	   pre-­‐determined	   narrative	   patterns,	   which	   forever	   inscribe	   such	  
                                            13	  Virginia	  Woolf,	  'Modern	  Fiction	  (1919)',	  in	  Twentieth	  Century	  Literary	  Criticism,	  ed.	  David	  Lodge	  (London:	  Longman,	  1972)	  pp.	  88-­‐89.	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experience	   as	   already	   having	   happened.	   Thus,	   already	   having	   happened,	   that	  experience	  can	  be	  objectified,	  analysed	  and	  recounted	  –	  in	  a	  word,	  materialised	  –	  by	  the	  narrator,	  to	  form	  a	  readily	  understandable	  ‘series	  of	  gig	  lamps’,	  which	  proceed	  in	  a	  temporally	  unproblematic	  manner.	  Thus,	  one	  of	  the	  major	  aspects	  of	   Woolf’s	   challenge	   to	   naturalistic	   fiction	   lies	   in	   this	   interrogation	   of	   the	  naturalists’	  adherence	  to	  the	  historic	  model:	  her	  image	  of	  sensory	  impressions	  as	   constituting	   ‘innumerable	   atoms	   […]	   that	   shape	   themselves	   into	   the	   life	   of	  Monday	   or	   Tuesday’	   shows	   how	   her	   conception	   of	   modern	   fiction’s	   task	   to	  convey	   in	   prose	   the	   impressionistic	   nature	   of	   human	   experience	   necessarily	  entails	   the	  rejection	  of	   linearity,	   in	   favour	  of	  a	  narrative	   technique	  predicated	  upon	  sensory	  immediacy.	  
The	  applicability	  of	  Woolf’s	  comments	  to	  Love	  Life	   is	  clear,	  as	  the	  latter	  presents	   the	   reader	   with	   a	   kaleidoscopic	   array	   of	   textual	   and	   narrative	  fragments,	  all	  the	  while	  eschewing	  the	  straitjacket	  of	  a	  linear	  chronology,	  as	  it	  abandons	   any	   notion	   of	   narrative	   causality:	   Ai’s	   narrative	   switches	   without	  warning	   from	   the	   present	   tense	   to	   the	   past;	   it	   includes	   her	   attempts	   to	  remember	   in	   note	   form;	   her	   rushed,	   rather	   garbled,	   and	   abandoned	   written	  response	  to	  the	  friend	  in	  Kyoto;	  and	  snatches	  of	  her	  conversations	  with	  people,	  both	  those	  that	  take	  place	  in	  her	  past,	  and	  those	  that	  take	  place	  in	  her	  present	  moment.	  	  Ai	  writes:	  
[…]	  From	  the	  canteen	  window	  the	  rail	   tracks	   in	  the	  station	  yard	  can	   be	   seen,	   and	   the	   painter	   comments	   that,	   viewed	   from	   a	  height,	   the	  tracks	  have	  the	  vivid	  reality	  of	  another	  dimension	  to	  them,	  as	   if	  a	  child	  has	  drawn	  the	  tracks	   in	  black	  and	  white	  with	  slate	  pencils.	   	   I	   listened	  to	   the	  painter’s	  words	  while	  enduring	  a	  pain,	   like	   a	   tension,	   that	   crept	   up	   the	   right	   side	   of	   my	   back.	  Suddenly	  the	  pain	  came	  upon	  me.	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The	   pain	   is	   suddenly	   upon	  me.	   	   	   As	   I	   finish	   reading	   the	  letter,	  the	  right	  side	  of	  my	  back	  is	  throbbing.	  	  	  I	  close	  my	  eyes	  for	  a	   minute,	   while	   listening	   to	   the	   melody	   of	   the	   tango	   that	   the	  coffee	   shop	   is	   playing	   (it’s	   the	   Tango	   of	   Roses)	   and	   hold	   my	  breath.	  […]	  –	   It’s	   so	   painful.	   I	  wake	   alone	   in	   the	  middle	   of	   the	   night	  and	  hold	  a	  pen;	  I’m	  so	  scared	  sometimes	  that	  I	  even	  wake	  up	  F.	  	  I	  hate	   it.	   	   I	   hate	   it.	   	   I’m	   afraid.	   	  My	   life,	   every	   day,	   the	   room,	   the	  desk,	  everything,	  is	  completely	  unrelated	  to	  me.	  	  There’s	  nothing	  to	  be	  done,	  that’s	  how	  it	  is.	  	  I	  feel	  like	  I’m	  going	  mad.	  	  I	  feel	  sick.	  I	  turned	  to	  the	  painter	  and	  spoke	  impulsively.	  I	  tried	  to	  fight	  the	  words,	  washed	  clean	  by	  my	  sincerity	  as	  soon	  as	  they	  came	  out	  of	  my	  mouth.14	  	   Here,	  Ai	  starts	  by	  describing	  her	  (past)	  visit	  to	  an	  Ikebukuro	  department	  store	  canteen	  with	  the	  painter.	  	  She	  remembers	  feeling	  a	  pain	  in	  her	  back	  at	  the	  time,	  and	  immediately	  describes	  feeling	  the	  same	  pain	  in	  her	  present	  situation	  in	   the	   coffee	   shop	   in	   Shinjuku.	   	   She	   then	   recalls	   another	   past	   experience	   in	  which	  she	  was	  in	  pain	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  night.	  	  In	  the	  latter	  narrative	  section,	  Ai	  recalls	   in	  present	  tense,	   the	  past	  emotional	  state	  that	   is	  either	  triggered	  by	  pain,	   or	   that	   causes	  her	   the	  pain.	   	   	  Here	   she	   relates	   being	   scared;	   hating	   and	  feeling	   alienated	   from	  her	   daily	   life;	   feeling	   powerless;	  worrying	   about	   going	  insane,	   and	   so	   on,	   without	   attempting	   to	   form	   a	   linear,	   rational,	   explanatory	  narrative	  about	  this	  emotional	  state.	  	  Ai’s	  narrative	  then	  recounts	  another	  past	  episode	   in	   which	   she	   had	   spoken	   impulsively	   to	   the	   painter	   while	   she	   was	  visiting	   his	   atelier,	   thus	   linking	   it	   to	   the	   traumatic	   episode	   in	   which	   her	  emotions	  are	  brought	  to	  the	  fore.	  	  However,	  this	  time,	  Ai	  comments	  on	  how	  she	  
                                            14	  Kanai,	  Ai	  no	  seikatsu,	  pp.	  23-­‐24.	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spoke,	  and	  how	  she	  felt	  about	  the	  words	  that	  she	  said,	  without	  ever	  describing	  what	  she	  said.	  
Nakamura’s	   comment	   that	   Love	   Life	   is	   ‘something	   akin	   to	   a	   novel’	  (shōsetsu	   rashī	   mono),	   although	   perhaps	   meant	   to	   be	   pejorative,	   is	   thus	  accurate	  in	  that,	  by	  its	  taking	  the	  form	  of	  a	  personal	  diary	  or	  log,	  the	  text	  draws	  on	  the	  confessional	  conventions	  of	  the	  Japanese	  I-­‐Novel,	  even	  as	  it	  departs	  from	  them	   through	   its	  emulation	  of	  erratic	   thought	  patterns	  which	  do	  not	   follow	  a	  linear	  chronology.	   	   	  Ai’s	  thoughts,	  as	  the	  excerpt	  above	  demonstrates,	  go	  back	  and	   forth	   between	   past	   memories,	   anxieties	   for	   the	   future,	   and	   Ai’s	  engrossment	  in	  her	  own	  present	  physical	  and	  sensory	  experiences.	  	  This	  again	  underscores	   the	   text’s	   postmodernism,	   in	   its	   parody	   of	   and	   play	   with	   the	  modern	   literary	   form	  and	  departure	   from	   conventional	   linear	   narrative.	   	   The	  speed	  of	  the	  narrative	  flow,	  which	  skips	  from	  one	  incident	  to	  the	  next,	  means,	  as	  the	  panel	  judge	  Karaki	  pointed	  out,	  that	  it	  does	  not	  achieve	  a	  more	  ‘weighty’	  text	  depicting	  internal	  struggles	  (including	  ‘writer’s	  block’)	  that	  creates	  a	  sense	  of	   interiority	   important	   to	  modern	  confessional	   literary	   forms.15	  	   Instead,	   the	  kaleidoscopic	  rotation	  of	  events	  reinforces	  the	  impression	  of	  a	  selfhood	  which	  does	  not	  have	  time	  to	  edit,	  or	  rationalise,	  and	  which	  links	  image,	  to	  sensation,	  to	   a	   set	   of	   emotions,	   to	   a	   reflection	   on	   those	   emotions,	   through	   various	  associations	  and	  shifts	  of	  tense.	  
Furthermore,	   Ai	   does	   not	   inscribe	   herself	   as	   alienated	   from	   her	  landscape	  and	   its	  surrounding	  culture;	  on	  the	  contrary,	   through	  her	  narrative	  she	  is	   intricately	   integrated	  into	   it.	  Her	  stream-­‐of-­‐consciousness	  narrative	   is	  a	  
                                            15	  Karaki,	  in	  Kanai	  Mieko:	  Zentanpenshū.	  Vol.	  1,	  p.	  604.	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transcription	   not	   only	   of	   her	   decisions,	   recollections,	   observations,	   and	  descriptions,	  but	  also	  of	  the	  various	  texts	  which	  she	  encounters,	  and	  that	  might,	  conventionally,	   be	   considered	   as	   ‘external’.	   	   These	   include,	   for	   instance,	   the	  lyrics	   to	   the	   song	   that	   Ai	   overhears	   in	   the	   shopping	   arcade,	   the	   postcard	  invitation	  she	  receives	  to	  a	  John	  Cage	  concert,	  or	  her	  friend’s	  letter	  from	  Kyoto.	  The	   inclusion	  of	   these	   ‘external’	   texts,	   each	  with	  different	   styles	   and	   formats,	  some	  of	  which,	  like	  the	  Miyako	  Harumi	  song,	  or	  the	  ‘foreign	  literature’	  to	  which	  Usui	  referred	  in	  his	  panel	  assessment,	  are	  extratextual,	  gives	  the	  sense	  that	  Ai’s	  narrative	  (or,	  as	  we	  saw	  Nakamura	  prefer,	  Kanai’s	  own	  ‘head’)	  is	  ‘stuffed’	  with	  ‘literary	   images’. 16 	  	   	   By	   inscribing	   a	   contemporary	   selfhood	   which	   is	  necessarily	   inextricable	   from	   the	   surrounding	   culture	   (the	   culture	   of	   1960s	  Tokyo	   no	   longer	   being	   restricted	   to	   output	   of	   solely	   Japanese	   origin),	   Ai’s	  stream-­‐of-­‐consciousness	  narrative	  defies	   conventional	  modern	  conceptions	  of	  the	   duality	   between	   self	   and	   landscape,	   or,	   indeed,	   between	   ‘Japanese’	   and	  ‘Western’,	  or	  other	  ‘foreign’	  cultures.	  	  Furthermore,	  its	  stream-­‐of-­‐consciousness	  technique,	   seeking	   as	   it	   does	   to	   inscribe	   the	   erratic	   patterns	   of	   thought,	  undermines	  the	  realist	  mode	  of	  the	  conventional	  ‘internal	  voice’	  of	  confessional	  literature,	   and	   exposes	   how	   the	   latter	   is	   organised	   through	   dichotomies,	  linearities	  and	  chronologies	  which	  are	  themselves	  constructions.	  
As	  we	  have	  seen,	  Kanai’s	  short	  fiction	  works	  of	  the	  early	  1970s,	  such	  as	  ‘Rabbits’	  and	  ‘Rotting	  Meat’,	  feature	  anonymous,	  framing	  narrators	  who	  inhabit	  a	   recognisable,	   if	   sketchily-­‐defined	   world,	   together	   with	   internal	   narrators	  whose	  worlds,	  by	  contrast,	  are	  bizarre	  and	  fantastical;	  the	  challenge	  they	  throw	  
                                            16	  Nakamura,	  in	  Kanai	  Mieko:	  Zentanpenshū.	  Vol.	  1,	  p.	  605.	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down	  to	  any	  expectation	  of	  an	  unproblematic	  realist	  mode	  of	  narration	  is	  thus	  unmistakeable.	   In	   Love	   Life,	   however,	   the	   novella	   presents	   us	   with	   a	   single	  subjective	  perspective,	  which	  aims	  at	  replicating	  conscious	  experience,	  relaying	  thoughts	  and	  events	  as	  they	  occur,	  including	  the	  written	  texts	  that	  Ai	  reads,	  as	  they	   are	   written.	   Indeed,	   we	   might	   argue	   that	   it	   is	   precisely	   because	   of	   the	  protagonist’s	   stream-­‐of-­‐consciousness	   narrative	  method,	   taken	   together	   with	  the	  multitude	  of	   contemporary	   references	   to	  popular	   culture,	   counter-­‐culture	  and	   surrealism	   (not	   to	  mention	   her	   ‘half-­‐woman’,	   student-­‐like	   lifestyle),	   that	  the	   panel	   judge	   Ishikawa	  was	   so	   easily	   able	   to	   read	  Love	  Life	  as	   though	  Ai	   is	  nothing	   but	   a	   literary	   representation	   –	   and	   a	   poorly-­‐executed	   literary	  representation,	   at	   that	   –	   of	   the	   writing	   body	   Kanai.	   For	   Ishikawa,	   Love	   Life	  comprises	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  straightforward	  regurgitation	  onto	  the	  page	  of	  the	  author’s	  own	  thought	  processes;	  hence	  his	  severe	  rebuke	  that	  ‘the	  writer’s	  feelings	  float	  up	  and	  are	  exposed’.	  His	  pronouncement	  that	  ‘[i]n	  a	  novel,	  feelings	  are	   completely	   useless’	   shows	   that	   he	   felt	   that	   the	   novel	   was	   (and	  problematically	   so)	   a	   representation	   of	   Kanai’s	   emotional	   and	   psychological	  reality.17	  	  Challenging	  Ishikawa’s	  conflation	  –	  or,	  more	  to	  the	  point	  –	  confusion	  of	   ‘author’	  with	   ’narrator’,	   and	  having	   recovered	  Ai	   as	   a	   fictional	   construct	   of	  the	   text,	  we	   can	  nonetheless	   concede	   that	   is	   possible,	   in	   the	   first	   instance,	   to	  read	   Love	   Life	   as	   if	   it	   were	   a	   representationalist	   account	   of	   Ai’s	   thought	  processes.	  Certainly,	   its	  stream-­‐of-­‐consciousness	  technique	  doesn’t	  necessarily	  militate	   against	   a	   representationalist	   aesthetic.	   After	   all,	   to	   return	   to	   the	  passage	   from	   ‘Modern	   Fiction’	   quoted	   above,	  Woolf’s	   central	   point	   about	   the	  true	  nature	  of	  lived	  experience	  is	  that	  it	  is	  fundamentally	  failed	  or	  betrayed	  by	  
                                            17	  Kanai,	  Kanai	  Mieko:	  Zentanpenshū	  Vol.	  1.	  p.	  603.	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conventional	   narrative	   methods:	   ‘[l]ife	   is	   not	   a	   series	   of	   gig	   lamps	  symmetrically	   arranged;	   life	   is	   a	   luminous	   halo,	   a	   semi-­‐transparent	   envelope	  surrounding	   us	   from	   the	   beginning	   of	   consciousness	   to	   the	   end.’	   Rejection	   of	  the	   characteristic	   attributes	   of	   (what	   we	   can	   now	   term)	   so-­‐called	  representationalist	   fiction	   is	   not,	   for	   Woolf,	   a	   correlated	   rejection	   of	   an	  aesthetic	   presumption	   in	   favour	   of	   prose	   fiction	   that	   seeks	   to	   be	   true	   to	   life.	  Rather,	  she	  suggests	  ‘that	  the	  proper	  stuff	  of	  fiction	  is	  a	  little	  other	  than	  custom	  would	  have	  us	  believe	  it.’	  
And	   yet,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   through	   the	   deployment	   of	   the	   missing	  husband	  F,	  a	  metafictional	  device	  (discussed	  below)	  that	  propels	  the	  plot	  of	  the	  novella,	   Ai’s	   narrative	   breaks	   the	   illusion	   of	   realism	   and	   draws	   attention	   to	  itself	   as	   a	   text,	  while	  posing	  questions	   about	   the	   relationship	  between	   reality	  and	   fiction.	   	   Thus	   Love	   Life’s	   combination	   of	   metafiction	   and	   psychological	  realism	  also	  seems	  to	  have	  perturbed	  Ishikawa	  who	  takes	   issue	  with	  what	  he	  terms	  the	  ‘fuzziness’	  of	  Kanai’s	  text,	  by	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  narrative	  ‘leave[s]	  reality’	  but	  does	  not	  quite	  ‘gain	  entrance	  into	  the	  world	  of	  fiction’.18	  
	  
Ai-­‐Body-­‐Presence	  
For	  Ishikawa,	  then,	  ‘fuzziness’	  is	  effectively	  synonymous	  with	  ‘aesthetic	  failure’.	  Reclaiming	   such	   ‘fuzziness’,	   however,	   it	   is	   my	   contention	   that	   the	   novella’s	  production	   of	   these	   two	   distinct	   literary	  modes	   is	   moreover	   a	   result	   of	   the	  novella’s	  aim	  to	  locate,	  describe	  and	  resolve	  two	  distinct	  modes	  of	  being.	   	  The	  first	  of	  these	  is	  an	  elusive	  material	  reality	  that	  greatly	  resembles	  Julia	  Kristeva’s	  
                                            18	  Ishikawa	  in	  Kanai	  Mieko:	  Zentanpenshū.	  Vol.	  1,	  p.	  603.	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‘abject’.	   	   In	   contrast	   to	   her	   contemporaries,	   Luce	   Irigaray	   and	  Hélène	   Cixous,	  Kristeva	   does	   not	   challenge	   the	   Freudian	   and	   Lacanian	   concept	   of	   a	   finite	  dualism	   of	   self	   and	   other	   at	   work	   in	   modern	   psychoanalysis.19	  Instead,	   she	  challenges	  this	  dualism’s	  positioning	  at	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  self,	  by	  reformulating	  both	  Freud’s	   theory	  of	   ‘primal	  repression’	  and	  Lacan’s	   thesis	  of	   ‘the	  real’,	   in	  a	  manner	  which	  posits	  the	  maternal	  body	  (or	  ‘chora’,	  as	  Kristeva	  reterms	  it)	  as	  a	  pre-­‐cultural	  zone	  that	  precedes	  and	  produces	  the	  ego.20	  As	  she	  writes,	  
Let	   us	   enter,	   for	   a	   moment,	   into	   that	   Freudian	   aporia	   called	  primal	   repression.	   Curious	   primacy,	   where	   what	   is	   repressed	  cannot	   really	   be	   held	   down,	   and	   where	   what	   represses	   always	  already	   borrows	   its	   strength	   and	   authority	   from	   what	   is	  
                                            19	  Cixous,	   Irigaray	   and	   Kristeva	   all	   develop	   post-­‐structuralist	   theories	   which	   argue	  that	   the	   ‘othering’	   of	   women	   and	   their	   bodies	   is	   interwoven	   into	   the	   very	   fabric	   of	  modern	   language	   and	   cultural	   convention.	   For	   Cixous	   and	   Irigaray,	   this	   ‘othering’	   is	  evident	  in	  modern	  philosophies,	  such	  as	  Freudian	  psychoanalysis,	  in	  which	  the	  (only)	  template	   for	   the	   modern	   ‘self’	   (or	   ‘ego’)	   is	   white,	   heterosexual,	   and	   masculine;	   or	  alternatively,	   in	   Lacanian	   theory,	   which,	   in	   its	   post-­‐structuralist	   ‘return	   to	   Freud’,	  seeks	   to	   further	   delineate	   a	   finite	   dualism	   of	   subject/object	   at	   work	   in	   modern	  psychoanalysis,	   thereby	   continuing	   Freud’s	   sole	   (masculine)	   template	   for	   normality.	  	  In	  order	  to	  reclaim	  positive,	  yet	  different,	  identities	  for	  women,	  Cixous	  advocates	  that	  women	  challenge	  male-­‐led	  theories	  by	  writing	  about	  the	  female	  body,	  while	   Irigaray,	  whose	   theories	  on	   the	  other	  were	  considered	   in	  Chapter	  One,	  and	  are	  returned	  to	   in	  greater	   detail	   later	   in	   this	   chapter,	   creates	   a	   transcendent	   concept	   of	   the	   ‘feminine’	  which	  stands	  outside	  of	  the	  modern	  framework.	  	  In	  so	  doing,	  both	  thus	  argue	  there	  are	  alternative	  models	   for	   the	   self	   (and	   its	   relationship	   with	   the	   other)	   than	   those	   that	  Freud	  and	  Lacan	  outline.	  	  However,	  Kristeva	  challenges	  Freudian	  and	  Lacanian	  theory	  by	   returning	   to	   them	   and	   reformulating	   them,	   exploiting	   loopholes	   in	   both	  psychoanalytic	  models	   for	   traces	  of	   the	  maternal	  body	  and	   its	  pre-­‐symbolic	   language	  (which	  she	  terms	  ‘the	  semiotic’).	  	  This	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  her	  discussion	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  maternal	  body	  represents	  an	  excluded	  or	   ‘abjected’	  mode	  of	  being	   in,	   Julia	  Kristeva,	  Powers	  of	  Horror:	  An	  Essay	  on	  Abjection.	   trans.	   Leon	   S.	   Roudiez	   (New	  York:	  Columbia	   University	   Press,	   1982).	   	   For	   Cixous	   and	   Irigaray’s	   challenge	   to	   finite,	  masculine	   theoretical	   models	   see,	   for	   instance:	   Hélène	   Cixous,	   'The	   Laugh	   of	   the	  Medusa',	   trans.	   Keith	   Cohen	   and	   Paula	   Cohen,	   Signs,	   1	   (1976),	   875-­‐93;	   and	   Luce	  Irigaray,	  'When	  Our	  Lips	  Speak	  Together',	  in	  This	  Sex	  Which	  Is	  Not	  One.	  trans.	  Catherine	  Porter	  and	  Carolyn	  Burke	  (Ithaca,	  New	  York:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1977)	  and	  Luce	  Irigaray,	   'The	  Fecundity	  of	  the	  Caress',	   in	  An	  Ethics	  of	  Sexual	  Difference.	  trans.	  Carolyn	  Burke	  and	  Gillian	  Gill	  (London:	  Continuum,	  2004).	  	  20	  Kristeva	   refers	   to	   the	   chora	   as	   ‘the	   receptacle	   of	   narcissism’,	   in	   other	   words,	   a	  space,	   or	   state	  of	  being	   in	  which	   the	   individual	   learns	   to	  differentiate	   itself	   from	   the	  other.	  	  Kristeva,	  Powers	  of	  Horror:	  An	  Essay	  on	  Abjection,	  p.	  14.	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apparently	  very	  secondary:	  language.	  	  Let	  us	  therefore	  not	  speak	  of	   primacy	   but	   of	   the	   instability	   of	   the	   symbolic	   function	   in	   its	  most	  significant	  aspect—the	  prohibition	  placed	  on	   the	  maternal	  body	  (as	  a	  defense	  against	  autoeroticism	  and	  incest	  taboo).	  	  Here,	  drives	  hold	  sway	  and	  constitute	  a	  strange	  space	  that	  I	  shall	  name,	  after	  Plato	  (Timeus,	  48-­‐53),	  a	  chora,	  a	  receptacle.21	  	  
In	  this	  passage,	  Kristeva	  deconstructs	  Freud’s	  theory	  of	   ‘primal	  repression’	  by	  pointing	  out	  its	  contradictions:	  namely	  Freud’s	  assertion,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  that	  language	  is	  the	  restraining	  force,	  controlling,	  or	  rather,	  prohibiting	  access	  to	  the	  maternal	  body;	  and	  on	  the	  other,	  his	  acknowledgement	  that	  what	  is	  repressed	  inevitably	   returns,	   and	   therefore	   that	   language	   is	   unable	   to	   fully	   implement	  such	  a	  prohibition.	  	  In	  so	  doing,	  she	  places	  the	  maternal	  body	  not	  only	  as	  an	  a	  
priori	   to	   culture,	   but	   most	   importantly	   as	   a	   space,	   or	   state,	   which	   is	   not	  irrevocably	   cut	   off	   from	   the	   individual	   after	   they	   have	   entered	   the	   symbolic	  order,	   but	   which	   repeatedly	   intrudes	   into	   the	   consciousness,	   and	   thereby	  disrupts	  the	  symbolic	  order’s	  dualisms.22	  	  Kristeva	  further	  develops	  her	  theory	  
                                            21	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  13-­‐14.	  	  	  22	  In	  Freud’s	  Studies	  on	  Hysteria,	  he	  describes	  his	   first	  attempts	   to	  get	   the	  patient	   to	  recall	  pathogenic	  memories	  without	  the	  use	  of	  hypnosis,	  and	  notes	  how	  comparatively	  difficult	   they	  are	  to	  access	   from	  a	  state	  of	  consciousness.	  This	  discovery	   leads	  him	  to	  the	   theory	   that	   there	   is	   an	   initial	   phase	   of	   repression	   (or	   ‘primal	   repression’)	   that	  occurs	   at	   a	   stage	   in	   an	   infant’s	   development,	   prior	   to	   their	   acquisition	   of	   language,	  during	  which	  the	  child	  learns	  to	  link	  the	  forces	  of	  instincts	  with	  anxiety,	  and	  excludes	  them	   from	  consciousness,	   creating,	  or	   initiating	   the	  unconscious	  mind.	   	  See	  Sigmund	  Freud,	  'The	  Case	  of	  Miss	  Lucie	  R	  (1985),	  Selected	  Papers	  on	  Hysteria',	  trans.	  A.	  A.	  Brill,	  in	   Great	   Books	   of	   the	   Western	   World:	   The	   Major	   Works	   of	   Sigmund	   Freud	   (London:	  Encyclopaedia	   Britannica,	   Inc,	   1993)	   pp.	   31-­‐37;	   and	   Sigmund	   Freud,	   'Repression	  (1915)',	   trans.	   Cecil	   M.	   Baines,	   in	   Great	   Books	   of	   the	   Western	   World:	   The	   (London:	  Encyclopaedia	  Britannica,	  Inc,	  1993)	  pp.	  422-­‐27.	  	  In	  Lacanian	  theory,	   ‘the	  real’	   is	  a	  state	  of	  nature	  wherein	  pure	  need	  and	  satiation	  are	  realised	   and	   there	   is	   no	   separation	   between	   subject	   and	   object.	   Although	   animals	  experience	  this	  primordial	  state	  throughout	  their	  lives	  (for	  example,	  when	  they	  are	  on	  heat,	   or,	   as	  predators	  when	   they	   catch,	   kill	   and	  eat),	   Lacan	   contends	   that	   the	   closest	  humans	   experience	   to	   ‘the	   real’	   is	   as	   infants	   prior	   to	   six	   months	   old,	   at	   a	   point	   in	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of	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  chora	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  ego	  by	  reformulating	  Lacan’s	  outline	  of	  an	  infant’s	  psychological	  development.	  	  She	  writes	  that	  there	  is	  a	  stage,	  which	  she	  terms	  ‘the	  abject’,	  that	  bridges	  the	  final	  few	  months	  of	  the	  child’s	  immersion	  in	  the	  chora,	  and	  the	  first	  few	  months	  of	  the	  development	  of	  ‘narcissism’	  (which	  corresponds	  to	  Lacan’s	  ‘mirror	  stage’).23	  	  During	  the	  stage	  of	   ‘the	   abject’,	   the	   boundaries	   of	   self	   and	   other,	   human	   and	   animal	   are	  established,	   but	   not	   in	   a	   clean	   and	   complete	  manner.	   	   Instead,	   there	  may	   be	  moments	  when	  the	  child	  returns	  to	  the	  security	  of	  the	  chora.	  	  Yet,	  returning	  to	  
                                                                                                                           psychic	   development	   wherein	   there	   is	   no	   distinguishing	   between	   ‘the	   self’	   and	   ‘the	  mother’.	   Lacan	   terms	   the	  next	   stage	   in	  development,	  between	  approximately	   six	  and	  eighteen	  months,	   ‘the	  mirror	   stage’,	   as	   it	   is	   at	   this	   time	   that	   the	   child	   constructs	   an	  ‘ideal	  ego’	  based	  on	  their	  perception	  of	  themselves	  as	  a	  ‘whole’	  and	  ‘separate’	  entity	  in	  the	  mirror.	   	   As	   language	   is	   a	   system	   of	   differentiation,	   the	  mirror	   stage,	   although	   it	  marks	   the	   child’s	   entry	   into	   the	   ‘imaginary	   order’,	   is	   crucial	   for	   the	   child’s	   eventual	  mastery	  of	  language,	  and	  therefore	  their	  entry	  into	  the	  ‘symbolic	  order’	  from	  eighteen	  months	  onwards.	  For	  Lacan,	   the	  psychic	  and	  physical	  borderlessness	  that	  constitutes	  ‘the	  real’	   can	  never	  be	  articulated	   through	   language	  precisely	  because	  our	  entry	   into	  the	   ‘symbolic	   order’	   irrevocably	   seals	   it	   off	   from	   us,	   and	   this	   is	   what	   makes	   (our	  understanding	  of	  and	  re-­‐accessing)	  it,	  ‘the	  impossible’.	  Nevertheless,	  as	  it	  constitutes	  a	  material	   reality,	   ‘the	   real’	   erupts	   into	   our	   imaginary	   and	   symbolic	   orders	   around	  traumatic	   events	   (such	   as	   the	   death	   of	   a	   close	   friend	   or	   relative)	   forcing	   us	   to	  acknowledge	   the	   finite	   materiality	   of	   our	   existence.	   Its	   intrusion	   into	   our	  consciousness	  threatens,	  or	  fractures,	  the	  narratives	  and	  fantasies	  that	  we	  use	  to	  cover	  it	  up	  on	  a	  daily	  basis.	  Lacan	  thus	  posits	  ‘the	  real’	  as	  a	  psychic	  zone	  that	  is	  unknown	  and	  unknowable	   to	  modern	   subjectivity,	   and	   this	   leaves	   it	   open	   to	   interpretation.	   	   Lacan	  discusses	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘the	  real’	  in	  Jacques	  Lacan,	  'Tuché	  and	  Automaton',	  in	  The	  Four	  
Fundamental	   Concepts	   of	   Psycho-­‐Analysis	   (London:	   The	   Hogarth	   Press,	   1977).	   For	   a	  more	   detailed	   description	   of	   ‘the	   real’	   as	   a	   precondition	   of	   the	   mirror	   stage	   see:	  Elizabeth	  A	  Grosz,	  Jacques	  Lacan:	  A	  Feminist	  Introduction	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  1990)	  pp.	   32-­‐35.	   	   Lacan	   outlines	   the	   developmental	   transitions	   during	   the	  mirror	   stage	   in:	  Jacques	   Lacan,	   'The	  Mirror	   Stage	   as	   Formative	   of	   the	   I	   Function',	   in	  Écrits:	  The	  First	  
Complete	  Edition	  in	  English	  (London:	  W.	  W.	  Norton	  and	  Company,	  2006)	  pp.	  75-­‐81.	  For	  a	  concise	  summary	  of	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  symbolic,	  the	  imaginary	  and	  the	  real	  see:	   Slavoj	   Zizek,	   How	   to	   Read	   Lacan	   (London:	   Granta	   Publications,	   2006).	   Various	  feminist	  commentators,	  such	  as	  Elizabeth	  Grosz,	  have	  chosen	  to	  represent,	  and	  thereby	  emphasise	  the	  elision	  between	  ‘the	  other’	  and	  ‘the	  mother’	  in	  psychoanalytic	  discourse	  pertaining	   to	   ‘the	   real’	   by	   referring	   to	   it	   as	   ‘self	   and	   (m)other’.	   	   See	   Grosz,	   Jacques	  
Lacan:	   A	   Feminist	   Introduction,	   p.	   32.	   For	   Kristeva’s	   description	   of	   the	   chora	   as	   a	  receptacle	  of	  narcissism	  see:	  Kristeva,	  Powers	  of	  Horror:	  An	  Essay	  on	  Abjection,	  pp.	  13-­‐15.	  23	  Kristeva,	  Powers	  of	  Horror:	  An	  Essay	  on	  Abjection,	  pp.	  13-­‐15.	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this	   state	   becomes	   increasingly	   traumatic	   and	   suffocating,	   as	   the	   infant	  must	  relinquish	  their	  developing	  sense	  of	  independence.24	  	  As	  Kristeva	  writes:	  
The	  abject	  confronts	  us,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  and	  this	  time	  within	  our	  personal	  archeology,	  with	  our	  earliest	  attempts	  to	  release	  the	  hold	   of	   maternal	   entity	   even	   before	   existing	   outside	   of	   her,	  thanks	   to	   the	   autonomy	   of	   language.	   It	   is	   a	   violent,	   clumsy	  breaking	   away,	  with	   the	   constant	   risk	   of	   falling	   back	   under	   the	  sway	  of	  a	  power	  as	  securing	  as	  it	  is	  stifling.	  	  
The	   connection	   with	   the	   mother’s	   body	   must,	   therefore,	   through	   the	   child’s	  entry	  into	  the	  symbolic	  order,	  be	  violently	  repressed,	  must	  become	  ‘abject’.25	  
Moreover,	   in	  order	   to	  conceive	   the	  self	  as	  an	   ‘ideal’,	   ‘whole’,	   ‘separate’,	  ‘clean’	   and	   crucially	   ‘human’	   entity,	   it	   is	   not	   only	   the	  mother’s	   body	  which	   is	  radically	   and	   violently	   excluded,	   or	   ‘abjected’,	   from	   the	   infant’s	   identity,	   but	  also	  excrement,	   filth	  and,	  more	  broadly,	  the	  world	  of	  animals	  or	  animalism.26	  	  But	  the	  limits	  of	  this	  abject	  territory	  do	  not	  stop	  there.	  	  As	  humans,	  we	  create	  a	  distinction	  between	  that	  which	  remains	  in	  our	  social	  order,	  and	  that	  which	  we	  expel.	   	   Thus,	   through	  our	   socialisation,	  what	   constitutes	   ‘the	   abject’	   comes	   to	  encompass	  all	  that	  has	  been	  expelled	  from	  modern	  culture,	  even	  that	  which	  had	  
                                            24	  Ibid.,	  p.	  13.	  25	  See	  ‘Approaching	  Abjection’	  in	  Kristeva,	  Powers	  of	  Horror:	  An	  Essay	  on	  Abjection,	  pp.	  1-­‐32.	  26	  See	   ‘From	  Filth	  to	  Defilement’	   in	  Kristeva,	  Powers	  of	  Horror:	  An	  Essay	  on	  Abjection,	  pp.	  56-­‐89	  for	  Kristeva’s	  explanation	  of	  what	  societies	  abject.	  	  	  ‘Animalism’,	   or	   the	   worship	   of	   animals,	   is	   thought	   to	   be	   one	   of	   earliest	   forms	   of	  religion,	  and,	  as	  Kristeva	  explains,	  one	  which	  primitive	  societies	  turned	  away	  from	  in	  order	   exorcise	   the	   threat	   (of	   sex	   and	  murder)	   that	   it	   posed.	   (See	  Kristeva,	  Powers	  of	  
Horror:	  An	  Essay	  on	  Abjection,	  pp.	  12-­‐13.)	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once	  been	   its	  subject,	   such	  as	  corpses,	   criminals	  or	   the	   insane.27	  	  We	  repress	  our	  material	  association	  with	  ‘the	  abject’	  from	  our	  imagination	  and	  our	  culture,	  which	  is	  to	  say	  we	  ‘paper	  over’	  our	  encounters	  with	  it	  using	  narrative	  from	  the	  imaginary	  and	  symbolic	  orders.28	  	  Our	  encounters	  with	  the	  abject	  thus	  become	  what	  we	   cannot	   fully	   remember	   or	   confront	   and	  manifest	   themselves	   in	   our	  private	   phobias	   and	   traumas;	   they	   surprise	   us	   and	   fill	   us	   with	   horror.	   	   An	  instance	   which	   serves	   to	   illustrate	   the	   repression	   of	   the	   abject	   on	   a	   cultural	  level	   is,	   as	   we	   saw	   in	   Chapter	   One,	   the	   Japanese	   government’s	   attempts	   to	  establish	   a	   narrative	   in	   which	   Japan	   and	   its	   citizens	   were	   the	   leaders	   and	  instigators	   of	   peace,	   harmony,	   and	   world	   unity	   through	   high-­‐profile	   events,	  such	  as	  Expo	  ’70,	  thereby	  smoothing	  over	  their	  role	  in	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  and	  obscuring	  its	  attendant	  atrocities	  and	  horrors.	  	  In	  so	  doing,	  as	  avant-­‐garde	  artists	  such	  as	  Okamoto	  and	  Sakaguchi	  pointed	  out	  in	  their	  writings,	  they	  were	  actually	  returning	   to	  a	  rhetoric	  which	   they	  had	  deployed	   throughout	   the	  war.	  The	   Japanese	   avant-­‐garde	   movement’s	   attempts	   to	   dismantle	   this	   narrative,	  and,	   as	   this	   chapter	   sets	   out,	   to	   align	   themselves	   with	   ‘abject	   identities’,	   can	  thus	  be	  read	  as	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	  government’s	  attempts	  to	  wilfully	  forget	  the	  evils	   committed	   during	  war.	   	   Indeed,	   read	   alongside	   Kristeva’s	   theory	   of	   the	  abject,	   the	   avant-­‐garde’s	   crisis	   of	   identity	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   an	   effort	   to	  confront,	   and	  profoundly	   accept,	   that	  which	   is	  most	   violently	   extricated	   from	  social	   identity,	  and,	  as	  is	  the	  case	  with	  Love	  Life,	  denote	  that	  abject	  identity	  as	  ‘love’.	  
                                            27	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  1-­‐32.	  28	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  12-­‐13.	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How,	  then,	  might	  the	  theory	  of	  the	  abject	  affect	  (or	  effect,	  or	  infect)	  Love	  
Life?	  The	   first	   task	  Ai	  undertakes	   for	   the	  day,	  as	   the	  novella	  commences,	   is	   to	  attempt	  to	  remember	  what	  she	  has	  eaten	  over	  the	  previous	  week	  and	  on	  which	  day,	   and	   it	   is	   through	   this	   task	   that	   the	   narrator’s	   aims	   in	   writing	   her	   diary	  emerge.	  	  As	  Ai	  writes:	  
A	  new	  day	  has	  started.	  Although,	  where	  yesterday	  finished	  I	  already	  can’t	  clearly	  remember.	   	   I	   can’t	  even	  properly	   recall	  what	  kind	  of	  day	   it	  was	  yesterday.	   	   I	   look	   at	   the	   clock	   next	   to	   my	   pillow	   and	   it’s	   ten	  o’clock.	  	  What	  was	  it	  that	  I	  had	  for	  dinner	  last	  night?	  	  For	  dinner	  last	   night	   I	   had	   deep-­‐fried	   oysters,	   apple	   and	   lettuce	   salad,	   and	  miso	  soup	  with	  tofu.	  The	   day	   before	   yesterday	   was	   pork	   chops,	   potato	   salad,	  and	   miso	   soup	   with	   spring	   onion	   and	   deep-­‐fried	   tofu.	   	   Lunch	  yesterday	  was	  a	  croissant	  with	  a	  glass	  of	  milk,	  and	  the	  day	  before	  it	   was	   the	   same.	   	   Anyway,	   when	   I	   woke	   up	   at	   ten	   o’clock	  yesterday,	   I	   finally	   succeeded	   in	   remembering	   what	   was	   for	  dinner	  and	  lunch	  in	  detail,	  stretching	  back	  a	  week.	  But	  today	  I	  can	  only	  recall	  it	  fragmentarily.29	  	  Ai’s	   inability	   to	   remember	   things,	   and	   in	   particular,	   to	   recall	  what	   she	  has	   eaten	   over	   the	   past	   week,	   are	   thus	   a	   source	   of	   anxiety.	   She	   writes	   that	  yesterday	  she	  called	  up	  her	  husband	  F	  to	  resolve	  the	  matter,	  making	  a	  note	  of	  meals	  eaten.	  	  Today,	  she	  looks	  at	  the	  note	  to	  prompt	  her	  memory,	  but	  realising	  that	  the	  note	  and	  her	  memory	  contradict	  each	  other,	  and	  reasoning	  with	  herself	  that	   the	  note	   is	   based	  on	   yesterday’s	  memory,	   she	   concludes	   that	   she	  has	  no	  way	  of	  knowing	  which	  is	  correct,	  memory	  or	  the	  note.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  neither	  ‘consciousness’	  nor	   ‘text’	  are	  able	  to	  access	  or	  accurately	  represent	  a	  material	  
                                            29	  Kanai,	  Ai	  no	  seikatsu,	  pp.	  7-­‐8.	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reality.	   	   However,	   rather	   than	   this	   being	   a	   general	   comment	   on	   the	   limits	   of	  history	  and	  the	  unreliability	  of	  memory	  (we	  are	  later	  made	  to	  understand),	  it	  is	  because	   the	  material	   reality	  pertains	   specifically	   to	  her	   act	  of	   eating	  and	   that	  eating	   is	   a	   traumatic	   physical	   event,	   the	   memory	   of	   which	   Ai	   continually	  suppresses.	  	  As	  Ai	  herself	  explains:	  
I	  am	  always	  in	  terror	  of	  my	  incessant	  hunger.	  	  I	  always	  have	  an	  empty	  stomach,	  and	  cannot	  stop	  thinking	  I	  want	  to	  eat.	  	  And	  yet,	  when	   I	   eat	   even	   one	   or	   two	   mouthfuls	   of	   food,	   my	   empty	  stomach	  makes	  me	  so	  anxious	  that	  my	  hunger	  vanishes	  without	  trace.	  	  Just	  looking	  at	  food,	  my	  throat	  heaves	  with	  nausea.30	  	  In	   the	   original	   passage	   Ai	   writes	   ‘taemanai	   kūfukukan	   ga,	   itsumo	   watashi	   o	  
obiyakashite	  imasu’,	  translated	  above	  as:	  ‘I	  am	  always	  in	  terror	  of	  my	  incessant	  hunger’.31	  	  However,	  the	  term	  obiyakashite	  imasu,	  unlike	  the	  word	  terror,	  also	  means	  being	   taken	  suddenly	  unaware	  and	   therefore	   its	  use	   suggests	   that	  Ai’s	  hunger	   is	  a	   force	   that	  assaults	  her	  suddenly,	  regardless	  of	  her	   intent,	  and	   fills	  her	  with	  fear.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  we	  can	  see	  clearly	  how	  Ai’s	  hunger	  functions	  much	  like	  Kristeva’s	   ‘abject’.	   	  Indeed,	  Kristeva	  describes	  ‘[f]ood	  loathing’	  as	   ‘perhaps	  the	  most	  elementary	  and	  most	  archaic	  form	  of	  abjection’.32	  	  She	  explains:	  
When	  food	  appears	  as	  a	  polluting	  object,	  it	  does	  so	  as	  oral	  object	  only	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   orality	   signifies	   a	   boundary	   of	   the	   self’s	  clean	  and	  proper	  body.	  Food	  becomes	  abject	  only	  if	  it	  is	  a	  border	  between	  two	  distinct	  entities	  or	  territories.	  A	  boundary	  between	  nature	  and	  culture,	  between	  the	  human	  and	  the	  non-­‐human.	  […]	  	  In	  other	  respects,	  food	  is	  the	  oral	  object	  (the	  abject)	  that	  sets	  up	  
                                            30	  Ibid.,	  p.	  34.	   	  31	  Ibid.,	  p.	  34.	  32	  Kristeva,	  Powers	  of	  Horror:	  An	  Essay	  on	  Abjection,	  p.	  2	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archaic	  relationships	  between	  the	  human	  being	  and	  the	  other,	  its	  mother,	  who	  wields	  a	  power	  that	  is	  as	  vital	  as	  it	  is	  fierce.33	  	  For	   Ai,	   eating	   prompts	   the	   appearance	   of	   a	   horrific	   material	   reality	  which	  resembles	  Kristeva’s	  ‘abject’.	  First	  hunger	  ‘draws’	  Ai	  to	  the	  physical	  act	  of	  eating	  which	  she	  subsequently	  cannot	  remember	  or	  record	  accurately,	   just	  as	  the	  abject	   ‘draws	  [one]	   toward	  the	  place	  where	  meaning	  collapses’.34	  	  And	   in	  the	  middle	  of	   this	  act,	  after	  one	  or	   two	  mouthfuls,	  whereupon	  the	  boundaries	  between	   Ai	   and	   the	   abject	   entity	   (the	   food)	   are	   collapsed,	   her	   hunger	   turns	  quickly	  to	  fear	  and	  anxiety,	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that,	  for	  Kristeva,	  reunion	  with	  the	  mother’s	  body	  creates	  a	  sudden	  fear	  of	  being	  suffocated.	  
The	   most	   protracted	   appearance	   of	   ‘abject’	   imagery	   occurs	   when	   Ai	  visits	  a	  restaurant	  in	  downtown	  Tokyo.35	  	  Having	  ventured	  into	  Shinjuku	  that	  morning,	  Ai	  becomes	  so	  hungry	  that	  she	  goes	  to	  a	  place	  to	  eat.	  	  The	  restaurant	  is	   crowded,	   but	   brightly	   decorated	   in	   cream	   and	   green.	   	   The	   waitresses	   are	  dressed	   in	   ‘sky-­‐blue	   semi-­‐flared	   skirts’	   (sorairo	  no	   semi	   fureā	  no	   sukāto)	   that	  create	  a	  breeze	  as	  the	  waitresses	  swish	  around	  the	  tables.36	  	  Ai	  sits	  down	  at	  a	  small	   table	   for	   two	  and	  quickly	  orders	  a	   small	  bottle	  of	  beer,	  Hungarian	  style	  beef	   stew,	   bread	   and	   coffee.	   	   She	   lights	   a	   cigarette	   and	  waits	   for	   her	   food	   to	  arrive,	  taking	  a	  detailed	  note	  of	  what	  the	  two	  men	  and	  two	  women	  seated	  at	  the	  next	  table	  are	  eating	  (the	  men	  order	  stewed	  chicken	  livers,	  salad	  and	  rice,	  and	  
                                            33	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  75-­‐76	  34	  Ibid.,	  p.	  2.	  35	  Kanai,	  Ai	  no	  seikatsu	  (this	  scene	  appears	  pp.	  41-­‐43).	  36	  Ibid.,	  p.	  41.	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the	  women,	   deep-­‐fried	   pork	   cutlet	   and	   prawn	   respectively,	  which	   both	   come	  with	  a	  potato	  salad	  side).	  	  She	  can	  hear	  fragments	  of	  their	  conversation.	  	  One	  of	  the	  girls	  calculates	  that	  most	  people	  (assuming	  they	  eat	  three	  times	  a	  day	  and	  live	   to	   the	   age	   of	   seventy)	   consume	   an	   average	   of	   706,	   650	   mealtimes	   in	   a	  lifetime.	   	   One	   of	   the	  men	   at	   the	   table	   exclaims	   that	   this	   is	   ‘surprisingly	   few’	  (angai	   sukunē	  mon	  da	  na).37	  	   As	   the	  waitress	   sets	   down	  Ai’s	   fork	   and	   spoon,	  our	  protagonist	  starts	  to	  wonder	  how	  many	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  meals	  she	  has	  eaten	  to	  arrive	  at	  this	  one.	  	  Another	  customer	  comes	  in	  and,	  seeing	  the	  seat	  in	  front	  of	  Ai	  vacant,	  asks	  if	  he	  can	  sit	  down.	  	  The	  man	  orders	  spaghetti	  bolognese.	  	  Ai’s	  stew	  arrives;	  she	  is	  really	  hungry	  and	  butters	  her	  bread.	  
At	   the	   start	   of	   this	   scene,	   both	   the	   appetising	   cream	   and	   green	   of	   the	  restaurant,	   along	   with	   the	   length	   of	   narrative	   devoted	   to	   detailing	   the	   food	  orders,	   convey	   Ai’s	   desire	   for	   food.	   	   That	   Ai	   notices	   and	   remarks	   upon	   the	  liberating	   colour	   and	   movements	   of	   the	   waitresses’	   skirts	   suggests	   that	   her	  hunger	   is	  able	   to	  connect	  her	   to	  a	  state	  of	   ‘breezy’	   transcendence.	   	   	  However,	  the	  reader	  is	  already	  aware	  from	  Ai’s	  previous	  confession	  of	  the	  implicit	  danger	  in	   her	   hunger.	   	   Sure	   enough,	   in	   language	   which	   is	   fragmented	   (and	   which	  therefore	  signals	   the	  breakdown	  of	   the	  symbolic	  order),	  we	  are	   introduced	  to	  the	   idea,	   even	   before	   Ai	   has	   begun	   eating,	   of	   food	   as	   a	   continuous	  mass	   (an	  average	  of	  706,	  650	  mealtimes	  per	   lifetime)	  constantly	  passing	  through	  us,	  as	  human	  waste,	  as	  excess,	  as	  dung	  that	  will	  be,	  as	  that	  which	  we	  will	  irrevocably	  exclude	   and	   abject.	   	   The	  man’s	   exclamation	   that	   the	   number	   of	  mealtimes	   is	  surprisingly	   few	   reminds	   us	   that,	   by	   contrast,	   each	   meal	   for	   Ai	   becomes	  
                                            37	  Ibid.,	  p.	  42.	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excessive	   even	   after	   a	   few	  mouthfuls.	   	   Although	   Ai	   continues	   to	   feel	   hunger	  while	   she	   butters	   her	   bread,	   the	   notion	   of	   food	   as	   waste	   is	   present	   in	   the	  contemplation	  of	  meals	  she	  has	  already	  consumed.	   	  As	  the	  abject	  continues	  to	  intrude	  into	  her	  narrative,	  we	  are	  presented	  with	  a	  chain	  of	  images	  that	  pertain	  both	  to	  her	  real-­‐time	  situation	  and	  the	  vivid	  and	  traumatic	  memories	  that	  this	  provokes.	  	  These	  become	  progressively	  more	  grotesque	  in	  nature	  and	  lead	  both	  her,	  and	  the	  customer	  in	  front	  of	  her,	  to	  ‘abject’	  their	  food.	  
The	  customer’s	  spaghetti	  arrives.	  	  Ai	  watches	  him	  eat,	  commenting	  that	  it	  is	  rather	  as	  if	  he	  is	  ‘shovelling	  food	  into	  the	  hole	  in	  his	  face’.38	  	  This	  prompts	  a	  memory	  of	  the	  small	  dark	  infirmary	  at	  her	  primary	  school,	  which	  Ai	  describes	  at	   length.	   	   There	   are	   two	   large	   three-­‐dimensional	   models	   of	   the	   human	  anatomy	   in	   framed-­‐glass	  hanging	  on	   the	  wall.	   	  Below	  them	  is	  a	  painted	  white	  wooden-­‐framed	  glass	  cabinet	  filled	  with	  pristine	  and	  tightly	  rolled	  up	  bandages	  lined-­‐up	   neatly	   alongside	   silver	   tweezers	   and	   scissors.	   	   The	   first	   anatomical	  model	   displays	   the	   human	   anatomy	   in	   shockingly	   vibrant	   primary	   colours,	  which	  makes	  Ai	  wonder	  whether	  the	  colour	  of	  her	  own	  innards	  are	  the	  same,	  and	  which,	  accordingly,	  brings	  on	  nausea.	  	  The	  second	  frame	  on	  the	  wall	  has	  a	  rectangular	   brass	   plate,	   with	   ‘many	   kinds	   of	   parasites’	   in	   black	   Ming	   Cho	  lettering	  nailed	  onto	  it.39	  	  Ai	  recalls:	  
In	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  frame,	  six	  round	  shapes	  had	  been	  dug	  out,	  and	   in	   those	   holes	   ‘many	   kinds	   of	   parasites’	   were	   sleeping	  peacefully,	  tightly.	  	  Among	  them	  was	  one	  which	  I	  always	  ended	  up	   fixing	   upon;	   it	   was	   a	   long,	   thin,	   cream	   and	   white	  roundworm;	   this	   roundworm	   glistened	   amongst	   pink	   lumps,	  
                                            38	  Ibid.,	  p.	  44.	  39	  Ibid.,	  p.	  45.	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sleeping	  deeply.	  	  What	  was	  that	  pink	  stuff	  that	  resembled	  fried-­‐off	   minced	   meat?	   	   	   One	   reason	   I	   particularly	   hate	   spaghetti	  bolognese	   could	   be	   that	   it	   makes	   me	   remember	   that	  roundworm.40	  	  The	   customer	   in	   front	  of	  Ai	   becomes	  uncomfortable	   as	   she	   stares	   at	  his	  dish.	  	  She	   ‘gives	   him	   the	   smile	   of	   a	   roundworm’,	   and	   oblivious	   to	   its	   meaning,	   he	  smiles	  back.	  She	  asks	  him	  ‘You	  know	  roundworms?’	  He	  looks	  down	  at	  the	  plate	  as	   if	   remembering.	   ‘They	   look	   like	   that.	  Don’t	   they.’	  Without	   finishing	   the	   last	  few	  mouthfuls	  the	  man	  immediately	  stands	  up	  and	  exits	  the	  restaurant,	  leaving	  Ai	  to	  wonder	  if	  she	  is	  ‘terribly	  vulgar’.41	  
That	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘waste’	   becomes	   transferred	   from	   the	   food	   onto	   the	  man	   when	   he	   starts	   eating	   is	   evident	   from	   the	   way	   in	   which,	   rather	   than	  perceiving	  him	  as	  ‘eating’,	  Ai	  describes	  him	  as	  ‘shovelling	  food	  into	  the	  hole	  in	  his	  face’.	  Depicting	  him	  as	  such,	  as	  a	  performance	  of	  mechanical	  movements	  in	  front	  of	  a	  gaping	  orifice	  and	  therefore	  as	  a	  disembodied	  human	  presence,	  he	  is	  rendered	   ‘uncanny’.42	  	  And	   this	  uncanniness	   is	  due	   to	   the	   fact	   that,	   for	  Ai,	  he	  has	   become	   what	   Kristeva	   describes	   as	   ‘the	   most	   sickening	   of	   wastes’,	   the	  cadaver.	  	  Kristeva	  writes:	  
If	  dung	  signifies	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  border,	  the	  place	  where	  I	  am	  
                                            40	  Ibid.,	  p.	  45.	  41	  Ibid.,	  p.	  45.	  42	  In	  Freudian	  theory,	   to	  experience	  the	   ‘uncanny’	   is	   to	  experience	  something	  that	   is	  simultaneously	  familiar	  and	  incongruous,	  and	  therefore	  which	  results	  in	  the	  subject’s	  cognitive	   dissonance,	   and	   the	   object’s	   rejection	   or	   repulsion	   by	   the	   subject.	   	   For	  Kristeva,	   the	  abject	   is	  uncanny	  because	   it	   is	   something	   that	  has	  been	  expelled	  out	  of	  society	   and	   culture,	   therefore	   it	   simultaneously	   contains	   that	   which	   was	   familiar	  before	   it	  was	  expelled,	  and	  that	  which	  is	  violently	  rejected.	   	  See	  Sigmund	  Freud,	   'The	  “Uncanny”',	   ed.	   and	   trans.	   James	   Strachey	   in	   The	   Standard	   Edition	   of	   the	   Complete	  
Psychological	  Works	  of	  Sigmund	  Freud,	  Vol.	  17.	  (London:	  Vintage,	  2001)	  pp.	  217-­‐56.	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not	  and	  which	  permits	  me	  to	  be,	  the	  corpse,	  the	  most	  sickening	  of	  wastes,	   is	   a	  border	   that	  has	  encroached	  upon	  everything.	   It	   is	  no	  longer	  I	  who	  expel,	  ‘I’	  is	  expelled.	  The	  border	  has	  become	  an	  object.	  […]	   The	   corpse,	   seen	   without	   God	   and	   outside	   of	   science,	   is	   the	  utmost	   of	   abjection.	   It	   is	   death	   infecting	   life.	   	   Abject.	   	   It	   is	  something	  rejected	  from	  which	  one	  does	  not	  part,	  from	  which	  one	  does	  not	  protect	  oneself	  as	  from	  an	  object.	  	  Imaginary	  uncanniness	  and	  real	  threat,	  it	  beckons	  to	  us	  and	  ends	  up	  engulfing	  us.43	  	  This	   elision	   between	   food	   as	   waste	   and	   the	   customer	   as	   waste,	   and	   Ai’s	  revulsion	   at	   them	   both	   suggests	   that	   the	   boundaries	   between	   self	   and	   other	  have	  (or	  are	  being	  perceived	  as	  having)	  collapsed.	  	  Here,	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  just	  that	  the	  process	  of	  living	  produces	  constant	  waste	  that	  she	  must	  continually	  discard	  and	   abject;	   even	   human	   life	   is	   seen	   as	   waste,	   as	   excess	   materiality.	   	   The	  customer’s	   transfiguration	   into	   a	   corpse	   represents	   a	   ‘real	   threat’	   to	   Ai’s	  existence,	  because	  he	  becomes	  a	  physicalised	  metaphor	  for	  her	  suppressed	  fear	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  that	  lies	  beyond	  the	  limits	  of	  her	  own	  materiality:	  he	  is	  the	  embodiment	   of	   her	   own	  mortality.	   	   As	   such	   he	   confronts	   her	  with	   her	   great	  terror	  in	  facing	  death.	  	  This	  terror,	  perversely,	  prevents	  her	  from	  eating	  and	  is	  potentially	   fatal.	   	   This	   also	   suggests	   that	   Ai’s	   immersion	   in	   abject	   imagery	   is	  part	  of	  a	  progressive	  process,	  as	  it	  is	  in	  Kristeva’s	  writings.	  	  Kristeva	  applies	  the	  terms	   ‘abject’	   and	   ‘abjection’	   to	   both	   the	   liminal	   state	   of	   being	   wherein	   the	  boundaries	  between	  self	  and	  other	  are	  collapsed,	  and	  the	  act	  of	  repressing	  such	  a	  state,	  indicating	  its	  progressive	  but	  transitory	  nature.	  
This	  process	  of	  the	  abject,	  the	  initial	  collapsing	  of	  boundaries	  between	  self	  and	   other,	   the	   intensification	   of	   horrific	   imagery	   and	   its	   association	  with	   the	  
                                            43	  Kristeva,	  Powers	  of	  Horror:	  An	  Essay	  on	  Abjection,	  pp.	  3-­‐4.	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self,	   and	   eventually	   the	   rejection	   of	   such	   association,	   is	   illustrated	   in	   graphic	  detail	  by	  Ai’s	  narrative.	   	  As	  Ai	  continues	  to	  recollect	  her	  childhood	  memory	  of	  the	   school	   infirmary,	   describing	   her	   long	   held	   association	   between	   spaghetti	  bolognese	   and	   roundworms,	   the	   image	   of	   the	   cadaver	   intensifies,	   repeatedly	  and	  menacingly	  returning	  in	  the	  form	  of	  human	  anatomical	  models	  with	  holes	  dug	  out.	  	  Their	  brightly	  coloured	  innards	  ‘make	  [her]	  wonder	  about	  the	  colour	  of	  her	  own	  innards’.	   	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  prompt	  her	  to	  consider	  her	  body	  as	  objectively	   as	   she	   considers	   the	   cadaver’s.	   	   The	   neatly	   lined	   up	   medical	  paraphernalia;	   scissors,	   tweezers	   and	   bandages,	   also	   compound	   this	  association	   between	   her	   body,	  which	   is	   lined	   up	   as	   an	   object	   of	   examination	  and	  surgical	  treatment,	  and	  damaged,	   infected	  or	  dead	  ‘matter’.	   	  Ai’s	  response	  to	  this	  is	  to	  be	  sickened,	  or	  ‘nauseous’,	  and	  this	  signals	  her	  attempt	  to	  violently	  disassociate	  herself	  from	  the	  prevailing	  images	  of	  death,	  to	  refuse	  to	  assimilate	  herself	  with	  that	  which	  is	  abject.	  	  As	  Kristeva	  writes:	  
When	   the	   eyes	   see	   or	   the	   lips	   touch	   that	   skin	   on	   the	   surface	   of	  milk—harmless,	  thin	  as	  a	  sheet	  of	  cigarette	  paper,	  pitiful	  as	  a	  nail	  paring—I	   experience	   a	   gagging	   sensation	   and,	   still	   farther	   down,	  spasms	  in	  the	  stomach,	  the	  belly;	  and	  all	  the	  organs	  shrivel	  up	  the	  body,	   provoke	   tears	   and	   bile,	   increase	   heartbeat,	   cause	   forehead	  and	  hands	  to	  perspire.	  	  Along	  with	  sight-­‐clouding	  dizziness,	  nausea	  makes	  me	  balk	  at	  that	  milk	  cream,	  separates	  me	  from	  the	  mother	  and	   father	  who	   proffer	   it.	   	   ‘I’	   want	   none	   of	   that	   element,	   sign	   of	  their	  desire;	  ‘I’	  do	  not	  want	  to	  listen,	  ‘I’	  do	  not	  assimilate	  it,	  ‘I’	  expel	  it.44	  	  For	  both	  Ai	   and	  Kristeva,	   nausea	   is	   the	  body’s	   attempt	   to	   cast	   off	   association	  with	  the	  world	  of	  abject	  imagery	  and	  to	  reassert	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  self	  as	  clean,	  
                                            44	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  2-­‐3	  (original	  emphasis).	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whole	  and	  separate.	  	  	  In	  this	  instance,	  however,	  Ai	  finally	  escapes	  her	  alignment	  with	  the	  images	  of	  death	  that	  have	  been	  assailing	  her	  by	  assuming	  the	  identity	  of	   the	   roundworm	   and	   through	   a	   rebellious	   speech	   act,	   which	   forces	   the	  customer	  to	  expel	  his	  food	  and	  leave.	  	  The	  roundworm	  parasite,	  the	  focal	  image	  of	  the	  passage,	  transgresses	  three	  states	  of	  being.	  Firstly,	  it	  is	  seemingly	  passive:	  ‘sleeping	  deeply	  among	  pink	  lumps’,	  it	  reminds	  Ai,	  through	  its	  inert,	  object-­‐like	  state,	   of	   spaghetti	   Bolognese.	   Secondly,	   it	   is	   liminal:	   as	   a	   ‘parasite’,	   it	   is	   both	  object	  and	  agent,	  existing	  by	  consuming	  the	  host	  that	  it	  lives	  within.	  	  Finally	  it	  is	  
active,	   eating	   and	   eventually	   killing	   that	   which	   sustains	   its	   life.	   	   Ai	   in	   this	  instance,	  is	  similarly	  transgressive	  on	  the	  same	  three	  fronts:	  seemingly	  passive,	  allowing	   the	   customer	   to	   think	   she	   is	   docile	   with	   a	   sly	   roundworm	   smile;	  liminal,	   in	   the	   way	   in	   which	   she	   crosses	   the	   imaginary	   threshold	   between	  herself	   and	   the	   customer;	   active,	   by	   speaking	   and	   repelling	   that	   which	   she	  dislikes.	   Her	   revulsion	   at	   both	   the	   spaghetti	   bolognese	   and	   the	   customer	  enables	  her	  to	  reject	  passivity	  and	  death,	  and	  therefore	  reject	  the	  social	  identity	  (the	  docile	  female)	  to	  which	  she	  is	  supposed	  to	  conform,	  but	  which	  leaves	  her	  feeling	  sickened.	  	  Instead	  she	  chooses	  an	  active	  but	  othered	  identity,	  an	  identity	  that	  is	  taboo,	  and	  is	  in	  turn,	  repulsive	  to	  and	  rejected	  by	  society	  (as	  represented	  by	   the	   customer).	   	   	  This	   again	   seems	   to	  evoke	  Kristeva’s	   thesis	  on	   the	  abject,	  which	  sets	  out	   the	  notion	   that	   ‘abject’	   identities	   inhabit	  personalities	   that	  are	  immoral	  and	  depraved:	  
It	  is	  […]	  not	  lack	  of	  cleanliness	  or	  health	  that	  causes	  abjection	  but	  what	   disturbs	   identity,	   system,	   order.	   What	   does	   not	   respect	  borders,	   positions,	   rules.	   The	   in-­‐between,	   the	   ambiguous,	   the	  composite.	   The	   traitor,	   the	   liar,	   the	   criminal	   with	   a	   good	  conscience,	   the	   shameless	   rapist,	   the	   killer	   who	   claims	   he	   is	   a	  savior.	   .	   .	   .	   Abjection	   […]	   is	   immoral,	   sinister,	   scheming,	   and	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shady:	   a	   terror	   that	   dissembles,	   a	   hatred	   that	   smiles,	   a	   passion	  that	  uses	  the	  body	  for	  barter	  instead	  of	  inflaming	  it,	  a	  debtor	  who	  sells	  you	  up,	  a	  friend	  who	  stabs	  you.	  .	  .45	  	  To	   read	   Love	   Life	   alongside	   Kristeva’s	   theory	   of	   the	   abject,	   therefore,	  encourages	  the	  reader	  to	  situate	  the	  novella’s	  protagonist	  in	  a	  broader,	  ‘abject’	  context;	   a	   context	   of	   all	   that	   conventional	   society	   –	   and	   conventional	   literary	  representations	   of	   that	   society	   –	   deems	   criminal,	   hateful,	   deplorable,	  murderous,	   and	   so	   on.	   	   In	   this	  way,	  we	   can	   see	   how	  Love	  Life	   finds	   its	   place	  among	   the	   cultural	   output	   of	   1960s	   Japanese	   avant-­‐gardism,	   with	   its	  concomitant	  crisis	  of	  representation,	  a	  crisis	  that	  aligned	  representations	  of	  the	  self	  with	  the	  defiled,	  the	  fugitive	  and	  the	  criminal.	  
For	   example,	   the	   avant-­‐garde	   films	   Ōshima	   Nagisa’s	  Hakuchū	  no	   tōrima	  (Violence	   at	   High	   Noon)	   and	   Kōji	   Wakamatsu’s	   Kyōsō	   jōshikō	   (Running	   in	  
Madness,	  Dying	  in	  Love)	  both	  provide	  us	  with	  two	  clear	  (and	  extreme)	  examples	  of	  how	  criminal	  and	  socially	  subversive	   identities	   in	  1960s	  avant-­‐gardism	  are	  depicted	   as	   abject;	   and	   how	   such	   identities	   originate	   in	   violent	   acts	   of	  transgression.46	  	   Violence	   at	   High	   Noon	   traces	   the	   origins	   of	   the	   ‘phantom	  killer’	  (tōrima),	  Eisuke,	  who	  leaves	  his	   idyllic	  but	  suffocating	  rural	  community	  for	  the	  crowded	  metropolises	  of	  Japan,	  where	  the	  anonymity	  of	  the	  city	  permits	  him	  to	  commit	  his	  crimes	  in	  broad	  daylight.	  	  Through	  the	  memories	  of	  his	  first	  (rape)	  victim,	  Shino,	  whom,	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  film,	  he	  tracks	  down	  to	  Tokyo	  and	  rapes	   again,	   we	   discover	   that	   Eisuke’s	   propensity	   for	   violence	   is	   rooted	   in	  
                                            45	  Ibid.,	  p.	  4.	  46	  Ōshima	   Nagisa,	   Hakuchū	   no	   tōrima	   [Violence	   at	   High	   Noon]	   	   (Sōzōsha,	   1966);	  Wakamatsu	   Kōji,	   Kyōsō	   jōshikō	   [Running	   in	   Madness,	   Dying	   in	   Love]	   	   (Wakamatsu	  Productions,	  1969).	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necrophiliac	   desire.	   	   Prior	   to	   her	   life	   in	   Tokyo,	   Shino	   has	   agreed	   to	   commit	  double	   suicide	   with	   her	   lover,	   Genji,	   the	   newly-­‐elected	   community	   leader,	  whose	  public	   electoral	   success,	   contrasts	  with	   the	   doubt	   and	  uncertainties	   of	  his	  private	   relationship.	  Genji’s	  double	   suicide	  pact	   is	  his	  way	  of	  determining	  irrevocably	  whether	  Shino	  loves	  him	  or	  not:	  if	  she	  does,	  she	  will	  die	  with	  him;	  if	  she	   doesn’t,	   she	  will	   survive.	   	   Eisuke	   has	  meanwhile,	   been	   urged	   by	   his	  wife	  Matsuko,	   the	   village	   teacher,	   to	   follow	   Shino	   and	   Genji	   and	   prevent	   anything	  bad	  from	  happening	  to	  them.	  	  But	  Eisuke	  has	  simply	  watched	  from	  the	  bushes	  while	  Genji	  hangs	  himself.	  	  Shino	  attempts	  to	  hang	  herself	  too,	  but	  the	  knot	  fails,	  she	   falls	   from	   the	   tree	   unconscious	   and	   Eisuke	   rapes	   her	   lifeless	   body.	   	   On	  reviving,	  Shino	  thanks	  Eisuke,	  thinking	  that	  he	  had	  saved	  her	  life,	  but	  she	  then	  realises	  that	  he	  has	  violated	  her	  and	  demands	  to	  know	  why	  he	  had	  done	  such	  a	  thing.	   	   Eisuke	   answers	   in	   his	   coarse	   accent	   ‘Ome	   wa	   shinitan’da.	   Shinin	   wa	  
ningen	  ja	  ne.	  Tada	  no	  mono	  da.’	  (‘Because	  you	  had	  died.	  	  Corpses	  are	  no	  longer	  human.	  	  They’re	  just	  objects.’)47	  	  	  On	  finally	  being	  caught	  and	  sentenced,	  Eisuke	  asserts	  that	  it	  was	  this	  initial	  act	  of	  necrophilia	  on	  Shino’s	  body	  that	  sparked	  a	  desire,	   and	   that	   subsequently	  he	   could	  only	   fulfil	   this	  desire	  by	  attacking	  and	  raping	  women	  throughout	  Japan.	  
Kristeva	   comments,	   it	   may	   be	   recalled,	   that	   the	   corpse	   is	   ‘the	   most	  sickening	   of	   wastes’	   because	   it	   is	   ‘a	   border	   that	   has	   encroached	   upon	  everything’,	  ‘[i]t	  is	  no	  longer	  I	  who	  expel,	  ‘I’	  is	  expelled’.48	  	  	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  are	   not	   able	   to	   protect	   ourselves	   from	   the	   corpse	   as	  we	  might	   do	  with	   other	  
                                            47	  Ōshima,	  Hakuchū	  no	  tōrima.	  48	  Kristeva,	  Powers	  of	  Horror:	  An	  Essay	  on	  Abjection,	  pp.	  3-­‐4.	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‘wastes’,	  such	  as	  filth	  and	  excrement,	  because	  we	  identify	  with	  it,	  and	  thus	  view	  it	   with	   the	   force	   of	   the	   fear	   of	   our	   own	   mortality.	   Eisuke,	   in	   his	  acknowledgement	   that	   violating	   Shino,	   while	   she	   lay	   (apparently)	   dead,	   was	  permissible	   precisely	   ‘[b]ecause	   [she]	   had	  died’,	   because	   she	  had	   crossed	   the	  threshold	  and	  become	  an	  object,	   demonstrates	   that	  he	  does	  not	   identify	  with	  the	  corpse,	  or	  view	   it	  with	   the	   force	  of	   the	   fear	  of	  his	  own	  mortality.	  For	   this	  reason	  he	  is	  able	  to	  view	  the	  corpse	  opportunistically,	  as	  a	  ‘thing’	  for	  him	  to	  do	  with	  as	  he	  pleases.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  fact	  that	  Eisuke	  does	  not	  view	  the	  corpse	  as	   a	   dangerous	   boundary	   between	   self	   and	   other,	   suggests	   that	   he	   already	  occupies	   that	   liminal	   and	   abject	   territory.	   	   The	   film	   does	   not	   offer	   us	   any	  originary	  motive	  as	  to	  why	  Eisuke	  already	  occupies	  that	  liminal	  territory;	  he	  is	  portrayed	  from	  the	  outset	  as	  a	  shady	  character	  who	  is	  unable	  to	  fit	  in	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  village.	  However,	  what	  is	  made	  apparent	  is	  that	  Eisuke’s	  necrophilia,	  a	  shameless	  opportunistic	  pursuit	  of	  sexual	  gratification	  from	  the	  bodies	  of	  the	  dead,	   is	   initially	  able	   to	   thrive	   in	   the	  context	  of	   the	  city;	  whereas	  Genji’s	  need	  for	   certainty	   and	   emotional	   fulfilment	   prevents	   him	   from	   leaving	   his	   village,	  directly	  resulting	  in	  the	  (honourable)	  taking	  of	  his	  own	  life.	  	  Produced	  in	  1966,	  just	   as	   the	   immediate	   post-­‐war-­‐born	   baby-­‐boomer	   generation	   (which	  constituted	   the	   biggest	   surge	   in	   population	   figures	   in	   Japan’s	   twentieth	  century)	   started	   to	   come	   of	   age	   and	  migrate	   en	  masse	   to	   the	   cities,	   Ōshima’s	  film	  might	  thus	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  revelatory	  of	  the	  anxieties	  concomitant	  with	  such	  an	   immense	   demographic	   transition,	   and	   with	   the	   production	   of	   new,	   city-­‐dwelling	  cultural	  identities	  which	  it	  entailed.	  
Kōji	   Wakamatsu’s	   Running	   in	   Madness,	   Dying	   in	   Love	   also	   features	  transgressive	  protagonists	  who	  come	  to	  define	  their	  identities	  in	  opposition	  to	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societal	   norms	   and	   taboos.	   The	   film	   opens	   with	   a	   young	   student	   activist	  running	  alongside	  the	  rail	  cuttings	  of	  the	  Yamanote	  line,	  freshly	  wounded	  from	  engaging	   in	   political	   protest	   in	  Tokyo.	   	  He	   runs	   directly	   to	   confront	   his	   elder	  brother,	   a	   policeman,	   at	   his	   brother’s	   apartment.	   	   A	   heated	   argument	   erupts	  between	   himself	   and	   his	   brother	   about	   the	   brutality	   of	   the	   police	   during	   the	  riots.	   	   The	   argument	   is	   ended	   by	   the	   intervention	   of	   the	   wife	   of	   the	   elder	  brother,	   who	   in	   a	   sudden	   and	   startling	   move,	   takes	   the	   pistol	   from	   her	  husband’s	   hip	   holster	   and	   shoots	   him	   in	   the	   back.	   	   Fearing	   themselves	   to	   be	  wanted	   by	   the	   police,	   the	   younger	   brother	   and	   his	   sister-­‐in-­‐law	   immediately	  leave	  Tokyo	  and	  travel	  north	  by	  train.	  	  	  On	  their	  journey	  they	  succumb	  to	  their	  secretly-­‐held	   passion	   for	   each	   other,	   and	   are	   unable	   to	   decide	   whether	   to	  commit	  suicide,	  return	  to	  their	  families,	  or	  attempt	  to	  run	  indefinitely.	  	   	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  film,	  the	  pair	  visit	  their	  northern	  hometown,	  where,	  in	  a	  stark	  white	  field	   of	   snow,	   the	   elder	   brother	   stands	   to	   greet	   them	   dressed	   completely	   in	  black.	  	  The	  wife,	  although	  horrified	  that	  he	  is	  alive,	  immediately	  leaves	  the	  side	  of	  the	  younger	  brother	  and	  returns	  to	  him.	  
Like	   Ai,	   both	   the	   killer	   in	   Violence	   at	   High	   Noon	   who	   reveals	   that	   his	  motivation	   for	   his	   crimes	   is	   necrophilia,	   and	   the	   young	   student	   and	  his	   elder	  brother’s	   wife	   in	   Running	   in	  Madness,	   Dying	   in	   Love	   who	   formulate	   a	   sexual	  relationship,	   spurn	   the	   social	   values	   and	   categorisations	   to	   which	   they	   are	  supposed	   to	   conform	   by	   embracing	   that	   which	   society	   deems	   taboo.	   	   In	   so	  doing,	   and	   as	   Kristeva	  writes	   of	   abject	   identities,	   they	   ‘uphold	   “I”	   within	   the	  Other’	   and	   thereby	   ‘[shatter]	   the	   wall	   of	   repression	   and	   its	   judgments’.49	  	  
                                            49	  Kristeva,	  Powers	  of	  Horror:	  	  An	  Essay	  on	  Abjection,	  p.	  15	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However,	   rebellion	   through	   the	   abject,	   while	   it	   may	   constitute	   an	   important	  system	  of	  rejecting	  identities	  forced	  upon	  it,	  comes	  with	  the	  provision	  that	  it	  is	  always	  already	   thwarted	  precisely	  because	   it	   entails	  a	   radical	   rejection	  of	   the	  self.	   	   The	   serial	   killer	   in	   Violence	   at	   High	   Noon	   and	   the	   putative	   lovers	   in	  
Running	   in	   Madness,	   Dying	   in	   Love	   all	   live	   temporary,	   fugitive	   existences,	  attempting	   to	  defer	   the	  moment	  of	   their	  discovery	  and/or	  death.	   	  All	  of	   them	  are	  thus	  still	  trapped	  within	  a	  system,	  and	  in	  both	  cases	  it	  is	  this	  system	  of	  law,	  or	  civilised	  society,	  which	  prevails.	   	  Similarly,	   in	  Love	  Life,	  Ai’s	  alignment	  with	  the	  abject	  allows	  her	   to	  dissimilate	   from	  a	  passive	   identity;	  yet,	  because	  such	  dissimilation	   entails	   the	   abjection	  of	   food	   and	  because	   food	   is	   sustenance	   for	  the	  body	  and	  ‘not	  an	  “other”	  for	  “me”’,	  her	  rebellion	  equates	  to	  her	  abjection	  of	  her	  own	  body.50	  	  As	  such,	  it	  cannot	  result	  in	  Ai’s	  liberation	  from	  an	  oppressive	  system,	  but	  is	  limited	  purely	  to	  highlighting	  her	  entrapment	  within	  it.	  
Love	   Life	   is	   the	   only	   piece	   of	   short	   fiction	   from	   Kanai’s	   early	   writing	  career	   in	   which	   she	   presents	   us	   with	   the	   single	   perspective	   of	   a	   female	  protagonist.	  	  It	  is	  therefore	  the	  only	  work	  in	  which	  we	  are	  ostensibly	  presented	  with	   an	   unmediated,	   unitary	   (if	   not	   unified)	   and	   gendered	   subjectivity	   or	  perspective.51	  	  As	  we	  saw	   in	   the	   first	   chapter,	   in	   Japanese	  women’s	   fiction	  of	  this	   period,	   conventional	   female	   first-­‐person	   narratives	   might	   entail	   a	  description	  of	  ‘what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  woman’	  and	  centre	  on	  experiences	  of	  the	  gendered	  body,	  thus	  creating	  a	  ‘written	  feminine’.	  Yet,	  Love	  Life	  is	  notable,	  even	  among	   Kanai’s	   early	   works,	   in	   not	   overtly	   discussing	   the	   body	   of	   its	   main	  
                                            50	  Ibid.,	  p.	  3.	  51	  Her	  other	  novellas	  of	  this	  period	  all	  use	  an	  omniscient,	  third-­‐person	  narrator.	  They	  are:	  Eonta	  (Eonta,	  1968);	  Yume	  no	  jikan	  (Dream	  Time,	  1970);	  Kimyō	  na	  hanayome	  (The	  
Strange	  Bride,	  1970);	  and	  Moeru	  yubi	  (The	  Burning	  Finger,	  1970).	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female	   character	   as	   a	   ‘gendered’	   or	   ‘sexual’	   entity.	   	   Unlike	   the	   prostitute	   in	  ‘Rotting	  Meat’	   and	   the	   rabbit-­‐girl	   in	   ‘Rabbits’,	  we	   are	   not	  made	   aware	   of	   Ai’s	  sexuality	   or,	   even,	   her	   physicality.	   	   But	   the	   reader	   is	   reminded	   of	   her	   body’s	  
activeness	   through	   its	   experiences	   that	   are	   concomitant	  with	   her	   abjection	   of	  food,	  including,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  her	  hunger,	  nausea,	  and	  increasing	  anxiety.	  	  By	  focusing	   on	   such	   sensations	   and	  memories,	   the	   narrative	   discursively	   avoids	  gendering	   Ai’s	   active	   body;	   instead	   choosing	   to	   situate	   it	   within	   a	   perpetual	  cycle	  of	  fear	  and	  crisis.	  As	  discussed	  above,	  in	  so	  doing	  it	  clearly	  situates	  itself	  within	  the	  1960s	  avant-­‐garde	  context.	  
However,	   how	   this	   crisis	   specifically	   pertains	   to	   the	   representation	   of	  female	  bodies	  nonetheless	  –	   to	   (mis)appropriate	  Karaki	   Junzō’s	  phrase	  –	   ‘just	  trickles	   out’	   throughout	   Ai’s	   narrative.	   	   For	   example,	  while	   still	   seated	   at	   the	  restaurant,	  after	  having	  repelled	  the	  male	  customer,	  Ai	  recalls	  visiting	  her	  aunt	  in	  a	  maternity	  hospital.	  	  She	  remembers	  that	  because	  the	  hospital	  was	  building	  a	  new	  ward	  in	  the	  vacant	  land	  next	  to	  the	  current	  facility,	  it	  was	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  knocking	  down	   the	  building	   that	  held	   its	  medical	   resource	   rooms.	   	  Lining	   the	  staircase	  are	  wide	  necked	  glass	  bottles	  of	  all	  shapes	  and	  sizes	  from	  the	  resource	  rooms	  containing	  unknown	  substances,	  or	  rather	  lumps,	  that	  are	  undoubtedly	  human	  body	  parts	  or	  organs	  preserved	  in	  formaldehyde.52	  	  Ai	  is	  unable	  to	  walk	  down	  the	  stairs,	  but	  F	  comes	  up	  the	  stairs,	  looks	  at	  her	  and	  starts	  the	  following	  conversation:	  
‘There	  are	  babies	  conjoined	  by	  their	  backs.’	  ‘Are	  they	  big?’	  
                                            52	  Kanai,	  Ai	  no	  seikatsu,	  p.	  46.	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‘Quite,	  yes.	  	  About	  this	  size	  I	  think.’	  F	  demonstrates	  their	  size	  with	  his	  palm	  ‘They	  must	  have	  been	  lined	  up	  at	  some	  point	  while	  I	  was	  at	  my	  aunt’s	  side.	  	  I	  can’t	  come	  down.’	  ‘Shut	  your	  eyes;	  I’ll	  give	  you	  my	  hand.’	  ‘I	  can’t.’	  ‘Close	  your	  eyes.’53	  	  Ai	   closes	  her	  eyes,	   takes	  F’s	  hand	  and	  starts	  walking	  down	   the	  stairs.	   	  As	   she	  cannot	  gauge	  the	  height	  of	  each	  step,	  her	  feet	  hover	  in	  the	  air.	  	  When	  she	  gets	  to	  the	  landing	  she	  opens	  her	  eyes	  and	  sees	  wombs,	  ovaries,	  foetuses,	  pink	  lumps	  of	  cancer,	  a	  pinna,	  and	  a	  baby’s	  hand	  with	  six	  fingers	  all	  lined	  up	  one	  by	  one	  and	  pickled	  in	  formaldehyde.	  	  The	  women	  on	  her	  aunt’s	  ward	  eventually	  get	  used	  to	  the	  smell,	  but	  one	  of	   them	  gets	  reprimanded	  for	  saying	   ‘I’ve	   just	  remembered	  that	  thing’	  while	   they	  are	  all	  eating.54	  	  The	   inappropriateness	  of	   the	  woman’s	  comment,	   then,	   and	   Ai’s	   memory	   of	   it,	   are	   a	   corollary	   to	   the	   inappropriate	  comment	  made	   by	   Ai	   to	   the	  male	   customer.	   	   The	   link	   between	   the	   two	   then	  established,	  Ai’s	  stream-­‐of-­‐consciousness	  returns	  to	  the	  scene	  in	  the	  restaurant	  and	  concludes	  with	  her	  finishing	  the	  (now	  cold)	  coffee	  and	  smoking	  a	  cigarette;	  and	  this	  associative	   link	  that	  we	  are	   invited	  to	  make	  aligns	  not	  only	  past	  with	  
present	   inappropriateness,	   but	   also	   inappropriateness	   with	   the	   speaking	  feminine.	  Both	  Ai	  and	   the	  woman’s	   comments	  are	   transgressive	  because	   they	  challenge	   the	   conventional	   expectation	   of	   what	   a	  woman	  might	   be	   societally	  constrained	  to	  say.	  
                                            53	  Ibid.,	  p.	  46.	  54	  Ibid.,	  p.	  47	  (original	  emphasis).	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In	   this	   passage,	   it	   is	   striking	   that	   the	   hospital	   building	   is	   described	   as	  being	   in	   a	   state	   of	   transition	   between	   ‘dissolution’	   (in	   the	   process	   of	  dismantling	   and	   destroying	   the	   old	   medical	   resources	   building)	   and	  ‘reconstruction’	  (in	  the	  process	  of	  building	  a	  new	  ward	  situated	  in	  an	  adjacent	  vacant	  plot).	   Indeed,	   on	  one	   level,	   the	  maternity	  hospital	  describes	   the	   literal	  state	   of	   rebuilding	   throughout	   Japan,	   and	   particularly	   in	   Shinjuku,	   in	   the	   late	  1960s	  at	  the	  time	  Love	  Life	  was	  being	  written.	  Both	  Tokyo	  and	  Osaka	  were	  still	  in	   the	   process	   of	   reconstructing	   themselves	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   the	  War.	   	   There	  remained	  in	  places	  derelict	  sites	  of	  larger,	  sturdier	  buildings	  that	  had	  survived	  the	   bombings,	   and	   pockets	   of	   vacant	   wastelands	   that	   were	   waiting	   to	   be	  redeveloped.	  But	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  both	  cities	  were	  in	  the	  process	  of	  radically	  transforming	   architecturally	   during	   these	   few	   years	   and	   the	   construction	   of	  local	   transport	   systems,	   grand	   commercial	   buildings,	   vast	   station	   concourses	  and	   skyscrapers	   that	   remain	   today,	   gathered	   great	   pace	   in	   the	   late	   1960s.55	  	  	  When	   some	   of	   these	   came	   to	   fruition	   in	   the	   1970s,	   the	   resulting	   atmosphere	  would	   be	   very	   different.	   	   	   For	   instance,	   in	   Shinjuku’s	   western	   ward,	   the	  dilapidated	  Yodobashi	  water	  purification	  plant	  closed	  in	  1965	  and	  throughout	  the	   late	  1960s	   its	   land	  was	  sanitised	  and	  developed.	  The	  development	  of	   this	  site	   culminated	   in	   the	   completion	   of	   several	   distinctive	   skyscrapers:	   the	  Keio	  Plaza	   Hotel	   was	   completed	   in	   1971,	   followed	   by	   the	   Shinjuku	   Sumitomo	  Building,	  the	  KDDI	  Building,	  and	  the	  Shinjuku	  Mitsui	  Building	  in	  1974.	   	  By	  the	  mid-­‐1970s	   the	   skyline	  of	   Shinjuku,	   and	   indeed	   the	  whole	   of	  Tokyo,	   had	  been	  
                                            55	  For	   accounts	   of	   these	   transformations	   and	   constructions	   see:	   White,	   James	   W.	  (1982)	   Migration	   in	   Metropolitan	   Japan:	   Social	   Change	   and	   Political	   Behaviour,	  California:	   University	   of	   California;	   and	   Watanuki,	   J.	   (1992)	   Japan	   in	   the	   1960s	   and	  
After:	  The	  Politics	  of	  High-­‐Growth	  Tokyo:	  Sophia	  University.	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irrevocably	   altered	   by	   these	   giant	   feats	   of	   construction.	   	   Their	   appearances	  accompanied	  Japan’s	  newly	  acquired	  economic	  confidence	  of	  the	  1970s	  and	  the	  heightening	  materiality	   of	   its	   cultural	   aims	   and	   ambitions.	   	   The	   image	   of	   the	  maternity	   hospital,	   then,	   situated	   at	   a	   time	   of	   rupture	   and	   crisis	  wherein	   the	  past	   is	   in	   the	   process	   of	   being	   dismantled	   even	   before	   the	   future	   can	   be	  concretely	  materialised,	  can	  thus	  be	  read,	  not	  only	  as	  a	  straightforward	  literal	  representation	  of	   Japan’s	   infrastructural	  upheaval,	  but	  also	  metaphorically	   for	  the	  concomitant	  social,	  political	  and	  cultural	  upheaval	  of	  late	  1960s	  Japan.56	  
The	  architecture	  of	  the	  hospital	  serves	  to	  cue	  another	  set	  of	  associations	  that	   generate	   potential	   meanings	   clustered	   around	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘woman’.	  Specifically,	   in	   her	  memory’s	   reconfiguration	   of	   the	   hospital,	   Ai	   forces	   a	   link	  between	   the	   hospital	   corridor	   and	   (Ai’s	   perception	   of	   its	   resemblance	   to)	   a	  brothel.	   	   She	   writes	   that:	   ‘[e]xiting	   the	   hospital	   ward	   was	   a	   dark	   narrow	  corridor	   that	  reminded	  one	  of	  a	  brothel,	  and	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  corridor	  was	  a	  
                                            56	  Considered	  another	  way,	  we	  might	  argue	   that	  architecture,	  or	   landscape,	   is	  never	  coincidental	   to	   the	   culture,	   society	   and	  politics	   in	  which	   it	   is	   situated.	   	  Rather	   it	   is	   a	  three	  dimensional	  manifestation	  of	   them.	   	  As	  Cotton	  Mather,	  P.P.	  Karan,	   and	  Shigeru	  Iijima	   note,	   ‘Landscape	   is	   the	   interaction	   of	   culture,	   time,	   and	   geographic	   space.	   	   It	  records	  what	  has	  happened.	  	  It	  is	  an	  eloquent	  transcription	  of	  the	  physical	  history	  and	  the	  essence	  of	   life	  as	   it	   functions	   in	  a	  complex	  matrix.	   	  Landscape	   is	   the	  unvarnished	  etching	   of	   the	   past	   and	   present,	   of	   reality	   […it	   is]	   the	   consequent	   compage	   of	   the	  elemental	   bonds	   of	   land	   and	   culture.’	   	   See	   P.P.	   Karan,	   Cotton	   Mather,	   and	   Shigeru	  Iijima,	  Japanese	  Landscapes:	  Where	  Land	  and	  Culture	  Merge	  (Kentucky:	  The	  University	  Press	   of	   Kentucky,	   1998)	   p.	   1.	   	   Nevertheless,	   it	   is	   certainly	   the	   case	   that	   the	  architectural	   transitions	  during	   the	   late	  1960s,	   striking	  as	   they	  were	   in	  exposing	   the	  present	  moment	  as	  one	  which	  was	  situated	  within	  a	  rupture	  between	  past	  and	  future,	  were	  often	   foregrounded	  by	   avant-­‐garde	   artists	   at	   the	   time.	   	   See	   for	   instance,	   Seijun	  Suzuki’s	   film	   Koroshi	   no	   Rakuin	   (Branded	   to	   Kill,	   Nikkatsu,	   1967)	   and	   Yoshishige	  Yoshida’s	  Erosu	  purasu	  gyakusatsu	  (Eros	  Plus	  Massacre,	  Art	  Theatre	  Guild,	  1969).	  Both	  shoot	  various	  scenes	  either	  within	  the	  ruins	  and	  wastelands	  left	  over	  from	  the	  war,	  or	  within	   and	   alongside	   the	   new	   and	   iconic	   brutalist	   and	   metabolist	   architecture	   that	  characterised	  Japan’s	  redevelopment.	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tap’.57	  	   By	   suggesting	   a	   collapse	   of	   the	   distinction	   between	   ‘mother’	   and	  ‘whore’	   through	  an	  alignment	  of	   the	  physical	  spaces	  wherein	  motherhood	  and	  whoredom	  are	  performed	  (the	  maternity	  ward	  and	  the	  brothel),	  Ai’s	  narrative	  necessarily	   foregrounds	   the	   roles	   that	   constitute	   ‘women’.	   	   The	   fact	   that	   such	  roles	  might	  be	  social	  rather	  than	  ‘natural’	  and	  therefore	  learned	  is	  compounded	  by	   the	   additional	   similarity	   Ai’s	   narrative	   discerns	   between	   the	   hospital	  building	  and	  the	  institution	  of	  the	  school:	  ‘There	  was	  a	  set	  of	  steps	  to	  the	  side	  of	  the	  faucet,	  and	  these	  steps	  had	  a	  wide	  landing	  like	  those	  in	  a	  school	  building	  (all	  of	   which	   was	   permeated	   with	   the	   smell	   of	   disinfectant).’ 58 	  As	   a	   social	  institution,	  the	  school	  implements	  (in	  Kristeva’s	  phrase)	  ‘[t]oo	  much	  strictness	  on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   Other’,	   instructing	   young	   girls	   how	   to	   deport	   themselves,	  while	   punishing	   or	   censoring	   behaviour	   which	   departs	   from	   examples	   of	  modesty	   and	  propriety.59	  The	   brothel,	   in	   contrast,	   is	  where	  we	   see	   (again	   in	  Kristeva’s	  phrase)	   ‘[t]he	   lapse	  of	   the	  Other’,	  where	  women	  need	  not	  abide	  by	  rules	   to	  cover	  up	  or	  hide	   their	   sex,	  but	  must	   instead	  offer	   it	  up	   for	  a	  price.60	  	  Consequently,	   we	   can	   see	   how	   these	   elisions	   between	  past/present/school/brothel/hospital/restaurant	  demonstrate	  clearly	  how	  the	  literary	  technique	  of	  stream-­‐of-­‐consciousness	  lends	  itself	  so	  well	  not	  only	  to	  the	  crisis	   of	   representation	  we	   have	  already	   identitfied	   as	   being	   characteristic	   of	  1960s	   Japanese	   avant-­‐gardism,	   but	   also	   to	   the	   crisis	   of	   representation	   that	  Kristeva’s	   ‘abject’	  constitutes.	   	  Kristeva	  writes	  that	   it	   is	   in	  cases	  where	  society	  
                                            57	  Kanai,	  Ai	  no	  seikatsu,	  p.46	  58	  Ibid.,	  p.	  46.	  59	  Kristeva,	  Powers	  of	  Horror:	  An	  Essay	  on	  Abjection,	  p.	  15.	  60	  Ibid.,	  p.	  15.	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produces	   such	   contradicting	   messages	   that	   ‘a	   narcissistic	   crisis’	   is	   brought	  about,	  wherein	   the	   subject	   becomes	   unable	   to	   perceive	   herself	   as	  whole	   and	  clean	  through	  the	  mirror	  which	  society	  holds	  up,	  and	  that	  this	  ‘provides,	  along	  with	   its	   truth,	   a	   view	   of	   the	   abject’.61	  	   This	   appears	   to	   be	   borne	   out	   by	   Ai’s	  journey	   down	   the	   stairs,	   during	   which	   the	   foundations	   of	   her	   identity	   are	  thrown	   into	   crisis.	   	   That	  which	   she	   at	   first	   could	   only	   perceive	   as	   ‘unknown	  substances’,	   transpire	   to	   be	   none	   other	   than	   women’s	   sexual	   organs,	   the	  mother’s	  body,	  all	  that	  represents	  life	  in	  the	  chora,	  including	  foetuses	  and	  parts	  of	  babies.	  	  These	  have	  been	  extracted,	  preserved,	  and	  positioned	  on	  the	  stairs	  of	  the	   hospital,	   reflecting	   back	   to	   Ai	   disturbing	   images	   of	   the	  mutilation	   of	   her	  gender	  and	  physical	  origin.	  
The	   inclusion	   in	   the	   list	   of	   preserved	   body	   parts	   of	   a	   pinna	   recalls	  Kanai’s	   1971	   short	   story	   ‘Mimi’	   (‘The	   Ear’),	   in	   which	   the	   protagonist,	   an	  adolescent	  girl,	  cuts	  off	  her	  ear	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  story.	   	  Before	  the	  conclusion	  however,	   she	  dreams	  that	  she	   is	   tightly	  bound	  up	  within	  her	   father’s	  ear.	   	  On	  the	   one	   hand,	   the	   experience	   is	   suffocating,	   but	   on	   the	   other,	   it	   is	  much	   like	  being	   ‘wrapped	  up	  by	  a	  supple	  rose-­‐coloured	   flesh	  cocoon	  so	   [the	  young	  girl]	  remains	   still’.62	  	   Kitada,	   writing	   on	   ‘The	   Ear’	   comments	   that,	   while	   the	   ear	  belongs	  to	  ‘the	  father’,	  it	  is	  nevertheless	  conflated	  with	  a	  ‘motherly	  image’,	  with,	  presumably,	   the	   ‘cocoon’	  a	  clear	  reference	  to	  the	  womb,	  and	  the	   ‘supple	  rose-­‐coloured	   flesh’	   evoking	   female	   genitalia.	   	   Therefore,	   she	   argues,	   the	   ear	   in	  Kanai’s	   works	   is	   a	   symbol	   that	   breaks	   down	   the	   differences	   between	   the	  
                                            61	  Ibid.,	  p.	  15.	  62	  Kanai	  Mieko,	  'Mimi',	  in	  Kanai	  Mieko:	  Zentanpenshū	  (Tokyo:	  Nihon	  Bungeisha,	  1992)	  pp.	  478-­‐93,	  p.	  490.	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genders	  and	  presents	  the	  reader	  with	  an	  androgynous	  super-­‐ego,	  which	  Kitada	  terms	   ‘an	   ideal	   androgynous	   reflection’	   (ryōseigūyūteki	   na	   risōteki	   kyōzō).63	  	  However,	   a	   comparison	   between	   Kanai’s	   works	   and	   Kristeva’s	   theory	   of	   the	  abject	  challenges	  Kitada’s	   interpretation	  of	   this	  symbol.	   	  The	  ear’s	  description	  as	  ‘suffocating’	  and	  womb-­‐like	  in	  ‘The	  Ear’	  aligns	  with	  the	  primordial	  site	  of	  ‘the	  abject’,	   as	   does	   its	   inclusion	   in	   a	   line-­‐up	   of	   preserved	   female	   organs	   in	   a	  maternity	  hospital	  in	  Love	  Life.	  	  That	  it	  is	  aligned	  with	  the	  abject	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  that	   the	   ear	   in	   both	   its	   manifestations	   here	   is	   a	   symbol	   of	   androgyny.	   	   For	  Kristeva,	   because	   abjection,	   motherhood,	   the	   womb	   and	   the	   process	   of	  pregnancy	   are	   pre-­‐cultural	   and	   pre-­‐symbolic,	   they	   are	   also	   of	   indeterminate	  gender	  and	  subjectivity.	  	  As	  she	  writes:	  
Cells	   fuse,	   split	   and	  proliferate;	   volumes	  grow,	   tissues	   stretch,	  and	  body	  fluids	  change	  rhythm,	  speeding	  up	  or	  slowing	  down.	  	  Within	   the	   body,	   growing	   as	   a	   graft,	   indomitable,	   there	   is	   an	  other.	   	  And	  no	  one	   is	  present,	  within	   that	  simultaneously	  dual	  and	  alien	  space,	  to	  signify	  what	  is	  going	  on.	  ‘It	  happens,	  but	  I’m	  not	   there.’	   ‘I	   cannot	   realise	   it,	   but	   it	   goes	   on.’	   Motherhood’s	  impossible	  syllogism.	  	  64	  	  Here,	   pregnancy	   is	   described	   as	   an	   organic	   or	   biological	   event	   that	   ‘happens’	  regardless	   of	   intent;	   it	   is	   a	   process	   that	   requires	   no	   agency,	   wherein	   the	  mother’s	  body	  hosts	   ‘an	  other’	  body	  in	  a	  space	  where	  neither	  mother	  or	  baby	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  present	  as	  culturally	  constituted	  beings.	  	  Thus,	  pregnancy,	  the	  womb	  and	  the	  developing	  foetus	  are	  not	  abject	  for	  Kristeva.	  This	  is	  not	  because	  they	   are	   processes	   and	   entities	   that	   pertain	   to	   the	   female	   gender;	   in	   other	  
                                            63	  Sachie	  Kitada,	   'Usagi:	  Hito	  to	  Bungaku',	   in	  Tanpen	  Josei	  Bungaku:	  Gendai,	  ed.	  Teiko	  Yabu	  and	  Sumiko	  Watanabe	  Yasuko	  Imai	  (Tokyo:	  Ōfū,	  1993)	  pp.	  153-­‐60,	  p.	  159.	  64	  Kristeva,	  Powers	  of	  Horror:	  An	  Essay	  on	  Abjection,	  p.	  237	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words,	   it	   is	   not	   female	   gender	   per	   se	   which	   is	   taboo.	   	   Rather	   (and	   more	  radically),	   they	  are	  abject	  because	  they	  pertain	  to	  the	  genderless,	  androgynous	  origin	   of	   all	   humans	   and	   because	   they	   are	   transgressive	   of	   the	   boundary	  between	   self	   and	   other,	   male	   and	   female.	   It	   is	   this	   liminal	   and	   androgynous	  origin	   which	   must	   be	   repressed	   in	   order	   for	   the	   individual	   to	   be	   able	   to	  conceive	  themselves	  as	  Lacan’s	  ‘whole’,	  ‘separate’	  and	  ‘clean’	  Ideal	  I	  during	  the	  mirror	   stage.	   	  Therefore,	  Ai’s	  memory,	  or	  vision,	  of	   the	   line	  of	   jars	   containing	  foetal	  specimens	  at	  the	  hospital,	  including	  that	  of	  the	  pinna,	  might	  suggest	  that	  she	  continues	  to	  be	  unable	  to	  repress	  her	  connection	  to	  the	  severed	  origin,	  and	  is	  therefore	  unable	  to	  conceive	  of	  herself	  as	  ‘ideal’.	  
All	  the	  other	  women	  in	  the	  hospital	  appear	  to	  be	  able	  to	  cope	  better	  than	  Ai	  with	   the	  reality	  of	   the	  womb’s	  extraction	  and	  pickling	   in	  wide-­‐necked	   jars.	  	  However,	   the	   black	   humour	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   narrative,	   when	   one	   of	   the	  patients	   mentions	   the	   word	   ‘thing’	   over	   dinner,	   exposes	   an	   important	  distinction	   between	  Ai	   and	   these	  women.	   	   Namely,	   that	   however	   used	   to	   the	  world	   of	   abject	   imagery	   the	   women	   have	   become,	   however	   much	   they	   live	  among	   it	   and	   are	   confronted	   with	   it	   on	   a	   daily	   basis,	   they	   (on	   the	   whole)	  nonetheless	   retain	   the	   ability	   to	   render	   it	   ‘taboo’,	   to	   exclude	   it	   from	   their	  consciousness	  when	   necessary	   (for	   instance,	   when	   eating).	   	   This	   is	   precisely	  what	  Ai	  has	  been	  unable	  to	  do.	  	  For	  her,	  abject	  imagery	  protrudes	  violently	  into	  her	   stream-­‐of-­‐consciousness	   narrative,	   seemingly	   autonomous	   of	   her	   actions,	  countering	  her	   strong	  desires	   to	   eat,	   thereby	   threatening	  her	   identity,	   indeed	  her	  existence.	  
Ai’s	  own	  narrative	  aim,	  it	  will	  be	  recalled	  (an	  aim	  outlined	  to	  the	  reader	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  novella),	  is	  to	  retrieve	  and	  stabilise	  her	  memories;	  framed	  in	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Kristevan	  terms,	  she	  is	  attempting	  to	  retrieve	  a	  repressed	  material	  reality.	  The	  governing	   logic	  underpinning	   such	  an	  aim	   (again,	   framed	   in	  Kristevan	   terms)	  assumes	  that	  material	  reality	  pre-­‐exists	  the	  imaginary	  and	  symbolic	  orders	  into	  which	   it	   is	   transcribed.	   	  Ai’s	  attempt	  at	  recovering	  her	  memories	  (and	  thus	  at	  stabilising	  her	  own	  sense	  of	  self)	  also	  assumes	  that	  the	  subject	  can	  subvert	  the	  primacy	  of	  the	  imaginary	  and	  symbolic	  order	  by	  entering	  this	  material	  reality,	  and	  writing	  (about)	  it	  ‘truthfully’;	  the	  ‘truth’	  being	  the	  horrific	  manner	  in	  which	  our	   physicalised	   identity	   (that	   is	   to	   say,	   our	   impression	   of	   the	   reality	   of	   the	  body	   as	   being	   primary)	   is,	   in	   modern	   society,	   intellectualised,	   obscured	   and	  alienated.	  	  It	  is	  here	  that	  Kristeva’s	  theory	  of	  the	  abject	  and	  (what	  we	  termed	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  chapter)	  the	  matrix	  Ai-­‐body-­‐presence	  meet.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  Love	  Life,	  Ai’s	  inscription	  of	  herself	  –	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  her	  inscription	  of	  herself	  as	  being	  textually	  present	  (which	  inscription	  then	  stands	  metonymically	  for	  her	  
physical	  presence)	  is	  dependent	  in	  turn	  upon	  her	  being	  temporally	  present.	  This	  is	  the	  paradox	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  written	  statement	  here	  I	  am:	  the	  present	  tense	  –	  which	  operates	  on	  the	  temporal	  plane	  –	  has	  also	  to	  function	  metonymically	  on	  the	   spatial	   plane,	   as	   it	   pretends	   to	   present	   the	   absent	   speaker	   (even	   as	   it	  necessarily	  disavows	  the	  possibility	  of	  such	  representation).	  Hence,	  just	  as	  Ai’s	  claim	   (in	   her	   capacity	   as	   a	   first	   person	   narrator)	   to	   textual	   	   presence	   is	  subverted	   by	   the	   inevitability	   of	   her	  absence;	   so,	   too,	   in	   Kristevan	   terms,	   her	  




There	   is	  a	  second	  matrix	  we	  need	  to	   introduce	  at	   this	  stage,	  which	  sits	  alongside	  Ai-­‐body-­‐presence,	  commenting	  on	  it,	  reflecting	  it	  and	  problematizing	  it:	   this	   is	   the	  matrix	   I	  have	  named	  F-­‐narrative-­‐absence.	  Before	  we	  discuss	   this	  second	  matrix	  in	  any	  detail,	  however,	  let	  us	  first,	  by	  way	  of	  introduction,	  briefly	  mention	  the	  letter	  that	  Ai	  receives	  from	  her	  (nameless)	  friend.	  In	  this	  letter	  the	  friend	  comments	  on	  Franz	  Kafka’s	  short	  story,	   ‘The	  Cares	  of	  a	  Family	  Man’.65	  	  	  For	  Ai’s	   friend,	   this	  story	  highlights	  an	  ontological	  problem,	  which	  he	  phrases	  as:	  ‘[is	  Odradek/existence]	  a	  reality	  beyond	  illusions,	  or	  is	  it	  an	  illusion	  beyond	  reality’(genkaku	   ijō	   no	   genjitsu	   ka,	   genjitsu	   ijō	   no	   genkaku	   ka)?66	  	   The	   friend	  thus	   here	   proposes	   that	   Kafka’s	   short	   story	   illustrates	   that	   there	   are	   two	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  may	  understand	  our	  existence.	  	  The	  first	  is	  that	  it	  is	  ‘a	  reality	  beyond	  illusions’;	  or,	  in	  other	  words,	  that	  it	  is	  a	  material	  reality	  that	  is	  
                                            65	  Franz	   Kafka,	   'The	   Cares	   of	   a	   Family	   Man',	   in	   The	   Complete	   Stories	   (New	   York:	  Schocken	  Books,	  1971)	  pp.	  269-­‐70.	  In	  this	  story,	  the	  narrator	  (a	  family	  man)	  describes	  an	  object	  that	  the	  children	  play	  with	  as	  if	  it	  is	  ‘a	  creature’,	  called	  Odradek.	  	  He	  explains	  how	  Odradek,	  ‘looks	  like	  a	  flat	  star-­‐shaped	  spool	  for	  thread,	  and	  indeed	  it	  does	  seem	  to	  have	  thread	  wound	  upon	  it	  […].	  But	  it	  is	  not	  only	  a	  spool,	  for	  a	  small	  wooden	  crossbar	  sticks	  out	  of	   the	  middle	  of	   the	   star	   and	  another	   small	   rod	   is	   joined	   to	   that	   at	   a	   right	  angle’.	  Odradek	  is	  thus	  able	  to	  stand	  upright	  as	  if	  on	  two	  legs.	  	  Although	  his	  appearance	  seems	   senseless,	   like	   a	   ‘broken-­‐down	   remnant’	   of	   that	   which	   had	   once	   been	   an	  intelligible	   whole,	   he	   is,	   in	   his	   own	   way,	   perfectly	   finished.	   	   Odradek	   appears	  throughout	   the	   house,	   in	   ‘the	   stairway,	   the	   lobbies,	   the	   entrance	  hall’;	   sometimes	  he	  goes	  missing	  but	  he	  always	   faithfully	   returns	   to	   the	  house	  again.	   	  The	  narrator	  often	  feels	  compelled	  to	  speak	  to	  Odradek	  and	  asks	  him	  questions,	  such	  as	  what	  his	  name	  is,	  and	  where	  he	  lives.	  	  Sometimes	  Odradek	  answers	  and	  laughs,	  but	  often	  ‘he	  stays	  mute	  for	  a	  long	  time,	  as	  wooden	  as	  his	  appearance’.	   	  The	  narrator	  concludes	  by	  wondering	  whether	   Odradek	   can	   possibly	   die,	   or	   whether	   he	   will	   ‘always	   be	   rolling	   down	   the	  stairs,	  with	  ends	  of	   thread	  trailing	  after	  him	  right	  before	  the	   feet	  of	  my	  children,	  and	  my	   children’s	   children’,	   and	   that	   he	   finds	   the	   notion	   that	   Odradek	  may	   outlive	   him	  most	  painful.	  	  	  66	  Kanai,	  Ai	  no	  seikatsu,	  p.	  21.	  
 144 
obscured	  by	   the	   very	  narratives	  we	  deploy	   to	   try	   and	   re-­‐present	   that	   reality,	  just	   as	   Odradek	   is	   nothing	   more	   than	   a	   wooden	   spool,	   an	   object	   that	   the	  children	  play	  with,	  and	  not	   ‘a	  creature’	  as	   the	  children	  and	  their	   father	  make-­‐believe.67	  	  This	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  simplification	  of	  Kristeva’s	  theory	  of	  the	  abject,	  in	   which,	   as	   we	   have	   already	   seen,	   she	   proposes	   that	   there	   is	   a	   repressed	  material	   reality	   that	   hides	   beneath	   the	   symbolic	   and	   imaginary	   orders.	   This	  understanding	  of	  existence	  also	  describes	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  abjection	  of	  Ai’s	  body	  traumatically	  intrudes	  into	  her	  narrative	  of	  the	  present.	  	  The	  second	  way	  in	  which	  we	  may	   understand	   our	   existence,	   however,	   is	   that	   it	   is	   ‘an	   illusion	  beyond	  reality’,	  or	  an	  elusive	  fiction	  that	  cannot	  be	  grasped,	  reduced,	  or	  limited	  to	  the	  material	  world;	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  Odradek	  is	  predicated	  upon	  the	  fiction	  of	  his	  being	  a	   ‘creature’;	   remove	  the	   fiction	  and	  Odradek	  necessarily	  disappears.	  But	   if	   Odradek	   is	   a	   fiction,	   can	   he	   ever	   be	   said	   to	   be	   truly	   present,	   or	   is	   he	  perpetually	   an	   absence?	   	   It	   is	   this	   question	   that	   underpins	   the	   second	   of	   our	  matrices,	  F-­‐narrative-­‐absence	  and	  that	  forms	  the	  basis	  of	  Ai’s	  relationship	  with,	  and	  search	  for,	  her	  elusive	  husband	  F.	  
F	  may	   be	   associated	  with	  absence	   in	   the	   story;	   however,	  we	   soon	   run	  into	   a	   paradox,	   because	   although	   F	   is	   ‘absent’,	   the	   fact	   of	   his	   absence	   is	  continually	  present.	   	  We	  read	  about	  the	  physical	  traces	  he	  has	  left	  behind	  him	  that	   morning:	   the	   un-­‐washed	   up	   crockery	   from	   breakfast;	   an	   unexpected	  listening	  choice	  left	  on	  the	  record	  player;	  and	  the	  magazine	  he	  has	  turned	  open.	  Further,	   Ai’s	   narrative	   often	   deviates	   to	   ponder	   the	   meaning	   of	   their	  relationship	  and	  her	  feelings	  for	  him.	  	  In	  her	  memories	  of	  past	  traumatic	  events,	  
                                            67	  Kafka,	  F.	   (1971)	  The	  Cares	  of	  a	  Family	  Man	   (trans.	  Willa	  and	  Edwin	  Muir)	   in:	   ‘The	  Complete	  Stories’,	  United	  States	  of	  America:	  Schocken	  Books.	  pp.	  269-­‐270.	  	  p.	  270.	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for	  instance,	  the	  scene	  at	  the	  maternity	  hospital,	  he	  appears	  and	  comes	  to	  her	  aid.	  F	  also	  features	  in	  all	  Ai’s	  correspondence	  with	  others;	  when	  she	  visits	  the	  Shinjuku	  Jazz	  Café,	  Mokuba,	  she	  exchanges	  words	  with	  a	  young	  man	  who	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  one	  of	  F’s	  students,	  he	  is	  mentioned	  in	  the	  letter	  Ai	  receives	  from	  her	  friend	   in	   Kyoto,	   and	   again	   in	   the	   conversation	   that	   she	   holds	   with	   another	  friend,	  the	  painter.	  	  At	  the	  end	  of	  each	  of	  these	  episodes	  therefore,	  Ai	  returns	  to	  the	   fact	   that	   F	   has	   disappeared	   and	   describes	   her	   heightening	   anxiety,	  reiterating	   her	   hypothesis	   that	   he	   has	   met	   with	   an	   accident,	   until	   it	   finally	  transpires	  he	  has	  been	  at	  his	  friend’s	  house	  all	  day.	  	  Ai’s	  anger	  at	  this	  discovery	  soon	   disappears	   when	   she	   witnesses	   the	   sudden	   death	   of	   a	   young	   couple	  walking	  a	  few	  paces	  behind	  her	  who	  are	  hit	  by	  a	  car	  just	  seconds	  after	  she	  has	  crossed	  the	  road.	  
The	  search	  for	  a	  missing	  lover,	  or	  for	  ‘the	  eternal	  lover’	  is	  an	  underlying	  theme	  of	  many	  of	  Kanai’s	  early	  works.	  As	  a	  trope,	  it	  is	  useful	  for	  allowing	  us	  to	  gauge	  the	  benefits	  and	  limitations	  of	  various	  theoretical	  approaches,	  precisely	  because	  it	  raises	  directly	  some	  of	  the	  major	  concerns	  of	  contemporary	  critical	  theory,	   and	   thus	  actually	   seems	   to	   invite	   theoretical	   engagement	  with	   it.	   	   For	  instance,	  in	  Love	  Life,	  because	  F	  does	  not,	  and	  cannot,	  exist	  outside	  Ai’s	  stream-­‐of-­‐consciousness	  narrative,	  theoretical	  questions	  surrounding	  human	  ontology	  and	  psychology,	  questions	  of	  textual	  presence,	  textual	  absence,	  the	  inscription	  of	  the	  self,	  the	  inscription	  of	  the	  other,	  emanate	  from	  the	  text	  and,	  accordingly,	  become	  foregrounded.	  
Commentators	  on	  Kanai	  such	  as	  Kitada	  Sachie	  and	  Shibusawa	  Tatsuhiko	  have	   put	   forward	   the	   theory	   that	   the	   search	   for	   F	   in	   Love	   Life	   constitutes	   a	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metaphor	  for	  the	  search	  for	  the	  origins	  of	  writing.68	  	  In	  elaborating	  on	  how	  it	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  such,	  the	  two	  critics	  employ	  profoundly	  different	  critical	  methodologies.	  Kitada	  resorts	  to	  using	  a	  psychobiographical	  critical	  approach,	  arguing	   that	   Kanai	   learned	   her	   love	   of	   literature	   and	   film	   through	   both	   her	  father,	   an	   avid	   reader,	   who	   particularly	   enjoyed	   the	   writings	   of	   Tanizaki	  Jun’ichiro,	  and	  her	  mother,	  who	  used	  to	  take	  the	  young	  Kanai	  to	  the	  cinema	  on	  her	  back	  when	  she	  was	   little.	  Citing	  one	  of	   the	   few	  autobiographical	  accounts	  written	  by	  Kanai,	  Kitada	  states	   that	   the	  death	  of	  Kanai’s	   father	  when	  she	  was	  five	   years	   old,	   created	   a	   ‘physiological	   vacuum’	   (nikutaiteki	   kūhaku)	   and	   an	  immoveable	  ‘sensation	  of	  lack’	  (ketsurakukan)	  which	  in	  turn	  led	  her	  to	  immerse	  herself	  in	  the	  world	  of	  fiction	  and	  fantasy.69	  	  Kanai’s	  protagonist’s	  search	  for	  ‘F’	  is	  therefore	  metaphorical	  for	  Kanai’s	  search	  for	  her	  lost	  ‘Father’	  and	  constitutes	  the	  origins	  of	  Kanai’s	  own	  very	  personal	  motive	  for	  writing.70	  
In	  contrast	  to	  Kitada,	  Shibusawa	  Tatsuhiko,	  writes	  that	  the	  eternal	  lover	  constitutes	  a	   ‘metaphor	   for	   [Kanai’s]	  philosophy	  of	   language’	   (gengotetsugaku	  
no	  hiyu):71	  
There	  is	  no	  way	  of	  knowing	  exactly	  how	  the	  slightly	  old	  fashioned	  image	   of	   the	   eternal	   lover	   is	   fixed	   in	   [Kanai]’s	   consciousness.	  However,	   I	   wish	   to	   draw	   attention	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   fifteen	  short	  stories	  contained	  in	  the	  collection	  Rabbits	  are	  all,	  via	  some	  
                                            68	  Kitada,‘Usagi:	  Hito	  to	  bungaku’	  (For	  Kitada’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  missing/eternal	  lover	  see	  pp.	  153-­‐155);	  Shibusawa	  Tatsuhiko,	  Bungei	  tenbō	  (1974)	  reprinted	  in	  Kanai	  Mieko,	  
Kanai	  Mieko:	  Zentanpenshū.	  Vol.	  1	  (Tokyo:	  Nihonbungeisha,	  1992)	  pp.	  624-­‐626.	  	  	  69	  Kitada,‘Usagi:	  Hito	  to	  bungaku’,	  p.	  153.	  Kitada	  is	  citing	  from	  Kanai	  Mieko,	  ‘Oboegaki,	  Yosei	  ni	   tsuite’,	   in	  Kanai	  Mieko	  Shishū.	  Vol.	  55,	  Gendai	  Shi	  Bunko	   (Tokyo:	  Shinchōsha,	  1973).	  70	  Ibid.,	  p.	  153.	  	  71	  Shibusawa,	  in	  Kanai	  Mieko:	  Zentanpenshū,	  Vol.	  1,	  p.	  624.	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meaning	   or	   another,	   narratives	   about	   searching	   for	   a	   lover.	   	   In	  short,	  each	  story	  departs	   from	  the	  absence	  of	   the	  object	  of	   love.	  	  […]	  	  It	  seems	  it	  is	  best	  to	  think	  of	  this	  absence	  as	  a	  metaphor	  for	  her	  philosophy	  of	  language.72	  	  Shibusawa	   also	   explains	   that,	   in	   Kanai’s	   writings,	   the	   ‘object	   of	   love’	   (aisuru	  
taishō)	   is	   ‘absent’	   (fuzai),	   not	   always	   because	   s/he	   has	   ‘disappeared,	   become	  separated	  or	  died’	  in	  the	  past,	  but	  sometimes	  because	  s/he	  is	  the	  manifestation,	  or	  an	   image,	  of	   a	  person	   in	   the	   future,	   an	  eternal	   lover	  who	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  met,	  but	  who	  knows	  one	  intimately.	  This	  symbol	  or	  image,	  Shibusawa	  posits,	  is	  similar	  to	  Jung’s	  ‘anima’	  (the	  ideal	  female	  in	  the	  male	  psyche),	  or	  ‘animus’	  (the	  ideal	   male	   in	   the	   female	   psyche)	   and	   produces	   a	   sudden	   realisation,	   like	   an	  epiphany,	   that	   one	   has	   again	   discovered	   that	   which	   is	   already	   known.	   	   In	  clarifying	   the	   use	   of	   his	   terms,	   Shibusawa	   argues	   that	   Kanai’s	   eternal	   lover	  draws	  on	  surrealist	  images	  and	  principles,	  according	  to	  which	  ‘absence’	  (fuzai)	  is	  simultaneously	  ‘presence’	  (jitsuzai).	  
As	   we	   saw	   in	   Chapter	   One,	   the	   Japanese	   surrealist	   concept	   of	   fuzai	  shifted	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	   	   In	  the	  1930s,	  artists	  such	  as	  Kitasono	   Katsue,	   created	   works	   around	   the	   concept	   of	   fuzai	   or	   ‘shinkū’	  (vacuum)	   which	   proposed	   that	   becoming	   ‘nothing’	   was	   the	   ultimate	   aim,	   or	  essence,	   of	   art.73 	  	   He	   displayed,	   for	   instance,	   a	   vacuum	   tube	   as	   an	   art	  installation	  to	  represent	  the	  doubled	  negative	  state	  of	  being:	  the	  vacuum	  tube	  
                                            72Ibid.,	  p.	  624.	  73	  Miryam	   Sas,	   Fault	   Lines:	   Cultural	   Memory	   and	   Japanese	   Surrealism	   (California:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1999)	  pp.	  70-­‐71.	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that	   is	   ‘nothing	   at	   all’.74	  	   However	   his	   work	   was	   criticised	   after	   the	   Second	  World	  War	  by	  artists	  Okamoto	  Tarō	  and	  Tsuruoaka	  Yoshihisa,	   for	   the	  precise	  reason	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  nothingness	  that	  it	  deployed	  was	  felt	  to	  be	  nihilistic,	  weakening	   surrealism’s	   subversive	   potential,	   and	   weakening	   its	   ability	   to	  mount	   an	   effective	   resistance	   to	   the	   oppressive	   rhetoric	   of	   fascism.75	  	   In	   his	  works,	   Okamoto	   instead	   depicts	   the	   cosmic	   abyss	   as	   a	   space	   filled	  with	   the	  tension	  of	   paradox,	   like	   the	   ‘torn	  mouth	  of	   a	  wound’.	   	   For	  him,	   the	   surrealist	  concept	   of	   fuzai	   is	   not	   actually	   absence	   at	   all,	   but	   rather,	   an	   enigmatic	  presence.76	  
It	  is	  this	  latter,	  paradoxical,	  surrealist	  concept	  that	  Shibusawa	  alludes	  to	  in	  his	  critique	  of	  Kanai’s	  trope	  of	  the	  eternal	  lover	  when	  he	  claims	  that	  ‘absence’	  is	   simultaneously	   ‘presence’.	   	   In	   so	   doing,	   Shibusawa	   theoretically	   aligns	  Kanai’s	  writings	  (as	  I	  do	  in	  this	  thesis)	  with	  a	  surrealist	  avant-­‐gardism.	  	  He	  then	  goes	   on	   to	   explain	   the	   effect	   that	   Kanai’s	   use	   of	   the	   surrealist	   concept	   of	  ‘absence’	  creates	  in	  her	  writings:	  
[…	   I]n	   Kanai	   Mieko’s	   abstract	   compositions,	   ‘absence’	   can	   be	  considered	   as	   a	   form	   of	   presence;	   our	   perspective	   is	   reversed,	  and	   positive	   becomes	   negative.	   […]	   It	   could	   be	   argued	   that	   the	  literary	  worlds	  that	  she	  orchestrates	  all	  similarly	  invert	  presence,	  and	  are	  negative	  worlds.	  	  Which	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  writer	  makes	  it	  look	  as	  if	  she	  is,	  throughout	  the	  narrative,	  on	  the	  side	  of	  ‘absence’,	  operating	  language.	  	  Or	  rather,	  perhaps	  it	  is	  closer	  to	  the	  truth	  to	  
                                            74	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  70-­‐71.	  75	  Ibid.,	  p.	  53	  76	  See	  Tarō	  Okamoto,	  Gabunshū	  Avangyarudo	  (Japan:	  Getsuyōshoten,	  1948)	  p.124.	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say	   that,	   in	  simply	  making	   the	  decision	   to	  operate	   language,	   the	  writer	  is	  compelled	  to	  stand	  on	  the	  side	  of	  ‘absence’.77	  	  In	  other	  words,	  Shibusawa	  contends	  that	  by	  deploying	  the	  surrealist	  concept	  of	  ‘absence’	  through	  the	  image	  of	  the	  eternal	  lover,	  Kanai	  is	  able	  to	  create	  literary	  worlds	   that,	   to	   the	   furthest	   extent	   possible,	   conceal	   the	  writing	   body,	   rather	  than,	  for	  instance,	  attempting	  to	  inscribe	  its	  presence.78	  	  While	  this	  may	  be	  the	  case	  for	  some	  of	  the	  stories	  in	  the	  collection	  Rabbits,	  as	  this	  chapter	  discussed	  at	   the	  beginning	  of	   its	  analysis	  of	  Love	  Life,	  Kanai’s	  debut	  novella	  differs	   from	  her	   later	  writings	  by	  narrating	   from	  a	   first	  person	  perspective	   in	  a	  stream-­‐of-­‐consciousness	   narrative;	   by	  making	   several	   references	   to	   shared	   reality,	   and	  through	   its	  descriptions	  of	  episodes	  that	   focus	  on	  Ai’s	  physicalised	  self.	  These	  techniques	  all	  work	  to	  foreground,	  and	  not	  conceal,	  the	  writing	  body;	  to	  make	  it	  more	  realistic,	  or,	  to	  borrow	  Shibusawa’s	  phrase,	  to	  make	  it	   ‘stand	  on	  the	  side	  of	   “presence”’.	   	   However,	   although	  his	   deployment	   demonstrably	   does	   not,	   as	  Shibusawa	   puts	   forward,	   render	   the	   writer’s	   body	   on	   the	   side	   of	   ‘absence’	  throughout	   the	   novella,	   it	   is	   nevertheless	   the	   case	   that	   F,	   as	   an	   abstract	   and	  
                                            77	  Shibusawa,	  in	  Kanai	  Mieko:	  Zentanpenshū,	  Vol.	  1,	  p.	  625.	  78	  Shibusawa	   is	   here,	   as	   the	   first	   quotation	   from	  him	   above	   sets	   out,	   discussing	   the	  stories	  in	  the	  collection	  Rabbits	  and	  linking	  them	  together	  through	  their	  deployment	  of	  the	   image	  of	   the	  eternal	   lover.	  However,	  although	  Shibusawa’s	   interpretation	   that	  all	  stories	  depart	  from	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  object	  of	  love	  holds	  true	  for	  many	  of	  the	  stories	  in	  that	  collection,	  including	  ‘Rotting	  Meat’,	  for	  ‘Rabbits’	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  trope	  of	  the	  missing	  lover	  is	  less	  apparent.	  Rather,	  as	  I	  argue	  in	  Chapter	  One	  of	  this	  thesis,	  the	  paradoxical	   surrealist	   concept	   of	   ‘absence’/‘presence’	   is	   deployed	   in	   both	   of	   these	  short	   stories	   through	   the	  use	  of	   various	   tropes	  and	   images.	   Indeed,	   in	  both	   ‘Rabbits’	  and	  ‘Rotting	  Meat’	  it	  is	  chiefly	  via	  the	  deployment	  of	  anonymous	  frame	  narrators	  who	  identify	  themselves	  as	  writers	  (and	  not	  the	  trope	  of	  eternal	  lovers),	  that	  the	  reader	  is	  invited	   to	   question	   realism	   of	   the	   text,	   and	   thus	   to	   perceive	   the	   author-­‐function	   as	  nothing	  more	  than	  narrative	  convention.	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elusive	  presence,	  enables	  Ai	  to	  pursue	  the	  importance	  of	  fiction	  to	  her	  identity.	  	  As	  Ai	  writes:	  
My	   life	  with	  F.	   	  Sometimes	   I	  wonder	  what	  F	   is	   to	  me,	  but	   in	   the	  end	  I’m	  left	  not	  understanding.	   	  I	  can	  only	  think	  as	  others	  might	  say,	  that	  F	  is	  my	  husband;	  I	  love	  him.	  	  Whether	  this	  is	  true	  or	  not	  is	  not	  for	  me	  to	  know.	  	  F	  and	  I	  are	  married.	  	  F	  and	  I	  are	  husband	  and	  wife.	   	  F	  is	  my	  husband.	   	  F	   leaves	  for	  work	  every	  morning.	   	   I	  am	  his	  wife.	   	  I	   love	  my	  husband.	   	  I	  exhale	  these	  words	  as	  if	  they	  are	  sentence	  examples	   in	  a	   foreign	   languages	   lesson.	   	   I	  even	   try	  saying	  them	  in	  English	  and	  French.	   	  But	  at	  any	  rate,	   they,	  at	   the	  present	  moment,	   seem	   to	  me	   like	   an	   unshakeable	   truth.	   	   F	   is	   a	  concrete,	   and	   moreover	   abstract	   presence.	   	   Although	   this	   is	  perhaps	  true	  of	  all	  husbands.79	  	  The	  sentences	  in	  this	  passage	  at	  first	  appear	  facile.	  	  Yet,	  what	  they	  manage	  is	  an	  ontological	  equation,	  producing	  an	  ethical,	   intersubjective	  and	  non-­‐egocentric	  selfhood.	   This	   is	   illustrated	   first	   by	   the	  way	   in	  which	   F	   precedes	   Ai	   in	   every	  sentence.	   	  Ai	  also	  writes	   ‘F	   is	  my	  husband.	   	  F	   leaves	   for	  work	  every	  morning’	  before	  writing	  ‘I	  am	  his	  wife.	  	  I	  love	  my	  husband’,	  thus	  foregrounding	  him	  in	  the	  overall	  sequence	  of	  sentences	  in	  the	  passage.	  	  This	  is	  particularly	  noticeable	  in	  the	  Japanese	  wherein	  F	  is	  positioned	  first	  in	  almost	  all	  sentences:	  
F	   to	   watashi	   no	   seikatsu.	   Tokidoki,	   watashi	   wa	   F	   ga	   watashi	   ni	  
totte	   nani	   nano	   ka	   kangaeru	   no	   dakeredo,	   sore	   wa	   kekkyoku	  
wakarazujimai.	   	  Tanin	  ga	  iu	  yō	  ni,	  F	  wa	  watashi	  no	  otto	  nano	  da,	  
watashi	  wa	  kare	  o	  aishiteiru	  no	  da,	  to	  kangaeru	  hoka	  nai.	  	  Sore	  ga	  
hontō	   ka	   uso	   ka	   watashi	   ni	   wa	   wakarimasen.	   	   F	   to	   watashi	   wa	  
kekkon	   shiteimasu.	   	   F	   to	  watashi	  wa	   fūfu	  desu.	   	   F	  wa	  watashi	   no	  
otto	  desu.	  	  F	  wa	  mai	  asa	  tsutome	  ni	  dekakemasu.	  Watashi	  wa	  kare	  
no	  tsuma	  desu.	  	  Watashi	  wa	  otto	  o	  aishiteimasu.	  […]	  F	  wa	  gutaiteki	  
                                            79	  Kanai,	  Ai	  no	  seikatsu,	  p.	  33.	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de,	   nao	   chūshōteki	   na	   sonzai	   desu.	   	   Arui	  wa	   subete	  no	  otto	  ga	   sō	  
nano	  desukeredomo.80	  	  The	  foregrounding	  of	  F	  in	  both	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  individual	  sentences,	  and	  in	  the	   overall	   sequence	   of	   sentences,	  might	   suggest	   that	   Ai	   conceives	   F	   as	   an	  a	  
priori	  given,	  preceding	  her	  own	  existence.	  	  Establishing	  the	  primacy	  of	  F	  to	  her	  identity	  does	  not	  entail	  Ai’s	  negation	  of	  her	  own	  existence,	  however,	  but	  allows	  Ai	  to	  construct	  a	  selfhood	  which	  is	  contingent	  on	  the	  other,	  and	  therefore	  which	  is	   able	   to	  make	  assertions	   to	  presence	  without	  being	   founded	  on	   the	  need	  or	  desire	   to	   possess,	   reduce	   or	   eradicate	   the	   other.	   	   The	   contingency	   of	   Ai’s	  existence	  is	  emphasised	  by	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  Ai	  precedes	  her	  analysis	  of	  her	  relationship	  with	  F	  with	  several	  phrases	  that	  emphasise	  the	  provisional	  nature	  of	  such	  analysis.	  	  She	  writes,	  ‘[s]ometimes	  I	  wonder’,	  ‘I	  can	  only	  think	  as	  others	  might	   say’,	   and	   ‘[w]hether	   it	   is	   true	  or	   false	   is	  not	   for	  me	   to	  know’.	   	  By	  using	  these	  expressions,	  Ai	  demonstrates	  that	  she	  is	  fully	  aware	  of	  the	  provisionality	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  her	  assertions	  about	  herself,	  but	  also	  of	  others’	  claims	  to	  ‘truth’.	  Because	  Ai	  acknowledges	  this	  provisionality	  of	  truth,	  words	  float	  free	  from	  her	  (and	  others’)	  subjective	  realities,	  as	  if	  they	  are	  ‘sentence	  examples	  in	  a	  foreign	  languages	   lesson’.	   	  Their	  detachment	   from	  the	  potential	  meaning	  which	  Ai,	  or	  anyone	   could	   imbue	   them	   with,	   strips	   them	   of	   empirical	   meaning.	   	   They	  become	  a	  ‘fictional’	  space.	  
By	   first	   creating	   this	   fictional	   void,	   and	   next	   inscribing	   herself	   and	   F	  within	   it,	  Ai’s	  narrative	  renders	  F	  and	  herself	  as	   fictions,	  or	  abstract	  concepts,	  like	  mathematical	  symbols	  and	  equations.	  	  Clauses	  such	  as,	  ‘F	  and	  I	  are	  married’	  
                                            80	  Ibid.,	  p.	  33.	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and	   ‘F	   and	   I	   are	  husband	   and	  wife’,	   demonstrate	  how	  as	   entities	   F	   and	   I	   join	  together	   to	   create	   one	   state	   (married)	   and	   yet,	   interestingly,	   retain	   their	  distinction	   from	   each	   other	   (husband	   and	   wife).	   Although	   Ai	   describes	   their	  objectification	   and	   possession,	   each	   by	   the	   other	   with	   the	   phrases	   ‘F	   is	   my	  husband’	   ‘I	   am	   his	  wife’,	   she	   shows	   how	   this	   does	   not	   affect	   their	   individual	  agency	   by	   stressing	   their	   active	   subjectivity	   in	   the	   following	   sentences:	   ‘F	  leaves	  for	  work	  every	  morning’;	  	  ‘I	  love	  my	  husband’.	  	   	  These	  extremely	  simple	  statements	  thus	  neither	  implement	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  self	  in	  antithesis	  to	  the	  other,	   nor	   the	   reduction	   of	   the	   other	   to	   the	   self.	   	   Instead	   they	   recognise	   the	  contingency	  and	  primary	  importance	  of	  the	  other	  to	  the	  self,	  and	  thus	  create	  an	  ethical	  abstract	  intersubjective	  mode	  of	  being.	  
In	   its	   challenge	   to	   the	   modern	   relationship	   with	   the	   other,	   this	  intersubjective	  mode	   of	   being	   seems	   to	   share	  many	   features	   that	   Emmanuel	  Levinas	  and	  Luce	  Irigaray	  outline	  in	  their	  theories	  on	  ‘alterity’.	  	  The	  realisation	  that	   the	   act	   of	   shoring	  up	   the	   terms	  of	   selfhood	  by	   fabricating	   an	  antithetical	  other	  held	   the	  potential	   for	   catastrophic	   evil	  was	  made	  particularly	  pertinent	  through	   the	   rise	   of	   fascism,	   Nazism	   and	   the	   Jewish	   Holocaust.	   	   And,	   in	   the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  there	  was	  a	  debate	  over	  the	  development	  of	  modern	   ontological	   philosophy	   in	   Europe,	  which	  mirrored	   the	   criticism	   of	  Okamoto	  and	  his	  avant-­‐garde	  contemporaries’	  critique	  of	  surrealist	  philosophy,	  by	  pointing	  out	  philosophy’s	  contribution	  to	  the	  horrors	  committed	  during	  the	  war.	   	   In	   this	   debate,	   Levinas	   (among	   others)	  was	   strongly	   critical	   of	   theories	  that	   presented	   a	   universalistic	   standpoint,	   that	   assumed	   and	   excluded	  difference,	  and	  that	  purported	  to	  understand,	  know,	  and	  define	  everything.	  He	  instead	   emphasised	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   unknown,	   and	   the	   plurality	   of	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possibility,	   in	   humanist	   and	   scientific	   inquiry.81	  	   Rather	   than	   philosophy	  informing	   ethics,	   Levinas	   understood	   philosophy	   as	   a	   primarily	   ethical	  endeavour,	  and	   felt	   that	   it	  should	  pursue	   ‘the	  wisdom	  of	   love’	  not	   ‘the	   love	  of	  wisdom’	   (the	   latter	   phrase	   being,	   of	   course,	   a	   literal	   translation	   of	   the	   Greek	  word	   ‘philosophy’).82	  	   In	  Totality	  and	  Infinity:	  An	  Essay	  on	  Exteriority,	  Levinas	  puts	   forward	   that	   how	  we	   conceive	  our	   subjective	   identities	   is	   dependent	   on	  how	  we	  approach	  that	  which	  is	  ‘other’,	  and	  is	  therefore	  guided	  by	  prior	  ethical	  intent.	  Totality	  and	  Infinity	  highlights	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  modern	  philosophy	  has	  prioritised	   ‘rationality’	  when	  establishing	   its	   grounds,	   and	  both	   implicitly	  and	   explicitly	   challenges	   concepts	   such	   as	   Hegel’s	   Geist	   (Spirit)	   and	   Sartre’s	  
Être-­‐pour-­‐soi	   (Being-­‐for-­‐oneself),	   the	   former	   presuming	   that	   the	   superior	  rationality	   of	   the	   state	   will	   align	   with	   the	   spirit	   of	   the	   people,	   the	   latter	  presuming	   the	   individual’s	   freedom	   to	   make	   rational	   personal	   choices.83	  	   It	  asserts	  that	  whether	  authoritarian	  or	  anarchic,	  modern	  philosophy	  has	  sought	  
                                            81	  Jean	  Francois	  Lyotard	  joined	  Levinas	  in	  this	  critique	  of	  modern	  philosophy	  and,	  as	  is	   very	   often	   cited,	   defines	   the	   ‘postmodern	   condition’	   in	   terms	   of	   an	   ‘incredulity	  towards	   metanarrative’.	   	   By	   this,	   he	   seeks	   to	   demonstrate	   how	   grand	   modern	  narratives	   had	   become	   redundant	   as	   they	   were	   not	   able	   to	   accurately	   depict	   plural	  perspectives	   in	   history.	   See	   Jean-­‐François	   Lyotard,	   The	   Postmodern	   Condition	  (Manchester:	  Manchester	  University	  Press,	  1984).	  pp.	  xxiv.	  82	  In	  his	  earlier	  writing,	  including	  Emmanuel	  Levinas,	  Totality	  and	  Infinity:	  An	  Essay	  on	  
Exteriority	   trans.	   Alphonso	   Lingis	   (Pittsburgh:	   Duquesne	   University	   Press,	   1969)	  which	   Irigaray	   specifically	   critiques,	   Levinas	   avoided	   using	   the	   word	   ‘love’.	   	   This	   is	  because	  he	  felt	  it	  to	  be	  a	  vague,	  even	  meaningless	  term,	  and	  one	  that	  was	  often	  taken	  to	  imply	  sinful	  behaviour.	  	  See	  Corey	  Beals,	  Levinas	  and	  the	  Wisdom	  of	  Love:	  The	  Question	  
of	   Invisibility	   (Texas:	   Baylor	   University	   Press,	   2007)	   p.28.	   	   However,	   he	   later	   went	  against	   this	   initial	   judgement,	   and	   wrote:	   ‘philosophy	   is	   the	   wisdom	   of	   love	   at	   the	  service	   of	   love’.	   	   See	   Emmanuel	   Levinas,	   Otherwise	   Than	   Being	   or,	   Beyond	   Essence.	  trans.	  Alphonso	  Lingis.	  Vol.	  3,	  Martinus	  Nijhoff	  Philosophy	  Texts	   (Pittsburg:	  Duquesne	  University	  Press,	  1981)	  p.	  162.	  83	  Levinas,	  Totality	  and	  Infinity:	  An	  Essay	  on	  Exteriority.	  For	  Levinas’	  challenge	   to	   the	  all-­‐encompassing	  rationality	  of	  Hegel’s	  ‘Spirit’	  see	  p.	  208.	  	  For	  his	  challenge	  to	  Sartre’s	  Being-­‐for-­‐oneself	  see	  p.	  303.	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to	   eradicate	   the	   ‘unease’	   of	   not	   understanding	   and	   attempted	   to	   reduce	  ‘otherness’,	   either	   to	   an	   extension	   of	   the	   self,	   or	   to	   an	   alien	   and	   externalised	  category.84	  	  By	  presuming	  to	  be	  able	  to	  see	  the	  ‘totality’	  of	  self	  and	  other	  in	  an	  ‘all-­‐inclusive,	   panoramic	   view’,	   modern	   philosophy	   has	   mirrored,	   even	  supported,	   an	   egocentric	   culture	   at	   the	   root	   of	   a	  hegemonising	  modern	   state,	  whose	   aim	   is	   at	   best	   to	   attain	   assimilation	   amongst	   citizens,	   or	   at	   worst,	   to	  violently	  suppress,	  or	  rid,	  difference.85	  	  Levinas’	  writings	   instead	  advocate	  an	  openness	   to	   that	  which	   is	   other,	   a	   readiness	   to	   accept	   it	   on	   its	   terms	   and	   to	  answer	   its	   questions,	   to	   not	   presume	   its	   reducibility,	   but	   perceive	   it	   in	   its	  limitless	  difference,	  in	  its	  infinity.86	  
For	  Levinas,	  the	  encounter	  with	  this	  indefinable,	  irreducible	  and	  sublime	  otherness,	  which	  he	  terms	  ‘alterity’,	  involves	  a	  ‘calling	  into	  question	  of	  oneself’	  and	   thus	   is	   the	  means	   through	  which	   the	   subject	   defines	   and	   shapes	  himself,	  and	   therefore,	   ‘otherness’	   has	   phenomenological	   primacy	   over	   ‘selfhood’	  (which	  Levinas	   terms	   ‘the	  same’).87	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  through	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	   passage	   above,	   Ai	   defines	   herself	   through	   her	   relationship	   with	   the	  enigmatic	   presence	   of	   F,	   to	   whom	   she	   gives	   phenomenological	   primacy.	  	  Furthermore,	   doing	   so	   results	   in	   Ai	   repeatedly	   calling	   her	   (own)	   self	   into	  question.	  	  Ai	  writes:	  
I	   do	   love	   F.	   	   I	   bet	   I	   couldn’t	   live	   if	   I	   wasn’t	   with	   F.	   I	   use	   the	  vacuous	  term	  ‘love’	  even	  though	  I	  am	  ashamed	  of	  it.	  
                                            84	  Ibid.	  (see	  both	  p.	  208	  and	  p.	  303	  in	  relation	  to	  Hegel	  and	  Sartre	  respectively)	  85	  Ibid.,	  p.	  15.	  86	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  33-­‐48	  87	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  79-­‐81	  and	  pp.	  187-­‐219	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How	  is	  it	  that	  I	  love	  F?	  With	  complete	   love.	   	   Is	  someone	  like	  me	  able	  to	   ‘love’?	   	  Really	  have	  I	  ever	  fallen	  in	  love?	  	  If	  I	  do	  love,	  why	  is	  it?	  	  Why	  do	  I	  love?	  	  Is	  it	  F	  that	  I	  love?88	  	  
In	  this	  passage,	  Ai’s	  wish	  to	  define	  concretely	  the	  self	  in	  relation	  to	  ‘life	  with	  F’	  is	   confronted	  by	  her	   questioning	   of	   her	   self(hood)	   and	  of	   the	  meaning	   of	   the	  word	   ‘love,’	   both	   of	  which	  hinge	   on	  her	   inability	   to	   know,	   limit	   and	  define	   F.	  	  Thus,	  her	  primary	  emphatic	  assertions,	  ‘I	  do	  love	  F’	  and	  ‘I	  bet	  I	  couldn’t	  live	  if	  I	  wasn’t	  with	  F’	  (in	  which	  F	  is	  rendered	  the	  [knowable]	  object	  of	  the	  sentence),	  results	  in	  ‘[i]s	  it	  F	  that	  I	  love?’’.	  
In	   the	   chapter	   ‘Phenomenology	   of	   Eros’,	   Levinas	   describes	   alterity	   as	  ‘feminine’,	   and	  here	   it	   becomes	  not	   just	   an	   abstract	   concept,	   but	  moreover,	   a	  carnal,	   living,	   sensate	   being.	  89	  This	   theory	   was	   crucial	   to	   Irigaray	   in	   her	  project	   to	   rewrite	   the	   feminine.	   In	   ‘The	   Fecundity	   of	   the	   Caress’,	   Irigaray	  formulates	   a	  post-­‐structuralist	   critique	  of	   the	   ‘Phenomenology	  of	  Eros’	  which	  points	   out	   the	   derogatory	   alignments	   that	   the	   text	   makes	   with	   the	   feminine	  beloved.90	  ‘The	   Fecundity	   of	   the	   Caress’	   points	   out	   that,	   whereas	   the	   male	  lover,	  according	  to	  Levinas,	  ‘rises	  up	  to	  the	  greatest	  heights’	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  caress,	  the	  beloved	  woman	  ‘sinks	  into	  the	  abyss’,	  thus	  aligning	  masculinity	  with	  lightness,	   divinity	   and	   the	   ethical	   subject,	   and	   the	   feminine	   with	   darkness,	  
                                            88	  Kanai,	  Ai	  no	  seikatsu,	  p.	  34.	  89	  Levinas,	  Totality	  and	  Infinity:	  An	  Essay	  on	  Exteriority,	  pp.	  256	  -­‐266.	  	  90	  See	   Irigaray,	   'The	   Fecundity	   of	   the	   Caress',	   p.	   194.	   Levinas	   describes	   feminine	  alterity	  as	  ‘an	  irresponsible	  animality	  which	  does	  not	  speak	  true	  words’	  (See	  Levinas,	  
Totality	  and	  Infinity,	  p.	  263.)	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profanity	   and	   the	   erotic/fallen. 91 	  	   This,	   for	   Irigaray,	   perpetuates	   the	  suppression	   of	   the	   feminine,	   denying	   woman’s	   own	   call	   to	   divinity.	  	  Nevertheless,	  Irigaray	  considers	  many	  aspects	  of	  Levinas’	  depiction	  of	  alterity,	  including	  that	  of	  opening	  the	  self	  to	  the	  questions	  of	  the	  other,	  as	  fundamental	  to	   constructing	   a	   new	   ethical	   feminine	   subject.	   	   Indeed,	   a	   comparison	   of	   the	  passage	  from	  Love	  Life	  quoted	  above	  with	  Irigaray’s	  1977	  essay	  ‘When	  Our	  Lips	  Speak	  Together’	  reveals	  many	  similarities	  between	  Ai’s	  relationship	  with	  F,	  and	  Irigaray’s	  ethical	  subject’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  other.	  	  Irigaray	  writes:	  
‘I	  love	  you’	  is	  addressed	  by	  convention	  or	  habit	  to	  an	  enigma	  –	  an	  other.	  	  An	  other	  body,	  an	  other	  sex.	  	  I	  love	  you:	  I	  don’t	  quite	  know	  who,	   or	   what.	   	   ‘I	   love’	   flows	   away,	   is	   buried,	   drowned,	  burned,	   lost	   in	   a	   void.	   	  We’ll	   have	   to	  wait	   for	   the	   return	   of	   ‘I	  love.’	  	  Perhaps	  a	  long	  time,	  perhaps	  forever.	  	  Where	  has	  ‘I	  love’	  gone?	   	   What	   has	   become	   of	   me?	   	   ‘I	   love’	   lies	   in	   wait	   for	   the	  other.	  	  […]	  	  When	  you	  say	  I	  love	  you	  –	  staying	  right	  here,	  close	  to	  you,	  close	  to	  me	  –	  you’re	  saying	  I	  love	  myself.	  	  You	  don’t	  need	  to	  wait	  for	  it	  to	  be	  given	  back;	  neither	  do	  I.	  	  We	  don’t	  owe	  each	  other	  anything.	  	  That	  ‘I	  love	  you’	  is	  neither	  gift	  nor	  debt.92	  	  For	  Irigaray	  here,	  as	  with	  Ai	  in	  her	  narrative,	  love	  is	  an	  open-­‐ended	  state,	  it	  is	  ‘lost	   in	   a	   void’,	   or	   ‘vacuous’,	   and	   directed	   towards	   the	   unknown	   and	  unknowable,	   to	   ‘I	   don’t	   know	   who’,	   to	   the	   enigmatic	   presence,	   to	   F.	   	   Both	  passages	  notably	  begin	  with	   ‘I	   love’	  and	  end	  in	  rhetorical	  questions:	  Why	  do	  I	  love?	  	  Is	  it	  F	  that	  I	  love?	  Where	  has	  ‘I	  love’	  gone?	  	  What	  has	  become	  of	  me?	  	  That	  Ai’s	  narrative	  and	   Irigaray’s	  essay	  seem	  to	  agree	  on	   the	  concept	  of	   love	  as	  an	  intersubjective	  act	  divorced	  from	  selfish	  gain	  is	  again	  crucial	  for	  asserting	  that	  
                                            91	  Irigaray,	  ‘The	  Fecundity	  of	  the	  Caress’,	  p.	  194.	  92	  Irigaray,	  When	  Our	  Lips	  Speak	  Together,	  p.	  206.	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F	  is	  not	  a	  detractive	  ‘absence’	  or	  ‘lack’,	  but	  a	  positive	  and	  enigmatic	  presence	  in	  her	   narrative.	   	  Moreover,	   it	   is	   during	   the	   passages	   in	  which	   Ai	   describes	   her	  relationship	   with	   F	   that	   the	   specific	   connotation	   of	   her	   name	   as	   an	   active,	  viewing	   subject,	  who	  does	  not	  position	  herself	   in	  antagonism	  with	   the	  world,	  but	  in	  ethical	  relation	  to	  it	  through	  love,	  comes	  fully	  into	  focus.	  
However,	   there	   are	   crucial	   differences	   between	   F	   and	   ‘alterity’,	  particularly	  in	  its	  Irigarayan	  reincarnation.	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  alterity	  is	  defined	  (by	  both	  Levinas	   and	   Irigaray)	   as	   an	   ‘exteriority’,	   or	  profound	  otherness.	   	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  this	  otherness	  is	  necessarily	  conceptual,	  in	  that	  it	  manifests	  itself	  in	   the	  mind	  of	   the	  subject,	  who	  must	  be	  predisposed	  to	  conceive	   it	  positively,	  and	   welcome	   its	   difference.	   	   	   It	   is	   also	   (again,	   as	   both	   Levinas	   and	   Irigaray	  insist)	  corporeal;	  it	  is	  a	  carnal	  and	  sexed	  being,	  although	  sexually	  different	  from	  the	   subject,	   endowed	  with	   the	   use	   of	   all	   five	   senses.	   	   As	   we	   saw	   in	   the	   first	  quotation	   on	   F	   and	   Ai’s	   relationship,	   F	   is	   described	   as	   a	   ‘concrete	   and,	  moreover,	   abstract	   presence’.	   	   The	   word	   ‘concrete’	   (gutaiteki)	   here	   used	   to	  describe	   F	   suggests	   that	   his	   presence	   is	   in	   some	   way	  material	   or	   embodied.	  	  And	   yet,	   it	   is	   striking	   that	   F	   is	   never	   described	   as	   a	   ‘physical/physiological’	  (nikutaiteki)	  presence.	   	   Furthermore,	  he	  only	  appears	   through	  Ai’s	  memories,	  through	  her	  knowledge	  of	  him	  and	   through	  her	  hypotheses	  about	  what	  could	  have	   happened	   to	   him.	   	   He	   does	   not	   appear	   in	   the	   present	   moment	   of	   the	  narrative	  to	  be	  physically	  reunited	  with	  Ai.	  	  Certainly,	  Ai’s	  relationship	  with	  F	  is	  not	  distinguished	  by	  the	  kind	  of	  erotic	  union	  that	  Irigaray	  states	  is	  essential	  to	  creating	   carnal	  memory	   of	   the	   other,	   and	   necessary	   to	   generate	   compassion.	  	  	  Therefore,	  it	  seems	  important	  to	  question	  precisely	  to	  what	  extent	  and	  in	  what	  capacity	  he	  is	  ‘material’.	  	  As	  the	  adjective	  gutaiteki	  (concrete)	  can	  be	  applied	  to	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abstract	  ideas	  and	  language,	  I	  propose	  that	  F’s	  concreteness,	  or	  ‘materiality’,	  is	  not	  physiological,	  but	  again	  pertains	  to	  his	  status	  as	  a	  ‘fiction’.	  In	  his	  capacity	  as	  a	  ‘fiction’	  however,	  F	  nevertheless	  has	  a	  profound	  effect	  on	  Ai’s	  body.	  
In	  two	  specific	  cases,	  F’s	  presence	  acts	  as	  an	  antidote	  to	  Ai’s	  immersion	  in	  the	  abject.	  	  In	  the	  first	  recollected	  episode	  in	  which	  this	  happens,	  Ai	  describes	  waking	  up	  at	  night	  alone	  and	  writing,	  but	  suddenly	  becoming	  racked	  with	  pain,	  waking	  up	  F	  and	  trying	  to	  tell	  him	  how	  painful	  it	  is.	  	  	  She	  says:	  
I	  am	  seized	  by	  an	  impulse	  that	  I	  cannot	  explain	  and	  fragmented	  words	   run	   off	  my	   tongue.	   	   At	   those	   times	  without	   fail,	   F	   says	  
there	   is	   no	   way	   that	   I	   can	   understand	   that	   and	   forces	   me	   to	  drink	  brandy.	  93	  	  At	  first,	  Ai’s	  attempts	  to	  write	  culminate	  in	  her	  descent	  into	  the	  abject,	  signalled	  here	  by	  the	  way	  in	  which	  she	  becomes	  consumed	  by	  a	  physical	  impulse,	  and	  all	  meaning	  and	  signification,	   including	   the	  very	  name	  of	   the	   impulse	   that	   seizes	  her,	   is	   lost.	   	   F	   is	   a	   presence	   here	   (whether	   he	   is	   just	   a	  manifestation	   of	   Ai’s	  consciousness	   is	   unclear)	   capable	   of	   physically	   affecting	   Ai	   by	   numbing	   her	  pain	  through	  administering	  brandy.	  	  He	  also	  provides	  a	  non-­‐egocentric	  motive	  for	   her	   to	   exit	   the	   abject	   and	   enter	   the	   symbolic,	   namely,	   to	   communicate	  meaningfully	  with	  him.	  
The	  second	  episode	  in	  which	  F’s	  presence	  has	  a	  physical	  effect	  on	  Ai	   is	  one	   we	   have	   considered	   before,	   in	   which	   Ai	   is	   surrounded	   by	   pickled	   body	  parts,	   and	   F	   appears,	   ordering	   her	   to	   take	   his	   hand.	   	   To	   recap:	   Ai	   closes	   her	  eyes,	  takes	  F’s	  hand	  and	  starts	  walking	  down	  the	  stairs.	  	  However,	  as	  she	  cannot	  
                                            93	  Kanai,	  Ai	  no	  seikatsu,	  p.	  34.	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gauge	  the	  height	  of	  each	  step,	  her	  feet	  hover	  in	  the	  air.	  	  She	  is	  then	  able	  to	  look	  at	   pickled	   lumps	   more	   closely	   and	   recognise	   them	   for	   what	   they	   are:	   the	  disembodied	  womb	  and	  its	  contents.	   	   	  Ai	   is	  again	  at	  this	  point,	  surrounded	  by	  the	  abject,	  by	  the	  horrific.	  	  Here	  F’s	  hand	  provides	  ‘physical’	  assistance	  to	  Ai,	  at	  first	  by	  enabling	  her	  to	  travel	  down	  the	  stairs	  with	  her	  eyes	  closed	  so	  that	  she	  can	  block	  out	  that	  which	  terrifies	  her.	  	  However,	  as	  her	  feet	  ‘hover’	  the	  process	  also	  seemingly	  lifts	  her	  out	  of	  her	  body,	  so	  that	  she	  is	  less	  attuned	  to	  the	  world	  of	  the	  abject,	  which	  is	  experienced	  through	  her	  sense	  of	  her	  own	  corporeality.	  	  This	   sensation	   of	   mild	   disembodiment	   enables	   her	   to	   confront	   the	   pickled	  objects.	   	   Here,	   F’s	   presence	   aids	   Ai	   by	   detaching	   her	   from	   her	   ‘corporeality’	  enough	   to	   enable	   her	   to	   perceive	   that	   world	   as	   abstract,	   and	   this	   in	   turn	  empowers	  her	  to	  identify	  and	  describe	  it.	  
In	   both	   instances	   given	   above,	   F	   demonstrates	   himself	   to	   be	   an	  enigmatic	  presence,	  which	  intervenes	  between	  Ai	  and	  the	  abject,	  and	  promotes	  non-­‐egocentric	  communication.	  He	  thus	  differs	  in	  these	  respects	  from	  both	  an	  Irigarayan	  concept	  of	  feminine	  alterity	  that	  achieves	  compassion	  for	  the	  other	  through	   intimate	  carnal	   interaction	  and	   instead,	  he	  could	  be	  considered	  as	  an	  examplar	   of	   a	   masculine	   alterity	   that	   achieves	   compassion	   for	   the	   other	  through	  an	  abstract	  fictional	  materiality.	  
Conclusion	  
Love	  Life,	  then	  offers	  the	  reader	  two	  modes	  of	  being	  that	  it	  does	  not	  presume	  to	  resolve	   and	   that,	   as	   we	   have	   already	   argued,	   figure	   as	   two	   contrasting	  interpretive	   matrices.	   	   Within	   Love	   Life’s	   stream-­‐of-­‐consciousness	   narrative,	  both	  of	   these	   constellatory	   schemata	   can	  be	   read	  as	  being	   integral	   aspects	  of	  Ai’s	  troubled	  subjective	  experience,	  and	  therefore	  a	  necessary	  part	  of	  her	  ‘self’.	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(Such	  a	  reading,	  of	  course,	  has	  as	  its	  basis	  a	  straightforward,	  representationalist	  account	  of	  Kanai’s	   text.	   In	  other	  words,	  Ai’s	  narrative	  account,	   in	  this	  reading,	  stands	   as	   an	   unproblematic	   representation	   of	   Ai’s	   self/personality/mental	  state/identity,	  or	  however	  one	  wants	  to	  term	  it.)	  However,	  these	  matrices	  can	  also	   be	   read	   as	   being	   separate	   from	   Ai’s	   ‘self’	   (and	   her	   sense	   of	   that	   ‘self’)	  inasmuch	   as	   they	   figure	   as	   an	   ineradicable	   ‘other’	   which,	   individually	   and	  together,	   problematise	   the	   notion	   of	   an	   unmediated,	   representationally	  coherent	   first-­‐person	   narrator.	   After	   all,	   as	   soon	   as	   one	   conceptualises	   and	  reifies	   one	   aspect	   of	   one’s	   self/personality/mental	   state/identity,	   that	   aspect	  becomes	  necessarily	  external	  to	  one’s	  (sense	  of)	  self.	  With	  specific	  regard	  to	  Ai’s	  narrative	   account	   in	   Love	  Life,	   the	   first	   of	   our	  matrices,	   (the	   abject)	  Ai-­‐body-­‐
presence,	   constitutes	   all	   that	   she	   necessarily	   has	   to	   repress	   from	   her	   own	  conception	  of	  herself	  in	  order	  to	  function	  as	  a	  social	  being;	   in	  other	  words,	  Ai’s	  narrative	   seeks	   to	   inscribe	   a	  material	   reality	   that	   is	   nonetheless	   obscured	   by	  her	   imaginary	  and	  symbolic	  orders.	   	  The	  second,	  F-­‐narrative-­‐absence	   (termed	  by	  Ai	   as	   ‘an	  abstract,	  but	  material	  presence’)	   constitutes	  a	   fiction,	  or	   rather	  a	  conceptual	  other	  for	  whom	  she	  perpetually	  yearns	  and	  whose	  very	  absence	  has	  actually	  generated	  Ai’s	  narrative	  account	  in	  the	  first	  place.94	  	  Therefore,	  we	  can	  see	   how,	   in	   Kanai’s	   debut	   novella,	   the	   psychic	   experience	   of	  
being/loving/observing	   is	   formulated	   through	   a	   whole	   raft	   of	   narrative	  preoccupations	  (body,	  mind,	  presence,	  absence,	  text,	  self,	  other).	  	  Although	  the	  two	  matrices	  described	  above	  foreground	  specific	  preoccupations	  among	  these,	  and	   compete	  with	   each	   other	   for	   narrative	   space	   throughout	   the	   novella	   (so	  that	  Ai’s	   experience	   appears	   as	   one	  which	   is	   divided	  by	   concerns	   of	   her	   own	  
                                            94	  Kanai,	  Ai	  no	  seikatsu,	  p.	  33.	  
 161 
corporeality	  and	  her	  husband’s	  absence)	  this	  is	  not	  to	  assert	  that	  either	  matrix	  is	   ever	   defined	   wholly	   in	   opposition	   to	   the	   other,	   nor	   that	   any	   narrative	  preoccupation	   within	   these	   matrices	   is	   inscribed	   as	   a	   discrete	   conceptual	  entity.	   Rather,	   each	   of	   these	   matrices	   and	   their	   concomitant	   preoccupations	  floats	  in	  perpetual,	  liminal	  relation	  to	  the	  other,	  able	  to	  become	  neither	  wholly	  dependent	  on	   the	  other	   for	   its	   conceptual	  definition	   (that	  difference-­‐with-­‐no-­‐positive-­‐terms	   that	   is	   so	   fundamental	   to	   Saussurean	   linguistics),	   nor	   fully	  distinct	  from	  them.	  
These	  two	  versions	  of	  human	  ontology	  collide	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  novella	  when	  death,	  which	  has	  hitherto	  manifested	  itself	  in	  both	  Ai’s	  abject	  visions,	  and	  her	   hypotheses	   of	  what	  might	   have	   happened	   to	   F,	   becomes	   a	   vivid	   and	   real	  event.	  	  Ai	  is	  furious	  after	  hanging	  up	  the	  phone	  on	  F’s	  friend’s	  wife	  who	  informs	  her	  that	  he	  is	  with	  them,	  and	  starts	  to	  wonder	  where	  on	  earth	  he	  had	  been	  all	  day.	   	   She	   is	   almost	   angry	   that	   all	   her	   ‘hypotheses’	   about	   his	   meeting	   with	   a	  terrible	  accident	  and	  dying	  had	  faded	  in	  this	  moment.95	  	  She	  says:	  
All	   my	   hypotheses	   had	   simply	   faded	   under	   light.	   	   In	   the	   first	  instance,	  such	  hypotheses	  had	  only	  been	  created	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  fading	  away.	  96	  	  But	   then	   she	   overhears	   a	   couple	   rowing	   behind	   her.	   	   The	   young	   woman	   is	  furious	   with	   the	   man	   for	   saying	   that	   he	   wished	   to	   die	   before	   turning	   thirty	  because	  he	  didn’t	  want	   to	   turn	   into	  a	   ‘lame	  adult’	   (mittomonai	  otona).97	  	   She	  tells	   him	   that	   with	   such	   an	   attitude	   he	   is	   already	   lame,	   so	   he	   might	   as	   well	  
                                            95	  Kanai,	  Ai	  no	  seikatsu,	  p.	  49.	  96	  Ibid.,	  p.	  49.	  97	  Ibid.,	  p.	  49.	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commit	  suicide.	  	  They	  start	  crossing	  a	  crossroad.	  	  A	  car	  comes	  round	  the	  corner	  without	  reducing	  its	  speed	  and	  hits	  them.	  	  There	  is	  a	  loud	  noise.	  	  Ai	  instinctively	  runs	  to	  the	  girl	  thinking	  that	  the	  man	  at	  least	  might	  have	  received	  his	  wish.	  	  A	  crowd	   of	   people	   gathers	   around	   them.	   	   The	   man’s	   hands	   and	   legs	   are	  convulsing.	   	   	  The	  woman	   lies	   still	   on	  her	   front,	   a	  pool	  of	  blood	  spreading	  out	  from	  underneath	  her.	  	  Ai	  notices	  that	  the	  woman	  had	  been	  carrying	  a	  book;	  she	  sees	   that	   the	   covers	   of	   the	   book	   have	   come	   apart,	   and	   that	   the	   book	   is	   lying	  open	  next	  to	  a	  bucket	  of	  rubbish.	  	  She	  remembers	  that	  she	  had	  speculated	  that	  day	  that	  F	  might	  die	  as	  the	  ambulance	  arrives.	  	  Ai	  picks	  up	  the	  book	  and	  gives	  it	  to	  the	  policeman	  at	  the	  scene,	  telling	  him	  it	  belonged	  to	  the	  woman.	  	  She	  lights	  a	  cigarette	   and	   says:	   	   ‘That	   young	  woman	   died.	   	   She	   died	  with	   complete	   ease.	  Complete	  ease.’98	  With	  tears	  streaming	  down	  her	  face,	  Ai	  runs	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction	  of	  the	  scene	  of	  the	  accident.	  
On	   the	  one	  hand,	   this	   conclusion	   could	  be	   interpreted	  as	  affirming	   the	  textual	   	   primacy	   of	   the	   ‘abject’	   (that	   underpins	   our	   first	   matrix,	   Ai-­‐body-­‐
presence)	   in	   describing	   the	   nature	   of	   human	   existence.	   	   The	   event	   occurs	  immediately	  after	  Ai	  realises	  that	  all	  her	  theories	  about	  F	  (that	  arose	  from	  her	  imaginary	  order	  and	  were	  translated	  into	  the	  symbolic)	  have	  been	  proven	  to	  be	  illusory	   or	   false.	   	   As	   she	   puts	   it,	   they	   had	   ‘faded	   under	   light’	   (iroaseta),	   and	  therefore	  cease	  to	  grip	  her,	  or	  have	  any	  power	  over	  her	  conception	  of	  reality.99	  	  Moreover,	  she	  realises	  that	  such	  hypothetical	  discourse	  in	  itself,	   is	   formulated	  
                                            98	  Ibid.,	  p.	  51.	  99	  Ibid.,	  p.	  49.	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for	  the	  very	  purpose	  of	  ‘fading	  under	  light’,	  for	  not	  pertaining	  to	  reality.100	  	  In	  contrast,	   the	   car	   accident	   demonstrates	   to	   Ai	   the	   same	   message	   which	   the	  abject	   seeks	   to	   impress	  upon	  us,	   namely	   that	   the	   fragile	   body	   is	   not	   only	   the	  root	  of	  our	  existence,	  but	   its	   limits.	   	  This	   truth	   is	  conveyed	   to	  her	  here	   in	   the	  present	   moment,	   in	   bright	   and	   vivid	   detail,	   right	   down	   to	   the	   young	   man’s	  convulsions	  and	  the	  young	  woman’s	  pool	  of	  blood.	  The	  incident	  highlights	  that	  death	  is	  mundane,	  complete	  and	  indiscriminate:	  levelling	  us	  all,	  reducing	  us	  to	  the	  same.	  
However,	   this	   conclusion	   could	  equally	  be	   interpreted	  as	  affirming	   the	  primacy,	   in	   accounting	   for	   human	   experience,	   of	   our	   second	   matrix:	   F-­‐
narrative-­‐absence.	   	   Ai	   exclaims:	   ‘That	   young	   woman	   died.	   	   She	   died	   with	  complete	  ease;	  complete	  ease.’	  (Ano	  shōjo	  wa	  shinda.	  	  Shōjo	  wa	  mattaku	  muzōsa	  
ni	   shindeitta,	   mattaku.)	   The	   brevity	   of	   the	   first	   statement	   underscores	   Ai’s	  shock	   at	   the	   completeness	   of	   death,	   at	   its	   permanent	   termination	   of	   the	  woman’s	   life.	   	   Her	   repetition	   of	   the	   word	   ‘complete’	   indicates	   that	   both	   the	  ‘ease’	  with	  which	  death	  completes,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  complete,	  are	  traumatic	  to	  Ai.	  	  The	  woman’s	   life	   is	   unable	   to	   repeat,	   yet	   Ai	   repeats	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   has	   been	  completed.	   	   It	   is	   here	   that	   the	   symbolic	   achieves	   its	   ultimate	   purpose	   in	  surpassing	   death	   by	   continuing,	   even	   after	   the	   body	   has	   failed,	   to	   attempt	   to	  understand,	  describe	  and	  explain	  human	  existence.	   	  This	  is	  also	  demonstrated	  by	  Ai’s	  act	  of	  saving	  the	  woman’s	  book	  from	  being	  discarded	  as	  rubbish.	   	  The	  notion	  that	  text	  not	  only	  surpasses	  the	  body,	  but	  that	  it	  gives	  scope	  for	  plurality	  of	  identity	  and	  difference	  of	  meaning	  through	  an	  endless	  chain	  of	  ‘substitution’	  
                                            100	  Ibid., p. 49. 
 164 
is	   present	   here	   too.	   	  What	   goes	   unmentioned	   is	   that	   Ai	   is	   clutching	   her	   own	  (unfinished)	  chronicle	  of	  her	  life,	  which	  is	  to	  become	  the	  novella	  that	  the	  reader	  is	  reading.	   	   	  As	  we,	  as	  readers,	  do	  not	  know	  what	  book	  the	  young	  woman	  was	  holding,	  Love	  Life	  becomes	  its	  substitute,	  the	  young	  woman’s	  epitaph.	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Chapter	  Three	  
The	  Corporeal	  Text	  
Literature	   begins	   at	   the	   moment	   when	   literature	   becomes	   a	  question.	  	  Maurice	  Blanchot,	   ‘Literature	  and	  the	  Right	  to	  Death’,	  The	  Work	  
of	  Fire.	  	  
Introduction	  
The	  previous	  chapter	  argued	  how	  Love	  Life’s	  representation	  of	  its	  protagonist,	  Ai,	  can	  be	  situated	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  cultural	  output	  of	  1960s	  Japanese	  avant-­‐gardism,	  and	  seen	  as	  an	  exemplar	  of	  the	  various	  crises	  of	  representation	  that	   such	   avant-­‐gardism	   critiqued	   or	   enacted.	   Specifically,	   Love	   Life	   critiques	  (and	  enacts)	  how	  that	  crisis	  of	  representation	  affected	  the	  female	  body;	  and	  the	  prism	   through	  which	   such	   critique	   is	   refracted	   is	   an	   interrogation	   of	  what	   it	  means	   to	   love	   and	   to	   be	   in	   love.	   	   This	   chapter	   considers	   how	   Kanai’s	  subsequent	   writings	   further	   explore	   the	   relationship	   between	   these	   various	  phenomena,	   specifically	   by	   examining	   how	   Kanai	   repeatedly	   sets	   in	   play	  another	   constellatory	  matrix	   of	  meaning:	   text-­‐body-­‐mind.	   Again	   and	   again,	   as	  we	  will	  see,	  Kanai	  elides	  the	  three	  through	  her	  repeated	  descriptions	  of	  text	  as	  though	   it	   is	   a	   physical	   body	   possessed	   of	   a	   consciousness.	   This	   new	   matrix	  features	  significantly	  as	  a	  trope	  in	  Kanai’s	  writings,	  a	  trope	  which	  Kanai	  refers	  to	   as	   ‘the	   corporeal	   text’.	   	   Focusing	   on	   two	   of	   Kanai’s	   essays,	   'Nikutairon	   e	  josetsu	   dai’ippo'	   (‘Towards	   a	   Theory	   of	   Corporeality’,	   1969),	  'Kotoba/genjitsu/nikutai'	  (‘Text/Reality/The	  Body’,	  1984),	  and	  a	  piece	  of	  short	  fiction,	   'Kūki	   otoko	   no	   hanashi'	   (‘The	   Story	   of	   the	   Inflated	   Man’,	   1974),	   the	  chapter	   aims	   to	   show	   how	   the	   dissolution	   of	   the	   conceptual	   discreteness	   of	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each	   constituent	   member	   of	   our	   new	  matrix	   operates	   in	   these	   writings	   as	   a	  fundamental	  challenge	  both	  to	  conventional	  notions	  of	  the	  acts	  of	  reading	  and	  writing	  and,	  specifically,	  to	  the	  conventional	  situation	  of	  the	  reader	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  given	  text.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  chapter	  contends	  that	  Kanai’s	  deployment	  of	  the	  corporeal	  text	  is	  a	  deliberate	  act	  that	  is	  designed	  to	  transform	  the	  reader’s	  experiential	  relationship	  with	  the	  text	  from	  that	  of	  a	  passive	  recipient	  to	  one	  of	  an	  active,	  engaged	  creator	  of	  meaning.1	  
	  
Towards	  a	  Theory	  of	  Corporeality	  
Kanai’s	  1969	  essay	  ‘Towards	  a	  Theory	  of	  Corporeality’	  uses	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  avant-­‐garde	  dance	  movement,	  butō	  –	  and	  the	  relationship	  therein	  between	  the	  artist	   and	   the	   audience	   (as	   well	   as	   of	   literary	   and	   theoretical	   texts	   on	   the	  subject’s	  relation	  to	  the	  body)	   in	  order	  to	  advance	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  body	  is	  inseparable	   from	   consciousness,	   and	   that	   it	   holds	   the	   ability	   to	   think,	   dream,	  imagine,	  and	  create	  narrative.	  	  Kanai	  commences	  this	  discussion	  by	  writing:	  
‘To	  physically	  know’	   (mi	  o	  motte	  shiru)	   is,	   in	   fact,	   the	  only	  way	  of	  knowing:	   we	   each	   possess	   our	   own	   ‘bodies’,	   within	   which	   our	  existence	  is	  rolled	  up;	  which	  is	  to	  say	  that,	  beyond	  being	  sure	  of	  the	  body	   itself,	  and	  all	   the	   functions	  which	   the	  body	  contains,	  we	  can	  be	   sure	   that	   this	   body	   calls	   forth	   both	   dreams	   and	   illusions.	   	   In	  other	  words,	  ‘to	  physically	  know’	  means	  that	  in	  order	  to	  know,	  the	  process	  passes	  through	  the	  body	  […].	  2	  
                                            1	  The	  full	  references	  for	  these	  writings	  are:	  'Nikutairon	  e	  josetsu	  dai’ippo'	  [‘Towards	  a	  Theory	  of	  Corporeality’]	  Gendai	  shi	  techō,	  12	  (1969),	  20-­‐26;	   'Kotoba/genjitsu/nikutai'	  [‘Text/Reality/The	  Body’]	   in	  Obasan	  no	  disukūru	   	   (Tokyo:	   Chikuma	   shobō,	   1984)	   pp.	  62-­‐68;	  and	  'Kūki	  otoko	  no	  hanashi'	  in	  Kanai	  Mieko:	  Zentanpenshū,	  Vol.	  2	  (Tokyo:	  Nihon	  bungeisha,	   1992)	   pp.	   144-­‐52.	   	   The	   story	   originally	   appeared	   as	   part	   of	   a	   special,	  themed	  edition	  of	  the	  literary	  magazine	  Shingeki,	  entitled	  Sākasu	  tokushū',	  21	  (1974),	  138-­‐44.	  2	  Kanai,	  'Nikutairon	  e	  josetsu	  dai’ippo',	  p.	  20.	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  For	   Kanai,	   then,	   body	   and	   consciousness	   are	   not	   discrete	   categories;	   rather,	  they	  are	  indivisible.	  The	  body,	  therefore,	  becomes	  the	  basis	  for	  understanding	  
all	  human	  experience;	  or	   rather,	   the	  human	  body’s	   experience	  of	   the	  world	   is	  indistinguishable	   from	   the	   human	  mind’s	   experience	   of	   that	  world.	   Although,	  Kanai	   writes,	   the	   Japanese	   phrase	   ‘mi	   o	   motte	   shiru’	   (‘to	   know	   through	   the	  body’)	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  there	  might	  be	  another	  way	  of	  knowing	  (that	  is	  to	  say,	   for	   example,	   to	   know	   through	   the	  mind),	   nonetheless,	   as	   the	  body	   is	   the	  host	  and	  origin	  of	  all	  human	  functions,	  such	  as	  being	  able	  to	  see,	  hear,	  listen	  or	  touch,	   it	   is	   actually	   impossible	   to	   know	   anything	   without	   the	   body.	  	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  the	  body	  that,	  through	  all	  of	  its	  experiences,	  both	  painful	  and	  pleasurable,	  ‘calls	  forth	  dreams	  and	  illusions’.	  	  	  Indeed,	  her	  essay	  goes	  so	  far	  as	  to	  argue	  that,	  if	  there	  is	  no	  discernible	  distinction	  between	  the	  mind	  and	  body,	  and	   if	   ‘we	   are	   our	   bodies’,	   then	   we	   must	   also	   conclude	   that	   language	   and	  sexuality	  are	  also	  of	  the	  body.	  	  She	  writes:	  
When	  it	  is	  said	  that	  the	  self	  discovers	  everything	  in	  the	  body,	  it	  goes	   without	   saying	   that	   ‘everything’	   includes	   language	   and	  sexuality.	   When	   I	   use	   words	   and	   when	   I	   behave,	   my	   body	   is	  always	   already	   there;	   thus	   I	   cannot	   conceive	   of	   splitting	   the	  consciousness	  from	  the	  body.3	  	  By	   claiming	   that	   one’s	   primary	   experience	   of	   language	   lies	   in	   one’s	   use	   of	  words,	   and	   that	   sexuality	   is	   rooted	   in	   our	  behaviour,	   and	   that	   both	   therefore	  are	   dependent	   on	   physical	   acts,	   Kanai’s	   essay	   overturns	   any	   assumption	   that	  either	   precedes	   the	   body.	   Instead,	   for	   Kanai,	   precedence	   lies	   the	   other	   way	  around:	   it	   is	   the	   body	   that	   operates	   as	   a	   de	   facto	   ‘origin’;	   the	   body	   can	   be	  
                                            3	  Ibid.,	  p.	  22.	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reconfigured	  as	  the	  origin	  for	  the	  self,	  inasmuch	  as	  it	  necessarily	  precedes	  those	  linguistic	  and	  socio-­‐biological	   systems	  whose	  manifestation	   the	  body	  permits,	  and	  which	  only	  then,	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  such	  physical	  manifestation,	  facilitate	  what	  we	  might	  now	  term	  the	  ‘body-­‐self’	  to	  interact	  with,	  interpret	  and	  imbibe	  the	  world	  beyond.	  
This	  notion,	  that	  the	  body-­‐self	  somehow	  constitutes	  an	  ‘origin’,	  is	  not,	  of	  course,	  a	  self-­‐evident	  proposition,	  as	  we	  saw	   in	  Chapter	  One	  when	  discussing	  women	   writers’	   engagement	   with	   the	   carnal	   literature	   movement	   and	   Ango	  Sakaguchi’s	   inscription	   of	   daraku.	   Apart	   from	   anything	   else,	   the	   very	   term	  ‘origin’	  carries	  within	  it	  a	  whole	  set	  of	  linear,	  teleological	  assumptions	  that,	  as	  we	   have	   already	   seen,	   Kanai’s	   writings	   explicitly	   write	   against	   and	   seek	   to	  subvert.	  These	  difficulties	  are	  discussed	  below,	  when	  we	  move	  on	  to	  examine	  how	   Kanai	   flags	   up,	   as	   a	   prime	   exemplar	   of	   her	   concept	   of	   the	   body-­‐self,	  Hijikata	  Tatsumi’s	  performances	  of	  butō.	  	  For	  the	  moment,	  however,	  we	  need	  to	  ask	  a	  different,	  more	  straightforward	  question,	  which	  is	  this:	  to	  what	  end	  does	  Kanai	   make	   this	   claim	   to	   the	   primacy	   of	   the	   body-­‐self?	   What	   might	   a	  recognition	   of	   this	   conception	   actually	   accomplish?	   However	   straightforward	  the	   question,	   it	   should	   be	   noted,	   the	   answer	   is	   nowhere	   near	   as	  straightforward,	   not	   least	   because	   Kanai’s	   elusive	   and	   elliptical	   writing	   style	  seems	  consciously	  to	  resist	  the	  straightjacket	  of	  linear	  argument.	  Moreover,	  as	  the	  actual	  title	  of	  the	  essay	  makes	  clear,	  her	  observations	  are	  not	  presented	  as	  a	  set	  of	  fully-­‐formed,	  coherent	  epistemological	  certitudes;	  rather,	  they	  should	  be	  read	   merely	   as	   intellectual	   interventions;	   they	   are,	   after	   all,	   remarks	   aimed	  ‘towards	   a	   theory	  of	   corporeality’.	  However,	   one	   aspect	   of	   her	   argument	   that	  we	   may	   infer	   is	   that,	   for	   Kanai,	   one	   of	   the	   readiest	   ways	   to	   appreciate	   her	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conception	   of	   the	   body-­‐self	   is	   through	   a	   consideration	   of	   such	  art/text/performance	   that	   deals	   with	   physical	   extremes:	   pain;	   love;	   death;	  birth	  (both	  the	  act	  of	  giving	  birth	  and	  the	  act	  of	  being	  born).	  	  It	  then	  follows	  that	  the	   consequence	   of	   such	   an	   appreciation	   (for	   both	   creator	   of	   a	   work	   and	  recipient	   –	   be	   it	   viewer,	   audience	   member	   or	   reader	   –	   of	   that	   work)	   is	   the	  newly-­‐awakened	  transformative	  potential	  for	  a	  recognition	  –	  or	  re-­‐recognition	  –	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  self.	  ‘I	  am	  now’,	  Kanai	  writes,	  ‘in	  the	  middle	  of	  this	  reality,	  holding	  a	  pencil	  and	  writing.	  	  This	  pain	  originates	  from	  my	  moving	  right	  hand,	  and	   it	   is	   strange	   that	   the	   movement	   of	   my	   right	   hand	   is	   at	   all	   times	   faced	  towards	  the	  originary	  meaning	  of	  human	  existence.’4	  	  This	  gnomic	  conclusion	  to	  the	  essay	  points	   the	  way	  to	  how	  the	  body-­‐self	  (in	  this	   instance,	   the	  writing	  body-­‐self)	   can	   use	   the	   physical	   sensation	   of	   pain	   that	   is	   the	   act	   of	   (in	   this	  instance)	  writing	  to	  achieve	  a	  heightened	  understanding	  of	  the	  actuality	  of	  the	  body-­‐self	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  the	  world	  around	  it.	  
Kanai	   initiates	   this	   set	   of	   observations	   on	   how	   the	   sensation	   of	   pain	  serves	   to	   enable	   rediscovery	   of	   the	   body-­‐self,	   which	   is	   in	   turn	   experientially	  transformative	   for	   one’s	   understanding	   of	   what	   it	   is	   to	   be	   a	   ‘self’,	   through	   a	  discussion	  of	  the	  presentation	  of	  what	   it	  means	  to	  be	  a	   loving	  subject	   in	  Hans	  Christian	   Andersen’s	   ‘The	   Little	   Mermaid’.5	  	   For	   Kanai,	   the	   story	   melds	   the	  
                                            4	  Ibid.,	  p.24.	  5	  Hans	   Christian	   Andersen,	   'The	   Little	   Mermaid',	   in	   Hans	   Andersen's	   Fairy	   Tales:	   A	  
Selection,	   trans.	  L.W.	  Kingsland,	   intro.	  Naomi	  Lewis	   (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1984)	  pp.	  76-­‐106.	  A	  brief	  synopsis	  of	  the	  story	  amply	  demonstrates	  the	  link	  between	  the	   physical	   sensation	   and	   pain,	   and	   the	   twin	   acts	   of	   loving	   and	   being.	   The	   Little	  Mermaid	   falls	   in	   love	  with	   a	   handsome	   prince	  whom	   she	   observes	   from	   a	   distance,	  aboard	  his	  ship.	  	  Later,	  a	  storm	  hits	  and	  she	  saves	  him	  from	  drowning,	  taking	  him	  to	  a	  sandy	   beach	   in	   front	   of	   a	   temple.	   	   He	   is	   found	   by	   a	   young	  woman	  who	   lives	   at	   the	  temple;	  on	  waking,	  he	  does	  not	  notice	  the	  mermaid,	  let	  alone	  know	  that	  she	  has	  saved	  him.	  	  The	  mermaid	  returns	  to	  the	  kingdom	  under	  the	  sea,	  but	  she	  longs	  for	  the	  prince.	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notions	  pain,	   love	   and	   the	  body,	   thereby	  demonstrating	  how	  Andersen’s	   short	  story	   renders	   the	   conventional	   dichotomy	   between	   the	   mind	   and	   the	   body	  untenable.	  Moreover,	  the	  Little	  Mermaid’s	  experience	  of	  the	  sensation	  of	  loving	  operates	   at	   what	   we	  might	   term	   the	   limits	   of	   her	   being:	   it	   informs	   the	   first,	  child-­‐like	  discovery	  of	  her	  own	  body;	  it	  is	  also	  the	  cause	  of,	  and	  reason	  for,	  not	  only	  her	  death,	  but,	  crucially,	  of	  her	  physical	  understanding	  of	  that	  death.	  Writes	  Andersen:	  she	  ‘threw	  herself	  from	  the	  ship	  down	  into	  the	  sea,	  and	  felt	  her	  body	  dissolving	   into	   foam.’6	  The	   moment	   of	   her	   death	   is	   not,	   for	   the	   mermaid,	  marked	   by	   a	   ceasing	  of	   consciousness	   of	   being;	   rather,	   it	  manifests	   itself	   as	   a	  
physical	  experience	  of	  dissolution.	  
                                                                                                                           She	  is	  told	  that,	  whereas	  mermaids	  can	  live	  for	  three	  hundred	  years	  but	  dissolve	  into	  sea	  foam	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  time,	  humans	  have	  a	  shorter	  life	  span,	  but	  an	  immortal	  soul.	  	  The	  Little	  Mermaid,	  desperate	  to	  meet	  her	  prince	  so	  that	  he	  might	  fall	  in	  love	  with	  her,	  goes	  to	  ask	  the	  Sea-­‐Witch	  for	  help.	  	  The	  Sea-­‐Witch	  tells	  her	  that	  she	  may	  exchange	  her	  beautiful	  voice	  and	  fish	  tail	  for	  human	  legs,	  but	  that	  the	  act	  of	  walking	  will	  feel	  as	  if	  she	  is	   treading	   upon	   sharp	   knives,	   and	  make	  her	   feet	   bleed.	   	  Nevertheless,	   the	  mermaid	  drinks	   the	   potion	   that	   the	   sorceress	   has	   prepared	   for	   her,	   loses	   her	   tail,	   and	   grows	  human	  legs.	  	  The	  prince	  finds	  her	  and	  takes	  her	  in	  to	  his	  care	  without	  knowing	  that	  it	  was	  she	  who	  saved	  his	  life.	  	  She	  dances	  for	  him,	  even	  though	  to	  do	  so	  is	  excruciating	  for	  her.	  	  He	  is	  charmed	  by	  her	  and	  grows	  extremely	  fond	  of	  her,	  but	  confesses	  that	  he	  does	  not	   want	   to	  marry	   her	   because	   he	   is	   already	   in	   love	   with	   the	   young	   woman	   at	   the	  temple,	  who,	  he	  believes,	  saved	  him	  from	  drowning.	  The	  mermaid	  watches	  the	  prince	  marry	  and	  feels	  as	  if	  her	  heart	  is	  broken.	  	  She	  is	  told	  by	  her	  sisters	  that	  she	  may	  return	  to	  being	  a	  mermaid	  if	  she	  kills	  the	  prince	  with	  a	  knife	  and	  lets	  his	  blood	  drip	  upon	  her	  feet.	   	   However,	   her	   love	   for	   the	   prince	   prevents	   her	   from	   doing	   this;	   instead,	   she	  throws	  both	   the	  knife	  and	  herself	   into	   the	  sea,	  whereupon,	   instead	  of	  dissolving	   into	  foam	   as	  mermaids	   usually	   do,	   she	   is	   raised	   into	   the	   spirit	   world	   and	   given	   another	  chance	  to	  achieve	  an	  immortal	  soul.	  	  	  For	  discussions	  of	  the	  many	  ways	  in	  which	  ‘The	  Little	  Mermaid’	  has	  been	  appropriated	  both	   by	   Japanese	   and	   English	   writers	   see	   the	   recent	   research	   by	   Lucy	   Fraser:	   Lucy	  Fraser,	  'Fairy	  Tale	  Transformations	  and	  Gender:	  The	  Little	  Mermaid's	  Metamorphoses	  in	   Japanese	   and	   English'	   (The	   University	   of	   Queensland,	   2013);	   Lucy	   Fraser,	   'Lost	  Property	  Fairy	  Tales:	  Ogawa	  Yoko	  and	  Higami	  Kumiko's	  Transformations	  of	  'the	  Little	  Mermaid'',	  Marvels	  &	  Tales,	  27	  (2013),	  181-­‐93;	  and	  Lucy	  Fraser,	  'Reading	  and	  Retelling	  Girls	  across	  Cultures:	  Mermaid	  Tales	  in	  Japanese	  and	  English',	  Japan	  Forum,	  26	  (2014),	  246-­‐64.	  6	  Ibid.,	  p.105.	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In	   Andersen’s	   story,	   of	   course,	   one	   of	   the	   clearest	   narrative	  juxtapositions	   of	   physicalised	   love	   and	   physicalised	   pain	   comes	   when	   the	  mermaid,	   having	   relinquished	   her	   fish	   tail,	  walks	   or	   dances	   on	   her	   new	   legs:	  ‘Every	   step	   she	   took	  was	   […]	   like	   treading	  on	  pointed	   tools	   and	   sharp	  knives	  but	  she	  bore	  it	  all	  willingly.’7	  	  For	  Kanai,	  this	  act	  of	  relinquishment,	  this	  ‘leap	  of	  love’,	   is	   symbolic	   of	   the	   act	   of	   faith	   necessary	   in	   submitting	   the	   self	   to	   the	  physical	  experience	  of	  love,	  and	  specifically	  to	  the	  pain	  that	  this	  involves.8	  	  Her	  receiving	   human	   legs	   and	   walking	   in	   them	   for	   the	   first	   time	   operates	   as	   a	  metaphor	  for	  the	  way	  in	  which	  (the	  act	  of)	  love	  constitutes	  ‘a	  discovery	  of	  the	  body’:	  
It	  is	  not	  because	  the	  little	  mermaid	  wishes	  to	  live	  outside	  of	  love,	  but	  because	  the	  leap	  of	   love	  is	  synonymous	  with	  a	  discovery	  of	  the	  body,	  that	  in	  order	  for	  the	  mermaid’s	  love	  to	  be	  fulfilled,	  or	  rather,	   because	   love	   itself	   connotes	   pain,	   she	   abandons	   that	  which	   is	  natural	   to	  her	  body,	  her	   fish	   tail,	   exchanging	   it	  with	  a	  pain	  that	  pierces	  her	  entire	  body	  in	  order	  to	  receive	  human	  legs	  and	  walk.	  […]	  Through	  the	  experience	  of	  walking	  step	  by	  step	  in	  excruciating	   pain	   […]	   the	   mermaid’s	   love	   finally	   brings	   her	  before	  death.9	  	  Love,	  then,	  is	  an	  emotion	  which	  provokes	  physical	  sensations	  (in	  this	  case,	  the	  sensation	  of	  excruciating	  pain).	  Accepting	  Kanai’s	  conception	  of	   the	  body-­‐self,	  however,	  allows	  us	   to	   reformulate	   this	   sentence:	  physical	   sensations	   (such	  as	  the	   sensation	   of	   excruciating	   pain)	   permit	   the	   understanding	   that	   one	   is	  experiencing	  the	  emotion	  called	  love.	   	  And	  it	  is	  this	  understanding	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  see	  how	  the	  term	  ‘origin’,	  mentioned	  above,	  comes	  to	  acquire	  a	  resonance	  
                                            7	  	  Ibid.,	  p.	  98.	  8	  Kanai,	  ‘Towards	  a	  Theory	  of	  Corporeality’,	  p.	  20.	  9	  Kanai,	  'Nikutairon	  e	  josetsu	  dai’ippo',	  p.	  20.
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or	  meaning	  whose	   temporality	   has	   to	   be	   redefined	   as	  being	   cyclical	   (hence	   a	  constant	   presence),	   rather	   than	   linear	   (hence	   an	   absence	   belonging	   to,	   and	  deriving	   from,	   a	   single,	   past	  moment).	   Each	   time	   the	  mermaid	   puts	   her	   foot	  upon	   the	   ground	   she	   endures	   the	   physical	   experience	   of	   love	   anew.	   This	  constant,	   eternal	   re-­‐experiencing	   of	   love,	   as	   though	   each	   time	   were	   the	   first	  time	  such	  an	  experience	  occurred,	  constitutes	  a	  never-­‐ending	  cycle	  of	  constant	  re-­‐understanding	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  love,	  which	  in	  turn	  necessarily	  functions	  as	   a	   constant	   originary,	   child-­‐like	   act	   of	   beginning	   to	   experience	   and/or	  understand.	   Paradoxically,	   however,	   this	   act	   of	   loving,	   as	   a	   constant	   cycle	   of	  originary	  experiences,	  exists	  through	  and	  informs	  the	  body-­‐self	  right	  until	   the	  moment	  of	  death.	  	  As	  Kanai	  writes:	  
From	  love,	  we	  have	  no	  means	  of	  escape.	  	  It	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  meeting	  with	  otherness;	  the	  significance	  of	  our	  acquaintance	  and	  its	  true	  meaning	  to	  us	   is	  only	  revealed	  at	   the	  very	  end	  (‘kyokugen	  e	  iku	  
made’,	  lit.	   ‘until	  we	  reach	  its	  furthest	  limits’).	   	  And	  it	  is	  there,	  at	  the	   end,	   that	   the	   origins	   of	   the	   ancient,	   romantic,	   yet	   eternally	  incomplete	  dream,	  are	  relinquished.	   	  Which	   is	   to	  say,	  we	  die	  of	  love.10	  	  Kanai’s	   essay	   thus	   presents	   Andersen’s	   inscription	   of	   love	   as	   an	   exemplar	   of	  originary	  experience,	  wherein	  ‘origin’	  is,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  a	  reoccuring	  physical	  event,	  which	  manifests	  itself	  as	  a	  constant	  presence.	  	  If	  we	  examine	  and	  analyse	  further	  the	  inscription	  of	  love	  as	  exemplifying	  a	  cyclical	  originary	  experience,	  it	  becomes	   apparent	   that	   it	   is	   driven	   by	   two	   main	   factors:	   the	   first	   is	   the	  disassociation,	   or	   alienation,	   of	   the	   self	   from	   the	   body	   (represented,	   in	  Andersen’s	  story,	  by	  the	  mermaid’s	  abandonment	  of	  the	  fish	  tail);	  the	  second	  is	  the	   concomitant	   (re)discovery	   of	   the	   body	   as	   origin	   (represented,	   as	   noted	  
                                            10	  Kanai,	  'Nikutairon	  e	  josetsu	  dai’ippo',	  p.	  20.	  
 173 
above,	  by	  the	  mermaid’s	  appropriation	  of	  human	  legs	  and	  her	  act	  of	  walking	  on	  them).	   	  Love,	  as	  an	  enactment	  of	  originary	  experience,	   is	  thus	  equivalent	  with	  the	  rediscovery	  of	   the	  self,	  and	   is	   therefore	  not	  so	  much	  a	   ‘retrieval’	  of	  a	  past	  origin	   or	   moment,	   but	   instead	   signals	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   new	   (or,	   more	  specifically,	  renewed)	  awareness	  or	  sense	  of	  love	  which	  is	  born	  simultaneously	  with	   the	   ‘return’	   to	   that	   origin	   and	   the	   rediscovery	   of	   the	   self.	   	  However,	   the	  new	   origin	   and	   hence	   our	   ‘return’	   to	   it	   –	   like	   each	   experience	   of	  walking	   on	  sharp	  knives	  –	  ends	  as	  soon	  as	  it	  takes	  place.	  
The	  attempt	  to	  ‘return	  to	  origin’	  (or,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  mermaid’s	  love,	  as	  Kanai	  writes,	   to	   ‘realise’	   the	   significance	   of	   the	  meeting	  with	   otherness)	   thus	  necessitates	   the	   foregrounding	   of	   the	   temporal	   extremities	   of	   existence,	  birth	  and	   death,	   while	   pulling	   each	   of	   these	   extremities	   into	   the	   present	   moment.	  This	   latter	  point	  needs	  qualification	  as,	  of	  course,	   it	   is	  misleading	  to	  configure	  
birth	  and	  death	  as	  being	  experiential	  opposites:	  birth	  is	  a	  constituent	  part	  of	  the	  act	   of	   being	   alive;	   death,	   however,	   can	   never	   be	   considered	   as	   being	   an	  experience,	   as	   such,	   precisely	   because	   it	   can	   never	   be	   experienced:	   the	   man	  who	   is	   tortured	   to	   death	   can	   experience	   the	   torture,	   but	   never	   the	   death.	  Instead,	  it	  might	  be	  more	  productive,	  in	  this	  context,	  to	  deploy	  the	  terms	  ‘birth’	  and	   ‘death’	   figuratively,	   to	   mean,	   respectively,	   the	   conceptual-­‐beginning-­‐of-­‐
one’s-­‐life-­‐experiences	   and	   the	   conceptual-­‐end-­‐of-­‐one’s-­‐life-­‐experiences.	   In	   other	  words,	   the	   cyclical,	   eternal	   return	   to	   origin	   functions	   as	   a	   challenge	   to	  conventional,	   chronological	  ways	  of	  accounting	   for	  one’s	   life-­‐experiences.	  The	  body-­‐self,	   through	   its	   existing	   in	   a	   constant	   state	   of	   in-­‐betweenness	   and	  liminality,	  doesn’t	  merely	  foreground	  in	  perpetuity	  these	  twin	  extremities,	  birth	  and	  death	  (as	  we	  have	  glossed	  them):	  it	  also	  forever	  challenges	  their,	  as	  it	  were,	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narrative	   supremacy,	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   accounting	   for	   the	   nature	   of	   human	  experience.	  Moreover,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  the	  body-­‐self’s	  necessary	  understanding	  of	   itself	   as	   being	   constantly	   in	   the	   present	   (birth	   and	   death,	   as	   we	   now	  understand	  them	  in	  this	  context,	  corresponding	  to,	  respectively,	  beginning	  and	  
end,	  past	  and	  future)	  leads	  us	  to	  a	  recognition	  of	  how	  Kanai’s	  conception	  of	  the	  body-­‐self	  might	  have	  profound	   implications	   for	  her	  own	  writing	  practice,	  and	  for	   our	   understanding	   of,	   and	   engagement	  with,	   that	   practice.	  We	   shall	   have	  more	  to	  say	  about	  this	  below.	  For	  the	  moment,	  however,	  let	  us	  note	  that	  Kanai’s	  urging	  on	  her	  readers	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  body-­‐self	  as	  being	  a	  constant	  presence	  constitutes	  an	  important	  avant-­‐garde	  strategy	  in	  (re-­‐)shaping	  that	  readership’s	  understanding	   of	   the	   techniques	   that	   necessarily	   need	   to	   be	   deployed,	   or	  rejected	  wholesale,	   in	   the	   act	   of	   inscribing	   such	  a	   conception.	  Put	   simply,	   the	  body-­‐self	  demands	  to	  be	  written	  about	  in	  new	  ways.	  
Moving	   towards	   a	   fuller	   consideration	   of	   the	   question	   of	   how	   Kanai’s	  conception	  of	  the	  body-­‐self	  has	  a	  material	  consequence	  for	  her	  own	  writing,	  we	  come	   first	   to	   her	   essay’s	   engagement	   with	   a	   different	   aesthetic	   practice:	   the	  avant-­‐garde	  dance	  movement,	  butō.	  11	  Kanai	  begins	  her	  discussion	  of	  butō	  by	  
                                            11	  Butō,	   its	   participants,	   and	   its	   contribution	   to	   the	   avant-­‐garde	   movement	   are	   all	  explored	   in:	   	   Susan	   Blakely	   Klein,	   Ankoku	   Butō:	   The	   Premodern	   and	   Postmodern	  
Influences	   on	   the	   Dance	   of	   Utter	   Darkness	   (Cornell:	   Cornell	   University	   East	   Asia	  Program,	  1988	  [Cornell	  East	  Asia	  Series,	  Number	  49]);	  Thomas	  R.	  H.	  Havens,	  Radicals	  
and	   Realists	   in	   the	   Japanese	  Nonverbal	   Arts:	   The	   Avant-­‐Garde	   Rejection	   of	  Modernism	  (Honolulu:	   University	   of	   Hawai'i	   Press,	   2006);	   and,	   more	   recently,	   in	   Bruce	   Baird,	  
Hijikata	   Tatsumi	   and	   Butoh:	   Dancing	   in	   a	   Pool	   of	   Gray	   Grits	   (New	   York:	   Palgrave	  Macmillan,	   2012)	   and	   Miryam	   Sas,	   Experimental	   Arts	   in	   Postwar	   Japan:	   Moments	   of	  
Encounter,	  Engagement,	  and	  Imagined	  Return	  (Cambridge,	  Mass.	  and	  London:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2011).	  For	  a	  comparatively	  straightforward	  biographical	  account	  of	  Hijikata	   and	  butō,	   see	   Stephen	  Barber,	  Hijikata:	  Revolt	  of	  the	  Body	   (London:	  Creation	  Books,	   2006;	   later	   edition	   Chicago	   and	   London:	   University	   of	   Chicago	   Press	   [Solar	  Books	  imprint]	  2010).	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widening	  her	  observations	  on	   ‘The	  Little	  Mermaid’	   to	   include	  other	  stories	  of	  Hans	  Christian	  Andersen.	  She	  notes	  that:	  
[…]	  whether	   it	   is	   legs	  that	  send	  pain	  all	   through	  the	  body	   in	  the	  act	  of	  walking,	  or	  whether	  it	  is	  Princess	  Elisa’s	  bearing	  of	  the	  pain	  of	  treading	  on	  nettles	  with	  bare	  feet,	  or	  whether	  it	  is	  the	  girl	  who	  is	  consigned	  to	  dance	  for	  eternity	  when	  she	  puts	  on	  the	  red	  shoes	  and	   finally	   cuts	   off	   her	   feet,	   there	   is	   no	  mistake	   that	   the	   act	   of	  stepping	  corresponds	  to	  the	  pain	  of	  being	  on	  the	  earth.12	  	  The	  motif	  of	  the	  young	  woman	  walking/dancing-­‐in-­‐pain	  occurs	  not	  only	  in	  ‘The	  Little	  Mermaid’,	  then,	  but	  also	  in	  Andersen’s	  other	  stories	  of	   ‘The	  Wild	  Swans’	  and	  ‘The	  Red	  Shoes’;13	  and	  it	  is	  this	  motif	  of	  the	  woman	  dancing	  in	  pain	  which,	  Kanai	  writes,	  informs	  the	  butō	  performances	  of	  Hijikata	  Tatsumi.	  
	  
Butō,	  and	  the	  Dancing-­‐Girl-­‐in-­‐Pain	  
Butō	   (or,	   as	   it	  was	  originally	   termed,	  ankoku	  butō	   [dance	  of	  darkness])	  was	  a	  form	   of	   dance	   developed	   by	   Hijikata	   and	   Ohno	   Kazuo	   in	   the	   late	   1950s	   and	  early	   1960s.	  14	  Before	  we	   detail	   Kanai’s	   engagement	  with	   it	   in	   her	   essay,	  we	  
                                            12	  Kanai,	  'Nikutairon	  e	  josetsu	  dai’ippo',	  p.	  21.	  13	  In	  the	  former,	  Elisa	  discovers	  her	  eleven	  brothers	  have	  been	  turned	  into	  wild	  swans	  by	   their	  wicked	   stepmother.	   In	   order	   to	   break	   the	   spell,	   and	   turn	   her	   brothers	   back	  into	  handsome	  princes,	   she	  has	   to	  pick	  nettles	   from	  the	  churchyard	  and	  bruise	   them	  with	  her	  feet,	  regardless	  of	  the	  pain	  that	  this	  causes	  her.	  In	  the	  latter,	  a	  vain	  and	  spoilt	  girl	  demands	  that	  her	  rich	  adopted	  mother	  buy	  her	  a	  pair	  of	  beautiful	  red	  shoes.	  	  The	  magic	   shoes	  cause	  her	   to	  dance	  ceaselessly;	  even	  after	   she	  despairingly	  has	  her	  own	  feet	  amputated,	  the	  shoes	  continue	  to	  dance	  and	  torment	  her.	  14	  Kanai’s	   essay	   omits	   to	  mention	   her	   own	   participatory	   forays	   into	   the	   practice	   of	  
butō.	   	   We	   know,	   however,	   from	   the	   butō	   dancer	   and	   choreographer	   Kasai	   Akira	   (a	  disciple	   of	   Hijikata),	   that	   he	   practiced	   butō	   with	   Kanai	   at	   least	   twice.	   His	   epistolary	  essay	  to	  Kanai	  (where	  he	  mentions	  these	  two	  occasions)	  is	  appended	  in	  her	  collected	  poetry.	  Kasai	  Akira,	  'Sore	  wa	  ai	  ka	  shi	  ka	  soretomo	  yume	  ka:	  Kanai	  Mieko	  e	  no	  shishin'	  [‘A	  Private	  Letter	   to	  Kanai	  Mieko:	  Was	  That	  Love,	   or	  Poetry,	   or	   a	  Dream?’]	   in	  
Kanai	  Mieko	  Shishū	  (Tokyo:	  Shinchōsha,	  1973)	  pp.	  136-­‐44,	  p.	  141.	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might	   fruitfully	   make	   some	   prefatory,	   clarificatory	   remarks	   about	   the	   dance	  form	  itself	  (if	  the	  very	  term	  ‘form’	  isn’t	  too	  conceptually	  prescriptive	  or,	  at	  any	  rate,	  antithetical	  to	  butō’s	  avowed	  aims).	  To	  achieve	  its	  aims,	  and	  to	  explore	  its	  own	  philosophical	  pre-­‐occupations,	  butō	  departed	  from	  other	  dance	  traditions	  and	   movements,	   such	   as	   ballet,	   classical	   Japanese	   dance	   and	   contemporary	  dance.	   	   As	   Klein	   states:	   ‘Butō	   choreographers	   had	   no	   compunction	   about	  regarding	   these	   traditional	   dance	   forms	   as	   a	   kind	   of	   treasure	   trove	   of	  technique,	  gesture,	  and	  principles,	  which	  could	  be	  appropriated	  without	  regard	  to	  their	  original	  context	  or	  meaning,	  stripped	  down,	  and	  transformed	  into	  kata	  (a	   vocabulary	   of	   movement	   patterns).’15	  	   While	   sometimes	   parodying	   and	  mocking	   the	   stylised	   movements	   of	   these	   other	   dance	   traditions,	   then,	   butō	  nonetheless	  resisted	  all	  classificatory	  labels,	  seeking	  to	  avoid	  the	  crystallisation	  of	   a	   consistent,	   formal	   style	   of	   its	   own	   in	   favour	  of	  wild,	   improvisational	   and	  unexpected	   moves	   and	   positions:	   ‘[a]lthough	   many	   of	   these	   movements	   and	  gestures	  had	  quite	  specific	  meanings	  within	  their	  own	  traditional	  context,	  those	  meanings	   were	   stripped	   away	   in	   the	   appropriation	   process,	   becoming	  unintelligible	   (or	   unreadable)	   to	   the	   viewer.’16	  	   These	   magpie-­‐like	   acts	   of	  cultural	   appropriation	   then	   find	   themselves	   lent	   a	   philosophical	   coherence;	  accordingly,	  as	  Miryam	  Sas	  argues,	  butō,	  as	  an	  art-­‐form	  shares	  some	  of	  the	  pre-­‐occupations	  of	  Japanese	  surrealism.	  In	  particular,	  she	  contends,	  they	  both	  strive	  for	  an	  
anti-­‐conceptual	   search	   for	   a	   terrifying	   limit-­‐moment,	   a	  breakdown	   of	   symbolic	   systems	   –	   the	   moment	   of	   approach	   to	  
                                            15	  Klein,	  Ankoku	  butō,	  p.	  21.	  16	  Ibid.,	  p.21.	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actuality	   and	   the	   body,	  which	   they	   conceive	   in	   paradoxical	   and	  unexpected	  ways.	  Both	  movements	  […]	  aspire	  to	  effect	  a	  radical	  decentering	   of	   conventional	   systems	   of	   thought	   and	  consciousness,	   a	   rupture	   of	   existing	   symbolic	   frameworks.	   By	  varying	   means,	   they	   work	   to	   reach	   a	   space	   of	   ‘(sur)reality’	   or	  ‘actuality’	   beyond	   socially	   defined	   boundaries	   of	  understanding.17	  	  Here,	   as	   Sas	   later	   explains,	   ‘actuality’	   connotes	   ‘the	   existent	   pain	   of	   reality’	  which	  was	  considered	  by	  Hijikata	  and	  other	  avant-­‐garde	  artists	   to	  be	  glossed	  over	   by	  mainstream	   culture,	   and	   the	   banalities	   of	   the	   humanistic	   discourses	  that	   underpin	   and	   inform	   it,	   from	   the	   average,	   television-­‐watching	   Japanese	  consumer.18	  By	  reaching	  a	  space	  of	   ‘actuality’	   through	  performance,	  butō	  was	  contrived	  to	  deliver	  society	  the	  shock	  of	  ‘terrorism’	  or	  ‘scandal’,	  or	  ‘the	  pleasure	  of	  a	  bloody	  nose’.19	  
Returning	   to	   Kanai’s	   essay,	   we	   can	   see	   how	   she	   explicitly	   links	   the	  various	   princesses	   and	   mermaids	   of	   Andersen	   with	   the	   performances	   of	  Hijikata.	  Specifically,	  she	  discerns	  in	  the	  physicality	  of	  Hijikata’s	  performance	  –	  and	   by	   ‘physicality’	   we	  might	   explicitly	   mean	   the	   indivisibility	   of	   the	   dancer	  from	  the	  dance	  –	  the	  same	  originary	  presence	  that	  she	  finds	  in	  the	  mermaid’s	  act	  of	  loving/being/dancing:	  
                                            17	  Sas,	  Experimental	  Arts	  in	  Postwar	  Japan,	  p.	  159.	  18	  Ibid.,	  p.	  166.	  19	  Shibusawa	   Tatsuhiko,	   'Zen'ei	   to	   sukyandaru'	   [‘The	   Avant	   Garde	   and	   Scandal’]	   in	  
Shibusawa	  Tatsuhiko	  Zenshū	  (Tokyo:	  Kawade	  shobō,	  1993)	  pp.	  356-­‐57,	  quoted	  in	  Sas,	  
Experimental	  Arts	  in	  Postwar	  Japan,	  p.	  160.	   	   In	  her	  discussion	  of	  Hijikata’s	   theoretical	  writings	   on	   butō,	   Sas	   writes	   extensively	   on	   Hijikata’s	   friendship	   with	   Shibusawa	  Tatsuhiko,	   the	  Francophile	   translator,	  writer	   and	   literary	   critic.	   	   Shibusawa	  was	  also	  closely	   associated	   with	   Kanai,	   engaging	   in	   head-­‐to-­‐head	   discussions	   with	   her	   on	  literature,	  from	  the	  1990s	  onwards,	  and,	  as	  we	  saw	  in	  Chapter	  Two	  of	  this	  thesis,	  has	  critiqued	  Kanai’s	  writings,	  analysing	  their	  use	  of	  the	  trope	  of	  the	  eternal	  lover.	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Anyway,	  for	  me,	  the	  strange	  power	  of	  these	  women’s	  bodies	  can	  also	   be	   read	   in	   some	   of	   the	   specific	   movements	   of	   Hijikata	  Tatsumi’s	  dance.	  	  Our	  initial	  response	  to	  Hijikata’s	  body	  is	  to	  the	  decisive	  power	  displayed	   in	   the	  way	  his	   ribs	  stick	  out.	   […]	  The	  moment	  he	  appears	  on	  the	  stage,	  we	  have	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  hold	  our	  breath	  and	  take	  in	  his	  strange	  appearance.	   	  […	  H]e	  appears	  standing	  before	  us	  like	  a	  demon	  etched	  with	  all	  the	  pain	  that	  the	  body	  suffers.	  In	  this	  moment,	  Hijikata	  imparts	  the	  audience	  with	  the	   specific	   visual	   experience	   of	   his	   peculiarly	   honed	   body,	   a	  feeling	  of	  indescribable	  pain	  is	  brought	  to	  the	  audience’s	  bodies	  and	   this	   phantom-­‐like	   body’s	   violent	   invasion	   of	   the	   audience	  commences.	  20	  	  In	   this	   passage,	   Kanai	   seeks	   to	   convey	   how	   both	   Andersen’s	   stories	   and	  Hijikata’s	  butō	  performances	   inscribe	  or	  enact	  what	  we	  might	   term	   ‘originary	  pain’	  and	  how	  origin,	  or	  originary	  pain,	  is	  able	  to	  transmit	  across	  the	  perceived	  boundaries	  that	  are	  conventionally	  considered	  to	  separate	  the	  writer	  or	  dancer	  from	   their	   audience,	  manifesting	   itself	   as	   a	   physical	   experience,	   or	   presence,	  among	   them.	  Kanai’s	   conclusion,	   ‘a	   feeling	  of	   indescribable	  pain	   is	  brought	   to	  the	  audience’s	  bodies	  …	  [as	  Hijikata’s]	  phantom-­‐like	  body’s	  violent	  invasion	  of	  the	   audience	   commences’	   is	   particularly	   illustrative	   of	   this	   point.21	  Kanai’s	  understanding	   that	   butō	   is	   able	   to	   affect	   its	   audience	   physically	   is	   further	  highlighted	   by	   the	   linguistic	   choices	   she	  makes	   to	   frame	   her	   argument.	   	   For	  instance,	   the	   following	   sentence:	   ‘Hijikata	   Tatsumi	   no	   nikutai	   kara	   saisho	   ni	  
ukeru	  kandō	  wa,	  sono	  abarabone	  no	  ukidekata	  ga	  ketteiteki	  na	  chikara	  de	  motte	  
sayō	  suru	  to	  itte	  yoi	  de	  arō.’	  has	  been	  translated	  above	  as:	   ‘Our	  initial	  response	  to	  Hijikata	  Tatsumi’s	  body	  is	  to	  the	  decisive	  power	  displayed	  in	  the	  way	  his	  ribs	  stick	   out.’	   	   However,	   the	   Japanese	   original	   conveys	  more	   precisely	   the	   sense	  that	   something	   physical	   or	   tangible	   is	   passed	   or	   transmitted	   from	   Hijikata’s	  
                                            20	  Kanai,	  'Nikutairon	  e	  josetsu	  dai’ippo',	  p.	  21.	  21	  Ibid.,	  p.21.	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body	   to	   his	   audience	   than	   this	   translation.	   	   This	   apparent	   physicality	   of	   the	  audience’s	  experience	  is	  expressed	  in	  part	  by	  the	  noun	  kandō,	  which	  in	  its	  verb	  form	  kandō	  suru	   literally	  translates	  as	   ‘to	  be	  moved	  (by	  emotion)’	  rather	  than	  ‘to	  respond’;	  and	  which	  therefore	  strengthens	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  a	  physicality	  might	   feature	   in	   the	   audience	   or	   viewers’	   reception/perception	   of	  performances	  beyond	  that	  which	  is	  articulated	  in	  the	  English	  translation	  above.	  	  Furthermore,	  Kanai’s	  sentence	  describes	  the	  audience’s	  tangibly	  ‘receiving’	  this	  movement	  of	  emotion	  ‘from’	  Hijikata’s	  body	  (kara	  […]	  ukeru),	  and	  thus	  makes	  full	  use	  of	   the	   fact	   that	   	   it	   is	  grammatically	  possible	   to	  describe	  performances	  and	  the	  responses	  they	  elicit	  as	  if	  they	  are	  physical	  or	  material	  entities	  that	  are	  given	  and	  received	  between	  bodies.	  	  In	  Kanai’s	  interpretation	  of	  Hijikata’s	  butō,	  then,	  the	  audience	  becomes	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  performance;	  which	  is	  to	  say	  that	   their	   bodies	   function	   as	   a	   medium	   through	   which	   Hijikata’s	   art	   finds	  expression	  and	  enactment.	   	  But	  moreover,	  Kanai’s	  text	  makes	  it	  apparent	  that	  this	   notion	   that	   performance	   (particularly	   performance	   which	   explores	   the	  limits	   of	   being	   and	   evokes	   existent	   pain)	   is	   able	   to	   transmit	   physically	  transformative	  experiences,	  ultimately	  rests	  on	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  body-­‐self,	   not	   as	   a	   discrete	   entity	   in	   fundamental	   isolation	   from	   the	   environment	  around	   it;	   but,	   rather,	   as	   one	   which	   is	   enmeshed	   within	   a	   wider	   matrix	   of	  bodies	   and	   selves,	  which	   intersect	   across	  performance	   spaces.	   	   	   For	   instance,	  Kanai	   writes,	   ‘Sate,	   kanojotachi	   no	   iyō	   na	   chikara	   ni	   yotte	   tsukiugokasareru	  
nikutai	  wa,	  Hijikata	  no	  buyō	  no	  aru	  tagui	  no	  miburi	  no	  uchi	  ni	  yomitoru	  koto	  ga	  
dekiru	   mono	   to	   watashi	   no	   naka	   de	   musubitsuki	   no	   da.’22	  	   	   This	   has	   been	  rendered	   above	   as:	   ‘Anyway,	   for	   me,	   the	   strange	   power	   of	   these	   women’s	  
                                            22	  Ibid.,	  p.	  21.	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bodies	  can	  also	  be	  read	  in	  some	  of	  the	  specific	  movements	  of	  Hijikata	  Tatsumi’s	  dance.’	  	  However,	  a	  more	  literal	  translation	  of	  this	  sentence	  would	  be:	  	  ‘Anyway,	  the	   strange	   power	   of	   these	   women’s	   bodies	   and	   a	   thing	   that	   can	   be	   read	   in	  some	   of	   the	   specific	   movements	   of	   Hijikata	   Tatsumi’s	   dance	   are	   connected	  
inside	  me.’	   	   The	   statement	   that	   the	   two	   are	   connected	   inside	   Kanai	   is	   a	   little	  awkward	   linguistically;	   hence	   the	   first	   translation,	   being	   more	   readily	  understandable,	   was	   preferred.	   	   Nevertheless,	   it	   is	   the	   very	   notion	   that	   our	  bodies	  are	  as	  physical	  meeting	  points	  in	  a	  vast	  web	  of	  bodies,	  selves	  and	  texts	  which	  connects	  the	  dancing-­‐girl-­‐in-­‐pain	  motif	  as	  it	  occurs	  in	  Hijikata’s	  dancing	  to	   Kanai’s	   later	   concept	   of	   the	   ‘corporeal	   text’.	   	   	   To	   explain	   further,	   it	   is	  necessary	  to	   first	   turn	  to	   the	  theoretical	  writings	  of	  Hijikata	  himself,	   in	  which	  he	  attempts	   to	   theorise	  and	  describe	  how	  butō	  effectively	  generates	   the	  same	  constant	  cycle	  of	   re-­‐origination	   that	  Kanai	  discerns	   in	   the	  act	  of	   loving-­‐being-­‐hurting	  that,	  as	  we	  discussed	  above,	  Andersen’s	  women	  perform,	  and	  moreover,	  how	   the	   dancing-­‐girl-­‐in-­‐pain’s	   appearance	   in	   a	   butō	   performance	   indicates	  what	  can	  only	  be	  described	  as	  a	  physicalised	  collective	  unconsciousness.	  
Dancing	  Girl	  in	  Pain	  is,	  of	  course,	   the	  title	  (or,	  at	  any	  rate	  one	   title;	   it	   is	  also	   translated	   as	   Ailing	   Dancer)	   of	   Hijikata’s	   hard-­‐to-­‐categorise,	   quasi-­‐autobiographical	   narrative	   in	   which	   he	   reflects,	   somewhat	   esoterically	   and	  poetically,	  on	  life,	  art	  and	  the	  body’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  world	  around	  it;	  23	  
                                            23	  Hijikata	   Tatsumi,	   Yameru	   maihime	   [Dancing	   Girl	   in	   Pain]	   in	   Tanemura	   Akihiro,	  Tsuruoka	   Yoshihisa,	   and	  Motofuji	   Akiko,	   eds.	  Hijikata	  Tatsumi	  Zenshū	   [The	  Complete	  
Works	  of	  Hijikata	  Tatsumi]	  2	  Vols.	  (Tokyo:	  Kawade	  shobō	  shinsha,	  1998).	  	  Dancing	  Girl	  
in	   Pain,	   in	   Sas’s	   words,	   ‘an	   experiment	   or	   practice	   of	   mingling	   thought	   and	   matter,	  language	  and	  flesh’	  	  (Sas,	  Experimental	  Arts	  in	  Post-­‐War	  Japan,	  p.173),	  not	  only	  resists	  the	  temporal	  strictures	  of	  a	  conventional	  linear	  narrative,	  but	  actively	  seeks	  to	  dissolve	  the	  limits	  of	  spatiality	  in	  its	  account	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  child-­‐man	  narrator	  and	   the	  world	   ‘around’	   him.	   A	   full	   discussion	   of	   the	   text	   is	   outside	   the	   scope	   of	   the	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and	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  motif	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  his	  theories	  about	  butō	  cannot	  be	  understated.	   For	  Hijikata,	   the	  dancing-­‐girl-­‐in-­‐pain	   is	   a	  materialised	  image,	  or	  vision,	  which	  appears	  when	  the	  dancer	  and	  the	  dance	  (or,	  to	  be	  more	  precise,	  when	  the	  act	  itself	  and	  the	  impetus	  to	  act)	  become	  indivisible,	  and	  the	  performance	  thus	  produces	  a	  new	  physical	  presence	  which	  is	  able	  to	  extend	  out	  of	   and	   beyond	   the	   dancer’s	   body.	   	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   dancing-­‐girl-­‐in-­‐pain’s	  appearance	  signifies	  a	  moment	  of	  intense	  creativity	  within	  the	  dance,	  in	  which	  both	   the	  dancer’s	  body	  and	   the	   space	  around	   it	   are	   transfigured	   in	   a	  manner	  which	  also	  physically	  affects	  the	  audience.	  
Hijikata’s	   use	   of	   the	  motif	   of	   the	   dancing-­‐girl-­‐in-­‐pain	   to	   describe	   such	  moments	   is	   cited	   (and	   translated)	   by	   Sas	   in	   an	   excerpt	   from	  Hijikata’s	   1974	  essay	  ‘Sen	  ga	  sen	  ni	  nitekuru	  toki’	  (‘When	  the	  Line	  Begins	  to	  Resemble	  a	  Line’)	  which	  reads:	  
It	   is	  true	  that	  an	  act	   lets	  out	   its	   first	  cry	  of	  birth	  at	  precisely	  the	  moment	   when	   it	   refutes	   [all]	   acts.	   	   But	   because	   of	   this,	   at	   the	  moment	   of	   action	   people	   tend	   to	   forget	   the	   origins	   of	   their	  expressions.	  	  What	  we	  usually	  call	  expression	  is,	  in	  fact,	  the	  name	  of	   that	  which	  has	   forgotten	   its	  origins.	   	  Expression	   is	  something	  that	  is	  secreted	  of	  itself,	  not	  something	  that	  appeared	  as	  a	  pattern	  for	   some	   purpose.	   	   […]	   Then	   again,	   there	   are	   times	   when	   acts	  pierce	  us	  suddenly	  before	  we	  have	  a	  moment	  to	  catch	  our	  breath.	  	  
                                                                                                                           present	   argument.	  However,	   in	   the	  way	   its	  narrator	   is	   constantly	   transformed	   in,	   by	  and	  into	  the	  world	  that	  surrounds	  him,	  it	  is	  strikingly	  similar	  to	  Andersen’s	  account	  of	  the	  little	  mermaid’s	  dissolution	  into	  the	  sea	  foam,	  and	  her	  subsequent	  existence	  in	  the	  air	  as	  a	  disembodied	  spirit:	  ‘But	  I	  was	  carried	  along	  in	  the	  flow	  of	  colors	  around	  me	  ….	  	  I	  became	  like	  the	  pale	  heroic	  Kurama	  Tengu	  [the	  popular	  folk-­‐hero	  of	  both	  novel	  and	  film]	  under	  the	  high	  heavens,	  an	  existence	  that	  no	  one	  would	  understand,	  and	  I	  moved	  with	  great	  care,	  hemmed	  in	  by	  the	  air	  around	  me.	  The	  kind	  of	  body	  about	  which	  one	  feels	  certain	  (yes,	   this	   is	   I)	  was	  being	  taken	  away	  from	  me.	  My	  thoughts,	   like	  moving	  pictures	  –	  where	  among	  material	  phenomena	  were	  they	  trying	  to	  insert	  themselves?	  –	  were	  bathed	  in	  a	  waterfall	  of	   light	  mixed	  with	  dust	   falling	  through	  a	  hole	   in	  the	  roof.	  This	  heroic	  ghost-­‐horseman	  under	  the	  waterfall	  of	  light	  mixed	  with	  dust	  stopped	  doing	  anything	  but	  sucking	  up	  the	  seeds	  of	  fingernails,	  and	  I	  started	  to	  resemble	  the	  seed	  of	  a	  fingernail’	  (Hijikata,	  Yameru	  maihime,	  p.69;	  quoted	  in	  Sas,	  p.173	  [trans.	  Sas]).	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At	  that	  moment,	  like	  that	  pierced	  emptiness,	  we	  ever	  so	  vividly	  –	  our	  own	  dancing	  girl	  comes	  into	  existence.24	  	  Hijikata’s	  circuitous	  description	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  ‘an	  act	  […]	  refutes	  all	  acts’	  thus	  forgetting	   ‘the	  origins	  of	  their	  expressions’,	   is	  rendered	  more	  fathomable	  once	   it	   becomes	   apparent	   that	   such	   circuitousness	   is	   due	   to	   his	   subscription,	  not	  readily	  discernible	  in	  the	  above	  quotation,	  to	  the	  working	  hypothesis	  (one	  with	  which	  we	  are	  already	  familiar	  through	  our	  analysis	  of	  Kanai’s	  essay)	  that	  body,	  consciousness,	  and	  self	  are	  not	  discrete	  conceptual	  entities,	  and	   that	  all	  human	   experience	   is	   primarily	   physical.25	  	   Hijikata’s	   subscription	   to	   this	  hypothesis	  becomes	  apparent	  in	  the	  way	  his	  prose	  takes	  those	  various	  abstract	  acts	   	   (such	  as	   the	  act	  of	   refutation,	   the	  act	  of	   forgetting,	   the	  act	  of	   cognition),	  acts	   whose	   agency	   might	   be	   conventionally	   regarded	   –	   precisely	   because	   of	  their	  abstraction	  –	  as	  deriving	  from	  the	  conscious	  mind,	  and	  instead	  inscribes	  their	   agency	   as	   deriving	   from	   the	   body	   itself.	   	   Put	   more	   starkly:	   refutation	  becomes	  a	  physical	  act;	  forgetting	  becomes	  a	  physical	  act;	  cognition	  becomes	  a	  physical	  act.	  
Indeed,	  Hijikata	  goes	  one	  stage	  further,	   inasmuch	  as	  he	  seems	  to	  imply	  that	   the	   gestures	   that	   comprise	   these	   (conventionally	   abstract)	   acts	   do	   not	  merely	   represent	   the	   precedence	   of	   the	   physical	   over	   the	   mental	   in	  determining,	   and	   accounting	   for,	   our	   perception	   of	   experience;	   instead,	   the	  
                                            24	  Hijikata’s	  essay	  'Sen	  ga	  sen	  ni	  nitekuru	  toki'	  [‘When	  the	  Line	  Begins	  to	  Resemble	  a	  Line’]	  originally	  published	  in	  Gendai	  shi	  techō,	  17(11)	  (1974),	  243-­‐47;	  republished	  in:	  
Hijikata	  Tatsumi	  Zenshū,	  Vol.	  1	  (Tokyo:	  Kawade	  shobō,	  1998)	  p.	  266;	  and	  translated	  by	  and	   cited	   in:	   Sas,	   Experimental	   Arts	   in	   Postwar	   Japan:	   Moments	   of	   Encounter,	  
Engagement,	  and	  Imagined	  Return,	  p.	  162.	  	  25	  Sas,	   Experimental	   Arts	   in	   Postwar	   Japan:	  Moments	   of	   Encounter,	   Engagement,	   and	  
Imagined	  Return,	  p.	  162.	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movement	   itself	   precedes	   the	   body’s	   inhabiting	   of	   it.	   This	   is	   because,	   for	  Hijikata,	   ‘origin’	   resides	   in	   the	   physical	  momentum	   behind	   the	   gestures,	   acts,	  and	  expressions	  which	  the	  body	  performs,	  such	  physical	  momentum	  residing,	  presumably,	  within	  the	  performance	  or	  dance.	  	  Thus,	  his	  text	  refuses	  to	  adhere	  to	  any	  further	  conventional	  distinctions	  one	  might	  choose	  to	  make	  between	  the	  actor	  and	  the	  act,	  the	  dancer	  and	  the	  dance,	  and	  instead	  focuses	  on	  describing	  the	  physicality	   (which	  we	  glossed	  above	  as	  the	  indivisibility	  of	  the	  dancer	  and	  the	  dance)	  at	  work	  in	  butō.	  	  Breaking	  the	  body-­‐self	  down	  into	  an	  assemblage,	  or	  manifestation	  of	  various	  acts	  and	  gestures	  thus	  also	  allows	  Hijikata	  to	  discuss	  (as	  he	  does	  above)	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  body-­‐self	  is	  a	  site	  of	  competing	  modes	  of	   being	   and	   understanding	   without	   resorting	   to,	   and	   thereby	   without	  reaffirming,	   that	   straight	   dichotomisation	   of	   body	   and	   mind	   which	   butō	  attempts	   to	  move	  beyond.	  Nevertheless,	   precisely	   because	   the	   passage	   above	  seems	  to	  be	  explicitly	  describing	  conflicting	  understandings	  of	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  self,	   in	  order	   to	   render	  his	   text	   in	  more	   conventional	   and	   familiar	   terms,	   it	   is	  helpful	   if	   we	   temporarily	   restore	   the	   classical	   distinction	   of	   body	   and	  consciousness,	   if	   only	   to	   see	  more	  clearly	  how	  Hijikata	  attempts	   to	  dismantle	  such	  a	  distinction.	  
The	  first	  thing	  to	  clarify	  is	  that,	  despite	  his	  claim	  that	  ‘origin’	  resides	  in	  performance	   which	   necessarily	   precedes	   the	   body-­‐self,	   Hijikata	   still	   has	   to	  account	  for	  the	  impetus	  to	  move/be;	  or	  rather,	  he	  needs	  to	  account	  for	  how	  we	  account	  for	  the	  impetus	  to	  move/be.	  A	  conventional	  binary	  opposition	  between	  body	  and	  mind	  might	  see	  the	  former	  moving	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  the	  latter,	  with	  the	  latter’s	  being	  forever	  the	  dominant	  category	  in	  such	  an	  opposition;	  the	  body,	  in	  other	  words,	  might	  conventionally	  be	  regarded	  as	  being	  in	  a	  permanent	  state	  of	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obeisance	   towards	   the	   mind.	   It	   is	   precisely	   such	   a	   binary	   opposition	   that	  Hijikata	   seeks	   to	   subvert	   (and	   it	   is	   important	   to	   remember	   that	   it	   is	   a	  
subversion,	   rather	   than	   a	   mere	   inversion).	   In	   other	   words,	   for	   Hijikata,	   this	  binary	   opposition	   effectively	   derives	   from	   a	   mistaken	   narrative	   of	   how	   we	  account	  for	  our	  actions:	  because	  ‘an	  act	  lets	  out	  its	  first	  cry	  of	  birth	  at	  precisely	  the	  moment	  when	  it	  refutes	  [all]	  acts,	  […]	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  action	  people	  tend	  to	  forget	  the	  origins	  of	  their	  expressions….’26	  	  Our	  own	  conscious	  recognition	  of	  
/	   accounting	   for	   a	   given	   act	   (the	   first	   cry	   of	   birth	   of	   an	   act)	   supplants	   any	  understanding	  that	  the	  impetus	  to	  act	  arises	  from	  the	  body-­‐self,	  in	  that	  such	  a	  recognition/account	   creates	   the	   perception	   that	   the	   conscious	   recognition	   of	  the	   act	   was,	   instead,	   the	   intention	   to	   act.	   	   Our	   habituated	   adherence	   to	  conventional	   notions	   of	   selfhood	   as	   residing	   within	   the	   conscious	   mind,	   is	  therefore	   responsible	   for	   generating	   the	   misunderstanding	   that	   it	   is	   our	  conscious	   decision	   to	   act	   which	   generates	   our	   actions.	   	   On	   the	   contrary,	   for	  Hijikata,	   this	   conscious	   decision,	   like	   any	   act	   of	   consciousness,	   necessarily	  originates	   (as	   Kanai	   also	   argues	   in	   her	   essay)	   in	   the	   physical	   realm.	   	   Hence,	  Hijikata	   writes	   that,	   ‘[e]xpression	   is	   something	   that	   is	   secreted	   of	   itself,	   not	  something	  that	  appeared	  as	  a	  pattern	  for	  some	  purpose’.27	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  understanding	  that	  a	  given	  set	  of	  acts	  is	  a	  deliberate	  and	  intended	  expression	  of	  a	   consciousness	   that	   precedes	   the	   movements	   of	   the	   body,	   is	   erroneous.	  	  Instead,	   physical	   expression	   originates,	   or	   gains	   its	   impetus,	   from	   the	  movements	  of	  the	  body	  in	  dance.	  
                                            26	  Ibid.,	  p.	  162.	  27	  Ibid.,	  p.	  162.	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In	   contrast,	   however,	   to	   our	   tendency	   to	   attribute	   the	   impetus	   of	   our	  actions	  to	  the	  conscious	  realm,	  there	  are	  times,	  according	  to	  Hijikata,	  when	  we	  are	   surprised,	   even	  assaulted,	   by	  our	  own	  acts,	   as	  he	  writes:	   ‘there	   are	   times	  when	  acts	  pierce	  us	  suddenly	  before	  we	  have	  a	  moment	  to	  catch	  our	  breath’.28	  	  Such	  acts	  thus	  create	  a	  corporeal	  awareness	  of	  the	  physicality	  of	  our	  origin	  and	  its	   impetus	  –	  an	  awareness	  which,	   for	  Hijikata	   is	  distinguished	  by	  a	   feeling	  of	  acuteness,	  or	  sharpness,	  which	  he	  articulates	  as	   the	  pain	  of	  being	   ‘pierced’.29	  	  Thus	   here,	   Hijikata’s	   prose	   reveals	   that,	   for	   Hijikata	   (and,	   as	   Kanai’s	   essay	  points	  out,	  for	  Andersen)	  experiencing	  the	  physicality	  of	  the	  self	  and	  its	  origin	  is	   tantamount	   to	  a	   form	  of	  pain	  and,	   in	  particular,	   such	  an	  experience	  evokes	  the	  sharp	  pain	  of	  being	  stabbed	  or	  pierced	  as	  if	  by	  knives.	  	  Put	  differently,	  as	  we	  may	   remember	   from	   the	   discussion	   above,	   Sas	   posits	   that	   butō	   performance	  aims	  at	  reaching	  a	  space	  of	  ‘actuality’:	  a	  sense	  of	  reality	  that	  does	  not	  gloss	  over	  ‘existent	  pain’,	  but	  which	  instead	  delivers	  such	  pain	  as	  a	  shock,	  or	  a	  ‘scandal’	  to	  its	  audience.	  Thus,	  what	  Hijikata	  here	  appears	  to	  be	  describing	  by	  ‘acts	  [which]	  pierce	  us	  suddenly	  before	  we	  have	  a	  moment	   to	  catch	  our	  breath’	   is	   the	  very	  moment	  in	  which	  this	  space	  of	  actuality	  is	  entered	  by	  the	  performer.30	  
As	  should	  be	  readily	  apparent,	  this	  aim	  of	  seeking	  out	  the	  attainment	  of	  actuality	  aligns,	  as	  we	  saw	  in	  Chapter	  One,	  with	  the	  surrealists’	  search	  to	  reject	  linear	   narrative	   methods	   that	   unproblematically	   accept,	   re-­‐inscribe	   and	  reinforce	   the	   world	   ‘as	   it	   is’,	   instead	   preferring,	   in	   their	   artistic	   output,	   to	  emphasise	  states	  of	  tension	  and	  irresolvable	  paradox.	  	  	  Butō	  similarly	  rejects	  all	  
                                            28	  Ibid.,	  p.	  162.	  29	  Ibid.,	  p.	  162.	  30	  Ibid.,	  p.	  162.	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dance	   forms	   (such	   as	   classical	   ballet,	  kabuki	   and	  modern	   dance)	  which	   carry	  out	  a	  set	  of	  pre-­‐established	  moves.	  	  Instead,	  through	  a	  process	  of	  appropriating	  and	  mimicking	  a	  range	  of	  movements	  from	  these	  dances,	  butō	  crucially	  works	  to	   achieve	   the	   reverse	   of	   any	   formal	   coherence,	   and	   to	   break	   up	   those	  recognisable	   narratives	   and	   the	   linear	   rationalisations	   of	   the	   mind	   which	  obscure	  the	  body’s	  precedence	  in	  origin,	  while	  arriving	  at	  a	  state	  of	  awareness	  of	   the	  physicality	  of	   the	   self	   in	   each	  moment.	   	  That	   this	   state	  of	   awareness	   is	  reached	  through	  a	  fragmentation	  of	  narratives	  of	  the	  self	  explains	  why	  Hijikata	  concludes	   his	   description	   of	   such	  moments	   of	   awareness	  with	   the	   disjointed,	  final	  line:	  ‘At	  that	  moment,	  like	  that	  pierced	  emptiness,	  we	  ever	  so	  vividly	  –	  our	  own	   dancing	   girl	   comes	   into	   existence’.31	  	   The	   phrase	   ‘pierced	   emptiness’	  implies	   that	   the	   attainment	   of	   the	   space	   of	   actuality,	   wherein	   origin	   is	  experienced	  as	  a	  sharp	  pain,	   is	  also	  a	  space	  devoid,	  or	   ‘empty’,	  of	  signification	  which	  would	  ordinarily	  construct	  the	  self.	  	  	  Here,	  modern	  linear	  narratives	  have	  been	   successfully	   fragmented.	   	   As	   the	   dancer	   moves	   through	   this	   space	   of	  actuality,	   and	   hence	   beyond	   conventional	   explanations	   of	   the	   self,	   they	  articulate	   a	   collective	  or	  shared	  being	   so	   ‘vivid’,	   so	   tangible	   and	  dynamic,	   that	  Hijikata	  envisions	   it	  as	  a	  body	  that	  belongs	  to,	  but	   is	  disjointed	   from	  both	  the	  dancer	   and	   the	   audience,	   as	   ‘our	   own	   dancing	   girl’.32	  	   In	   other	   words,	   the	  dancing	  girl	  seems	  to	  represent	  to	  Hijikata	  the	  principle	  that	  existent	  pain	  is	  not,	  at	  the	  moment	  of	   its	  articulation,	  experienced	  solely	  by	  the	  dancer,	  but	  by	  the	  entire	   audience.	   For	   Hijikata	   the	   motif	   of	   the	   dancing-­‐girl-­‐in-­‐pain	   is	   thus,	   as	  
                                            31	  Ibid.,	  p.	  162.	  32	  Ibid.,	  p.	  162.	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Kanai	  points	  out,	  precisely	  as	  she	   is	   in	  Andersen’s	  narratives:	  a	  symbol	  of	  our	  shared	  origin,	  a	  sign	  of	  our	  connectedness	  to	  one	  another.	  
Text/Reality/The	  Body	  
It	   is	  precisely	   the	  understanding	  of	   the	  body-­‐self	   as	  an	  originary	   site	   through	  that	  the	  limits	  of	  being	  (pain,	  love,	  birth	  and	  death)	  manifest	  themselves	  which	  is	   fundamental	   to	   Kanai’s	   idea	   of	   ‘the	   corporeal	   text’	   (nikutaiteki	   na	   kotoba),	  wherein	   text	   that	   explores	   and	   tests	   the	   limits	   of	   conventional	   narrative	  meaning(s)	  is	  able	  to	  materially	  transform	  the	  reader’s	  experience	  from	  being	  passive	   to	  being	  participatory;	   from	  being	  merely	  a	  reader	   to	  being	  an	  active,	  creative	   (re-­‐)writer.	   	   Before	   we	   examine	   this	   idea,	   however,	   we	   should	   note	  how	   the	   essay	   of	   Kanai	   that	   discusses	   the	   corporeal	   text,	   ‘Text/Reality/The	  Body’,	  directs	  us,	  in	  the	  first	  instance,	  to	  a	  similar	  understanding	  of	  the	  body	  as	  that	  presented	  in	  ‘Towards	  a	  Theory	  of	  Corporeality’:	  that	  it	  functions	  as	  a	  site	  of	  consciousness	  and	  sentience,	  as	  a	  physical	  entity	  that	  is	  forever	  engaged	  and	  interactive	  with	   its	   surroundings,	   able	   to	   transform	   itself	   and	   others	   through	  the	   exploration	   of	   its	   own	   limits	   and	   limitations.33	  	   However,	   the	   body	   is	  viewed	   in	   ‘Text/Reality/The	   Body’	   through	   a	   consideration	   and	   critique	   of	  prevailing	   cultural	   representations	   of	   text,	   reality,	   and	   the	   body,	   which	  culminates	   in	   the	   essay’s	   depiction	   of	   text	   as	   a	   conscious,	   sentient	   and	  interactive	  body.	   In	  so	  doing,	   ‘Text/Reality/The	  Body’	  thus	  helps	  us	  towards	  a	  better	   understanding	   of,	   and	   further	   develops,	   the	   enigmatic	   conclusion	   to	  ‘Towards	   a	   Theory	   of	   Corporeality’:	   that	   writing,	   in	   its	   two	   senses	   of	   the	  
physical	  act	  of	  writing	  and	  that	  which	  is	  written	  (in	  particular,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  
                                            33	  Kanai	   Mieko,	   'Kotoba/Genjitsu/Nikutai',	   in	  Obasan	  No	  Disukūru	   (Tokyo:	   Chikuma	  shobō,	  1984)	  pp.	  62-­‐68.	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latter,	   those	   texts	   which	   continue	   to	   be	   re-­‐read	   within	   new	   contexts	   against	  which	  they	  are	  repeatedly	  re-­‐understood,	  re-­‐formulated,	  re-­‐appropriated	  and,	  ultimately,	   re-­‐written),	   is	   akin	   to	   corporeality	   in	   that	   such	   writing	   can	   also	  function	  as	  a	  site	  of	  consciousness,	  is	  interactive	  with	  its	  cultural	  surroundings,	  and	   hence	   is	   able	   to	   transform	  both	   itself	   and	   its	   readers	   through	   the	   act	   of	  what	  we	  might	  term	  reading-­‐as-­‐writing.	  
‘What,’	  Kanai	  asks	  in	  the	  essay,	  ‘is	  the	  body?’	  Her	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  begins	  by	  outlining	  how	  the	  body	  can	  be	  understood	  both	  as	  a	  limit,	  as	  an	  object	  which	  encases	  and	   imprisons	  consciousness,	  and	  as	  an	  entity	  which	   is	  able	   to	  transgress	  such	  physical	  limits.	  	  Kanai	  writes:	  
Whereas	  Mishima	  Yukio	  wrote,	   in	  a	   tone	   indistinguishable	   from	  despair	   and	   resignation,	   that	   the	   body	   was	   a	   limit,	   that	  consciousness	  was	  covered	  by	  our	  skin	  and	  unable	   to	   take	  even	  one	   step	   outside	   of	   the	   body,	   recently,	   it	   seems	   as	   though	   the	  thought	   of	  New	  Age	   sciences	   –	   that	   the	   boundaries	   of	   the	   body	  are	  not	  necessarily	  a	  limit	  –	  is	  popular.	  […]	  Even	  so,	  the	  body	  is	  a	  peculiar	  thing.	  34	  	  These	   two	   glancing	   references	   to,	   respectively,	   Mishima	   and	   the	   then-­‐fashionable	  offerings	  of	  the	  New	  Age	  scientists	  form,	  despite	  their	  brevity,	  the	  basis	   of	   the	   two	   models	   of	   accounting	   for	   mind/body/consciousness	   that	  Kanai’s	  essay	  wishes	  to	  critique.	  
Turning	  firstly	  to	  the	  former,	  Kanai’s	  mention	  of	  Mishima’s	  ‘despair	  and	  resignation’	   recalls,	   in	   particular,	   the	   note	   that	   Mishima	   left	   on	   his	   desk	   the	  morning	  before	  his	  failed	  coup	  d’état	  resulted	  in	  his	  ritual	  suicide,	  which	  read,	  
                                            34	  Ibid.,	  p.	  67.	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‘Human	   life	   is	   limited	   but	   I	   would	   like	   to	   live	   forever’.35	  	   This	   note	   and	   his	  consequent	  act	  of	  ritual	  suicide	  suggest,	  as	  Kanai	  intimates	  above,	  that	  Mishima	  never	   ultimately	   escaped	   his	   fundamental	   belief	   in	   the	   dualism	   of	   body	   and	  consciousness,	   and	   that	   he	   aligned	   the	   self	   with	   the	   latter	   rather	   than	   the	  former	   –	   hoping	   somehow	   to	   transcend	   the	   body	   after	   death.	   However,	   it	   is	  arguable	  that	  his	  beliefs	  are	  slightly	  more	  nuanced	  than	  Kanai’s	  brief	  allusion	  in	  her	  essay	  would	  have	  us	  believe.	  His	  1968	  long	  essay,	  ‘Taiyō	  to	  tetsu’	  (‘Sun	  and	  Steel’),	   for	   instance,	  published	  two	  years	  before	  his	  attempted	  coup	  d’état	  and	  ritual	   suicide	   (and	   often	   read	   as	   an	   explanation	   of	   the	   philosophical	   values	  which	   led	   to	   his	   actions	   that	   day)	   problematises	   this	   understanding. 36	  	  Mishima	  relates	  how	  literary,	  rather	  than	  physical	  pursuits	  preoccupied	  him	  as	  a	  child;	  how	  his	  primary	  understanding	  of	  his	  identity	  was	  developed	  through	  words	   rather	   than	   the	   body;	   and	   how	   his	   appreciation	   of	   the	   body	   and	  consequent	  cultivation	  of	  his	  own	  physique	  came	  subsequently.	  	  He	  writes:	  
When	   I	   examine	   closely	   my	   early	   childhood,	   I	   realise	   that	   my	  memory	   of	  words	   reaches	   back	   far	   farther	   than	  my	  memory	   of	  the	   flesh.	   	   In	   the	   average	   person,	   I	   imagine,	   the	   body	   precedes	  language.	   	   In	  my	   case	  words	   came	   first	   of	   all;	   then	   –	   belatedly,	  with	   every	   appearance	   of	   extreme	   reluctance,	   and	   already	  clothed	   in	   concepts	   –	   came	   the	   flesh.	   	   It	   was	   already,	   as	   goes	  without	  saying,	  sadly	  wasted	  by	  words.37	  	  First,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  establish	  that,	  although	  Mishima	  here	  is	  describing	  the	  relationship	   between	   language	   (and	   not	   the	   consciousness)	   and	   the	   body,	   the	  
                                            35	  Damian	  Flanagan,	  Yukio	  Mishima,	  Critical	  Lives	   (London:	  Reaktion	  Books,	  2014)	  p.	  236.	  36	  Yukio	   Mishima,	   Taiyō	   to	   tetsu	   (Tokyo:	   Kodansha,	   1968);	   translated	   as:	   Yukio	  Mishima,	  Sun	  and	  Steel.	  trans.	  John	  Bester	  (Tokyo:	  Kodansha	  International	  Ltd,	  1970).	  37	  Mishima,	  Sun	  and	  Steel.	  p.	  8.	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text	   makes	   it	   evident	   that	   the	   acquistion	   of	   language	   cultivates	   an	   aspect	   of	  selfhood	  which	  is	  distinct	  and	  separated	  from	  the	  body	  (and	  therefore	  implies	  that	  the	  self	  resides	  somewhere	  other	  than	  the	  body	  in,	  for	  instance,	  an	  abstract	  consciousness).	   	   That	   this	   is	   a	   fundamental	   premise	   of	   the	   essay	   is	   later	  confirmed	  when	  he	  writes:	  
Words	   are	   a	   medium	   that	   reduces	   reality	   to	   abstraction	   for	  transmission	  to	  our	  reason,	  and	  in	  their	  power	  to	  corrode	  reality	  inevitably	   lurks	   the	   danger	   that	   the	   words	   themselves	   will	   be	  corroded	  too.	  	  It	  might	  be	  more	  appropriate,	  in	  fact,	  to	  liken	  their	  action	   to	   that	  of	  excess	  stomach	   fluids	   that	  digest	  and	  gradually	  eat	  away	  the	  stomach	  itself.38	  	  This	  passage	  posits	  that	  reality	  needs	  to	  be	  converted	  into	  an	  abstract	  code	  in	  order	  for	  us	  to	  be	  able	  to	  ‘reason’	  (which	  presumably	  here	  entails	  the	  ability	  to	  conceptualise,	  imagine,	  or	  mentally	  recreate	  external	  reality);	  hence	  it	  supposes	  that	   our	   ability	   to	   reason	   is	   somehow	   formed	   through	   an	   abstract	  consciousness,	   all	   the	  while	   removed	   from,	   and	   independent	   of,	   the	  material	  reality	   of	   the	   body.	   Furthermore,	   Mishima	   here	   contends	   that,	   through	   the	  conversion	   of	   reality	   into	   words,	   or	   the	   abstract	   code	   in	   which	   our	   minds	  operate,	   reality	   is	   somehow	   condensed,	   elided,	   reduced,	   or	   ‘corroded’.39	  	   In	  other	  words,	  we	  are	  asked	  to	  consider	  that	  our	  textual	  and	  conceptual	  figurings	  of	  the	  body	  are	  nothing	  more	  than	  attempts	  to	  translate	  material	  reality	  into	  an	  intangible	   abstraction;	   and,	   moreover,	   that	   words	   and	   the	   abstract	  consciousness	  to	  which	  they	  are	  directed	  are	  deficient	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  capture	  the	  original:	  they	  can	  allude,	  but	  never	  describe.	  	  Mishima’s	  essay	  thus	  not	  only	  depicts	   a	   selfhood	   divided	   between	   the	   physical	   and	   the	   abstract,	   but	   also	  
                                            38	  Ibid.,	  p.	  9.	  	  39	  Ibid.,	  p.	  9.	  
 191 
perceives	  these	  two	  categories,	  as	  Kanai’s	  essay	  points	  out,	  as	  working	  against	  each	  other,	  the	  one	  limiting,	  or	  smothering,	  the	  other.	  	  However,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  assertion	  that	  Kanai’s	  essay	  makes	  –	  that	  Mishima	  believed	  the	  body	  was	  a	  
limit	   –	   here	  Mishima	  writes	   that	   concepts	   and	  words	   ‘clothed’	   his	   body	  with	  their	  meanings,	   and	  hence	   implies	   that	   such	   concepts	  and	  words	   conceal	   and	  restrict	   the	   body,	   ‘wasting’	   it	   by	   stripping	   it	   of	   its	   own	   power	   and	   agency.40	  	  Indeed,	   although	   Mishima	   never	   departs	   from	   conceiving	   mind	   and	   body	   as	  entities	   that	   diametrically	   oppose	   one	   another,	   Mishima’s	   essay	   argues	   that,	  among	   other	   things,	   through	   bodybuilding,	   he	   came	   to	   realise	   a	   different,	  physical	  identity,	  which	  was	  also	  bound	  to	  a	  ‘spirit’	  of	  its	  own	  which	  is	  beyond	  both	  the	  body	  and	  the	  mind.	  
Even	  if	  one	  might	  wish	  to	  claim	  that	  Mishima’s	  account	  of	  the	  self	  in	  ‘Sun	  and	  Steel’	   is	  more	  subtle	  than	  the	  straightforward	  argument	  attributed	  to	  him	  by	   Kanai,	   it	   nevertheless	   remains	   that	   his	   understanding	   of	   the	   relationship	  between	   consciousness,	   language	   and	   the	   body	   contradicts	   that	   advanced	   in	  Kanai’s	  earlier	  essay,	  and	  is	  used	  as	  an	  example	  of	  a	  negative	  model	  of	  being	  in	  the	   latter.	   	   In	   ‘Towards	   a	   Theory	   of	   Corporeality’,	   everything	   –	   including	  language	  and	  consciousness	  –	  is	  considered	  as	  arising	  from	  the	  body;	  whereas	  in	   ‘Text/Reality/The	  Body’,	  Mishima’s	   inscription	   of	   the	   dualism	  of	  mind	   and	  body	  is	  used	  as	  a	  metaphor	  for	  texts	  which	  are	  unsuccessful	  in	  creating	  active	  and	  engaged	  readerships.	  	  Kanai	  writes:	  
Among	  all	   our	   various	  discourses,	   including	   those	  which	   are	  not	  necessarily	   popular,	   there	   are	   texts	   that	   are	  unable	   to	   take	   even	  one	   step	   outside	   of	   their	   lost	   internal	   worlds,	   and	   which	   refer,	  perhaps,	   to	   a	   fantastical	   ‘I’	   or	   ‘us’,	   and	   I	   suppose	   that	   they	  must	  
                                            40	  Ibid.,	  p.	  9.	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have	  an	   incorporeal	  body,	  which	  doesn’t	  belong	  to	  the	  body,	  and	  which	   lies	  outside	  of	   the	  body	   like	  a	  wreckage	  of	  used-­‐up	  words	  that	  age	  in	  written	  and	  spoken	  years.41	  	  
In	   this	   passage,	   Kanai	  makes	   an	   alignment	   between	  Mishima’s	   inscription	   of	  
consciousness	  as	  an	  abstract	  entity	  which	  is	  discrete	  from,	  and	  yet	   imprisoned	  by,	  the	  physical	  realm	  of	  the	  body,	  and	  texts	  that	  confront	  the	  reader	  with	  a	  set	  of	   discourses	   which	   are	   divorced	   from	   the	   material	   reality	   of	   the	   reading	  experience	   itself:	   those	   texts	   deemed	   classic	  works	   of	   literature,	   for	   instance,	  whose	   cultural	   presence,	   role	   and	  meaning	   are	   so	   well-­‐established	   that	   they	  actually	   have	   no	   need	   of	   a	   reader	   to	   guarantee	   such	   a	   presence,	   such	   a	   role,	  such	   a	   meaning;	   this	   is	   why	   these	   ‘incorporeal’	   texts	   perhaps	   refer	   to	   a	  	  ‘fantastical	  “I”	  or	  “us”’,	  readers	  who	  are	  present	  in	  the	  text,	  as	  it	  were,	  in	  name	  only.42	  
Kanai’s	  essay	  next	  evokes	  a	  second	  concept	  of	  body	  and	  consciousness,	  which,	  she	  claims	  is	  expounded	  by	  New	  Age	  science,	  in	  which	  ‘the	  boundaries	  of	  the	   body	   are	   not	   necessarily	   a	   limit’.43	  	   She	   then	   deploys	   this	   concept	   as	   a	  metaphor	  for	  the	  way	  in	  which	  certain	  other	  texts,	  which	  she	  terms	  ‘corporeal	  texts’,	  are	  able	  to	  overcome	  the	  limitations	  faced	  by	  ‘incorporeal	  texts’,	  and,	  it	  is	  intimated,	   continue	   to	   resonate	   for	   their	   readers.	   	  Although	   the	  essay	  neither	  provides	  the	  reader	  with	  specific	  examples	  of	  ‘incorporeal’	  or	  ‘corporeal’	  texts,	  nor	   lists	   nor	   details	   their	   distinguishing	   features,	   Kanai’s	   two	  metaphors	   for	  
                                            41	  Kanai,	  ‘Kotoba/genjitsu/nikutai’,	  p.	  67-­‐68.	  42	  Ibid.,	  p.67.	  43	  Ibid.,	  p.67.	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text	   can,	   nevertheless	   be	   taken	   as	   a	   commentary	   which	   sets	   out	   to	   critique	  conventional	  understandings	  of	  reading	  and	  writing.	  
	  
Before	   we	   attempt	   to	   ascertain	   more	   clearly	   what	   Kanai’s	   division	   of	  texts	   as	   being	   either	   corporeal	   or	   incorporeal	   actually	   achieves,	   it	   is	   first	  necessary	   to	   revisit	   and	   contextualise	   her	   statement	   (quoted	   above)	   that	  ‘recently,	   it	   seems	   as	   though	   the	   thought	   of	   New	   Age	   sciences	   –	   that	   the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  body	  are	  not	  necessarily	  a	  limit	  –	  is	  popular.’44	  	  Specifically,	  we	  need	  to	  consider	  how,	  for	  the	  New	  Age	  sciences,	  the	  body	  can	  be	  understood	  to	  exceed	  the	  limitations	  of	  its	  own	  materiality.	  
The	  term	  ‘New	  Age	  science’	  is	  arguably	  too	  homogenising,	  as	  it	  has	  been	  used	   to	   describe	   a	   vast	   range	   of	   theories	   and	   discourses,	   some	   of	   which	   are	  more	   rigorously	   ‘scientific’	   than	   others.	   However,	   around	   the	   time	   of	   Kanai’s	  writing,	  various	  respected	  members	  of	   the	  scientific	  community	   in	   the	  United	  States	   were	   producing	   articles	   and	   books	   that	   drew	   parallels	   between	  advanced	   new	   theories	   in	   physics	   or	   neuroscience	   and	   (particularly	   eastern)	  mystical	   accounts	   of	   the	   universe.	   	   These	   books,	   as	   Kanai	   notes,	   became	  extremely	  popular	   (not	   only	   in	   Japan	  but	  worldwide).	   	   They	   include,	   notably,	  biologist	  Humberto	  R.	  Maturana’s	  ‘Biology	  of	  Cognition’	  (1970),	  neuroscientist	  Karl	  H	  Pribam’s	  Languages	  of	  the	  Brain:	  Experimental	  Paradoxes	  and	  Principles	  
in	  Neuropsychology	   (1971),	  physicist	  Fritjof	  Capra’s	  The	  Tao	  of	  Physics	  (1975),	  
                                            44	  Ibid.,	  p	  67.	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and	   physicist	   David	   Bohm’s	   Wholeness	   and	   the	   Implicate	   Order	   (1980).45	  Collectively,	  these	  texts	  offered	  a	  profound	  challenge	  to	  conventional	  scientific	  and	  philosophical	  models,	  such	  as	  Newtonian	  physics	  and	  Cartesian	  dualism.46	  	  	  For	  example,	  with	  specific	  regard	  to	  the	  collapse	  of	  any	  mind/body	  distinction	  or	   categorisation,	   Fritjof	   Capra	   (writing	   retrospectively	   in	   1996)	   notes	   how,	  according	   to	   the	   ‘Santiago	   theory’	  of	  Maturana	  and	  biologist	  Francisco	  Varela,	  cognition	  is	  defined	  as	  a	  process,	  and	  one	  which	  is	  common	  to	  all	  organic	  life:	  
According	   to	   the	  Santiago	   theory,	   the	  brain	   is	  not	  necessary	   for	  the	  mind	  to	  exist.	  	  A	  bacterium,	  or	  a	  plant,	  has	  no	  brain	  but	  has	  a	  mind.	  	  The	  simplest	  organisms	  are	  capable	  of	  perception	  and	  thus	  of	   cognition.	   	   They	   do	   not	   see,	   but	   they	   nevertheless	   perceive	  changes	   in	   their	   environment	   –	   differences	   between	   light	   and	  shadow,	  hot	   and	   cold,	  higher	  and	   lower	   concentrations	  of	   some	  chemical,	   etc.	   	   […]	  The	  new	  concept	  of	   cognition,	   the	  process	  of	  knowing,	  is	  thus	  much	  broader	  than	  that	  of	  thinking.	  	  It	  involves	  perception,	  emotion,	  and	  action	  –	  the	  entire	  process	  of	  life.	  	  In	  the	  human	   realm	   cognition	   also	   includes	   language,	   conceptual	  thinking	  and	  all	  the	  other	  attributes	  of	  human	  consciousness.	  	  […]	  	  The	   Santiago	   theory	   provides,	   in	   my	   view,	   the	   first	   coherent	  
                                            45	  The	  full	  references	  for	  these	  works	  and	  their	  translations	  into	  Japanese	  are:	  David	  Bohm,	  Wholeness	   and	   the	   Implicate	  Order	   (London:	   Routledge,	   1980)	   (translated	   as:	  David	  Bohm,	  Zentaisei	  to	  naizo	  chitsujo.	  trans.	  Sano	  Masahiro,	  Inoue	  Tadashi,	  Itō	  Shakō	  [Tokyo:	   Seidosha,	   1986]);	   Fritjof	   Capra,	   The	   Tao	   of	   Physics	   (Berkeley,	   California:	  Shambhala	  Publications,	  1975)	  (translated	  as:	  Taoshizengaku.	  trans.	  Tanaka	  Mitsuhiko,	  Yoshifuku	  Shinichi,	  Shimada	  Hiromi	  and	  Nakayama	  Naoko	  [Tokyo:	  Kōsakusha,	  1980]);	  Humberto	   R.	   Maturana,	   'Biology	   of	   Cognition',	   in	   Biological	   Computer	   Laboratory	  
Research	  Report	   (Illinois:	   University	   of	   Illinois,	   1970)	   (later	   reprinted	   in	  Autopoiesis	  
and	  Cognition:	  The	  Realization	  of	  the	  Living	  [Dordecht:	  D.	  Reidel	  Publishing	  Co.,	  1980]	  pp.	   5-­‐58);	   and	   Karl	   Pribam,	   Languages	   of	   the	   Brain:	   Experimental	   Paradoxes	   and	  
Principles	  in	  Neuropsychology	  (New	  Jersey:	  Prentice-­‐Hall,	  1971)	  (translated	  as:	   	  Nō	  no	  
gengo:	   Jikken	   jō	  no	  paradokkusu	   to	   shinkei	   shinrigaku	  no	  genri	   [Tokyo:	   Seishinshobō,	  1978]).	  46 	  The	   main	   contention	   behind	   Maturana’s	   ‘Biology	   of	   Cognition’,	   namely	   that	  cognition	   is	   a	   biological	   process,	   is	   summarised	   by	   Capra’s	   outline	   of	   the	   Santiago	  Theory	   below;	   Pribam’s	   Language	   of	   the	   Brain	   sets	   out	   how	   the	   brain	   processes	  information	   through	   storage	   networks	   which	   are	   spread	   across	   the	   whole	   brain;	  Capra’s	   Tao	   of	   Physics	   (very	   controversially)	   seeks	   to	   demonstrate	   how	   modern	  physics	   offers	   a	  world	   view	  which	   correlates	   to	   the	  mystical	   visions	   of	   Buddha	   and	  Krishna;	  and	  Bohm’s	  Wholeness	  and	  the	  Implicate	  Order	  sets	  out	  how	  recent	  findings	  in	  quantum	   physics	   challenge	   conventional	   western	   conceptions	   of	   self	   as	   separate,	  independent	  from,	  and	  objective	  of,	  the	  surrounding	  reality.	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scientific	   framework	   that	   really	   overcomes	   the	   Cartesian	   split.	  	  Mind	   and	   matter	   no	   longer	   appear	   to	   belong	   to	   two	   separate	  categories	  but	  are	  seen	  as	  representing	  merely	  different	  aspects,	  or	  dimensions,	  of	  the	  same	  phenomenon	  of	  life.47	  	  
The	  claim	  that	  cognition,	  or	  knowing,	  is	  a	  physiological	  process	  recalls	  Kanai’s	  assertion	   that	   ‘“to	   physically	   know”	   is	   […]	   the	   only	   way	   of	   knowing’.	   Taken	  together,	   they	   both	   subvert	   any	   implicit	   hierarchy	   which,	   through	   the	  alignment	   of	   the	   thinking	   subject	   with	   an	   abstract	   consciousness,	   privileges	  intellect,	  while	  either	  vilifying	  or	  fetishising	  the	  physical	  acts	  of	  the	  body-­‐as-­‐an-­‐object.	   Of	   course,	   the	   challenge	   to	   the	   mind/body	   binary	   opposition	  fundamental	   to	   Cartesian	   dualism	   has	   not	   only	   come	   from	   the	   New	   Age	  scientists	   of	   the	   1970s.	   	   Feminist	   theory	   has	   also	   sought	   to	   question	   the	  apparent	  self-­‐evidence	  of	   the	  opposition,	   in	  order	  to	  highlight	  and	  interrogate	  the	  societal	  alignment	  of	  the	  male	  with	  the	  mind	  and	  the	  female	  (as	  child	  bearer,	  or	   sexual	   object,	   for	   instance)	   with	   the	   body.	   	   (As	   we	   saw	   in	   Chapter	   One,	  Japanese	   female	   writers	   such	   as	   Takahashi	   Takako,	   Kurahashi	   Yumiko	   and	  Tsushima	   Yūko	   actively	  made	   such	   alignment	   themselves.)	   	   Indeed,	   many	   of	  these	   feminist	   texts	   have	   focussed	   specifically	   on	   reconfiguring	   the	   body	   in	  order	   to	   demonstrate	   how	   it	   can	   transgress	   the	   limitations	   that	   Cartesian	  dualism	  imposes.	  48	  	  	  It	  is	  through	  a	  consideration	  of	  this	  feminist	  challenge	  to	  
                                            47	  Fritjof	  Capra,	  The	  Web	  of	  Life:	  A	  New	  Synthesis	  of	  Mind	  and	  Matter	  (London:	  Harper	  Collins,	  1996).	  p.	  170.	  	  48	  Feminist	   publications	   that	   critique	   classical	   scientific	   discourse	   and	  methodology	  include:	  Sandra	  Harding,	  The	  Science	  Question	  in	  Feminism	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	   1987);	   Nancy	   Tuana	   (Ed.)	   Feminism	   and	   Science	   (Indiana	   University	   Press,	  1989);	  Evelyn	  Fox;	  Longino	  Keller,	  Helen	  E	  ed.	  Oxford	  Readings	  in	  Feminism:	  Feminism	  
and	  Science	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1996);	  Angela	  N	  H	  Creager,	  Feminism	  in	  
Twentieth-­‐Century	   Science,	   Technology	   and	   Medicine	   (Chicago:	   The	   University	   of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2001).	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the	  mind/body	  hierarchy	  that	  we	  can	  inch	  closer	  to	  a	  clearer	  understanding	  of	  Kanai’s	  ‘corporeal’	  and	  ‘incorporeal’	  text	  and	  of	  the	  radical	  potential	  contained	  in	  the	  former.	  
Elizabeth	  Grosz,	   in	  her	  book,	  Volatile	  Bodies,	  describes	  various	  ways	   in	  which	  the	  body	  can	  be	  understood	  to	  exceed	  its	  supposed	  materiality	  (recalling,	  and	  echoing	  incidentally,	  Kanai’s	  phrase	  ‘the	  body	  is	  a	  peculiar	  thing’):	  
The	  body	  is	  a	  most	  peculiar	  ‘thing,’	  for	  it	  is	  never	  quite	  reducible	  to	   being	  merely	   a	   thing;	   nor	   does	   it	   ever	   quite	  manage	   to	   rise	  above	  the	  status	  of	  thing.	  	  Thus	  it	  is	  both	  a	  thing	  and	  a	  nonthing,	  an	   object,	   but	   an	   object	   which	   somehow	   contains	   or	   coexists	  with	   an	   interiority,	   an	   object	   able	   to	   take	   itself	   and	   others	   as	  subjects,	  a	  unique	  kind	  of	  object	  not	  reducible	   to	  other	  objects.	  	  Human	  bodies,	  indeed	  all	  animate	  bodies,	  stretch	  and	  extend	  the	  notion	   of	   physicality	   that	   dominates	   the	   physical	   sciences,	   for	  animate	   bodies	   are	   objects	   necessarily	   different	   from	   other	  objects;	   they	   are	   materialities	   that	   are	   uncontainable	   in	  physicalist	  terms	  alone.	  	  If	  bodies	  are	  objects	  or	  things,	  they	  are	  like	   no	   others,	   for	   they	   are	   the	   centers	   of	   perspective,	   insight,	  reflection,	   desire,	   agency.	   	   They	   require	   quite	   different	  intellectual	  models	   than	   those	   that	   have	   been	   used	   thus	   far	   to	  represent	   and	   understand	   them.	   	   I	   am	   not	   suggesting	   that	  medical,	   biological,	   even	   chemical	   analyses	   of	   the	   body	   are	  ‘wrong’	  or	   ‘inappropriate’;	  my	  claim	  is	  the	  simpler	  one	  that	  the	  guiding	   assumptions	   and	   prevailing	   methods	   used	   by	   these	  disciplines	   (indeed,	  by	  any	  disciplines)	  have	   tangible	  effects	  on	  the	   bodies	   studied.	   Bodies	   are	   not	   inert;	   they	   function	  interactively	   and	   productively.	   They	   act	   and	   react.	   	   They	  generate	  what	  is	  new,	  surprising,	  unpredictable	  .49	  
	  
The	  first	  thing	  to	  note	  in	  Grosz’s	  text	  is	  that	  her	  definition	  of	  the	  body	  (a	  thing	  and	   a	   nonthing)	   is,	   like	   Kanai’s	   model	   of	   the	   body	   which	   New	   Age	   Science	  describes,	   also	   predicated	   upon	   the	   notion	   that	   it	   is	   conceptually	   indivisible	  from	   consciousness:	   it	   is	   not	   an	   object	   which	   somehow	   contains	   or	   coexists	  
                                            49	  Grosz,	   E.	   (1994)	   Volatile	   Bodies:	   Towards	   a	   Corporeal	   Feminism.	   Indiana:	   Indiana	  University	  Press.	  p.	  xi.	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with	  an	  intellect.	  	  	  It	  is	  not	  our	  minds	  which	  are	  ‘centers	  of	  perspective,	  insight,	  reflection,	  desire,	  agency’,	  but	  our	  bodies;	  hence	  it	   is	  the	  body,	  and	  not	  a	  mind	  that	   is	   separate	   from	   the	   body,	   which	   is	   ‘able	   to	   take	   itself	   and	   others	   as	  subjects’.50	  	  The	  second	  thing	  to	  note	   is	   that	  Grosz’s	  bodies	  are	  also	  situtated	  within	   an	   interactive	   context	   of	   social,	   cultural	   and	   scientific	   practices,	   all	   of	  which	   are	  deemed	   to	   ‘have	   tangible	   effects’	   on	   them	  which,	   she	   intimates,	   go	  unacknowledged.51	  	  Different	   observers,	   as	   it	  were,	   change	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  thing	  observed.	   	  Thus	  Grosz’s	  bodies	  can	  be	  said	   to	  be	  configured	  (at	   least,	   in	  part)	  through	  the	  discourses	  and	  texts	  that	  surround	  them.	  
Very	  simply	  then,	  it	  is	  this	  understanding	  –	  that	  the	  body	  is	  a	  conduit	  of	  
consciousness	  which	  operates	  within	  a	  wider	  matrix	  of	  bodies	  and	  texts	   –	  which	  enables	  us	  to	  view	  how	  the	  body,	  through	  its	  interface	  with	  the	  universe	  around	  it,	  constantly	  exceeds	  its	  material	  boundaries	  by	  interacting	  with	  other	  bodies,	  responding	  to	  information	  and	  texts,	  and	  assimilating	  and	  reshaping	  itself	  to	  its	  environment	  and	  those	  around	  it,	  thereby	  ‘generat[ing]	  what	  is	  new,	  surprising,	  unpredictable.’	   	   It	   is	   precisely	   this	   understanding	   of	   the	   body	   and	   its	  relationship	  to	  other	  bodies,	  texts,	  and	  the	  universe	  at	  large,	  which,	  I	  contend,	  is	  at	  work	  in	  Kanai’s	  description	  of	  the	  corporeal	  text.	  	  Kanai	  writes:	  
[I]f	  we	  are	  to	  suppose	  that	  the	  thing	  which	  we	  call	  the	  body	  does	  not	  necessarily	  belong	  to	  a	  consciousness	  which	  functions	  within	  a	  physiological	  limit,	  surely	  texts	  too	  do	  not	  necessarily	  belong	  to	  the	   specific	   body	   of	   the	  writer	   (lit.	   the	   solid	   body	   of	   the	  writer:	  
kaiteru	  mono	  no	  kotai	   toshite	  no	  nikutai).	   	   Of	   course,	  we	   are	   not	  speaking	  of	  typical	  texts	  (and	  by	  typical	  texts	  I	  here	  refer	  not	  only	  to	  the	  weekly	  magazines	  and	  newspapers,	  but	  also	  to	  poems	  and	  novels)	   that	   are	   weakened	   and	   incorporeal.	   Amongst	   all	   our	  
                                            50	  Ibid.,	  p.	  xi	  51	  Ibid.	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various	  discourses,	  even	  those	  which	  are	  not	  necessarily	  ‘popular’,	  there	  are	  texts	  that	  are	  unable	  to	  take	  even	  one	  step	  outside	  of	  a	  lost	  internal	  world,	  that	  pertain,	  perhaps,	  to	  a	  fantastical	  ‘I’	  or	  ‘us’,	  and	  I	  suppose	  they	  must	  have	  an	  incorporeal	  	  corporeality,	  which	  lies	  outside	  of	  the	  body	  like	  a	  wreckage	  of	  used	  up	  words	  that	  age	  in	  written	  and	  spoken	  years.	  	  Corporeal	   texts,	   by	   which	   term	   I	   do	   not	   mean	   their	   written	  contents,	   but	   texts	   that	   are	   incessantly	   turned	   towards	   the	  ‘exteriority’	  of	  texts,	  that	  quietly	  slip	  through	  the	  limits	  (which	  so	  many	  people	  point	  out:	  the	  limits	  of	  words)	  are	  faced	  towards	  the	  ‘exteriority’	   of	   that	   which	   is	   written	   and	   read,	   as	   a	   complete	  corporeal	  experience.	  	  	  Corporeal	   texts	   are	   completely	   different	   from	   texts	   that	   create	  sexual	  or	  erotic	  images	  (which	  rather	  than	  ‘corporeal’,	  should	  be	  called	  ‘stereotypically	  physiological’),	  rather,	  I	  wish	  to	  assert	  that	  texts	   themselves	   have	   a	   body,	   and	   it	   is	   particularly	   texts	   that	  relentlessly	   attempt	   to	   overcome	   their	   own	   body	   that	   are	   very	  corporeal	  in	  nature.52	  	  In	  Kanai’s	  metaphor,	  the	  writer,	  reader,	  and	  external	  texts	  are	  elided	  together,	  are	   not	   distinguished	   from	   each	   other.	   	   However,	   they	   reveal	   themselves	   by	  constituting	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  corporeal	  text.	   	  The	  act	  of	   ‘slip[ping]	  through	  the	  limits’	   must	   involve	   an	   interaction	   of	   the	   text,	   namely	   its	   being	   re-­‐read	   and	  rewritten.53	  	  By	  being	  re-­‐read	  and	  re-­‐written	  by	  different	  generations,	  cultures,	  and	  in	  different	  contexts,	  the	  corporeal	  text	  takes	  on	  new	  meanings,	  exceeding	  the	  boundaries	  of	   its	   initial	  denotations	  and	  connotations.	   	  The	  reader,	  writer	  and	   external	   texts	   in	   their	   plurality	   thus	   give	   the	   text	   its	   own	   ‘exteriority’.54	  That	   the	   corporeal	   text	   is	   ‘turned	   towards	   the	   “exteriority”	   of	   texts’,	   suggests	  that	  Kanai’s	  active	  physiological	  textual	  bodies	  turn	  towards	  the	  reader,	  writer	  
                                            52	  Kanai,	  pp.	  67-­‐68	  (original	  emphasis).	  53	  Ibid.,	  p.	  68.	  54	  Ibid.	  
 199 
and	  external	  texts,	  that	  they	  invite	  comparison,	  criticism	  and	  re-­‐writing.55	  	  As	  the	   limits	   of	   the	   corporeal	   text	   continue	   to	  be	   exceeded	  with	   each	   re-­‐reading	  and	  re-­‐writing,	  that	  which	  once	  was	  ‘exterior’	  keeps	  shifting.	  	  And	  therefore	  the	  corporeal	  text	  must	  twist	  again	  to	  encompass	  new	  boundaries,	  to	  facilitate	  new	  ways	   in	  which	   it	   is	   read	   and	  written,	   packaged	   and	   conceived,	   to	   locate	   new	  meanings	  for	  itself,	  to	  rewrite	  itself.	  	  This	  process	  results	  in	  ‘texts	  that	  might	  be	  misshapen	   almost	   beyond	   reason’;	   or,	   as	   Grosz	   describes	   the	   interactive	  physiological	  body,	   ‘[t]hey	  generate	  what	  is	  new,	  surprising,	  unpredictable’.56	  	  Kanai’s	   corporeal	   text	   and	  Grosz’s	  physiological	  body	  are	   therefore	   similar	   in	  the	   way	   in	   which	   their	   relentless	   interactivity	   with	   other	   bodies,	   whether	  textual	   or	   physiological,	   enables	   them	   to	   overcome	   their	   status	   as	   an	   object,	  provides	  them	  with	  agency,	  and	  facilitates	  the	  creation	  of	  that	  which	  is	  original	  and	  unique.	  
By	   now,	   it	   should	   be	   apparent	   that	   Kanai’s	   conceptions	   of	   the	  incorporeal	   and	   corporeal	   text	   might	   be	   fruitfully	   considered	   in	   conjunction	  with	  the	  literary-­‐theoretical	  terms	  that	  they	  most	  resemble:	  Barthes’	  notion	  of	  the	   ‘readerly’	  and	   ‘writerly’	   texts.57	  	  For	  Barthes,	   the	  readerly	  text	   is	  one	  that	  
                                            55	  Ibid.	  56	  Ibid.,	  p.	  68	  and	  Grosz,	  Volatile	  Bodies,	  p.	  xi.	  	  57	  Barthes	  writes	   about	   ‘readerly’	   and	   ‘writerly’	   texts	   in:	   Roland	  Barthes,	  S/Z.	   trans.	  Straus	  and	  Giroux	  Farrar,	   Inc.	  (Oxford:	  Blackwell	  Publishers,	  1990).	   	  The	  relationship	  between	  Kanai	  and	  Barthes	  has	  been	  commented	  upon	  by	  Atsuko	  Sakaki	  in	  Sakaki,	  A.	  (2009)	   Breezes	   Through	   Rooms	   with	   Light:	   Kanai	   Mieko	   by	   Roland	   Barthes	   by	   Kanai	  
Mieko.	   	  PAJLS.	  Vol.	  10.	  Purdue	  University	  Press.	  pp.	  204-­‐219,	  p.	  216.	   	  Sakaki,	  stresses	  that	  the	  various	  similarities	  in	  their	  writings	  are	  not	  due	  to	  what	  Sakaki	  terms	  ‘direct	  and	  vertical’	   influence,	  as	   is	  demonstrable	  by	  the	   fact	   that	   they	   include	  passages	  that	  Kanai	  had	  written,	  that	  were	  later	  closely	  echoed	  by	  Barthes,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  other	  way	  round,	  and	  when	  neither	  writer	  would	  have	  had	  access	  to	  the	  other’s	  text	  in	  a	  language	  they	  could	  read.	  	  Instead,	  Sakaki	  concludes,	  such	  influence	  from	  one	  to	  the	  other	  is	  as	  much	   due	   to	   the	   natural	   empathy	   between	   the	  writers	   (who	  have	   broad	   but	   similar	  
 200 
‘can	   be	   read	   but	   not	   written’,	   is	   one	   that	   inhibits	   the	   reader’s	   role	   in	   the	  production	  of	  meaning(s),	   is	   one	   that	   forever	   inscribes,	   defines	   and	  positions	  the	  reader	  as	  fundamentally	  passive.58	  He	  writes:	  
instead	   of	   gaining	   access	   to	   the	   magic	   of	   the	   signifier,	   to	   the	  pleasure	   of	   writing,	   [the	   reader]	   is	   left	   with	   no	   more	   than	   the	  poor	   freedom	   either	   to	   accept	   or	   reject	   the	   text:	   reading	   is	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  referendum.59	  	  
The	   readerly	   text	   is	   thus	   not	   a	   text	   that	   asks	   the	   reader	   to	   think,	   make	  connections,	   or	   interpret.	   For	   Barthes,	   these	   texts	   are	   overwhelmingly	   in	   the	  majority;	   and	   their	   proliferation	   is	   due	   in	   no	   small	   measure	   to	   the	   various	  cultural	   practices	   of	   the	   institutions	   of	  modern	   literature	   and	   its	   criticism.	  At	  the	   very	   outset	   of	   S/Z	  he	   explains	   that	  modern	   literary	   criticism,	   rather	   than	  celebrate	   any	   plurality	   of	   the	   text,	   is	   involved	   in	   attempting	   to	   reduce	   all	  narratives	  to	  the	  same,	  and	  he	  boldly	  declares	  slightly	   later	  that	   ‘any	  readerly	  text	  [is	  called]	  a	  classic	  text’.60	  
In	  contradistinction	  to	  this	  is	  the	  text	  Barthes	  calls	  ‘writerly’,	  which	  will	  ideally	   ‘make	   the	  reader	  no	   longer	  a	  consumer,	  but	  a	  producer	  of	   the	   text’.61	  	  The	   writerly	   text	   demands	   the	   reader’s	   active	   engagement,	   offering	   many	  opportunities	   for	   the	  reader	   to	   intervene,	   to	   interpret	  and	   therefore	   to	  create	  
                                                                                                                           interests	  in	  textiles,	  photography,	  and	  film,	  to	  name	  but	  a	  few)	  as	  it	   is	  to	  Kanai’s	  self-­‐professed	  deep	  enjoyment	  of	  Barthes	  works.	   	   It	   is	  therefore	   ‘horizontal’,	   like	   ‘breezes	  through	  rooms	  next	  to	  each	  other’.	  	  58	  Barthes,	  S/Z,	  p.	  4.	  59Ibid.,	  p.	  4	  (original	  emphasis).	  60	  Ibid.	  61	  Ibid.	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their	  own	  ‘text’.62	  	  It	  is	  ‘ourselves	  writing’	  in	  a	  ‘perpetual	  present’,	  an	  embodied	  entity,	  a	  set	  of	  signifiers	  and	  signifieds	  whose	  meaning	  at	  any	  given	  moment	  is	  contingent	  on	  its	  readers/rewriters:63	  
The	  more	  plural	  the	  text,	  the	  less	  it	   is	  written	  before	  I	  read	  it;	  I	  do	  not	  make	   it	   undergo	   a	   predicative	   operation,	   consequent	   upon	   its	  being,	   an	   operation	   known	   as	   reading,	   and	   I	   is	   not	   an	   innocent	  subject,	  anterior	  to	  the	  text,	  one	  which	  will	  subsequently	  deal	  with	  the	  text	  as	  it	  would	  an	  object	  to	  dismantle	  or	  a	  site	  to	  occupy.	  This	  ‘I’	  which	  approaches	  the	  text	  is	  already	  itself	  a	  plurality	  of	  other	  texts,	  of	  codes	  which	  are	  infinite	  or,	  more	  precisely,	  lost	  (whose	  origin	  is	  lost).64	  	  
In	   this	   excerpt,	   Barthes	   draws	   a	   parallel	   between	   the	   plural	   text,	   which	   is	   a	  composite	  of	  many	  other	  texts,	  and	  which	  therefore	  cannot	  ever	  be	  considered	  ‘complete’,	  offering	  as	  it	  does	  multiple	  interpretive	  possibilities,	  and	  the	  reader	  who	   is	   also	   a	   ‘plurality	   of	   other	   texts’,	   whose	   identity	   can	   never	   be	   fixed,	  predicted	  or	  determined	  in	  advance	  by	  the	  text,	  and	  to	  whom,	  therefore,	  there	  can	   never	   be	   ascribed	   any	   definite,	   locatable	   origin.65	  	   	   Thus,	   unlike	   Kanai,	  rather	  than	  describing	  text	  as	  embodied	  or	  as	  corporeal,	  he	  describes	  the	  human	  subject	  as	  encoded	  by	  and	  within	  an	  infinity	  of	  codes.66	  
                                            62	  Ibid.,	  p.	  5.	  63	  Ibid.	  64	  Ibid.,	  p.	  10.	  65	  Ibid.	  66	  It	   is	   important	   to	   stress	   that,	   by	   ‘code’,	   Barthes	   does	   not	   mean	   a	   finite	   and	  ultimately	   closed	   set	   of	   interpretive	  parameters	   that	   a	  more	   conventional	   use	   of	   the	  term	  might	  imply:	  ‘[W]e	  use	  Code	  here	  not	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  list,	  a	  paradigm	  that	  must	  be	   reconstituted.	  The	   code	   is	   a	  perspective	  of	   quotations,	   a	  mirage	  of	   structures;	  we	  know	  only	  its	  departures	  and	  returns;	  …	  they	  are	  so	  many	  fragments	  of	  something	  that	  has	   always	   been	  already	   read,	   seen,	   done,	   experienced;	   the	   code	   is	   the	  wake	   of	   that	  
already.’	  (Barthes,	  S/Z	  p.	  20.)	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Both	  Kanai	   and	  Barthes,	   then,	   posit	   the	   existence	  of	   two	  kinds	  of	   text:	  one	   which	   is	   bound	   by	   convention,	   which	   does	   not	   easily	   produce	   plural	  meanings,	  that	  conforms	  to	  and	  relies	  upon	  stereotypical	  interpretive	  practices	  and	   conventions;	   and	   one	   which	   transcends	   or	   exceeds	   such	   interpretive	  boundaries,	  forcing	  its	  readers	  to	  interact	  with	  it,	  and	  which	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  a	  singular	  signification.	  	  Returning	  to	  Kanai,	  and	  her	  inscription	  of	  the	  former	  kind	   of	   text	   as	   being	   incorporeal,	   we	   should	   note	   that,	   in	   claiming	   that	   such	  texts	  ‘lie	  outside	  of	  the	  body’	  she	  also	  indicates	  that	  they	  cannot	  engage	  with,	  or	  transform,	   collective	  or	   individual	   textual	   and	  physiological	   identities.67	  Such	  texts	   (like	   Barthes’	   readerly	   texts),	   Kanai	   intimates,	   are	   culturally	   dominant	  because	   of	   the	   sheer	   fact	   of	   their	   ubiquity:	   they	   are	   the	   writings	   which	   are	  popular	  because	   they	  are	  populist;	   they	   include	   the	   specious	  discourse	  of	   the	  Japanese	  literati;	  news	  media	  stereotypes,	  and	  the	  clichés	  of	  commercial	  copy.	  Incorporeal	  and	  readerly	  texts	  are	  thus	  aligned	  through	  being	  characterised	  by	  their	  passivity.	   	  Conversely,	   the	   corporeal	   text,	   the	   interactive	   and	   productive	  text,	  is	  configured	  by	  Kanai	  as	  one	  which	  is	  constantly	  exercising	  and	  testing	  its	  own	   physical	   suppleness,	   turning	   around	   on	   itself,	   and	   continually	   evolving	  beyond	  its	  own	  limits	  by	  sensing	  and	  incorporating	  what	  lies	  beyond	  it.	  
However,	   there	   is	   a	   difference	   between	   these	   two	   conceptions	   of	   the	  writerly/corporeal	   text,	   a	   difference	   due	   in	   part	   to	   the	   semantic	   possibilities	  afforded	  by	   the	   Japanese	   language	   itself:	   as	   Japanese	  noun	   formations	  denote	  both	  the	  singular	  and	  the	  plural,	   in	  writing	  of	  a	   ‘corporeal	  text’	  (nikutaiteki	  na	  
kotoba),	  Kanai	   is	  able	  to	  signify	  a	  variety	  of	  meanings	  simultaneously.	  A	  given	  
                                            67	  Kanai,	  ‘Text/Reality/The	  Body,’	  p.	  68.	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noun	  often	  stands	  not	  only	  for	  a	  thing	  and	  that	  thing	  in	  its	  plural	  form,	  but	  also	  for	  the	  constituent	  parts	  of	  that	  thing:	  for	  instance,	  the	  term	  kotoba,	  which	  has	  been	   translated	   in	   this	   chapter	   as	   ‘text’,	   but	   which	   also	  means	   ‘word’,	   might	  signify	  a	  whole	  text,	  the	  individual	  components	  of	  that	  text,	  plus	  that	  text	  as	  a	  
plural:	  a	  text/a	  word/texts/words.	  Similarly,	  nikutai	  (‘body’)	  refers	  not	   just	  to	  the	   body	   singular	   and	   bodies	   plural,	   but	   also	   to	   its	   fundamental	   constituent,	  ‘flesh’.	   The	   term	  nikutaiteki	  na	  kotoba	   (corporeal	   text)	   thus	  makes	   use	   of	   the	  composite	  nature	  of	  language	  in	  general,	  its	  ability	  to	  interconnect	  concepts,	  to	  form	  whole	   conceptual	   structures	  which	   themselves	   interconnect	  with	   larger	  and	   smaller	   structures,	   simultaneously	   growing	  outward	  or	   contracting	   to	   its	  smallest	   semantic	   constituent	   part.	   	   Indeed,	   one	   might	   argue,	   as	   the	   French	  terms	   for	   text	  (texte)	  and	  subject	  (sujet)	  do	  not	   imply	   their	  construction	   from	  multiple	   parts,	   Barthes	   has	   to	   point	   out	   their	   fractured,	   plural,	   compositional	  nature	  whereas,	  for	  Kanai,	  such	  an	  implication	  is	  already	  present	  in	  the	  terms	  that	  she	  chooses.	  
This	  chapter	  commenced	  by	  arguing	  that	  the	  corporeal	  text,	  challenging	  as	   it	   does	   the	   conceptual	   discreteness	   of	   the	   categories	   text,	   body	   and	  mind,	  also	  problematises	  conventional	  practices	  of	  reading	  and	  writing:	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  corporeal	  text	  is,	  to	  reiterate,	  a	  deliberate	  act	  that	  is	  designed	  to	  transform	  the	  reader	  from	  passive	  recipient	  to	  active	  participant	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  literary	  meaning.	  What,	  then	  might	  such	  a	  corporeal	  text	  actually	  look	  like?	  How	  might	  we	  begin	   to	   enumerate	   the	   textual	   strategies	   that,	   firstly,	   prevent	   a	   slide	   into	  mere	  passive	  acceptance	  of	  a	  given	   text,	   and	   then,	   secondly,	  work	   to	  produce	  and	  facilitate	  the	  reader’s	  participatory	  function	  in	  the	  creative	  process?	  After	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all,	  if	  we	  return	  to	  Barthes’	  S/Z	  for	  a	  moment,	  we	  find	  that	  the	  writerly	  text	  is	  a	  difficult	  beast	  to	  track	  down:	  
There	   may	   be	   nothing	   to	   say	   about	   writerly	   texts.	   First	   of	   all,	  where	  can	  we	  find	  them?	  Certainly	  not	  in	  reading	  (or	  at	  least	  very	  rarely:	   by	   accident,	   fleetingly,	   obliquely	   in	   certain	   limit-­‐works):	  the	  writerly	  text	  is	  not	  a	  thing,	  we	  would	  have	  a	  hard	  time	  finding	  it	  in	  a	  bookstore.68	  	  
To	   try	   to	  account	   for	   the	  writerly	   text	  as	  a	   tangible,	  physical	   commodity	   is	   to	  already	  have	  misunderstood	  it;	  to	  have	  reconfigured	  it,	  then	  re-­‐installed	  it	  back	  within	   the	   conventional	   sociocultural	   frameworks	   of	   literary	   production,	  dissemination	   and	   reception;	   to	   have	   re-­‐situated	   it	   back	   into	   a	   world	   of	  authorial	   world-­‐views,	   literary	   reputations,	   bookshops,	   best-­‐seller	   lists	   and	  professional	   critical	   evaluations.	   The	   writerly	   text,	   however,	   evades	   such	  restrictive,	   culturally-­‐determined	   interpretive	   and	   distributive	   practices,	  existing	  only	  for	  those	  moments	  when	  it	  is	  brought	  into	  existence	  by	  the	  act	  of	  reading	  itself;	  it	   ‘is	  a	  perpetual	  present…,	  it	  is	  ourselves	  writing.’69	  	  It	  is	  in	  this	  latter	   insistence	   that	  Barthes	  comes	  closest	   to	  Kanai’s	   conception,	  not	  only	  of	  the	  corporeal	  text,	  but	  of	  the	  eternally-­‐present	  body-­‐self	  that	  was	  discussed	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  chapter;	  and,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  below,	  one	  of	  the	  challenges	  that	  the	  corporeal	  text	  throws	  down	  to	  conventional	  fictive	  reading	  and	  writing	  practices	   is	   a	   challenge	   to	   the	  conception	  of	   temporality	   upon	  which	  so	  much	  fiction	   is	   epistemologically	   dependent	   –	   the	   beginning,	  middle	   and	   end	   that	  characterise	  conventional,	  linear	  narratives.	  
                                            68	  Barthes,	  S/Z,	  p.	  5.	  69	  Ibid.,	  p.	  5.	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However,	   whereas	   Barthes’	   writerly	   text	   exists	   predominantly	   within	  the	   theoretical	   realm,	   Kanai’s	   corporeal	   text,	   it	   can	   be	   argued,	   has	   a	   more	  demonstrable	  textual	  existence	  (consistent,	  perhaps,	  with	  Kanai’s	  twin	  writing	  identities	  as	  both	  theorist	  and	  practitioner).	  In	  seeking	  to	  demonstrate	  as	  much,	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  her	  short	  story	  'Kūki	  otoko	  no	  hanashi’	  (‘The	  Story	  of	  the	  Inflated	  Man’),	  and	  tries	  to	  test	  how	  far	  one	  might	  fruitfully	  set	  her	  textual	  practice	  alongside	  her	  theoretical	  precepts.	  Of	  course,	  there	  is	  no	  
obligation	   on	   the	   short	   story	   to	   conform	   to	   any	   such	   theories	   in	   the	   name	  of	  authorial	   cohesiveness,	   and	   the	   aim	   is	   not	   to	   judge	   the	   story	   in	   terms	   of	   its	  success	  or	  failure	  in	  that	  (very	  limited)	  respect.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  question	  still	  remains:	  what	  might	  a	  corporeal	  text	  actually	  do,	  in	  order	  to	  figure	  the	  reader	  as	  an	  active	  participant	  in	  the	  creative	  process?	  
	  
‘The	  Story	  of	  the	  Inflated	  Man’:	  the	  Corporeal	  Text	  in	  Practice	  
‘The	  Story	  of	  the	  Inflated	  Man’	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  published	  in	  an	  English	  translation;	  accordingly,	  my	  own	  translation	  is	  appended	  to	  this	  thesis.	  However,	  before	  we	  begin	  to	  discuss	  either,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  even	  the	  bibliographic	  details	  of	  the	  story	  demonstrate	  just	  how	  elusive	  and	  plural	  it	  is	  as	  a	  literary	  text,	  existing	  as	   it	   does	   in	  multiple	   versions	  which	   themselves	   reach	   out	   to	   the	   context	   of	  their	   respective	   publications	   in	   order	   to	   suggest	   its	   multiplicity	   of	   possible	  meanings.	   	   Specifically,	   the	   story	   first	   appeared	   in	   1974	   as	   part	   of	   a	   special,	  themed	   edition	   of	   the	   literary	   magazine	   Shingeki,	   entitled	   Sākasu	   tokushū	  (Circus	  Special).70	  	  This	  edition	  featured	  a	  variety	  of	  disparate	  texts,	  all	  taking	  
                                            70	  Kanai	  Mieko,	  'Kūki	  otoko	  no	  hanashi',	  Shingeki,	  21	  (1974),	  138-­‐44.	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as	   their	   respective	   starting	   points	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   Circus.	   As	   well	   as	   Kanai’s	  story,	   the	   edition	   included	   discussions	   with	   ringmasters	   about	   the	  contemporary	  significance	  of	  the	  circus;	  a	  head-­‐to-­‐head	  discussion	  between	  the	  avant	  garde	  dramatists	  Terayama	  Shūji	  and	  Suzuki	  Chūshi	  on	  time	  and	  space	  in	  the	  Circus;	  and	  essays	  by	  Terayama	  and	  film	  director	  Akune	  Isao.71	  	  The	  story	  also	   appears,	   in	   a	   different	   form,	   which	   has	   become	   the	   more	   widely	  disseminated	   and	   better	   known	   of	   the	   two,	   in	   Kanai’s	   short	   story	   collection,	  
Akashia	   kishidan	   (The	   Knights	   of	   Akashia,	   1976).72	  	   Certainly,	   this	   is	   the	  version	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  only	  piece	  of	  sustained	  criticism	  of	  the	  story,	  by	  Suga	  Hidemi,	   who	   writes	   an	   introduction	   to	   Kanai	   in	   Showa	   bungaku	   zenshū	   (A	  
Complete	   Collection	   of	   Showa	   Literature)	   and	   whose	   comments	   on	   the	   story	  display	   no	   apparent	   awareness	   that	   the	   Shingeki	   text	   –	   and	   context	   –	   exists.	  	  The	   difference	   between	   the	   two	   is	   comparatively	   straightforward:	   in	   the	  
Shingeki	   text,	   the	   story	   has	   an	   unnamed	   framing	   narrator	   who	   briefly	  introduces	  and	  concludes	  the	  story.	   	  (In	  my	  appended	  translation,	  the	  framing	  device	   of	   the	   Shingeki	   text	   appears	   in	   bold.)	   	   The	   particular	   interpretive	  challenges	  thrown	  up	  by	  the	  Shingeki	  frame	  narrative	  are	  discussed	  below.	  	  	  For	  the	  moment,	  suffice	  it	  to	  say	  that	  the	  mere	  fact	  of	  these	  two	  different	  versions	  
                                            71The	   articles	   referred	   to	   are	  Ozawa	   Shōichi,	   Shibuya	  Gasen,	   and	  Yamagami	   Shigeo,	  'Sākasuteki	   kokoro	   (Sākasu	   tokushū)',	   Shingeki,	   21	   (1974),	   100-­‐17;	   Shingeki’s	   serial	  feature:	  Terayama	  Shūji	  	  and	  Suzuki	  Chūshi,	  	  ‘Jikan	  to	  kūkan	  4',	  Shingeki,	  21	  (1974),	  36-­‐51;	   Terayama	   Shūji,	   ‘Sākasu	   	   no	   seijigaku:	   Issunbōshi	   kara	   savari	   made	   (Sākasu	  tokushū)',	   Shingeki,	   21	   (1974),	   82-­‐89;	   and	   Akune	   Isao,	   ‘Sākasu	   no	   dentōgei	   (Sākasu	  tokushū)',	  Shingeki,	  21	  (1974),	  90-­‐99.	  	  72	  The	  version	  of	   'Kūki	  otoko	  no	  hanashi'	  printed	  in	  Akashia	  kishidan	  [The	  Knights	  of	  Akashia]	   (Tokyo:	   Shinchōsha,	   1976)	  was	   subsequently	   reprinted	   in:	   Shōwa	  bungaku	  
zenshū	  31	  (Tokyo:	  Shōgakukan,	  1988);	  Yoshimura	  Akira;	  Kanai	  Mieko;	  Hata	  Kōhei,	  ed.	  
Chikuma	  gendai	  bungaku	  taikei.	   Vol.	   93	   (Tokyo:	  Chikuma	   shobō,	   1978);	  Kanai	  Mieko:	  
Zentanpenshū	  (Tokyo:	  Nihon	  bungeisha,	  1992)	  pp.	  144-­‐52;	  and	  Ai	  no	  seikatsu/	  Mori	  no	  
merujīnu	  [Love	  Life/Melusine	  of	  the	  Forest](Tokyo:	  Kodansha,	  1997)	  pp.	  207-­‐216.	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of	  the	  story,	  and	  of	  the	  two	  necessarily	  different	  readings	  they	  engender,	  can	  be	  seen	   to	   initiate	   the	   process	   whereby	   any	   ‘fixedness’	   of	   interpretation	   of	   the	  story(ies)	  begins	  to	  slide.	  
As	   noted	   above,	   the	   only	   piece	   of	   published	   criticism	  which	   discusses	  ‘The	  Story	  of	  the	  Inflated	  Man’	  at	  any	  length	  is	  by	  Suga	  Hidemi,	  in	  which,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  discussion	  about	  Kanai’s	  literary	  output	  as	  a	  whole,	  he	  argues	  that,	  as	  a	  self-­‐reflexive	  piece	  of	  ‘writing	  about	  writing’	  (kakukoto	  ni	  tsuite	  kaku),	  the	  story	  doubles	  as	  a	  piece	  of	  literary	  criticism	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  writing	  itself,	  with	  such	   self-­‐reflexivity	   achieved	   through	   a	   repeated	   layering	   of	   metaphor	   and	  symbolism	  throughout	  the	  story:	  
Let	  us	  simply	  invalidate	  the	  naïve	  comment	  that	  ‘The	  Story	  of	  the	  Inflated	   Man’	   (1974)	   is	   a	   short	   conte:	   it	   is	   a	   piece	   of	   critical	  fiction.	   	   In	   this	   work,	   ‘watashi’,	   our	   narrator,	   is	   somone	   who,	  because	  of	  the	  ‘Inflated	  Man	  of	  the	  Circus’,	  has	  become	  a	  painter.	  	  	  If	  we	  consider	   ‘painter’	  to	  be	  a	  metaphor	  for	   ‘writer’,	   the	  typical	  structure	  of	  a	  piece	  of	  metafiction	  becomes	  instantly	  discernible.	  	  This	  is,	  moreover,	  because	  the	  Inflated	  Man	  is	  himself	  a	  metaphor	  for	   ‘writing’.	   His	   existence	   is	   predicated	   on	   consumption	  which	  does	  not	   result	   in	   fecundity:	  as	  we	  are	   informed	  by	   the	   Inflated	  Man,	  ‘[f]ood	  is	  something	  that	  becomes	  blood	  and	  flesh	  in	  normal	  bodies	  but	  in	  my	  case	  it	  becomes	  like	  a	  kind	  of	  air,	  a	  hollow	  that	  has	  no	  substance,	  but	  that	  continues	  to	  expand’.	  The	  reason	  why	  this	  constitutes	  a	  metaphor	  for	  ‘writing’	  is	  to	  do	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  this	   piece	   of	   short	   fiction	   is	   also	   is	   structured	   like	   the	   Inflated	  Man.	   	   […]	   The	   painting	   that	  watashi	  draws	   of	   the	   Inflated	  Man	  depicts	   this	   structure	   as	   follows:	   ‘If	   the	   Inflated	   Man’s	   innards	  were	   like	   a	   hollow	   cave,	   I	   would	   be	   able	   to	   fit	   inside	   him,	   all	  curled	  up’.73	  
	  
Any	   metafictive	   text	   forces	   the	   reader	   to	   question	   the	   relationship	   between	  fiction	   and	   reality,	   while	   bringing	   the	   postmodern	   sensibility	   at	   work	   in	   all	  
                                            73	  Suga	   Hidemi,	   'Kanai	   Mieko:	   Hito	   to	   sakuhin'	   [‘Kanai	   Mieko:	   People	   and	   Art’]	   in	  
Shōwa	  bungaku	  zenshū	  (Tokyo:	  Shōgakukan,	  1988)	  pp.	  961-­‐64,	  p.	  964.	  	  
 208 
metafiction	   to	   the	   fore;	  namely,	   that	   claims	   to	   ‘narrative	   truth’	  are	   subjective,	  contingent,	   and	   temporary.	   Hence,	   for	   Suga,	   in	   order	   for	   ‘The	   Story	   of	   the	  Inflated	  Man’	  to	  fulfill	  the	  metafictive	  function	  he	  confers	  upon	  it,	  not	  only	  is	  it	  necessary	  for	  him	  to	  read	  the	  painter,	  watashi,	  as	  being	  the	  symbolic	  writer	  of	  
the	  story,	  but	  also	  to	  read	  the	  Inflated	  Man	  as	  being,	  somehow,	  a	  metaphor	  for	  
the	  writer’s	  story,	   or,	  more	  plainly,	   for	  writing	  itself.	   	  However,	   in	   this	   specific	  instance	  –	  and	  while	  this	  chapter	  concurs	  with	  Suga	  that	  the	  story	  is	  a	  complex	  exercise	  in	  self-­‐referentiality	  –	  his	  account	  of	  the	  story	  will	  ultimately	  be	  found	  to	   be	   unsatisfactory,	   because	   of	   the	   fundamentally	   problematic	   critical	  epistemological	  certitudes	  he	  relies	  on	  to	  underpin	  and	  validate	  his	  argument.	  For	  example,	  and	  most	  strikingly,	  the	  rather	  crude	  formulation	  that	  he	  deploys	  above,	   ‘if-­‐we-­‐consider-­‐x-­‐to-­‐be-­‐y’	   is	   a	   weak	   foundation	   for	   any	   argument.	  Necessarily,	   if	  his	  analysis	  is	  to	  proceed	  untroubled,	  such	  a	  formulation	  has	  to	  avoid	  the	  very	  question	  that	  it	  raises:	  what	  happens	  if	  we	  don’t	  consider	  (in	  this	  instance)	   ‘painter’	   to	   be	   a	   metaphor	   for	   ‘writer’?	   What	   happens	   to	   Suga’s	  reading	  if	  we	  refuse	  to	  make	  the	  interpretive	  leap	  that	  he	  effectively	  coerces	  us	  into	  making	  with	  him?	  Put	  another	  (less	  combative)	  way,	  what,	   if	  anything,	   is	  there	  in	  the	  story	  that	  directs	  the	  reader	  to	  necessarily	  interpret	  the	  narrator’s	  account	  as	  being	  a	  metaphorical	  one?	  	  Without	  any	  immediate	  textual	  support	  for	   his	   position,	   Suga’s	   ‘if-­‐we-­‐consider-­‐x-­‐to-­‐be-­‐y’	   argument	   starts	   to	   look	  suspiciously	   like	   the	   sort	   of	   critical	   injunction	   that	   characterises	   Barthes’	  readerly,	   and	   Kanai’s	   incorporeal	   text:	   it	   presumes	   the	   reader’s	   assent,	   and	  hence	   effectively	   prohibits	   interpretive	   difference.	   Any	   potential	   plurality	   of	  meaning	  is	  denied.	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This	   is	   borne	   out	   by	   the	   rest	   of	   Suga’s	   essay;	   and,	   ultimately,	   Suga	   is	  unwilling	   to	   shift	   from	   a	   retrogressive	   critical	   procedure	   which	   talks	   about	  Kanai,	  her	  writings	  and,	  indeed,	  literature	  generally,	  in	  the	  most	  conservative	  of	  terms.	  
Novels	   cannot	  be	  written	   unless	   there	   is	   a	   given	   narrator’s	   tale.	  	  And	   readers	   can	   only	   read	   their	   tales	   as	   a	   story.	   	   	   Moreover,	  ‘writing	  about	  writing’	  will	  not	  continue	  for	  eternity.	  	  However,	  I	  don’t	  doubt	   for	  a	  minute	  Kanai	  Mieko’s	  claim	  that	  writing	  exists	  like	   a	   dazzling	   accident	   in	   the	   flow	   of	   water	   (or	   words).	   	   Is	   it	  necessary	   to	   say	   once	   again	   that	   Kanai	   Mieko,	   who	   soaks	   her	  body	  in	  that	  miracle	  water	  (words),	  is	  a	  writer	  for	  whom	  we	  are	  eternally	  waiting?	  74	  	  This	   succession	  of	  prescriptive,	   apparently	   common-­‐sense	   statements	   reveals	  the	   extent	   to	  which	   Suga	   is	   uncomfortable	  with	   the	   challenges	   thrown	  up	   by	  Kanai’s	  writings:	   he	   argues,	   ‘Novels	   cannot	  be	  written	   unless	   there	   is	   a	   given	  narrator’s	   tale,’	   a	   given	  narrator	  who	  acts	   as	   a	   coherent,	   unified	  and	  unifying	  bestower	   of	   meaning.75	  	   ‘And	   readers	   can	   only	   read	   their	   tales	   as	   a	   story’	  because	  the	  conventions	  that	  govern	  the	  production	  of	  literary	  meaning	  are	  so	  strong	  and,	  it	  is	  implied,	  so	  unchallengeable,	  that	  ‘readers	  can	  only’	  (literally)	  do	  
as	   they	   are	   told.76	  	   ‘Moreover,	   “writing	   about	   writing”	   will	   not	   continue	   for	  eternity.’77	  	   In	   other	   words,	   Suga	   reassures	   us,	   this	   self-­‐reflexivity	   that	   he	  identifies	   is	  nothing	  more	   than	  a	  modish	   literary	   fashion	   that	  will,	   thankfully,	  pass,	  presumably	  taking	  its	  challenges	  with	  it.	  	  ‘However,	  I	  don’t	  ever	  doubt	  for	  a	  minute	  Kanai	  Mieko’s	  claim	  that	  writing	  exists	  like	  a	  dazzling	  accident	  in	  the	  
                                            74	  Ibid.,	  p.	  964.	  75	  Ibid.	  76	  Ibid.	  77	  Ibid.	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flow	  of	  water	   (or	  words).’78	  This	   statement	   requires	   a	   slightly	  more	  detailed	  gloss;	   but,	   in	   essence,	   Suga	   is	   referring	   to	   Kanai’s	   essay	   ‘Mizu	   kara	   “soto”	   e’	  (‘From	   Water	   to	   “Surface”’)	   in	   which	   she	   likens	   the	   urge	   to	   write	   as	   a	  physiological	  impulse	  akin	  to	  the	  rising	  of	  water,	  and	  tells	  of	  an	  occasion	  when	  her	  body	  ‘came	  to	  feel	  as	  if	  it	  were	  awash	  with	  the	  flood	  of	  the	  word	  reality	  and	  the	  word	  novel’	  until	  she	  put	  pen	  to	  paper,	  and	  the	  writing	  overflowed.79	  	  Suga	  is	   able	   to	   seize	   on	   this	   image	   of	   literary	   activity	   as	   being	   an	   almost	  uncontrollable	  urge	  in	  order	  to	  validate	  his	  last	  point,	  which	  is	  that	  Kanai	  is	  an	  instance	  of	  that	  special	  person,	  an	  Author.	  ‘It	  is	  necessary	  to	  say	  once	  again	  that	  Kanai	  Mieko,	  who	  soaks	  her	  body	  in	  that	  miracle	  water	  (words),	  is	  a	  writer	  for	  whom	  we	  should	  be	  eternally	  waiting.’80	  	  Suga’s	  own	  words	  here,	  if	  not	  water,	  are	   certainly	   gushing;	   and	   in	   adapting	   Kanai’s	   own	   metaphor,	   he	   couldn’t	  demonstrate	   more	   clearly,	   in	   this	   extravagently-­‐paid	   compliment	   to	   Kanai’s	  literary	  ability,	  both	  his	  own	  view	  of	  her	  as	  a	  creator	  of	  literary	  works	  of	  great	  merit	  and	  the	  position	  of	  obeisance	  and	  respect	  he	  assumes	  ‘we’	  should	  adopt	  in	  relation	  to	  them.	  
Suga’s	   determination	   to	   locate,	   or,	   rather,	   install	   a	   unifying	   cohesive	  Authorial	   presence	   called	   ‘Kanai	   Mieko’	   behind/above/before/around	   her	  writings	  neatly	  exemplifies	  the	  critical	  procedure	  famously	  outlined	  by	  Barthes	  in	  ‘The	  Death	  of	  the	  Author’:	  
                                            78	  Ibid.	  79	  Mieko	   Kanai,	   ‘Mizu	   kara	   “soto”	   e’	   [From	  Water	   to	   “Surface”’]	   in	   Kotoba	   to	   'zure'	  [Words	   and	   Slippage]	   (Tokyo:	   Chūōkōronsha,	   1983)	   pp.	   56-­‐133,	   p.	   59	   (original	  emphasis).	  	  80	  Suga,	  'Kanai	  Mieko:	  Hito	  to	  sakuhin'	  p.	  964.	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To	   give	   a	   text	   an	   Author	   is	   to	   impose	   a	   limit	   on	   that	   text,	   to	  furnish	   it	   with	   a	   final	   signified,	   to	   close	   the	   writing.	   	   Such	   a	  conception	  suits	  criticism	  very	  well,	  the	  latter	  then	  allotting	  itself	  the	   important	   task	  of	  discovering	   the	  Author	  (or	   its	  hypostases:	  society,	   history,	   psyché,	   liberty)	   beneath	   the	   work:	   when	   the	  Author	   has	   been	   found,	   the	   text	   is	   ‘explained’	   –	   victory	   to	   the	  critic.81	  	  As	   Suga	   is	   determined,	   as	   Barthes	   might	   term	   it,	   to	   have	   his	   ‘victory’,	   he	   is	  compelled	  to	  ignore	  the	  conclusion	  that	  his	  own	  observations	  are	  leading	  him	  towards:	   namely,	   that	   the	  metafictive	   intertextuality	   that	   he	   discerns	   in	   ‘The	  Story	  of	  the	  Inflated	  Man’	  is	  inescapably	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  interpretative	  closure	  implicit	   in	   his	   critical	   pronouncements.	   	   That	   is	   why,	   ultimately,	   he	   has	   to	  account	   for	   the	   story’s	   intertextuality,	   not	   as	   an	   outward-­‐directed	   textual	  strategy,	   a	   strategy	   that	   ensures	   that,	   as	  Barthes	  puts	   it,	   any	   textual	   ‘unity’	   it	  may	  possess	  ‘lies	  not	  in	  its	  origin	  but	  in	  its	  destination	  [the	  reader]’.82	  	  Rather,	  in	  order	  to	  contain	  ‘The	  Story	  of	  the	  Inflated	  Man’,	  Suga	  has	  to	  reinscribe	  these	  Author-­‐less	  textual	  happenings	  as	  being	  no	  more	  than	  stylistic	  characteristics	  of	  an	  Author	  called	  ‘Kanai	  Mieko’.	  	  If,	  as	  Barthes	  writes,	  criticism	  ‘allot[s]	  itself	  the	  important	   task	   of	   discovering	   the	   Author	   (or	   its	   hypostases:	   society,	   history,	  psyché,	   liberty)’,	   then	   the	   hypostasis	   that	   Suga	   has	   discovered	   is	   one	   called	  ‘intertextuality’.83	  	   In	   other	   words,	   any	   plurality	   of	   meaning	   or	   signification	  becomes,	  for	  Suga,	  neither	  a	  challenge	  to,	  nor	  an	  interrogation	  of,	  conventional	  reading	  and	  writing	  practices;	   instead	   the	  plurality	  of	  meaning	   itself	  becomes	  merely	   emblematic	   of	   Kanai’s	  writing	   style.	   	   It	   then	   follows	   that	   the	   critic	   or	  
                                            81	  Roland	  Barthes,	   'The	  Death	  of	  the	  Author',	  in	  Image,	  Music,	  Text	  (London:	  Fontana,	  1977)	  p.	  147.	  82	  Ibid.,	  p.	  148.	  83	  Ibid.,	  p.	  147.	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reader’s	  recognition	  of	  the	  fact	  of	  intertextuality	  becomes	  the	  final	  destination	  of	   all	   critical	   enquiry.	   That	   recognition	   becomes	   the	   thing	   beyond	   which	  criticism	  cannot	  proceed;	   it	   is	   the	  conceptual	  end	  of	   interpretation	   that	   is	   the	  sure	  sign	  of	  the	  critic’s	  ‘victory’.84	  
Suga’s	  criticism	  of	  ‘The	  Story	  of	  the	  Inflated	  Man’,	  however	  problematical	  we	   may	   find	   it,	   is	   nonetheless	   useful	   precisely	   because	   it	   highlights	   and	  demonstrates	  how,	  so	  often,	  the	  critical	  proceedure	  of	  investigating	  a	  given	  text	  becomes	   an	   exercise	   in	   accounting	   for	   that	   text.	   	   Nevertheless,	   it	   is	   still	   my	  contention	  that,	  provided	  one	  acknowledges	  the	  inevitable	  provisional	  nature	  of	  one’s	   critical	   endeavours,	   one	   can	   still	   fruitfully	   examine	   Kanai’s	   story	   to	  ascertain	  if	   it	   in	  fact	  resists	  the	  interpretive	  closure	  that	  Suga	  seeks	  to	  impose	  upon	  it.	  
Barthes	  says,	  of	  ‘the	  ideal	  text’,	  
that	  the	  networks	  are	  many	  and	  interact,	  without	  any	  one	  of	  them	  being	  able	  to	  surpass	  the	  rest;	  this	  text	  is	  a	  galaxy	  of	  signifiers,	  not	  a	  structure	  of	  signifieds;	  it	  has	  no	  beginning;	  it	  is	  reversible;	  we	  gain	  access	   to	   it	   by	   several	   entrances,	   none	   of	   which	   can	   be	  authoritatively	  declared	  to	  be	  the	  main	  one;	   the	  codes	   it	  mobilizes	  extend	   as	   far	   as	   the	   eye	   can	   reach,	   they	   are	   indeterminable	  (meaning	   here	   is	   never	   subject	   to	   a	   principle	   of	   determination,	  unless	  by	  throwing	  dice);	  the	  systems	  of	  meaning	  can	  take	  over	  this	  absolutely	  plural	  text,	  but	  their	  number	  is	  never	  closed,	  based	  as	  it	  is	  on	  the	  infinity	  of	  language.85	  	  If	   Barthes’	   text	   is	   ‘ideal’,	   of	   course,	   then	   by	   definition	   it	   cannot	   exist.	  	  Nonetheless,	   the	   above	   passage	   indicates	   that	   it	   is	   the	   sheer	   proliferation	   of	  confliciting	  and	  competing	  textual	  signifiers	  that	  inevitably	  presents	  the	  text	  as	  
                                            84	  Ibid.,	  p.	  147.	  85	  Barthes,	  S/Z,	  pp.	  5-­‐6	  (original	  emphasis).	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a	   site	   wherein	   meanings	   are	   constantly	   shifting	   and	   tested.	   	   What	   the	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter	  aims	  to	  do,	  therefore,	  is	  to	  enumerate	  –	  without,	  it	  is	  to	  be	  hoped,	  privileging	  one	  over	  another	  –	  some	  of	  the	  various	  practices	  and	  features	   that	   keep	   ‘The	   Story	   of	   the	   Inflated	  Man’	   perpetually	   enigmatic	   and	  resistant	  to	  interpretive	  closure.	  
Returning	   to	   the	   Shingeki	   edition,	   then,	   already	   we	   see	   Kanai’s	   story	  being	   contextualised	   and,	   as	   it	   were,	   invaded	   by	   the	   plurality	   of	   texts	   that	  surround	   it.	   This	   is	   not	   merely	   to	   state	   the	   banal	   (but	   no	   less	   relevant)	  bibliographic	   fact	   that	   Kanai’s	   story	   originally	   found	   itself	   in	   the	   company	   of	  other	   pieces	   of	   writing;	   rather,	   the	   ‘invasion’	   by	   these	   other	   texts	   is	   actually	  manifest	  in	  the	  textual	  fabric	  of	  the	  story	  itself.	  	  The	  main	  body	  of	  the	  narrative	  begins:	  
Although	   I	   didn’t	   completely	   believe	   the	   story	   of	   the	   circus,	   the	  kidnappers,	   and	   the	   vinegar	   that	   the	   kidnapped	   children	   were	  forced	  to	  drink	  to	  make	  their	  bodies’	  bones	  supple,	  I	  thought	  there	  was	   no	  way	   of	   doubting	   that,	   a	   long	   time	   ago,	   this	   kind	   of	   thing	  really	  happened.	   	  Stories	  like	  this	  used	  to	  hide,	  coolly	  and	  quietly	  in	   the	   ancestral	   ashes,	   in	   the	   middle	   of	   a	   darkened	   room,	   and	  sometimes	  leak	  out	  in	  a	  faint,	  rasping	  voice.	  	  For	  me,	  the	  story	  was	  too	  equivocal	  to	  know	  exactly	  how	  far	  in	  the	  past	  ‘a	  long	  time	  ago’	  was	  supposed	  to	  refer;	  I	  had	  completely	  no	  idea.86	  	  The	   most	   pertinent	   question	   we	   might	   ask	   at	   the	   outset	   of	   this	   narrative	  account	   is	   precisely	   the	   question	   Barthes	   asked	   of	   the	   excerpt	   from	   Balzac’s	  ‘Sarrasine’	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   ‘The	   Death	   of	   the	   Author’:	   ‘Who	   is	   speaking	  thus?’87	  Barthes	  is	  talking	  about	  the	  interpretive	  difficulties	  thrown	  up	  by	  the	  
                                            86	  Kanai	  Mieko,	  'Kūki	  otoko	  no	  hanashi',	  in	  Kanai	  Mieko:	  Zentanpenshū	  (Tokyo:	  Nihon	  bungeisha,	  1992)	  pp.	  144-­‐52,	  p.	  144.	  87	  Barthes,	  'The	  Death	  of	  the	  Author',	  p.	  147.	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apparently	   author-­‐less	   statements	   that	   constitute	   the	   classic	   nineteenth-­‐century	  realist	  third-­‐person	  narrative.	  However,	  with	  ‘The	  Story	  of	  The	  Inflated	  Man’,	   Barthes’	   question	   becomes	   pertinent	   because	   of	   the	   way	   the	   story	  foregrounds,	   at	   its	   very	   outset,	   the	   interpretive	   difficulties	   present	   with	   any	  fictional	   first-­‐person	  narrative,	   in	  which	  any	   implied	  authorial	  voice	   is	   forever	  subsumed	   within,	   or	   obscured	   by,	   the	   narrator,	   so	   that	   the	   two	   are	   forever	  melded	  together,	  even	  as	  they	  forever	  strain	  to	  be	  discrete	  entities,	  locked	  in	  a	  constant	  state	  of	  tension.	  In	  this	  specific	  instance,	  any	  coherence	  of	  narratorial	  voice,	  which	  would	  allow	  the	  reader	  to	  regard	  the	  narrator	  not	  only	  as	  the	  teller	  
of,	   but	   also	   as	   a	   character	   within,	   his	   own	   story,	   is	   compromised	   at	   its	  commencement	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   text	   offers	   the	   possibility	   of	   two	   specific	  referents:	   the	   apparent	   ‘real’	   (but	   fictional)	   world	   referred	   to	   by	   the	   story’s	  main	   narrator,	   and	   the	   actual	   context	   of	   the	   story’s	   inclusion	   within	   the	  
Shingeki	  special	  edition.	  	  This	  might	  seem,	  on	  the	  face	  of	  it,	  an	  odd	  assertion	  to	  make.	   	   	  The	  simplicity	  of	  the	  two,	  short	  introductory	  sentences	  of	  the	  Shingeki	  framing	   device	   (‘I	   was	   introduced	   to	   a	   painter	   who	   only	   painted	   pictures	   of	  caves	  and	   I	   listened	   to	  his	   story.	   	  The	   following	   is	  what	  he	   told	  me.’)	   seem	  to	  define,	   in	   their	   simplicity,	   three	   straightforward	   and	   readily-­‐understandable	  categories:	   author,	   anonymous	   frame	   narrator,	   and	   the	   main,	   secondary	  narrator	  (‘the	  painter’).88	  	  For	  no	  other	  reason,	  than	  the	  inscription	  of	  the	  main	  narrator	   as	   being	  male,	   the	   difference	   here	   between	   female	   author	   and	  male	  narrator	  would	   seem	   to	   be	   clearly	  marked;	   and	   not,	   as	   I	   state	   above,	   on	   the	  point	   of	   collapse.	   	   However,	   it	   is	   my	   contention	   that	   not	   only	   might	   we	  legitimately	  infer	  that,	  in	  the	  narrator’s	  referencing	  ‘the	  story	  of	  the	  circus’,	  and	  
                                            88	  Kanai	  Mieko,	  'Kūki	  otoko	  no	  hanashi',	  in	  Shingeki,	  p.	  138.	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his	  having	   ‘no	  way	  of	  doubting	   that,	   a	   long	   time	  ago,	   this	   kind	  of	   thing	   really	  happened,’	  he	  (as	  a	  fictional	  character)	  is	  referring	  to	  stories	  that	  were	  told	  to	  him	  in	  the	  (fictional)	  past	  of	  his	  (fictional)	  childhood;	  we	  might	  also	  infer	  that	  the	  narrator,	  or	  rather,	  the	  author	  Kanai,	  is	  directly	  referencing	  such	  stories	  as	  alluded	  to	  in	  the	  pages	  of	  the	  magazine	  itself.89	  This	  is	  because	  the	  narrator’s	  ‘story’	   of	   the	   circus	   that	   no	   doubt	   ‘happened’	   is	  mimicked	   in	   the	   round-­‐table	  discussion	  of	  the	  three	  ringmasters,	  published	  in	  the	  same	  edition:	  
	  
Ozawa:	  By	  the	  way,	  are	  we	  saying	  that	  ‘The	  World	  of	  the	  Circus’	  is	  successful,	   and	   that	   the	   circus	   itself	   has	   overcome	   its	   bad	  reputation?	  –	  for	  people	  of	  my	  generation	  and	  older,	  when	  we	  were	  children	  [we	  thought	  that]	  the	  circus	  was	  an	  extremely	  bad	  place;	  if	  we	  didn’t	  listen	  to	  what	  was	  being	  said	  there	  would	  be	  the	  threat,	  ‘we’ll	  sell	  you	  to	  the	  circus’	  –	  that	  kind	  of	   thing	  was	   in	  everyone’s	  heads	   –	   and	   in	   films	   or	   in	   novels,	   if	   someone	   did	   something	   bad	  they	  would	  immediately	  run	  away	  to	  the	  circus;	  circus	  people	  were	  always	   doing	   bad	   things,	   and	   to	   be	   on	   stage	   was	   thought	   to	   be	  extremely	  sad	  –	  I	  think	  those	  kinds	  of	  tragic	  stories	  were	  extremely	  prevalent,	   but	   now,	   in	   contrast,	   I	   get	   the	   feeling	   things	   are	  much	  better.	  
Yamagami:	   In	   Japan	   generally,	   the	   image	   of	   the	   circus	   is	   bad,	  buying	  and	  selling	  children	  and…	  
Shibuya:	  I	  think	  it	  never	  happened,	  not	  in	  our	  circus….	  
Ozawa:	   But	   let’s	   say	   it	   did	   happen,	   it	   isn’t	   just	   the	   circus,	   in	   all	  kinds	  of	  arenas	  that	  sort	  of	  thing	  must	  have	  happened	  in	  the	  past.	  90	  	  
The	   similarities	  between	   the	   excerpt	   from	   the	   story	   and	   the	  panel	  discussion	  are	   unmistakeable;	   and	   set	   alongside	   one	   another,	   they	   cannot	   help	   but	  resonate	  with	  one	  another.	  One	  has	  to	  choose	  one’s	  language	  carefully	  here,	  of	  
                                            89	  Kanai	  Mieko,	  'Kūki	  otoko	  no	  hanashi',	  in	  Kanai	  Mieko:	  Zentanpenshū,	  p.	  144.	  90	  Ozawa	  Shōichi,	   Shibuya	  Gasen,	   and	  Yamagami	  Shigeo,	   'Sākasuteki	  kokoro	   (Sākasu	  tokushū)',	  Shingeki,	  p.	  101.	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course:	  the	  formulation	  I	  use	  above,	  ‘the	  narrator’s	  “story”	  …	  is	  mimicked	  in	  the	  round-­‐table	  discussion’,	   has	   the	  unintentional	   effect	  of	   creating	  a	  hierarchical	  structure	  in	  which	  the	  voices	  of	  the	  discussion	  are	  subservient	  to	  the	  narrative	  voice	   of	   the	   story,	   precisely	   because	   the	   latter	   is	   deemed	   to	   be	   the	   anterior,	  precedent	   one.	   	   A	   different	   formulation	   might	   have	   the	   same	   effect:	   ‘the	  narrator’s	   “story”	  …	   is	   echoed	  by	   the	   round-­‐table	   discussion.’	   	  Mindful	   of	   the	  need	  to	  avoid	  such	  privileging	  of	  one	  text	  over	  another,	   therefore,	  one	  should	  stress	   that	   the	   installation	   of	   such	   a	   hierarchy	   is	   due	   to	   a	   certain	   mode	   of	  reading,	   a	   mode	   which	   likes	   to	   think	   in	   terms	   of	   origins,	   consequences,	  influences	  and	  derivations,	  and	  which	  ultimately	  creates	  an	  Author	  who	  serves	  to	  underwrite	  all	  permissible	   interpretations,	  with	   the	  round-­‐table	  discussion	  then	  being	  reconfigured	  as	  a	  ‘source’	  of	  the	  Kanai	  story.	  As	  Barthes	  puts	  it:	  ‘The	  
explanation	  of	  a	  work	  is	  always	  sought	  in	  the	  man	  or	  woman	  who	  produced	  it,	  as	  if	  it	  were	  always	  in	  the	  end,	  through	  the	  more	  or	  less	  transparent	  allegory	  of	  the	  fiction,	  the	  voice	  of	  a	  single	  person,	  the	  author	   ‘confiding’	   in	  us.’91	  Rather,	  however,	  through	  their	  being	  set	  beside	  one	  another	  in	  the	  magazine,	  the	  voices	  of	  the	  panel	  and	  the	  narrative	  voice	  of	  the	  story	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  operate	  in	  the	  way,	   as	   we	   have	   already	   quoted	   from	   S/Z,	   that	   Barthes’	   ideal	   text	   does:	   ‘the	  networks	  are	  many	  and	  interact,	  without	  any	  one	  of	  them	  being	  able	  to	  surpass	  the	   rest’.92	  This	   returns	   us	   to	   the	   question	   ‘Who	   is	   speaking	   thus?’;	   and,	   by	  now,	  it	  will	  have	  become	  apparent,	  that	  the	  answer	  is	  far	  from	  straightforward:	  is	   it	  an	   implied	  authorial	   ‘I’	   referring	  directly	   to	   the	  pages	  surrounding	  her	   in	  the	  magazine?;	   is	   it	  a	   fictional	   ‘I’	  coincidentally	   talking	   in	  a	  similar	  vein	  to	  the	  
                                            91	  Barthes,	  ‘Death	  of	  the	  Author’,	  p.143.	  92	  Barthes,	  S/Z,	  p.	  5.	  
 217 
three	   ringmasters?;	   is	   it	   a	   fictional	   ‘I’	   deliberately	   shattering	   any	   illusion	   of	  fictive	  reality	  through	  the	  deployment	  of	  a	  deliberative	  metatextual	  allusion	  to	  the	  Shingeki	  framework	  of	  the	  story?	  Even	  if	   it	   is	  none	  of	  these,	  of	  course,	   the	  mere	  fact	  of	  the	  juxtaposition	  of	  the	  Kanai	  story	  with	  the	  accounts	  of	  the	  three	  ringmasters	  serves	  to	  liberate	  the	  text	  from	  a	  ‘single	  “theological”	  meaning	  (the	  “message”	   of	   the	  Author-­‐God)’,	   reaffirming	   its	   status	   as	   	   ‘a	  multi-­‐dimensional	  space	  in	  which	  a	  variety	  of	  writings,	  none	  of	  them	  original,	  blend	  and	  clash.’93	  
Moreover,	  the	  question	  of	  who	  is	  speaking	  is	  complemented,	  and	  further	  problematised,	  by	  –	  as	  we	  have	  already	  seen	  –	  a	  different	  question:	  what	  is	  the	  referent?	  If	  we	  turn	  to	  the	  excerpt	  from	  ‘The	  Story	  of	  the	  Inflated	  Man’	  quoted	  above,	  for	  instance,	  it	  becomes	  apparent	  that	  the	  immediate	  referent	  (the	  thing	  that	   allegedly	   happened	   to	   children	   at	   the	   circus)	   becomes	   conflated	  with	   its	  own	  narrative	  inscription	  (the	  story	  about	  the	  thing	  that	  allegedly	  happened	  to	  children	   at	   the	   circus).	   Such	   a	   conflation	   thus	   serves	   not	   only	   to	   render	   the	  (fictional)	   ‘truth’	   alluded	   to	   more,	   as	   it	   were,	   inaccessible;	   it	   also	   has	   the	  concomitant	  effect	  of	  highlighting	   the	  mode	  of	  narration	  rather	   than	   the	   thing	  
being	   narrated.	   This,	   then,	   is	   complicated	   further	   still	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  narrative	   voice	   uses,	   to	   relate	   these	   prefatory	   remarks,	   negative	   verbal	  constructions,	   constructions	   that	   have	   the	   effect	   of	   complicating	   any	   simple,	  ostensible	   correspondence	   between	   word	   and	   (fictional)	   world	   necessary	   to	  the	   textual	   self-­‐effacement	   that,	   in	   turn,	   is	   necessary	   to	   the	   realist	   illusion.	  Hence	   it	   is	   written:	   ‘[a]lthough	   I	   didn’t	   completely	   believe…’	   (zenmenteki	   ni	  
shinyō	   shiteita	   wake	   de	   wa	   nakatta	   keredo);	   and	   ‘I	   had	   no	   way	   of	   doubting	  
                                            93	  Barthes,	  ‘Death	  of	  the	  Author’,	  p.	  146.	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that…’	   (utagaiyō	   no	   nai	   koto).94	  As	   narrative	   statements,	   they	   both	   serve	   to	  distance	   the	   reader	   from	   the	   alleged	   remembered	   past	   that	   the	   narrator	   is	  alluding	   to,	   through	   their	   fundamental	   provisionality.	   They	   both	   serve,	   as	  qualifying	   statements,	   to	   cast	   doubt	   on	   the	   reliability	   of	   our	   narrator,	   even	  before	  we	  have	  any	  kind	  of	  coherent	  notion	  as	  to	  who	  our	  narrator	  ‘is’.	  In	  other	  words,	   through	   their	   negative	   formulation,	   the	   above	   statements	   are	   not	   so	  conducive	  to	  being	  susceptible	  to	  that	  willing	  suspension	  of	  disbelief	  necessary	  to	   the	   illusion	   of	   literary	   realism.	   Instead,	   what	   becomes	   inevitably	  foregrounded	  is	  the	  indistinctness	  of	  the	  narrator’s	  memory.	  (This	  foregrounding	  continues	   throughout	   the	   story,	   as	   the	   narrator	   continually	   qualifies	   his	  narrative	  with	  conventional	  expressions	  of	  recollective	  ambivalence:	  ‘[a]s	  far	  as	  I	  can	  remember’	  [watashi	  no	  kioku	  shiteiru	  kagiri	  de	  wa];	   ‘there	  is	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  the	  distant	  view	  of	  the	  tent	  about	  which	  my	  memory	  is	  inaccurate’	  [tento	  no	  
enkei	  toiu	  koto	  de	  aru	  ga,	  sore	  ni	  tsuite	  watashi	  no	  kioku	  wa	  fuseikaku	  de];	  ‘as	  far	  as	  I	  can	  remember’	  [oboeteitemo].)95	  In	  this	  way,	  with	  the	  opening	  sentences	  of	  ‘The	   Story	  of	   the	   Inflated	  Man’,	   the	   reader	   is	   left	   primarily	   contemplating	   the	  
mode	  of	  narration	  itself,	  rather	  than	  any	  successfully-­‐realised	  fictional	  world.	  	  
If	  we	  then	  turn	  to	  our	  excerpt	   from	  the	  round-­‐table	  discussion,	  we	  see	  that	  precisely	  the	  sort	  of	  referential	  difficulties	  encountered	  in	  the	  excerpt	  from	  the	   story	   obtain	   here	   (magnified	   by	   the	   sheer	   multiplicity	   of	   the	   voices	   on	  offer):	  just	  as	  it	  is	  in	  the	  story,	  the	  circus	  becomes	  a	  thing	  about	  which	  stories	  are	   told:	   it	   has	   ‘a	   bad	   reputation’;	   stories	   abound	   in	   films,	   novels	   and	   ‘in	  
                                            94	  Kanai,	  'Kūki	  otoko	  no	  hanashi',	  in:	  Kanai	  Mieko:	  Zentanpenshū,	  p.	  144.	  95	  Ibid.,	  p.	  145.	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everyone’s	   heads’;	   it	   is	   a	   place	   that	   generates	   ‘tragic	   stories’.96	  It	   further	  correlates	   to	   the	  Kanai	   text,	  moreover,	   in	   the	  way	   that	   these	   very	   stories	   are	  themselves	  only	  ever	  provisional	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  truth	  or	  falsity:	  ‘the	  image	  of	  the	  circus	  is	  bad’;	  ‘I	  think	  it	  never	  happened’;	  ‘let’s	  say	  it	  did	  happen’;	  ‘that	  sort	  of	   thing	  must	  have	  happened	   in	   the	  past’.97	  Taken	   together	   then,	  we	   can	   see	  that,	  for	  both	  Kanai’s	  narrator	  and	  the	  ringmasters,	  the	  circus	  is	  not	  so	  much	  a	  
thing	  to	  be	  referred	  to;	   rather,	   it	  operates	  as	  a	  site	   that	  reflects	  –	  or	  deflects	  –	  back	   to	   the	   reader	   the	   possibility	   of	   generating	   meanings.	   The	   circus	   is	   thus	  forever	  present,	  inasmuch	  as	  its	  configuration	  as	  a	  thing	  represented	  (it	  is	  never	  a	  thing;	  only	  ever	  a	  story	  about,	  an	  image	  of,	  that	  thing)	  means	  that	  it	  only	  exists	  when	   its	   never-­‐ceasing	   multiplicity	   of	   meanings	   is	   generated	   by	   the	   reader.	  That	   such	   a	   generation	   necessarily	   bestows	   an	   atemporal	   existence	   on	   both	  narrative	  and	   thing-­‐narrated	   is	  borne	  out	  by	   the	   last	  sentence	  of	  our	  excerpt:	  ‘For	  me,	   the	  story	  was	  too	  equivocal	   to	  know	  exactly	  to	  how	  far	   in	  the	  past	   ‘a	  long	  time	  ago’	  was	  supposed	  to	  refer;	  I	  had	  completely	  no	  idea.’98	  	  The	  circus	  only	   exists	   as	   ‘stories	   about	   the	   circus’,	   and	   such	   stories	   only	   exist	   at	   the	  moment	  of	  their	  generation	  by	  the	  narrator	  and	  (therefore)	  the	  reader:	  
text	  is	  made	  of	  multiple	  writings,	  drawn	  from	  many	  cultures	  and	  entering	   into	  mutual	   relations	  of	  dialogue,	  parody,	   contestation,	  but	  here	   is	  one	  place	  where	  this	  multiplicity	   is	   focused	  and	  that	  place	   is	   the	   reader,	   not,	   as	   was	   hitherto	   said,	   the	   author.	   The	  reader	   is	   the	   space	   on	  which	   all	   the	   quotations	   that	  make	   up	   a	  
                                            96	  Ozawa	   Shōichi,	   Shibuya	   Gasen,	   and	   Yamagami	   Shigeo,	   'The	   Heart	   of	   the	   Circus	  (Circus	  Special)',	  Shingeki,	  p.	  101.	  97	  Ibid.,	  p.	  101.	  98	  Kanai,	  'Kūki	  otoko	  no	  hanashi',	  in:	  Kanai	  Mieko:	  Zentanpenshū,	  p.	  144.	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writing	   are	   inscribed	   without	   any	   of	   them	   being	   lost;	   a	   text’s	  unity	  lies	  not	  in	  its	  origin	  but	  in	  its	  destination.99	  	  The	  circus,	  then,	  becomes	  like	  Barthes’	  notional	  writing:	  its	  [conceptual]	  ‘unity	  lies	  not	  in	  its	  origin	  but	  in	  its	  destination,	  and,	  in	  its	  endless	  cycle	  of	  narrative	  inscription	   and	   re-­‐inscription,	   it	   cannot	   help	   but	   continually	   foreground	  both	  its	  own	  atemporality,	  and	  its	  own	  status	  as	  a	  fiction:	  
At	  the	  very	  least,	  I’m	  sure	  over	  half	  of	  it	  was	  a	  circus	  composed	  of	  stories	  that	  I	  had	  read,	  about	  fierce	  animals,	  acrobats,	  and	  trapeze	  artists.	   	   At	   the	   present	  moment,	   in	   the	  middle	   of	   a	  microcosmos	  that	  does	  not	  abide	  by	  the	  laws	  of	  time,	  this	  circus	  exists	  […].100	  	  Not	   only,	   then,	   is	   a	   straightforward	   chronologically-­‐determined	   narrative	  account	   impossible	   (because	   of	   the	   permanent	   possibility	   that	   any	   apparent	  memories	   of	   the	   circus	   the	   narrator	   might	   wish	   to	   relate	   are,	   in	   fact,	  constructions	   made	   from	   later	   narrative	   encounters	   with	   the	   cultural	  phenomenon	  circus);	  moreover,	  to	  recall	  the	  circus	  becomes,	  instead,	  to	  re-­‐read	  the	  circus,	  hence	  its	  permanent	  existence	  ‘in	  the	  middle	  of	  a	  microcosmos	  that	  does	   not	   abide	   by	   the	   laws	   of	   time.’	   The	   circus	   is	   perpetually	   in	   ‘the	   present	  moment’.	  
One	  striking	  aspect	  of	  the	  narrative	  is	  its	  insistence	  on	  talking	  about	  the	  circus	   in	   terms	  of	   its	  structure;	  and,	  moreover,	  of	   the	   indeterminability	  of	   that	  structure:	  
At	   the	   circus,	   all	   the	   spectators	   turn	   their	   faces	   up	   to	   watch	   the	  trapeze	   in	  mid-­‐air,	  and	   it	  would	  be	  great	   if	   I	  could	   just	  remember	  the	   shape	   of	   the	   tent’s	   ceiling,	   but,	   somehow	   –	   to	   continue	   my	  fruitless	  rambling	  –	  my	  only	  impression	  was	  that	  it	  was	  high	  –	  and,	  
                                            99	  Barthes,	  ‘Death	  of	  the	  Author’,	  p.	  148.	  100	  Kanai,	  'Kūki	  otoko	  no	  hanashi',	  in:	  Kanai	  Mieko:	  Zentanpenshū,	  p.	  146.	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at	   the	   time	   the	   tents	   I	   knew	   were	   the	   small	   triangular-­‐shaped	  camping	  tents	  –	  so	  from	  the	  beginning,	  I	  was	  under	  the	  impression	  that	  all	  tents	  were	  that	  shape;	  I	  don’t	  think	  I	  even	  tried	  to	  consider	  what	  shape	  the	  circus	  tent	  was.	  101	  	  The	  elusive	  quality	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  tent,	  plus	  the	  narrator’s	  perspective	  (repeatedly	  enunciated	  through	  the	  story)	  of	  viewing	   from	  within,	  so	   that	   the	  very	   notion	   of	   ‘structure’	   becomes	   co-­‐terminous	   with	   that	   of	   the	   void	   it	  contains,	  surrounds	  and	  defines,	  together	  become	  another	  means	  by	  which	  the	  story	  continually	  challenges	  its	  own	  narrative	  procedures,	  and	  foregrounds	  its	  referential	  instability.	  Not	  only	  does	  ‘The	  Story	  of	  the	  Inflated	  Man’	  (as	  we	  have	  seen)	  make	  a	  figurative	  association	  between	  ‘circus’	  and	  ‘story’;	  it	  also,	  through	  its	   repeated	   associations	   of	   ‘structure’	   with	   ‘void’,	   makes	   a	   pictographic	  association.	   In	  other	  words,	   the	  story	  uses	   the	  symbolic	   representation	  of	   the	  term	  ‘fiction’	  (kyokō)	  to	  signal	  its	  own	  status	  as	  a	  piece	  of	  fiction.	  	  The	  two	  kanji	  characters	  for	  kyokō	  are	  ‘??’,	  the	  first	  of	  which	  (kyo)	  denotes	  ‘emptiness’,	  and	  the	  second	  of	  which	  (kō)	  denotes	  	  ‘structure’;	  put	  together	  thus,	  as	  a	  compound	  noun,	   they	   gesture	   towards	   an	  understanding	  of	   ‘fiction’	   as	   the	   structuring	   of	  that	  which	  is	  non-­‐existent	  (or,	  if	  one	  prefers,	  imaginary).	  	  However,	  as	  we	  saw	  in	  both	   Chapters	   One	   and	   Two,	   for	   Japanese	   surrealist	   avant	   gardism	   (which	  operates	  as	  one	  of	  the	  contexts	  within	  which	  Kanai’s	  early	  fictional	  writings	  can	  be	  situated),	  concepts	  such	  as	  mu	  (‘nothing’)	  or	  fuzai	  (‘absence’)	  have	  retained	  (or,	  rather,	  have	  been	  reinscribed	  in	  the	  postwar	  era	  with)	  a	  Buddhist	  aesthetic,	  in	  which	  existence,	  the	  universe,	  life	  itself,	  are	  simultaneously	  ‘everything’	  and	  ‘nothing’;	  ‘presence’	  and	  ‘absence’;	  ‘emptiness’	  and	  ‘repleteness’	  .	  Hence,	  in	  ‘The	  Story	  of	  the	  Inflated	  Man’,	  the	  reader	  is	  repeatedly	  presented	  with	  variations	  of	  
                                            101	  Ibid.,	  p.	  145.	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this	  image:	  an	  empty	  space,	  a	  void,	  a	  cosmos,	  a	  cave	  (or,	  to	  use	  a	  term	  applied	  several	   times	   within	   the	   story	   itself,	   kūdō	   [‘a	   hollow’	   or	   ‘a	   cavern’])	   which,	  paradoxically,	  stands	  for	  the	  framework	  that	  surrounds	   it.	  After	  all,	   to	  make	  a	  balloon	  balloon-­‐shaped	  –	  or,	   to	  put	   it	  another	  way,	   to	  ensure	   that	   the	  balloon	  
takes	   on	   the	   identity	   of	   a	   balloon	   –	   that	   balloon	   has	   to	   be	   filled	   with	   air.	  Thereafter,	  as	  the	  balloon’s	  existence	  is	  dependent	  upon	  that	  which	  it	  contains	  –	  even	  though	  it	  contains	  nothing	  –	  the	  paradox	  entails	  that	  it	  is	  precisely	  that	  nothing	  that	  acts	  as	  guarantor	  of	  the	  identity	  of	  that	  which	  surrounds	  it.	  
This	  paradox	  is	  one	  that	  is	  enacted	  for	  the	  reader	  throughout	  the	  story.	  We	  have	  already	  seen	  this	  in	  the	  way	  that	  the	  story	  inscribes	  the	  circus:	  stories	  about	  the	  circus	  are	  indivisible	  from	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  circus,	  which	  is	  indivisible	  from	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  circus	  tent,	  which	  is	  indivisible	  from	  the	  tent	  itself,	  which	  is	  indivisible	  from	  the	  void	  that	  fills	  the	  tent.	  Similarly,	  if	  we	  turn	  to	  the	  beginning	  of	   the	  painter’s	  narrative,	  we	  are	  presented	  with	  a	   complex	  overlaying	  of	   the	  twin	  notions	  of	  fiction	  and	  emptiness.	  We	  are	  told	  that	  ‘[s]tories	  like	  this	  used	  to	  hide,	   coolly	  and	  quietly	   in	   the	  ancestral	  ashes,	   in	   the	  middle	  of	  a	  darkened	  room,	   and	   sometimes	   leak	   out	   in	   a	   faint,	   rasping	   voice.’102	  	   In	   this	   sentence,	  fiction,	  as	  a	  concept,	   is	  referenced	  or	  alluded	  to	   thrice	  over:	   through	   its	  being	  the	   subject	   matter;	   through	   its	   being	   foregrounded	   as	   being	   subject	   to	   a	  ‘literary’	   mode	   of	   inscription;	   and	   through	   its	   invocation	   of	   the	   idea	   of	   the	  empty	  structure.	   	  The	   literal	  subject	  of	   the	  sentence	   is	   ‘stories’,	   stories	  whose	  truth,	   as	  we	   have	   already	   been	   informed,	   can	   never	   be	   ascertained:	   in	   other	  words,	   ‘fiction’.	   Furthermore,	   by	   inscribing	   these	   stories	   figuratively,	   or	   in	   a	  
                                            102	  Kanai,	  'Kūki	  otoko	  no	  hanashi',	  in:	  Kanai	  Mieko:	  Zentanpenshū,	  p.	  144.	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‘literary’	  manner	  (they	  are,	  metaphorically,	  able	  to	  ‘hide’,	  biding	  their	  time	  until	  they	   ‘leak	   out’	   of	   the	   ashes	   in	   ‘a	   faint	   rasping	   voice’),	   the	  mode	   of	   narration	  suggests	  that	  what	  is	  being	  said	  about	  these	  ‘stories’	  is	  necessarily	  not	  literally	  true,	  hence	   fictional.	   	   Finally,	   the	   creation	  of	   the	   image	  of	   an	  empty	   structure	  (the	  darkened	  room)	  which	  contains	  another	  empty	  structure	  (the	  pot	  of	  ashes,	  with	   ashes	   here	   being	   synonymous	   with	   the	   simultaneous	   absence	   and	  presence	   that	   derives	   from	   representing	   ‘death‘)	   inside	   of	   which	   is	   a	  multiplicity	   of	   stories	   (or,	   in	   other	  words,	   fiction,	   and	   therefore,	   symbolically,	  yet	  more	  empty	   structures)	   effects	   the	   pictographic	   representation	   of	   fiction,	  while	  insisting	  on	  the	  endlessness	  of	  that-­‐which-­‐is-­‐fictional.	  
We	  are	   also	  presented	  with	   the	   image	   (or	   images)	  of	   the	   Inflated	  Man	  himself,	   inscribed	   through	  a	  number	  of	   similes	  and	  analogies	  drawn	   from	  the	  literary	   and	   artistic	   realms	  which	   (aside	   from	   reinforcing	   the	   text’s	   status	   as	  being	  a	  constitutent	  part	  of	  a	  surrounding	  intertext)	  also	  collapse	  the	  apparent	  opposites	  listed	  above:	  
I	  could	  only	  think	  that	  he	  was,	  beyond	  doubt,	   like	  a	  big	  ball,	  a	  big	  ball	   inside	  of	  which	  something	  mysterious	  was	  stuffed.	   	  What	  had	  been	   stuffed	   in	   him?	   	   I	   imagined	   a	   large	   cavern	   inside	   his	   body.	  Jonah’s	  whale,	  or	   its	  pastiche,	  Pinocchio’s	  whale,	   I	   thought.	   	   If	   the	  Inflated	  Man’s	  innards	  were	  like	  a	  cavern,	  I	  would	  easily	  be	  able	  to	  fit	   inside,	   all	   curled	   up.	   	   Wasn’t	   he	   made	   from	   that	   hull-­‐like	  skeleton,	  a	  skeleton	  that	  had	  those	  dark	  cavern	  innards,	  a	  skeleton	  around	  which	  flesh	  and	  skin	  had	  been	  stuck.	  	  When	  I	  was	  twenty,	  I	  worked	  extremely	  hard	  to	  develop	  my	  technical	  skills	  and	  I	  drew	  a	  diagram	   of	   the	   inflated	   man’s	   innards.	   	   Colouring	   it	   with	  watercolours	   and	   pencils,	   I	   drew	   a	   man	   whose	   curved	   bones	  formed	   a	   ball	   shape,	   and	   inside	   of	   this,	   I	   tried	   drawing	   myself	  curled	  up	  asleep.103	  	  
                                            103	  Ibid.,	  p.	  149-­‐150.	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In	  a	  straightforwardly	  representationalist	  account	  of	  the	  above,	  we	  might	  claim	  that	   our	   narrator	  meets	   the	   Inflated	  Man,	   thinks	   about	   him,	   and	   uses	   him	   to	  help	   form	   his	   own	   unique,	   artistic	   sensibility	   (a	   sensibility,	   we	   might	   note,	  informed	   by	   the	   painter’s	   knowledge	   of	   scripture	   and	   contemporary	   culture:	  the	  biblical	  story	  of	  Jonah	  and	  the	  Whale;	  and	  of	  Monstro	  the	  sperm	  whale,	   in	  Disney’s	  Pinocchio).	  	  Thereafter,	  once	  our	  painter	  has	  a	  fully	  formed	  conception	  of	   his	   subject,	   he	   is	   finally	   able	   (with	   time	   and	   hard	  work)	   to	   craft	   an	   image	  deriving	  from	  his	  encounter	  with	  the	  Inflated	  Man.	  	  This	  is	  a	  perfectly	  adequate	  account,	  of	  course;	  but	  it	  is	  one	  that,	  centring	  as	  it	  does	  on	  the	  creator,	  his	   life	  and	  his	  encounters,	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  affirm	  a	  rather	  conventional	  understanding	  of	  the	  artist	  in	  relation	  to	  his	  art.	  However,	  as	  we	  have	  already	  seen,	  the	  story	  disrupts	  and	  obscures	   the	  narrative	  patterns	  necessary	   to	   creating	   the	   linear,	  chronological	   narrative	   implied	   by	   the	   account	   above.	   Moreover,	   as	   the	  quotation	  above	  reveals,	   the	  text	  of	   ‘The	  Story	  of	   the	  Inflated	  Man’	  repeatedly	  makes	   its	   frame	   of	   references	   textual	   and	   artistic	   ones,	   so	   that	   the	   reader’s	  understanding	   is	  directed,	  not	  to	   ‘the	  real	  world’	  but,	  primarily,	   to	  other	  texts	  and	  artefacts.	  Just	  as	  the	  ‘empty	  structure’	  that	  is	  the	  Inflated	  Man	  is	  inside	  the	  empty	  structure	  of	  the	  circus,	  which	  is	  itself	  occupying	  ‘a	  vacant	  plot’104,	  so,	  too,	  in	   the	   story	   itself,	   the	   preponderence	   of	   the	   references	   offered	   to	   assist	   the	  reader	   to	   interpret	   the	   Inflated	  Man	  are	   textual	  or	  pictorial:	   Jonah,	  Pinocchio,	  Noah’s	   Ark,	   the	   nameless	   proliferation	   of	   stories	   about	   the	   circus,	   and	  Rabelais’s	  Gargantua	  and	  Pantagruel.	  
This	   proliferation	   of	   texts	   is	   even	   more	   apparent	   in	   the	   story	   as	   it	  appears	   in	   the	  Shingeki	   edition,	   of	   course,	  being	   surrounded	  as	   it	   is	  with,	  not	  
                                            104	  Ibid.,	  p.	  145.	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only	   a	   framing	  narrative,	   but	   also,	   as	  we	  have	   already	  discussed,	   a	   variety	   of	  other	  circus-­‐themed	  texts	  and	  dialogues	  to	  which	  it	  cannot	  help	  but	  direct	  the	  reader’s	   interpretive	   attention.	   We	   might	   also	   add	   that	   the	   whole	   set	   of	  referents	   to	   do	   with	   painting/writing/fiction/empty	   structures	   is	   rendered	  more	  immediately	  explicit	  in	  the	  Shingeki	  version.	  	  As	  we	  will	  recall,	  the	  frame	  narrative	   states:	   ‘I	   was	   introduced	   to	   a	   painter	  who	   only	   painted	   pictures	   of	  caves	   and	   I	   listened	   to	   his	   story.	   	   The	   following	   is	  what	   he	   told	  me.’105	  	   	   By	  writing	   that	   the	  painter	   ‘only	  painted	  pictures	  of	   caves’,	   the	  narration	   starkly	  draws	  attention	  not	  only	  to	  the	  image	  of	  an	  ‘empty	  structure’,	  or	  ‘void’	  itself,	  but	  to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   image	   is,	   potentially,	   an	   important,	   mysterious	   ‘trope’	   or	  ‘symbol’	   within	   the	   painter’s	   story	   for	   the	   reader	   to	   solve,	   even	   though	   any	  solution	   is	   effectively	   withheld,	   thus	   simultaneously	   inviting	   interpretation	  while	   denying	   the	   possibility	   of	   interpretive	   closure.	   As	   Kanai	   writes	   of	   the	  corporeal	   text,	   the	   story	  will	   therefore	   be	   perpetually	   ‘turn[ing]	   towards	   the	  ‘exteriority’	  of	  [itself]’	  in	  an	  ‘attempt	  to	  overcome	  [its]	  own	  body’.106	  
The	   more	   common	   version	   of	   the	   story,	   without	   the	   frame	   narrative,	  might	  not	   invite	  so	  immediately	  and	  pointedly	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  image	  of	   the	   ‘caves’	  which	  habitually	   form	  the	  painter’s	  subject	  matter	   (and,	   indeed,	  this	   latter	   ‘fact’	   is	   never	   explicitly	   stated	   elsewhere	   in	   the	   story,	   so	   it	   is	   an	  aspect	  of	   the	  narrative	   lost	   to	   readers	  of	   the	   frameless	  version);	  nevertheless	  the	  image,	  and	  the	  concepts	  of	  ‘fiction’,	  ‘emptiness’	  and	  ‘multiplicity’,	  which,	  as	  discussed	  above,	  are	  tied	  to,	  or	  set	  alongside,	  this	  image,	  feature	  so	  repeatedly	  
                                            105	  Kanai,	  'Kūki	  otoko	  no	  hanashi’,	  Shingeki,	  p.	  144.	  106	  Kanai,	  ‘Kotoba/genjitsu/nikutai’,	  p.	  68.	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throughout	  the	  narrative	  that	  my	  central	  contention	  about	  the	  proliferation	  of	  texts	   and	   images	   directing	   the	   reader	   to	   a	   multiplicity	   of	   potential	  interpretations	   still	   holds.	   Moreover,	   this	   latter	   version	   offers	   its	   own	  ambiguities;	  by	  losing	  the	  framing	  narrator,	  the	  text	  renders	  the	  main	  narrator	  a	  more	  elusive	  textual	  presence,	  being	  nameless	  and	  genderless.	   	  The	  absence	  of	   these	   narrative	   determiners,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   lack	   of	   spatial	   and	   temporal	  indicators,	  helps	  yet	  again	  to	  reinforce	  and	  highlight,	  primarily,	  the	  textuality	  of	  the	  story.	  
As	  we	  have	  already	  seen,	  the	  story	  gestures	  towards	  multiple	  contexts	  in	  order	   to	  defer	   to	   the	   reader	   the	  process	  of	   generating	   its	  potential	  meanings,	  and	   the	   process	   whereby	   these	   gestures	   are	   made	   would	   seem	   to	   be	   an	  
associative	   one.	   Words,	   ideas,	   images:	   all	   are	   set	   alongside	   one	   another,	  resonating	   and	   producing	   their	   possible	   meanings	   when	   the	   reader	   brings	  them	   to	   bear	   on	   each	   other,	   or	   forms	   associations	   between	   them.	   In	   other	  words,	  rather	  than	  claim,	  say,	  that	  the	  Inflated	  Man	  is	  a	  metaphor	  for	  the	  circus	  (or,	  for	  that	  matter,	  that	  the	  circus	  is	  a	  metaphor	  for	  the	  Inflated	  Man),	  or	  that	  (as	  Suga	  would	  have	  it)	  painting	  is	  a	  metaphor	  for	  writing	  –	  claims	  which,	  in	  the	  finality	  of	  their	  pronouncements,	  are	  actually	  manifestations	  of	  a	  critical	  desire	  to	   account	   for,	   explain	   and	   therefore	   perform	   an	   act	   of	   interpretive	   closure	  upon	  the	  story	  –	  we	  might,	  instead,	  recognise	  that	  the	  text	  is	  asking	  for	  (or,	  at	  least,	  presenting	  the	  possibility	  for)	  the	  reader	  to	  form	  such	  associations,	  while	  recognising	  simultaneously	  that	  any	  meanings,	  or	  readings,	  thus	  generated	  are	  the	   responsibility,	   or	   at	   the	   discretion,	   of	   the	   reader.	   For	   example,	   as	   quoted	  above,	   the	   painter’s	   pondering	   the	   ‘something	  mysterious’	   inside	   the	   Inflated	  Man	  makes	  him	  ‘think	  of	  Jonah	  and	  the	  Whale,	  or	  the	  pastiche	  of	  Jonah’s	  whale	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in	  Disney’s	  Pinocchio’.	  A	  host	  of	  potential	  associations	  are	  immediately	  offered	  up	  to	  the	  reader:	  present,	  past,	  actual,	  imagined,	  living	  entity,	  empty	  structure,	  exteriority,	   interiority,	  writing,	   painting,	   text,	   image,	   scripture	   as	   literal	   truth,	  its	  pastiche	  –	  hence	  falsity	  –	  in	  the	  Disney	  picture,	  the	  descent	  into	  bathos	  that	  might	   be	   discerned	   in	   the	   step	   from	   whale-­‐in-­‐scripture	   to	   whale-­‐in-­‐cartoon,	  and	  so	  forth.	  As	  an	  example,	  let	  us	  pursue	  just	  one	  of	  these	  specific	  references	  further	  –	  the	  image	  of	  the	  whale	  in	  Pinocchio	  –	  in	  order	  to	  see	  just	  what	  sort	  of	  meanings	  and	  associations	  the	  reader	  might	  be	  able	  to	  produce	  by	  setting	  it,	  as	  a	  single	  textual	  element,	  against	  and	  beside	  other	  elements	  of	  the	  text.	  
Let	   us,	   because	   we	   can,	   first	   create	   an	   extra-­‐textual	   context	   for	   the	  Disney	  reference,	   in	  order	   to	   investigate	   just	  what	  sort	  of	  cultural	  resonances	  and	  associations	   it	  might	  possess.	  Accordingly,	   let’s	  begin	  by	  setting	   the	  1974	  
Shingeki	   edition	   alongside	   the	   publication,	   in	   1973,	   of	   Christopher	   Finch’s	  seminal	  The	  Art	  of	  Walt	  Disney.	  This	   latter	  was	   the	   first	   (and	   remains,	   to	   this	  day,	   the	  major)	  staking	  of	   the	  claim	  not	  only	  (as	   its	   title	  suggests)	   to	  Disney’s	  artistry,	  but	  also	  –	  in	  his	  commitment	  to	  the	  moving	  image	  –	  to	  his	  status	  as	  an	  innovator:	  
Disney’s	   obsession	   with	   naturalism	   seems	   anachronistic	   if	   one	  places	   him	   alongside	   Picasso.	   [….]	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   however,	  Picasso’s	   fidelity	   to	   largely	   traditional	   media	   –	   such	   as	   the	  stretched	  canvas	  with	  its	  built-­‐in	  limitations	  –	  might	  be	  considered	  anachronistic	  when	  compared	  to	  Disney’s	  pioneering	  of	   the	  art	  of	  imagination.	   Disney’s	   great	   contribution	  was	   to	   break	   free	   of	   the	  static	  image.107	  	  
                                            107	  Christopher	   Finch,	   The	   Art	   of	   Walt	   Disney:	   From	   Mickey	   Mouse	   to	   the	   Magic	  
Kingsdoms	  and	  Beyond	  (New	  York:	  Abrams,	  1973)	  p.	  144.	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Finch	  makes	   his	   claim	   to	  Disney’s	   artistry	   through	   his	   taking	   for	   granted	   the	  latter’s	  right	  to	  be	  compared	  to,	  and	  contrasted	  with,	  Picasso.	  His	  book	  enacts	  a	  paradox,	  however,	  inasmuch	  as,	  even	  as	  Finch	  stresses	  how	  Disney	  broke	  ‘free	  of	   the	   static	   image’,	   his	   argument	   is	   necessarily	   dependent,	   through	   the	  medium	   in	  which	  he	  makes	  his	   case,	   on	   such	   static	   images.108	  One	  might,	   in	  fact,	  argue	  that	  Disney’s	  artistry	  is	  implied	  and	  guaranteed	  by	  its	  featuring	  in	  an	  art	  book,	  published	  by	  the	  art	  book	  specialists	  Abrams	  of	  New	  York.	  Each	  of	  the	  Disney	   illustrations	   in	   the	   book,	   therefore,	   stands	   as	   being	   emblematic	   of	   a	  conflict	   that	   can	  be	   summarised	   in	   the	   simple	  question:	   is	   this	  Art?;	  And	   it	   is	  one	  such	  image,	  from	  Disney’s	  ‘masterpiece’,	  that	  is	  invoked	  by	  ‘The	  Story	  of	  the	  Inflated	  Man’:	   	   the	   interior	   of	   the	  whale.109	  Indeed,	  when	   the	  main	   narrator	  writes,	   of	   the	   Inflated	  Man,	   ‘[w]asn’t	   he	  made	   from	   that	   hull-­‐like	   skeleton,	   a	  skeleton	  that	  had	  those	  dark	  cavern	  innards,	  a	  skeleton	  around	  which	  flesh	  and	  skin	   had	   been	   stuck	   on?’	   one	   might	   contend	   that,	   for	   any	   reader	   who	   has	  actually	   seen	   either	  Pinocchio	   or	   the	   static	   image	   in	   Finch’s	   book,	   it	   becomes	  difficult	   to	   conceive	  of	   the	   inside	  of	   the	   Inflated	  Man	   in	   any	   terms	  other	   than	  that	  of	  the	  Disney	  illustration.110	  And	  once	  the	  association	  has	  been	  made,	  we	  might	  then	  choose	  to	  set	  the	  Disney	  whale	  –	  emblematic,	  as	  it	  is,	  of	  the	  is-­‐this-­‐Art?	  question	  –	  alongside	  the	  Inflated	  Man,	  who	  is	  also	  repeatedly	  figured	  in	  the	  story	  as	  embodying	  the	  same	  question:	  
	  
                                            108	  Ibid.	  109	  Ibid.,	  p.155	  (see	  Fig.1).	  110	  Kanai,	  'Kūki	  otoko	  no	  hanashi’,	  in:	  Kanai	  Mieko:	  Zentanpenshū,	  pp.	  149-­‐50.	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A	  long	  time	  ago	  I	  actually	  saw	  his	  performance,	  but	  -­‐	  how	  can	  I	  say	  this?	  	  It	  was	  a	  really	  peculiar	  art.	  	  Among	  his	  spectators	  were	  those	  who	  grumbled	  that	  they	  couldn’t	  consider	  that	  it	  was	  a	  unique	  art,	  or	  even	  an	  art	  worth	  paying	  the	  fee	  to	  watch	  it.	  	  Just	  as	  there	  is	  the	  phrase	  ‘an	  unaccomplished	  glutton’,	   in	  the	  past,	  a	  glutton	  was	  like	  all	  gluttons,	  and	  didn’t	  belong	  to	  the	  category	  of	  art:	  in	  other	  words,	  it	  was	  said	  that	  it	  was	  the	  sort	  of	  thing	  that	  only	  proved	  stupidity,	  the	  stupidity	  of	  the	  greedy.	  […]	  	  Supporters	  said	  that	  watching	  him	  made	  them	  feel	  great.	  […]	  	  We	  spectators	  would	  think	  about	  desire	  and	  pleasure,	  but,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  could	  not	  help	  feeling	  pity	  for	   the	   pettiness	   of	   our	   appetites.	   	   This	   was	   more	   or	   less	   the	  opinion	  of	   the	   fans;	   for	   those	  who	  weren’t	   fans,	  Peach’s	  huge	  size	  and	  huge	   appetite	  were	   talentless	   –	   he	  was	   artless	   –	   they	   looked	  down	  on	  him	  as	  a	  wasteful	  guzzler;	  with	  such	  a	  huge	  body	  he	  could	  have	   become	   a	   sumo	   player,	   he	   was	   a	   monstrous	   simpleton	  without	  even	  ambition.111	  	  Billed	  as	   ‘an	  appetite	  artist’,	   the	   Inflated	  Man’s	   ‘art’	   is	  nonetheless	  continually	  brought	  into	  question	  by	  the	  narrator	  and	  others	  who	  watch	  his	  ‘performance’;	  and,	   ultimately,	   the	   artistry	   of	   the	   Inflated	   Man	   is	   not	   innate;	   rather,	   it	   is	  dependent	  on	   the	  aesthetic	   judgement	  of	  his	  observers.	  Those	  unappreciative	  of	  the	  Inflated	  Man’s	  act	  reject	  the	  category	  ‘art’	  when	  accounting	  for	  it.	  Those,	  by	   contrast,	  who	   ‘watch	   [it]	   and	   feel	   great’	   experience	   something	   akin	   to	   the	  sublime,	  as	  they	  are	  led	  to	  a	  renewed	  appreciation	  of	  their	  own	  mortality	  and	  humanity	   (inscribed	   here	   as	   ‘the	   pettiness	   of	   their	   own	   appetites’).112	  This	  question	  of	  adjudication	  might	  better	  be	  reformulated	  as	  one	  of	  interpretation,	  and	  it	  is	  one	  that	  we	  shall	  return	  to	  below.	  
For	  the	  moment,	  however,	  let	  us	  return	  to	  the	  image	  of	  Disney’s	  whale,	  and	   restate	   that	   it	   was	   just	   one	   of	   our	   possible,	   associative	   readings	   or	  understandings	   of	   the	  painter’s	   painting	   of	   the	   Inflated	  Man	  which	   led	   to	   the	  generation	  of	  these	  interpretive	  questions	  about	  ‘The	  Story	  of	  the	  Inflated	  Man’.	  	  
                                            111	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  147-­‐148.	  112	  Ibid.	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If	  we	  pursue	  the	  image	  of	  Disney’s	  whale	  in	  a	  different	  direction,	  are	  there	  other	  interpretive	  questions	   to	  which	   it	  might	   lead	  us?	   	  Certainly,	  we	  might	  begin	  a	  new	  interpretive	  trail,	  as	  it	  were,	  by	  noting	  the	  (well-­‐documented)	  influence	  of	  the	  nineteenth-­‐century	  illustrator	  and	  engraver	  Gustave	  Doré	  on	  the	  animators	  of	   Pinocchio,	   an	   influence	   clearly	   apparent	   in	   the	   picture	   of	   the	   whale.113	  Having	  noted	  as	  much,	  we	  are	  then	  struck	  by	  a	  coincidence:	  every	  other	  single	  explicit	  literary	  allusion	  in	  ‘The	  Story	  of	  the	  Inflated	  Man’	  –	  the	  Book	  of	  Jonah,	  the	  story	  of	  Noah’s	  Ark,	  Rabelais’	  Gargantua	  and	  Pantagruel	  –	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  well-­‐known	   engravings	   by	   Doré;	   his	   Rabelais	   edition	   appeared	   in	   1854,	   his	  extensive	  illustrations	  for	  the	  Bible	  were	  first	  published	  in	  1866.	  What	  are	  we	  to	  make	  of	  this	  coincidence?	  And	  what	  might	  we	  make	  of	  another	  coincidence:	  Kanai	   chose	   another	   Doré	   engraving,	   from	   his	   illustrations	   to	   Perrault’s	  ‘Sleeping	   Beauty’,	   as	   the	   cover	   for	   the	   first	   edition	   of	  The	  Knights	  of	  Akashia,	  which	  is,	  of	  course,	  the	  short	  story	  collection	  in	  which	  ‘The	  Story	  of	  the	  Inflated	  Man’	   appears.114	  	   (There	   is	   a	   discernible	   further	   coincidence:	   the	   strikingly	  similar	   composition	  of	   the	   ‘Sleeping	  Beauty’	   engraving	  with	   the	  Disney	  whale	  picture.)	   Confronted	  with	   these	   coincidences,	   we	  might	   begin	   by	   recollecting	  the	   referential	   elision	  between	   text	   and	   image	   that	   occurs	  when	   the	  narrator	  tries	   to	   imagine	   Peach’s	   innards,	   and	   thinks	   ‘of	   Jonah	   and	   the	  Whale,	   or	   the	  
                                            113	  The	   Disney	   Studio	   Library	   had	  multiple	   copies	   of	   Doré’s	   illustrations	   of	   Dante’s	  
The	   Divine	   Comedy	   and	   Milton’s	   Paradise	   Lost.	   Robin	   Allan	   notes	   not	   only	   a	   similar	  artistic	   sensibility	   between	   Disney	   and	   Doré,	   but	   also	   a	   similar	   desire	   for	   artistic	  respectability:	   ‘Doré’s	   technically	   brilliant,	   often	   vulgar	   and	   melodramatic	   work	  appealed	  to	  Disney	  and	  his	  artists,	  for	  whom	  comedy,	  violence	  and	  the	  macabre	  were	  easily	   juxtaposed,	   though	   both	  Doré	   and	  Disney	   longed	   to	   be	   recognised	   for	   serious	  work	   rather	   than	   merely	   for	   “cartoons”.’	   Robin	   Allan,	   Walt	   Disney	   and	   Europe	  (Bloomington:	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  1999)	  p.	  23.	  114	  See	  Fig.	  2	  for	  his	  illustration	  to	  Perrault’s	  Sleeping	  Beauty.	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pastiche	   of	   Jonah’s	   whale	   in	   Disney’s	   Pinocchio.’	   In	   trying	   to	   envisage	   the	  Inflated	   Man,	   in	   other	   words,	   the	   narrator	   slips	   from	   a	   textual	   interpretive	  model	  to	  a	  pictorial	  one:	  the	  Disney	  image	  acts	  as	  a	  de	  facto	   illustration	  to	  the	  Book	  of	  Jonah.	  One	  might	  then	  argue	  that,	  when	  the	  text	  of	  the	  story	  references	  these	   other	   literary/scriptural	   texts,	   there	  might	   be	   an	   implied	   invitation	   for	  the	  reader	  to	  conceive	  these	  allusions	  also	  in	  terms	  of	  being	  images,	  rather	  than	  text.	   In	   other	   words,	   ‘The	   Story	   of	   the	   Inflated	   Man’	   invites	   us	   to	   read	   it	   as	  
though	  it	  were	  illustrated.	  	  The	  main	  narrator’s	  attempts	  to	  comprehend	  Peach	  result	  in	  the	  former’s	  envisaging	  the	  latter	  as	  though	  he	  were	  a	  cartoon;	  so,	  too,	  he	  tells	  us,	  ‘[m]ore	  than	  the	  circus	  itself	  (the	  “real	  circus”	  which	  my	  parents	  had	  taken	  me	   to	   see),	   I	   was	   bedazzled	   by	   the	   image	  of	   the	   circus’.115	  Moreover,	  through	   his	   referencing	   these	   literary	   allusions	   that	   are,	   perhaps	   inevitably,	  
pictorial	  allusions,	  his	  narrative	  enjoins	  us	  to	  do	  the	  same.	  This	  not	  only	  has	  the	  effect	   of	   problematising	   –	   yet	   again	   –	   any	   representationalist	   narrative	  aesthetic;	   it	   also	   returns	   us	   to	   the	   question	   of	   aesthetic	   value.	   Textual	  illustrations	  occupy	  a	  peculiar,	   liminal	  space	  in	  any	  text	  in	  which	  they	  feature.	  Are	  we	  to	  regard	  such	  illustrations	  as	  part	  of	  the	  text	  which	  they	  accompany,	  or	  as	  being	  separate	  from	  it?	  Are	  we	  to	  accord	  them	  a	  legitimate	  role	  in	  generating	  literary	   meaning	   or	   artistic	   value?	   Do	   they	   compromise	   any	   putative	   textual	  integrity	   that	   we	  might	   wish	   to	   attribute	   to	   a	   given	   text;	   or	   do	   they,	   rather,	  foreground	  the	  fact	  that	  such	  textual	  integrity	  is,	   in	  fact,	   illusory?	  In	  short,	  the	  textual	   illustration	   asks	   of	   itself	   precisely	   the	   same	   question	   that	   we	   have	  already	  seen	  posed	  by	  the	  Disney	  animation	  and	  the	  Inflated	  Man’s	  act:	  is	  this	  Art?	  
                                            115	  Kanai,	  'Kūki	  otoko	  no	  hanashi’,	  in:	  Kanai	  Mieko:	  Zentanpenshū,	  p.	  146	  (my	  italics).	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Conclusion	  
As	   we	   move	   towards	   the	   conclusion	   of	   this	   chapter,	   we	   should	   begin	   by	  stressing	  that	  neither	  of	  these	  interpretive	  trails	  we	  have	  just	  followed	  can	  be	  legislated	   for	   as	   being	   somehow	   correct,	   or	   ‘within’	   the	   text;	   no-­‐one	   would	  plausibly	  claim	  that	  the	  ‘The	  Story	  of	  the	  Inflated	  Man’	  deliberately	  sets	  out	  to	  
intend	  presenting	  a	  complex	  constellatory	  matrix	  of	  meanings	  resolving	  around	  a	   dissection	   of	   the	   Japanese	   term	   for	   fiction,	   Disney’s	   Pinocchio	   and	   the	  engravings	  of	  Gustave	  Doré	   (though	  one	  might,	   again,	  note	   the	   coincidences).	  Rather,	  our	  two	  interpretive	  excursions	  above	  are	  offered	  merely	  as	  instances	  of	   the	   possibilities	   afforded	   the	   reader	   when	   one	   accepts	   the	   story’s	   implicit	  invitation	   to	   engage	   in	   the	   creative	   process	   that	   arises	   from	   the	   act	   of	  juxtaposing	  its	  various	  textual	  elements	  and	  seeing	  what	  happens.	  There	  are,	  to	  be	   sure,	   a	  host	   of	   other	   references	  whose	   resonances	  within	   and	  without	   the	  text,	  would	  no	  doubt	  yield,	  upon	  investigation	  by	  the	  reader,	  a	  host	  of	  radically	  different	   readings	   of	   the	   story.	   	   For	   instance,	   one	   might	   note,	   yet	   again,	   the	  ‘empty	  structure’	  motif	  that	  runs	  throughout	  the	  story,	  and	  set	  it	  alongside,	  not	  only	  our	  narrator	  who	  paints	  ‘only	  caves’,	  but	  also	  the	  Inflated	  Man’s	  insistence	  on	  his	  ultimately	  doomed	  quest	  to	  end	  up	  the	  shape	  of	  a	  perfect	  sphere	  because	  ‘[i]f	   god	   existed,	   wouldn’t	   he	   be	   perfectly	   round	   in	   shape?’. 116	  	   Having	  registered	   this	   play	   of	   association	   between	   caves/the	   ideal	   versus	   the	   real,	  what	  would	  happen,	  what	  meanings	  might	  be	  generated,	  if	  we	  then	  invoked	  the	  most	  famous	  philosophical	  allegory	  of	  them	  all,	  Plato’s	  Allegory	  of	  the	  Cave	  in	  the	   Republic?	   Similarly	   (or,	   rather,	   not	   similarly),	   what	   readings	   could	   we	  
                                            116	  Ibid.,	  p.	  150.	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generate	   if	   we	   were	   to	   read	   the	   story	   alongside	   Kafka’s	   ‘A	   Hunger	   Artist’?	  Peach,	  after	  all,	  is	  defined	  as	  being	  specifically	  antithetical	  to	  the	  hunger	  artist;	  and	  here	  (to	  note	  yet	  another	  coincidence)	  Kanai	  writes	  that,	  for	  her,	  to	  watch	  Hijikata	  dance	  is	  to	  be	  irresistibly	  reminded	  of	  the	  Kafka	  story.117	  	  The	  Inflated	  Man’s	  name	  ‘Peach’	  creates	  yet	  another	  allusion,	  this	  time	  to	  the	  Japanese	  folk	  story,	   ‘Momotarō’	   (‘Peach	   Boy’).	   	   As	   one	   of	   the	   most	   popular	   folk	   stories	   in	  Japan,	   and	   hence	   a	   narrative	  which	   has	   been,	   and	   continues	   to	   be,	   recreated	  again	   and	   again	   through	   songs,	   books,	   images	   and	   films,	   and	   as	   a	   narrative	  which,	  through	  this	  process	  of	  repeated	  retelling	  has	  spawned,	  and	  continues	  to	  spawn,	  multiple	  versions	  of	  itself,	  and	  whose	  continued	  rewriting	  is	  given	  over	  to	  the	  readership,	   ‘Momotarō’	   is	  perhaps	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  a	  corporeal	   text.	  What	  might	  happen	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	   ‘The	  Story	  of	  the	  Inflated	  Man’	  in	  light	   of	   this	   association,	   or,	   indeed,	  when	   set	   against	   any	  of	   these	  profoundly	  different	   contexts	   mentioned	   above?	   One	   further	   question:	   when	   raising	   the	  possibility	   of	   the	   text’s	   –	   or	   rather,	   the	   reader’s	   –	   generating	   such	  meanings,	  might	  it	  not	  be	  better	  to	  do	  as	  I	  have	  just	  done	  (and	  am	  continuing	  to	  do),	  and	  frame	  such	  a	  possibility	  interrogatively?	  Isn’t	  that	  what	  the	  corporeal	  text	  does?	  	  The	  story’s	   two	   invocations	  of	   the	  whale,	   for	   instance,	   in	   the	  story	  are,	   as	  we	  have	  seen,	  offered	  as	   instances	  of	   ‘something	  mysterious’;	   they	  are	  effectively	  posed	   as	   a	   question.	   	   I,	   as	   reader,	   am	   liberated	   as	   to	   how	   I	   assemble	   and	  interpret	  the	  meanings,	  images	  and	  associations	  that	  I	  myself	  generate;	  and	  it	  is	  through	  the	  deployment	  of	  such	  meanings,	  images	  and	  associations	  that	  we	  see	  the	   corporeal	   text	   come	   into	   play.	   The	   ‘empty	   structure’	   that	   is	   fiction	   is	  paralleled	  by	  the	  ‘empty’	  (that	  is,	  identity-­‐free)	  reader	  that	  Barthes	  identified	  as	  
                                            117	  Kanai,	  ‘Nikutairon	  e	  josetsu	  dai’ippo’,	  p.	  22	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being	   ‘without	  history,	  biography,	  psychology;	  he	  is	  simply	  that	  someone	  who	  holds	   together	   in	   a	   single	   field	   all	   the	   traces	   by	   which	   the	   written	   text	   is	  constituted.’118	  	   The	   incorporeal	   text,	   by	   contrast,	   replete	   as	   it	   is	   with	   pre-­‐
determined	  meanings,	   has,	   ultimately,	   no	   need	   of	   the	   reader.	   In	   other	  words,	  once	   the	   literary-­‐critical-­‐cultural	   establishment	   has	   determined	   what	   say,	  Mishima’s	  The	  Temple	  of	  the	  Golden	  Pavilion	  is	   ‘about’,	  it	  renders	  both	  text	  and	  reader	  redundant.	  To	  quote	  Kanai	  again,	   the	  text’s	   ‘internal	  worlds’,	  denied	  to	  the	   reader,	   become	   ‘lost’;	   and	   ‘I	   suppose	   that	   they	  must	   have	   an	   incorporeal	  corporeality,	  which	   doesn’t	   belong	   to	   the	   body,	   and	  which	   lies	   outside	   of	   the	  body	   like	   a	   wreckage	   of	   used	   up	   words	   that	   age	   in	   written	   and	   spoken	  years.’119	  Once	   we	   know	   what	   the	   incorporeal	   text	   means,	   it	   –	   with	   its	  ‘wreckage	   of	   used-­‐up	   words’	   –	   need	   never	   trouble	   us,	   and	   we	   need	   never	  trouble	  it,	  ever	  again.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  corporeal	  text,	  forever	  outward	  looking,	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  reader	  in	  order	  for	  its	  meanings	  to	  be	  generated,	  and	  as	  such,	  the	   reader,	   through	   the	  act	  of	   reading,	   ensures	   that	   the	   corporeal	   text	   is	  only	  ever	  present	   in	  the	  present;	  the	   corporeal	   text	   and	   its	   reader	  engage,	   in	  other	  words,	  in	  a	  perpetual	  act	  of	  reciprocation,	  each	  requiring	  the	  other	  in	  order	  to	  exist.	  Thus,	   it	   is	  the	  living,	  actual	  conjoining	  of	  text	  and	  reader	  that	  brings	  the	  corporeal	   text	   into	   being.	   	   It	   cannot	   be	   separated	   from	   its	   reader;	   hence	   it	  cannot	  be	  separated	  from	  the	  physical	  act	  of	  reading.	  
                                            118	  Barthes,	  ‘Death	  of	  the	  Author’,	  p.	  148.	  119	  Kanai,	  ‘Kotoba/genjitsu/nikutai’,	  pp.	  67-­‐68.	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Around	   the	   time	   when	   I	   was	   at	   High	   School	   I	   was	   the	   most	  excited	   I	   had	   ever	   been	   –	   in	  writing	   things,	   looking	   at	   pictures,	  and	  listening	  to	  music	  –	  this	  was	  the	  time	  that	  my	  passion	  was	  at	  its	   height.	   	   In	   my	   daily	   life,	   everything	   had	   the	   feel	   of	   being	  unusual	   –	   whatever	   I	   read	   I	   had	   the	   feeling	   that	   I	   really	  sympathised	  with	  it	  –	  even	  looking	  at	  one	  picture	  I	  would	  become	  moved.	  	  It	  was	  exactly	  at	  this	  time	  that	  the	  ‘Yomiuri	  Independent	  Exhibition’	   had	   closed	   and	   the	   ‘Hi-­‐Red	   Center’	   had	   formed	   –	  whether	  it	  was	  Akasegawa’s	  ‘Art	  Gallery	  of	  Internal	  Medicine’,	  or	  whatever	  Nakanishi	  was	  doing,	   I	   saw	   it	   and	  –	   I	   really	   liked	   that	  sort	   of	   thing.	   	   It	   was	   interesting.	   	   The	   ‘objets	   portable’	   and	   the	  ‘happening’	  with	   the	   clips	  were	   really	   cool	   [….]	   I	   didn’t	   care	   for	  whatever	   it	   is	   that	   we	   call	   ‘Art’,	   I	   suppose	   I	   merely	   shared	   the	  kind	   of	   excitement	   that	   comes	   from	   touching	   the	   spring	   of	   real	  creativity.	  	  I	  was	  forced	  to	  learn	  that	  the	  world	  and	  the	  individual	  do	   not	   exist	   (or	   you	   could	   say,	   are	   not	   absent)	   in	   so-­‐called	  opposition	  to	  the	  other.	  	  Thanks	  to	  the	  Hi-­‐Red	  Center.	  	  Kanai	   Mieko,	   'Kaku	   hito	   no	   kanshin	   -­‐	   e	   to	   bungaku	   to'	   [‘The	  Concerns	  of	  Writers:	  Painting	  and	  Literature’]	  	  
Kanai’s	  writings,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  repeatedly	  gesture	  towards	  the	  generation	  of	  meaning	  through	  association	  and	  tangentiality.	  	  It	  is	  therefore	  fitting,	  I	  hope,	  to	  begin	  this	  conclusion	  by	  going	  off	  on	  a	  tangent	  of	  my	  own	  by	  discussing,	  briefly,	  the	   Hi-­‐Red	   Center.	   	   The	   Hi-­‐Red	   Center	   was	   one	   of	   the	   most	   notorious	   art	  performance	  groups	  of	  the	  1960s,	  whose	  bizarre	  art	  events	  were	  designed,	  as	  a	  form	   of	   ‘direct	   action,’	   to	   critique	   authority	   and	   interrupt	   the	   daily	   lives	   of	  people	  in	  Tokyo.1	  	  Their	  activities	  aimed	  at	  exposing	  the	   ‘noneverydayness’	  of	  the	   mundane,	   and	   as	   a	   means	   of	   protesting	   and	   attempting	   to	   revolutionise	  
                                            1	  The	   name	   ‘Hi-­‐Red	   Center’	   is	   an	   English	   transliteration	   of	   the	   first	   character	   of	   the	  surnames	  of	  the	  group’s	  three	  main	  members:	  Takamatsu	  Jirō,	  Akasegawa	  Genpei	  and	  Nakanishi	   Natsuyuki.	   	   	   The	   group	   was	   founded	   in	   May	   1963,	   although	   each	   of	   its	  members	   had	   been	   involved	   in	   various	   artistic	   activities,	   both	   collaboratively	   and	  individually,	  before	  this	  point.	  Their	  art	  and	  its	  relevance	  to	  the	  politics	  of	  mid	  1960s	  Japan	   are	   explored	   by	   William	   Marotti	   in	   Money,	   Trains	   and	   Guillotines;	   Art	   and	  
Revolution	  in	  1960s	  Japan	  (London:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2013).	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public	   consciousness.	  Their	   inaugural	  performance	   itself	   involved	   the	  group’s	  members’	   riding	  on	  Tokyo’s	   circular	  overground	  railroad,	   the	  Yamanote	  Line,	  with	   their	   faces	   painted	   white,	   while	   displaying	   certain	   ‘objets	   portable’	   that	  they	  had	  created	  specifically	   for	  the	  event,	  such	  as	  transparent	  polyester	  eggs	  injected	   with	   gel	   that	   held	   damaged	   everyday	   objects	   inside	   them.2	  	   The	  invitation	  to	  this	  event,	  which	  doubled	  in	  its	  purpose	  as	  a	  mini-­‐manifesto	  of	  the	  group’s	   aims	   and	   philosophy,	   was	   set	   out	   on	   card,	   with	   a	   diagram	   of	   the	  Yamanote	  Line	  on	  the	  right	  hand	  side,	  ‘with	  stations	  and	  event	  times	  marked’.3	  	  It	  was	  then	  handed	  out	  or	  posted	  to	  random	  members	  of	  the	  public.	   	  The	  left-­‐hand	  side	  of	  the	  card	  was	  printed	  with	  the	  following	  statement:	  
In	  this	  meaningless	  present,	  we	  are	   impelled	  with	  the	  desire	  to	  swim	  about	   in	   this	   fluid,	  agitate	  and	  make	   it	  a	  void.	   	  From	  this	  void	  we	  must	  persistently	  attempt	  work	  that	  will	  give	  birth	  to	  a	  new,	  pure	   interaction.	   	  There	   is	  a	  collective	  body	  of	   things	   that	  refuse	  to	  rest	  contented	  within	  these	  constructions,	  and	  attempt	  to	  be	  a	  point	  within	  this	  void	  that	  the	  fluid	  is	  pregnant	  with.	  	  As	  the	  movement	   of	   contraction	   and	   dispersion	   by	   this	   collective	  body	  unfolds,	   it	  moves	  about	   the	   circle	  drawn	  at	   the	   right	   [the	  Yamanote	   Line].	   	   Should	   you	   happen	   to	   come	   across	   this	  collective	  body	   in	   the	  circle,	  at	   the	  points	   fixed	  on	  the	  circle,	  at	  the	  times	  listed	  on	  the	  right,	  you	  will	  perhaps	  become	  a	  molecule	  agitated	   within	   this	   void,	   have	   your	   individuality	   wiped	   away	  and	   collapse	   into	   the	   indistinguishable	   crucible	   of	   you,	  me,	   us,	  and	  matter.4	  	  Let	  us,	  when	  considering	  the	  above,	  set	  aside	  questions	  of	  aesthetic	  value;	  let	  us,	  too,	   set	   aside	   the	   handy	   biographical	   fact	   that	   Kanai	   herself,	   in	   an	   interview,	  cited	   them	  as	  an	   influence	   (hence	  my	  epigraph).5	  Let	  us,	   instead,	  exercise	   the	  
                                            2	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  219-­‐221.	  3	  Marotti	  gives	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  event	  and	  manifesto:	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  219-­‐244.	  4	  Ibid.,	  p.	  221.	  5	  Kanai	  talks	  about	  her	  interest	  in	  their	  work	  in:	  Otsura	  Sakazaki,	  and	  Mieko	  Kanai,	  'Kaku	  hito	  no	  kanshin	  -­‐	  e	  to	  bungaku	  to',	  Bijutsu	  techō,	  349	  (1971),	  128-­‐33,	  p.	  134	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freedom	   to	   choose	   to	   read	   the	  Hi-­‐Red	   Center’s	   invitation	  metaphorically	   (not	  least	  because,	  to	  read	  it	  metaphorically	  is	  to	  accept	  the	  invitation)	  choosing	  as	  the	  subject	  of	  our	  metaphor	  the	  relationship	  between	  text	  and	  reader.	  Thus,	  the	  random,	  nameless	  recipients	  of	  this	  invitation	  might	  resemble	  that	  destination	  Barthes	   envisaged	   for	   his	   Authorless	   text:	   those	   anonymous	   readers	   (‘the	  collective	  body’)	  who	  don’t	  merely	  mark	  the	  destination	  of	  a	  text,	  but	  who	  also	  denote	   its	   (new)	  unity,	   ‘giv[ing]	  birth	   to	   a	  new,	  pure	   interaction’.	   	   Just	   as	   the	  chance	   offered	   by	   the	   Hi-­‐Red	   Center	   to	   the	   Tokyo	   commuters	   to	   subvert	  whatever	  meanings	   a	   ride	   on	   the	  Yamanote	  might	   yield	   –	   and	  what	   could	   be	  more	  predetermined	  in	  its	  meaning	  than	  a	  circular	  journey	  on	  a	  railway	  track?	  –	   so	   too,	  we	  might	   claim,	   in	   the	  wake	  of	   our	  discussion	  of	   the	   corporeal	   text,	  that	   Kanai’s	  writings	   constantly	   proffer	   themselves	   to	   the	   reader	   in	   order	   to	  democratise	   and	   release	   their	   radical	   potential,	   and	   readily	   defer	   the	  generation	   of	   their	   respective	  meanings.	   Thus,	   just	   as	   for	   the	   commuter	  who	  wishes	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  Hi-­‐Red	  Center	  (‘you	  will	  perhaps	  become	  a	  molecule	  agitated	  within	  this	  void,	  have	  your	  individuality	  wiped	  away	  and	  collapse	  into	  the	   indistinguishable	   crucible	   of	   you,	  me,	   us,	   and	  matter’),	   so	   too,	   for	  Kanai’s	  readers,	  the	  conventional	  categories	  of	  Author,	  reader	  and	  text	  will	  break	  down.	  	  In	  democratising	   the	  production	  of	  meaning,	  Kanai’s	  writings	   ‘wipe	  away’	  old	  categories	   of	   self,	   man,	   woman,	   body,	   authority,	   love.	   In	   short,	   we	   might	  therefore	  read	  the	  Hi-­‐Red	  Center’s	  invitation	  associatively.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  might	  read	  it	  as	  a	  metaphor	  for,	  and	  as	  an	  example	  of,	  the	  corporeal	  text	  itself.	  
That	   Kanai’s	   texts	   place	   in	   the	   readers’	   hands	   the	   possibility	   of	  producing	   manifold	   different	   readings	   becomes	   apparent	   when	   we	   see	   how	  easily	  and	  productively	  we	  might	  read	  the	  various	  texts	  discussed	  throughout	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this	   thesis	  against	  one	  another.	  What,	   for	   instance,	   is	  Humpty	  Dumpty	  but	  an	  example	   –	   perhaps	   the	   supreme	   example	   –	   of	   kyokō,	   fiction,	   an	   empty	  structure?	  Isn’t	  Love	  Life,	  with	  its	  twin	  matrices	  of	  interpretation	  that	  it	  proffers	  to	   its	   readers,	   another	   instance	  of	   the	   corporeal	   text,	   as	   it	   juggles	   its	   various,	  outwardly-­‐directed	   potential	   meanings	   surrounding	   issues	   of	   the	   body,	  fictionality,	   and	   the	   role	  of	   the	   reader	   in	   generating	  meaning?	  How	  might	  we	  account	   for	   the	   Inflated	  Man,	   perpetually	   on	   the	   point	   of	   either	   exploding	   or	  decaying,	  when	  we	  read	  him	  against	   the	   theories	  of	  Okamoto	  and	  Sakaguchi?	  Might	   not	   Ai’s	   pain	   as	   she	   physicalizes	   her	   abjection	   be	   situated	   fruitfully	  alongside	  Hijikata’s	  Dancing-­‐Girl-­‐in-­‐Pain?	  	  	  
As	  the	  aim	  of	  interrogative	  texts	  such	  as	  Kanai’s	  is	  neither	  to	  attempt	  to	  instill	   in	   the	   reader	   a	   specific	   set	   of	   values	   and	   attitudes,	   nor	   organise	   a	  criticism	  of	  a	  specific	  set	  of	  values	  and	  attitudes,	   it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	   their	  challenge	  to	  convention	  is	  non-­‐specific	   in	   its	  critique.	   	   	   It	  could,	  and	  has,	  been	  argued	   that	   such	   texts	  are	  a-­‐	  or	  non-­‐political;	  or	  otherwise,	   that,	   for	   instance,	  they	   are	   not	   ‘socially	   useful	   for	   feminist	   politics’;	   or	   even	   that	   they	   ‘ignore’	  important	   issues,	   such	   as	   ‘the	   traditional	   gender	  hierarchy.6	  	  However,	   as	  we	  have	   seen	   time	   and	   again	   in	   this	   thesis,	   focused	   critique	   is	   achieved	   through	  those	  texts’	  use	  of	  parody	  and	  satire,	  modes	  of	  expression	  capable	  of	  exacting	  
                                            6	  Suga	  Hidemi	  argues	  that	  Kanai’s	  writings	  are	  non-­‐political.	  	  See	  'Kanai	  Mieko:	  Hito	  to	  Sakuhin',	   Shōwa	  Bungaku	   Zenshū	  31	   (Tokyo:	   Shōgakukan,	   1988)	   pp.	   961-­‐64,	   p.	   961.	  Mary	   Knighton	   argues	   that	   Kanai’s	   early	   short	   stories	   are	   not	   ‘socially	   useful	   for	  feminist	  politics’	  in	  'Writing	  the	  Body	  as	  Meat:	  Kanai	  Mieko's	  "Rotting	  Meat"	  as	  Surreal	  Fable',	   in	   Japanese	   Studies	   around	   the	   World	   2004.	   Observing	   Japan	   from	   Within:	  
Perspectives	  of	  Foreign	  Scholars	  Resident	   in	   Japan,	   ed.	   by	   James	   Baxter	   (International	  Research	  Centre	  for	  Japanese	  Studies,	  2004)	  pp.	  161-­‐88,	  p.	  177;	  and	  Tomoko	  Aoyama	  argues	   that	   Kanai’s	   early	   writings	   ‘ignore’	   the	   ‘traditional	   gender	   hierarchy’	   in	  'Embroidering	  Girls’	  Texts:	  Fashion	  and	  Feminism	   in	   the	  Fiction	  of	  Kanai	  Mieko',	  US-­‐	  
Japan	  Women’s	  Journal,	  29	  (2005),	  99-­‐117,	  p.	  101.	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extremely	   specific	   critiques	   through	   their	   mimicry	   and	   exaggeration	   of	   their	  targets.	  	  And	  it	  is	  precisely	  these	  textual	  strategies	  that,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  our	  discussions	   of	   say,	   Okamoto’s	   Tower	   of	   the	   Sun,	   and	   Hijikata’s	   butō,	   align	  Kanai’s	  writings	  with	  the	  Japanese	  avant-­‐garde.7	  	  	  
Returning	   for	  one	   last	   time	   to	   the	  adjudicatory	   comments	  of	   the	  Dazai	  Osamu	   Prize	   committee,	   let	   us	   recall	   that	   the	   strongest	   criticism	   of	   Kanai’s	  writing	  was	  that	  it	  demonstrated	  a	  ‘narcissism’	  that	  was	  ‘physiological	  in	  basis’.	  The	  contention	  and	  conclusion	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  precisely	  the	  opposite:	  that	  the	  writings	   of	   Kanai	   Mieko,	   in	   their	   radical	   decentring	   of	   the	   conventional	  relationship	   between	   reader	   and	   author,	   reader	   and	   text,	   reader	   and	   world,	  Kanai’s	  writings	  serve	   (and	   I	  use	   the	  word	  advisedly)	  not	  only	   to	   liberate	   the	  texts	   themselves	   from	   the	   tyranny	   of	   a	   single,	   unified	   meaning;	   they	   also,	  through	  their	  constant	  interrogative	  strategies,	  serve	  to	  enable	  their	  readers	  to	  face	   the	  world,	   and	   to	  be	  profoundly	   interrogative	   in	   their	   turn.	   	   In	   this	  way,	  they	  offer	  themselves	  not	  only	  as	  interventions	  into	  the	  sociocultural,	  political	  and	  artistic	  debates	  of	  their	  time,	  but	  also	  as	  texts	  that	  insistently	  ask	  us	  today	  what	  one	  means	  when	  one	  conceives	  oneself	  as	  a	  self.	  
 
                                            7 	  These	   strategies	   and	   their	   potential	   for	   political	   critique	   are	   again,	   amply	  demonstrated	   by	   Hi-­‐Red	   Center’s	   1964	   happening,	   the	   ‘Ultra-­‐Cleaning	   Event’	   (or	  ‘Campaign	   for	   the	   Promotion	   of	   Sanitation	   and	   Order	   in	   the	   Capital’	   (Shutoken	   seisō	  
seiri	   sokushin	   undō)).	   This	   event	   parodied	   the	   government’s	   ‘Beautification	   of	   the	  Capital’	  campaign,	  a	  campaign	  which,	  in	  the	  run	  up	  to	  Tokyo’s	  hosting	  of	  the	  Olympic	  Games,	   attempted	   to	   conceal	   the	   squalor	  and	  decay	  of	  parts	  of	   the	   capital	  behind	   its	  renovation	   of	   the	   already	   affluent	   Ginza	   area.	   During	   the	   Hi-­‐Red	   Center’s	   ‘Ultra-­‐Cleaning	   Event’,	   the	   group	   dressed	   completely	   in	   white,	   wore	   masks,	   and	   set	   up	   a	  notice	   saying	   ‘Cleaning	   in	   Progress’	   in	   the	   middle	   of	   the	   streets	   in	   the	   upmarket	  shopping	   district	   of	   Ginza;	   members	   of	   the	   Hi-­‐Red	   Center	   then	   proceeded	   to	  obsessively	  polish	  the	  tarmac	  and	  manhole	  covers	  in	  front	  of	  passers-­‐by.	   	  See	  ibid.,	  p.	  310	  and	  Chong,	  Doryun,	  et	  al.	  Tokyo	  1955-­‐1970:	  A	  New	  Avant-­‐Garde	  (New	  York:	  MoMA,	  2012)	  p.	  103.	  
 242 
Bibliography	  	  Allan,	  Robin,	  Walt	  Disney	  and	  Europe	   (Bloomington:	   Indiana	  University	  Press,	  1999)	  	  Andersen,	  Hans	  Christian,	   ‘The	  Little	  Mermaid',	   in	  Hans	  Andersen's	  Fairy	  Tales:	  
A	  Selection	   (Oxford	  World's	   Classics)	   (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	   Press,	   1984)	  pp.	  76-­‐106	  	  Aoyama,	   Tomoko,	   'Embroidering	   Girls’	   Texts:	   Fashion	   and	   Feminism	   in	   the	  Fiction	  of	  Kanai	  Mieko',	  US-­‐	  Japan	  Women’s	  Journal,	  29	  (2005)	  99-­‐117	  ———,	   ‘Transgendering	   Shōsetsu:	   Girls’	   Intertext/Sexuality',	   in	   Genders,	  
Transgenders	  and	  Sexualities	  in	  Japan,	  ed.	  Mark	  McLelland	  and	  Romit	  Dasgupta	  (Routledge,	  2005),	  pp.	  49-­‐64	  ———,	  'Writing	  Along	  with	  and	  against	  the	  Smugness	  of	  Writing:	  Kanai	  Mieko’s	  A	   Study	  of	   the	  Comfortable	  Life',	   in	  Parody,	   ed.	   Sharalyn	  Orbaugh	  and	   Joshua	  Mostow	  (AJLS,	  2009)	  244-­‐61	  	  Aoyama,	  Tomoko,	  and	  Hartley,	  Barbara,	  eds.	  Girl	  Reading	  Girl	  in	  Japan	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2010)	  	  Baird,	  Bruce,	  Hijikata	  Tatsumi	  and	  Butoh:	  Dancing	  in	  a	  Pool	  of	  Gray	  Grits	   (New	  York:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2012)	  	  Barthes,	   Roland,	   'The	   Death	   of	   the	   Author',	   in	   Image,	   Music,	   Text	   (London:	  Fontana,	  1977),	  pp.	  142-­‐148	  ———,	  S/Z	  trans.	  Straus	  and	  Giroux	  Farrar,	  Inc.	  (Oxford:	  Blackwell	  Publishers,	  1990)	  	  Beals,	  Corey,	  Levinas	  and	  the	  Wisdom	  of	  Love:	  The	  Question	  of	  Invisibility	  (Texas:	  Baylor	  University	  Press,	  2007)	  
 243 
	  Birnbaum,	   Phyllis,	   ed.,	   Rabbits,	   Crabs,	   Etc:	   Stories	   by	   Japanese	   Women	  (Honolulu:	  Hawai'i	  University	  Press,	  1982)	  	  Blakeley	  Klein,	  Susan,	  Ankoku	  Butō:	  The	  Premodern	  and	  Postmodern	  Influences	  
on	  the	  Dance	  of	  Utter	  Darkness	   (Ithaca,	  New	  York:	  Cornell	  University	  East	  Asia	  Program,	  1988)	  	  Bohm,	   David,	  Wholeness	   and	   the	   Implicate	   Order	   (London:	   Routledge,	   1980)	  
Zentaisei	   to	   Naizo	   Chitsujo	   trans.	   Sano	   Masahiro,	   Inoue	   Tadashi,	   Itō	   Shakō	  (Tokyo:	  Seidosha,	  1986)	  	  Buckley,	   Sandra,	   ed.	   Broken	   Silence:	   Voices	   of	   Japanese	   Feminism	   (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1996)	  	  Bullock,	   Julia,	   The	   Other	  Women's	   Lib:	   Gender	   and	   Body	   in	   Japanese	  Women's	  
Fiction	  (Hawai'i:	  University	  of	  Hawaii	  Press,	  2009)	  	  Butler,	   Judith,	   Gender	   Trouble:	   Feminism	   and	   the	   Subversion	   of	   Identity	   (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  1990)	  	  Capra,	  Fritjof,	  The	  Tao	  of	  Physics	  (Berkeley,	  California:	  Shambhala	  Publications	  1975)	   Taoshizengaku	   trans.	   Tanaka	   Mitsuhiko,	   Yoshifuku	   Shinichi,	   Shimada	  Hiromi,	  Nakayama	  Naoko	  (Tokyo:	  Kōsakusha,	  1980)	  ———,	  The	  Web	  of	  Life:	  A	  New	  Synthesis	  of	  Mind	  and	  Matter	   (London:	  Harper	  Collins,	  1996)	  	  Carroll,	  Lewis,	  Through	  the	  Looking-­‐Glass	  and	  What	  Alice	  Found	  There	  (London:	  Macmillan	  London	  Limited,	  1978)	  ———,	  Alice's	  Adventures	  in	  Wonderland	  (London:	  Macmillan	  London	  Limited,	  1978)	  	  
 244 
Cassegard,	  Carl,	  'Japan's	  Lost	  Decade	  and	  Its	  Two	  Recoveries:	  On	  Sawaragi	  Noi,	  Japanese	   Neo-­‐Pop	   and	   Anti-­‐War	   Activism',	   in	   Perversion	   and	   Modern	   Japan:	  
Psychoanalysis,	   Literature,	   Culture	   ed.	   Nina	   Cornyetz	   and	   J.	   Keith	   Vincent	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2010)	  pp.	  38-­‐59	  	  Chong,	  Doryun,	  et	  al.	  Tokyo	  1955-­‐1970:	  A	  New	  Avant-­‐Garde	  (New	  York:	  MoMA,	  2012)	  	  Cixous,	  Hélène,	  'The	  Laugh	  of	  the	  Medusa',	  Signs,	  1	  (1976)	  875-­‐93	  	  Copeland,	  Rebecca,	  ed.	  Woman	  Critiqued	   (Hawai'i:	  University	  of	  Hawai'i	  Press,	  2006)	  	  de	   Bary,	   Brett,	   ed.	  Origins	  of	  Modern	   Japanese	  Literature	   ed.	   Stanley	   Fish	   and	  Fredric	  Jameson	  (London:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  1993)	  	  Derrida,	   Jacques,	   'Structure,	   Sign	   and	   Play	   in	   the	   Discourse	   of	   the	   Human	  Sciences',	  in	  Writing	  and	  Difference	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1978)	  278-­‐93	  	  Dobson,	   Hugo,	   et	   al.	   Japan's	   International	   Relations:	   Politics,	   Economics	   and	  
Security	  2nd	  edn	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2005)	  	  Dower,	   John,	   Embracing	   Defeat:	   Japan	   in	   the	  Wake	   of	   World	  War	   II	   	   (W.	   W.	  Norton	  and	  Company	  Ltd,	  1999)	  ———,'Peace	   and	   Democracy	   in	   Two	   Systems:	   External	   Policy	   and	   Internal	  Conflict',	  in	  Postwar	  Japan	  as	  History,	  ed.	  Andrew	  Gorden	  (California:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1993)	  	  Drake,	   Christopher,	   'The	   House	   of	   Madame	   Juju',	   in	   Contemporary	   Japanese	  
Literature:	   An	   Anthology	   of	   Fiction,	   Film	   and	   Other	   Writings	   since	   1945,	   ed.	  Alfred	  A	  Knopf	  (New	  York:	  1977),	  pp.	  342-­‐43	  	  
 245 
Etsugu,	   Tomoko,	   'Kanai	   Mieko	   "Yume	   no	   jikan"	   no	   Ai'	   [‘Ai	   in	   Kanai	   Mieko’s	  “Dream	  Time”’]	  Koku	  bungaku	  kaishaku	  to	  kansō,	  41	  (1976),	  124-­‐25	  	  	  Fairbanks,	   Carol,	   'Kanai	   Mieko',	   in	   Japanese	   Women	   Fiction	   Writers:	   Their	  
Culture	  and	  Society,	  1890s	  to	  1990s	  (London:	  The	  Scarecrow	  Press,	   Inc,	  2002),	  pp.	  148-­‐52	  	  Finch,	   Christopher,	   The	   Art	   of	  Walt	   Disney:	   From	  Mickey	   Mouse	   to	   the	   Magic	  
Kingdoms	  (New	  York:	  Abrams,	  1973)	  ———,	  The	  Art	  of	  Walt	  Disney:	  From	  Mickey	  Mouse	  to	  the	  Magic	  Kingdoms	  and	  
Beyond	  (New	  York:	  Abrams,	  2011)	  	  Fisher	   Sorgenfrei,	   Carol,	   Unspeakable	   Acts:	   The	   Avant-­‐Garde	   Theatre	   of	  
Terayama	   Shūji	   and	   Postwar	   Japan	   (Honolulu:	   University	   of	   Hawai'i	   Press,	  2005)	  	  Flanagan,	  Damian,	  Yukio	  Mishima	  (London:	  Reaktion	  Books,	  2014)	  	  Foucault,	   Michel,	   The	   Archaeology	   of	   Knowledge	   trans.	   A.	   M.	   Sheridan	   Smith	  (Tavistock	  Publications	  Limited,	  1972)	  ———,	  'Right	  of	  Death	  and	  Power	  over	  Life',	   in	  The	  History	  of	  Sexuality,	  Vol.	  1,	  
An	  Introduction	  (New	  York:	  Vintage,	  1980)	  	  Fowler,	   Edward,	   The	   Rhetoric	   of	   Confession:	   Shishōsetsu	   in	   Early	   Twentieth-­‐
Century	  Japanese	  Fiction	  (London:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1988)	  ———,	  'Buraku	  in	  Modern	  Japanese	  Literature',	  Journal	  of	  Japanese	  Studies,	  26	  (2000)	  1-­‐39	  	  Fox	   Keller,	   Evelyn;	   and	   Longino,	   Helen	   E.;	   eds.	  Oxford	   Readings	   in	   Feminism:	  
Feminism	  and	  Science	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1996)	  	  Fraser,	   Lucy,	   Fairy	   Tale	   Transformations	   and	   Gender:	   The	   Little	   Mermaid's	  
Metamorphoses	  in	  Japanese	  and	  English	  (The	  University	  of	  Queenland,	  2013)	  
 246 
———,	   'Lost	   Property	   Fairy	   Tales:	   Ogawa	   Yoko	   and	   Higami	   Kumiko's	  Transformations	  of	  “the	  Little	  Mermaid”',	  Marvels	  &	  Tales,	  27	  (2013)	  181-­‐93	  ———,	  'Reading	  and	  Retelling	  Girls	  across	  Cultures:	  Mermaid	  Tales	  in	  Japanese	  and	  English',	  Japan	  Forum,	  26	  (2014)	  246-­‐64	  	  Freud,	  Sigmund,	  'The	  Case	  of	  Miss	  Lucie	  R	  (1985),	  Selected	  Papers	  on	  Hysteria',	  in	   Great	   Books	   of	   the	   Western	   World:	   The	   Major	   Works	   of	   Sigmund	   Freud	  (London:	  Encyclopaedia	  Britannica,	  Inc,	  1993),	  pp.	  31-­‐37	  ———,	   'Repression	   (1915)',	   in	   Great	   Books	   of	   the	  Western	  World:	   The	  Major	  
Works	   of	   Sigmund	   Freud	   (London:	   Encyclopaedia	   Britannica,	   Inc,	   1993),	   pp.	  422-­‐27	  ———,	   'The	   Interpretation	   of	   Dreams	   (1900)',	   in	  Great	  Books	  of	   the	  Western	  
World:	   The	  Major	  Works	   of	   Sigmund	  Freud	   (London:	   Encyclopaedia	   Britanica,	  Inc,	  1993),	  pp.	  135-­‐398	  ———,	   'The	   'Uncanny'',	   in	  The	  Standard	  Edition	  of	  the	  Complete	  Psychological	  
Works	  of	  Sigmund	  Freud	  (London:	  Vintage,	  2001),	  pp.	  217-­‐56	  ———,	  'The	  Question	  of	  Lay	  Analysis',	   in	  The	  Standard	  Edition	  of	  the	  Complete	  
Psychological	   Works	   of	   Sigmund	   Freud	   ed.	   James	   Strachey	   (London:	   Vintage,	  2001),	  pp.	  179-­‐258	  	  Gerteis,	   Christopher,	   Gender	   Struggles:	   Wage-­‐Earning	   Women	   and	   Male-­‐
Dominated	  Unions	   in	  Postwar	   Japan	   (Massachusettes:	  Harvard	  University	  Asia	  Center,	  2009)	  	  Grosz,	   Elizabeth	  A.,	  Sexual	  Subversions:	  Three	  French	  Feminists	   (London:	  Allen	  and	  Unwin,	  1989)	  ———,	  Jacques	  Lacan:	  A	  Feminist	  Introduction	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  1990)	  ———,	  Volatile	  Bodies:	  Toward	  a	  Corporeal	  Feminism	  (Indiana	  Press,	  1994)	  	  Hasumi,	  Shigehiko,	  and	  Kanai,	  Mieko,	  'Hasumi	  Shigehiko	  ron	  no	  tame	  ni'	  [‘For	  a	  theory	  on	  Hasumi	  Shigehiko’]	  Koku	  bungaku	  kaishaku	  to	  kansō,	  37	  (1992)	  6-­‐24	  ———,	  'Handō	  sōchi	  toshite	  no	  bungaku'	  [‘Literature	  as	  Counterrevolutionary	  Equipment’]	  Bungei	  shunjū	  (1993)	  150-­‐72	  
 247 
	  Havens,	  Thomas	  R.	  H.,	  Radicals	  and	  Realists	  in	  the	  Japanese	  Nonverbal	  Arts:	  The	  
Avant-­‐Garde	   Rejection	   of	   Modernism	   (Honolulu:	   University	   of	   Hawai'i	   Press,	  2006)	  	  Hijikata,	   Tatsumi,	   'Sen	   ga	   sen	   ni	   nitekuru	   toki'	   [‘When	   the	   Line	   Begins	   to	  Resemble	  a	  Line’]	  Gendai	  shi	  techō,	  17(11)	  (1974)	  243-­‐47	  ———,	  Yameru	  maihime	  [Dancing	  Girl	  in	  Pain]	  (Tokyo:	  Hakusuisha,	  1983)	  ———,	   Hijikata	   Tatsumi	   zenshū	   [The	   Complete	   Works	   of	   Hijikata	   Tatsumi]	  (Tokyo:	  Kawade	  shobō,	  1998)	  	  Ibuse,	  Masuji,	  Jon	  Manjirō	  hyōryūki	  (Tokyo:	  Kawade	  shobō	  1937)	  John	  Manjiro,	  
the	   Castaway,	   His	   Life	   and	   Adventures	   trans.	   Hisakazu	   Kaneko	   (Tokyo:	  Hokuseido	  Press	  1941)	  ———,	  'Noriaijidōsha',	  in	  Noriaijidōsha	  (Tokyo:	  Chikumashobō,	  1952),	  pp.	  37-­‐54	  'The	  Charcoal	  Bus',	  in	  Modern	  Japanese	  Stories:	  An	  Anthology	  (London:	  Eyre	  and	  Spottiswoode,	  1961)	  ———,	   Kuroi	   ame	   (Tokyo:	   Shinchōsha,	   1966)	   Black	   Rain	   trans.	   John	   Bester	  (Tokyo:	  Kōdansha	  International,	  1969)	  	  Mather,	   Cotton;	   Karan,	   P.P.;	   and	   Iijima,	   Shigeru;	   Japanese	   Landscapes:	  Where	  
Land	  and	  Culture	  Merge	  (Kentucky:	  The	  University	  Press	  of	  Kentucky,	  1998)	  	  Luce	   Irigaray,	   'When	   Our	   Lips	   Speak	   Together',	   in	  This	   Sex	  Which	   Is	  Not	  One	  (Ithaca,	  New	  York:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1977)	  ———,	   Speculum	   of	   the	   Other	   Woman	   trans.	   Gillian	   Gill	   (Ithaca,	   New	   York:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1985)	  ———,	  'The	  Fecundity	  of	  the	  Caress',	  in	  An	  Ethics	  of	  Sexual	  Difference	  (London:	  Continuum,	  2004)	  	  Ishī,	  Takumi,	  et	  al.	   'Okamoto	  Tarō	  o	  yomitoku	  10	  no	  kīwādo'	  [‘Ten	  Key	  Words	  for	  Deciphering	  Okamoto	  Tarō’]	  Bijutsu	  techō,	  63	  (2011),	  20-­‐67	  	  
 248 
Ishikawa,	   Jun,	   Fugen	   (Tokyo:	   Hangasō,	   1936)	   The	   Bodhisattva,	   or,	  
Samantabhadra:	   A	   Novel	   trans.	   William	   Jefferson	   Tyler	   (New	   York	   Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1990)	  ———,	  'Marusu	  no	  uta',	  in	  Ōgon	  densetsu	  (Tokyo:	  Chūōkōronsha,	  1946),	  pp.	  53-­‐98	  'Mars'	  Song',	  in	  The	  Legend	  of	  Gold	  and	  Other	  Stories	  (Honolulu:	  University	  of	  Hawai'i,	  1998),	  pp.	  3-­‐37	  ———,	  Shifuku	  sennnen	  [The	  Millenian]	  (Tokyo:	  Iwanami	  shoten,	  1967)	  	  	  Isshiki,	  Jiro,	  Seigenki	  [Visions	  in	  Azure]	  (Tokyo:	  Chikuma	  shobō,	  1967)	  	  Kafka,	  Franz,	   'The	  Cares	  of	  a	  Family	  Man',	   in	  The	  Complete	  Stories	  (New	  York:	  Schocken	  Books,	  1971),	  pp.	  269-­‐70	  	  Kanai,	   Mieko,	   'Nikutairon	   e	   josetsu	   dai’ippo'	   [‘Towards	   a	   Theory	   of	  Corporeality’]	  Gendai	  shi	  techō,	  12	  (1969),	  20-­‐26	  ———,	  'Fini	  no	  ritorugurafu:	  Reonōru	  Fini	  ni	  yosete'	  [‘The	  Art	  of	  Leonor	  Fini:	  Fini’s	  Litographs’]	  Mizue,	  798	  (1971),	  68-­‐83	  ———,	  'Onna	  ni	  totte	  onna	  to	  wa	  nani	  ka'	  [‘What	  is	  “a	  Woman”	  to	  a	  Woman?’]	  in	  Kōza	  onna	  1:	  Naze	  onna	  ka?	  (Tokyo:	  Chikumashobō,	  1972),	  pp.	  68-­‐83	  ———,	  Usagi	  [Rabbits]	  (Tokyo:	  Chikumashobō,	  1973)	  ———,	  Kanai	  Mieko	  shishū	   [Kanai	  Mieko:	  Collected	  Poetry]	  Vol.	  55	  (Gendai	  shi	  bunko)	  (Tokyo:	  Shinchōsha,	  1973)	  ———,	   'Kūki	  otoko	  no	  hanashi'	   [‘The	  Story	  of	   the	   Inflated	  Man’]	  Shingeki,	   21	  (1974),	  138-­‐44	  ———,	  Akashia	  kishidan	  [The	  Knights	  of	  Akashia]	  (Tokyo:	  Shinchōsha,	  1976)	  ———,	  Kaku	  koto	  no	  hajimari	  ni	  mukatte	  [Turning	  to	  the	  Beginnings	  of	  Writing]	  (Tokyo:	  Chūōkōronsha,	  1978)	  ———,	  Kotoba	  to	  'zure'	  [Words	  and	  ‘Slippage’](Tokyo:	  Chūōkōronsha,	  1983)	  ———,	   Obasan	   no	   disukūru	   [The	   Discourse	   of	   Elder	   Ladies](Tokyo:	   Chikuma	  shobō,	  1984)	  ———,	   Kanai	   Mieko:	   Zentanpenshū	   [Kanai	   Mieko:	   A	   Complete	   Short	   Story	  
Collection]	  3	  vols.	  (Tokyo:	  Nihonbungeisha,	  1992)	  
 249 
———,	   Ai	   no	   seikatsu/Mori	   no	   merujīnu	   [Love	   Life/Melusine	   of	   the	   Forest]	  (Tokyo:	  Kodansha,	  1997)	  ———,	  Shōsetsuron:	  Yomarenakunatta	  shōsetsu	  no	   tame	  ni	   [For	   the	  Novels	  we	  
Stopped	  Reading:	  An	  Essay	  on	  Novels]	  (Chikumashobō,	  2008)	  ———,	  The	  Word	  Book	   trans.	   Paul	  McCarthy	   (London:	   Dalkey	   Archive	   Press,	  2009)	  	  Kanai,	   Mieko,	   and	   Kimura,	   Bin,	   Watakushi	   wa	   hontō	   ni	   watakushi	   nano	   ka:	  
Jikoron	  kōgi	  [Am	  I	  Really	  Myself?	  A	  Lecture	  on	  Theories	  of	  the	  Self]	  	  (Asahi,	  1983)	  	  Kano,	   Ayako,	   'Toward	   a	   Critique	   of	   Transhistorical	   Feminity',	   in	   Gendering	  
Modern	   Japanese	   History,	   ed.	   Barbara	   Molony	   and	   Kathleen	   Uno	   (Harvard	  University	  Harvard	  University	  Asia	  Center,	  2005),	  pp.	  520-­‐54	  	  Karatani,	   Kōjin,	   Nihon	   kindai	   bungaku	   no	   kigen	   (Tokyo:	   Kodansha,	   1980)	  
Origins	   of	   Modern	   Japanese	   Literature	   trans.	   Brett	   de	   Bary	   (London:	   Duke	  University	  Press,	  1993)	  ———,	  'One	  Spirit,	  Two	  Nineteenth	  Centuries',	  in	  Postmodernism	  and	  Japan,	  ed.	  Masao	  Miyoshi	   and	  H.D.	  Harootunian	   (London:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	   1989),	  pp.	  259-­‐72	  	  Kasai,	  Akira,	  'Sore	  wa	  ai	  ka	  shi	  ka	  soretomo	  yume	  ka:	  Kanai	  Mieko	  e	  no	  shishin'	  [‘A	  Private	  Letter	   to	  Kanai	  Mieko:	  Was	  That	  Love,	  or	  Poetry,	  or	  a	  Dream?’]	   in	  
Kanai	  Mieko	  shishū	  (Tokyo:	  Shinchōsha,	  1973),	  pp.	  136-­‐44	  	  Kearney,	  Richard,	  Continental	  Philosophy	  in	  the	  20th	  Century	  Vol.	  8,	  Routledge	  History	  of	  Philosophy	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1994)	  	  Keene,	   Donald,	   Dawn	   to	   the	   West:	   Japanese	   Literature	   of	   the	   Modern	   Era,	   A	  
History	  of	  Japanese	  Literature	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1998)	  	  
 250 
Kersten,	   R.,	   'The	   Intellectual	   Culture	   of	   Postwar	   Japan	   and	   the	   1968-­‐1969	  University	   of	   Tokyo	   Struggles:	   Repositioning	   the	   Self	   in	   Postwar	   Thought',	  
Social	  Science	  Japan	  Journal,	  12	  (2009),	  227-­‐45	  	  Kitada,	   Sachie,	   'Usagi:	   Hito	   to	   bungaku'	   [‘Rabbits:	   People	   and	   Literature’]	   in	  
Tanpen	   josei	   bungaku:	  Gendai,	   ed.	   Teiko	   Yabu,	   Sumiko	  Watanabe	   and	   Yasuko	  Imai	  (Tokyo:	  Ōfū,	  1993),	  pp.	  153-­‐60	  ———,	   'Kanai	  Mieko	  ni	   okeru	   "shōjo"	   to	   "boken"'	   [‘The	   “Young	  Woman”	   and	  “Maternal	  Rights”	  in	  Kanai	  Mieko’s	  Works’]	  in	  Haha	  to	  musume	  no	  feminizumu:	  
Gendai	  kazoku	  o	  koete,	  ed.	  Kitada	  Sachie,	  Noriko	  Mizuta	  and	  Hiroshi	  Hasegawa	  (Tokyo:	  Tahata	  Shōten,	  1996),	  pp.	  140-­‐56	  	  Kitaguchi,	   Suehiro,	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Buraku	  Issue:	  Questions	  and	  Answers	  trans.	  Alastair	  McLaughlan	  (Surrey:	  Japan	  Library,	  1999)	  	  Knighton,	  Mary,	  'Tracing	  the	  Body	  of	  the	  Question	  Mark:	  Kanai	  Mieko’s	  "Ai	  Aru	  Kagiri"',	   in	   Love	   and	   Sexuality	   in	   Japanese	   Literature	   (PMAJLS,	   1991)	   ed.	   Eiji	  Sekine	  286-­‐99	  ———,	  'Rotting	  Meat',	  Fiction	  International,	  29	  (1996)	  110-­‐15	  ———,	   'Kanai	   Mieko',	   in	   The	   Columbia	   Companion	   to	   Modern	   East	   Asian	  
Literature,	  ed.	  Joshua	  Mostow	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2003),	  pp.	  242-­‐44.	  ———,	   'Writing	   the	   Body	   as	   Meat:	   Kanai	   Mieko's	   "Rotting	   Meat"	   as	   Surreal	  Fable',	  in	  Japanese	  Studies	  around	  the	  World	  2004.	  Observing	  Japan	  from	  Within:	  
Perspectives	   of	   Foreign	   Scholars	   Resident	   in	   Japan,	   ed.	   James	   Baxter	  (International	  Research	  Centre	  for	  Japanese	  Studies,	  2004),	  pp.	  161-­‐88	  ———,	  'Down	  the	  Rabbit	  Hole:	  In	  Pursuit	  of	  Shojo	  Alices,	  from	  Lewis	  Carroll	  to	  Kanai	  Mieko',	  U.S.-­‐Japan	  Women's	  Journal,	  40	  (2011)	  49-­‐89	  	  Kristeva,	   Julia,	  Powers	  of	  Horror:	  An	  Essay	  on	  Abjection	   trans.	   Leon	   S.	  Roudiez	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1982)	  ———,	   The	   Kristeva	   Reader	   ed.	   Toril	   Moi	   (New	   York:	   Columbia	   University	  Press,	  1986)	  	  
 251 
Kurahashi,	  Yumiko,	  Sasoritachi	  [The	  Scorpions]	  	  (Tokyo:	  Tokumashoten,	  1968).	  ———,	   'Dokuyaku	   toshite	   no	   bungaku'	   [‘Poisonous	   Literature’]	   in	   Dokuyaku	  toshite	  no	  bungaku	  (Tokyo:	  Kōdansha	  bungei	  bunko,	  1975),	  pp.	  68-­‐77	  	  Lacan,	   Jacques	   'Tuché	   and	   Automaton',	   in	   The	   Four	   Fundamental	   Concepts	   of	  
Psycho-­‐Analysis	  (London:	  The	  Hogarth	  Press,	  1977)	  ———,	  Écrits:	  The	  First	  Complete	  Edition	  in	  English	  trans.	  Bruce	  Fink	  (London:	  W.	  W.	  Norton	  and	  Company,	  2006)	  ———,	   'The	  Mirror	   Stage	   as	   Formative	   of	   the	   I	   Function',	   in	  Écrits:	  The	  First	  
Complete	  Edition	   in	  English	   (London:	  W.	  W.	   Norton	   and	   Company,	   2006),	   pp.	  75-­‐81	  ———,	  'The	  Signification	  of	  the	  Phallus',	  in	  Écrits:	  The	  First	  Complete	  Edition	  in	  
English	  (London:	  W.	  W.	  Norton	  and	  Company,	  2006),	  pp.	  575-­‐84	  	  Levi-­‐Strauss,	   Claude,	   The	   Elementary	   Structures	   of	   Kinship	   trans.	   John	   von	  Sturmer	  James	  Bell,	  and	  Rodney	  Needham	  (Boston:	  Beacon	  Press,	  1969)	  	  Lévinas,	   Emmanuel,	   Totality	   and	   Infinity:	   An	   Essay	   on	   Exteriority	   trans.	  Alphonso	  Lingis	  (Pittsburgh:	  Duquesne	  University	  Press,	  1969)	  ———,	  Otherwise	  Than	  Being	  or,	  Beyond	  Essence	  trans.	  Alphonso	  Lingis.	  Vol.	  3,	  Martinus	   Nijhoff	   Philosophy	   Texts	   (Pittsburg:	   Duquesne	   University	   Press,	  1981)	  	  Long,	   Margherita,	   This	   Perversion	   Called	   Love:	   Reading	   Tanizaki,	   Feminist	  
Theory	  and	  Freud	  	  (Stanford,	  California:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2009)	  	  Lyotard,	   Jean-­‐François,	   The	   Postmodern	   Condition	   (Manchester:	   Manchester	  University	  Press,	  1984).	  	  Mackie,	  Vera,	  Feminism	  in	  Modern	  Japan:	  Citizenship,	  Embodiment	  and	  Sexuality	  	  (Cambridge,	  England:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2003)	  	  
 252 
Marotti,	  William,	  Politics	  and	  Culture	   in	  Postwar	   Japan:	  Akasegawa	  Genpei	  and	  
the	  Artistic	  Avant-­‐Garde	  1958-­‐1970	  (University	  of	  Chicago,	  2001)	  	  ———,	  'Japan	  1968:	  The	  Performance	  of	  Violence	  and	  the	  Theater	  of	  Protest',	  
American	  Historical	  Review,	  114	  (2009),	  97-­‐135	  ———,	   Money,	   Trains	   and	   Guillotines;	   Art	   and	   Revolution	   in	   1960s	   Japan	  (London:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2013)	  	  Maturana,	   Humberto	   R.,	   'Biology	   of	   Cognition',	   in	   Biological	   Computer	  
Laboratory	  Research	  Report	  (Illinois:	  University	  of	  Illinois,	  1970)	  ———,	   'Biology	  of	   Cognition',	   in	  Autopoiesis	  and	  Cognition:	  The	  Realization	  of	  
the	  Living	  (Dordecht:	  D.	  Reidel	  Publishing	  Co.,	  1980),	  pp.	  5-­‐58	  	  Mishima,	   Yukio,	   Taiyō	   to	   tetsu	   (Tokyo:	   Kodansha,	   1968)	   Sun	   and	   Steel	   trans.	  John	  Bester	  (Tokyo:	  Kodansha	  International	  Ltd,	  1970)	  	  Miyauchi,	   J.,	  Okamotoke	  no	  hitobito	   [The	  Okamoto	  Family]	   (Tokyo:	  Heibonsha,	  1996)	  	  Mizuta	   Lippit,	   Noriko;	   Iriye	   Selden,	   Kyoko,	   ed.,	   Stories	   by	   Contemporary	  
Japanese	  Women	  Writers	  (Armonk,	  New	  York:	  M.	  E.	  Sharpe,	  1982)	  	  Molasky,	  Michael,	  Sengo	  Nihon	  no	  jazu	  bunka:	  Eiga,	  bungaku,	  angura	  –	  The	  Jazz	  
Culture	  of	  Postwar	  Japan:	  Film,	  Literature,	  Subculture	  (Tokyo:	  Seidosha,	  2005)	  	  Mulvey,	  Laura,	  Visual	  and	  Other	  Pleasures	  (Basingstoke:	  MacMillan,	  1989)	  	  Napier,	   Susan,	  The	  Fantastic	   in	  Modern	   Japanese	  Literature:	  The	   Subversion	  of	  
Modernity	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1996)	  	  Nariai,	   Hajime,	   'Taikyokushugi:	   Mujun	   to	   iu	   hikisakareta	   kizuguchi'	  [‘Polaroppositionalism:	   The	   Paradox	   of	   the	   Torn	   Wound’]	   Bijutsu	   techō,	   63	  (2011),	  56-­‐57	  
 253 
	  Norgren,	   Tiana,	   'Abortion	   before	   Birth	   Control:	   The	   Interest	   Group	   Politics	  Behind	  Postwar	  Japanese	  Reproduction	  Policy	  ',	  Journal	  of	  Japanese	  Studies,	  24	  (1998),	  59-­‐94	  	  Ogura,	   Chikako;	   Tomioka,	   Taeko;	   and	   Ueno,	   Chizuko;	   Danryū	   bungakuron	  [Male-­‐stream	  Literature]	  (Tokyo:	  Chikuma	  shobō,	  1992)	  	  Okamoto,	   Tarō,	   Gabunshū	   avangyarudo	   [Avant	   Garde	   Pictures	   and	   Letters]	  (Japan:	  Getsuyōshoten,	  1948)	  ———,	  Yoake	  [Daybreak]	  	  (Tokyo:	  The	  Tokyo	  National	  Museum	  of	  Modern	  Art,	  1948)	  	  Oliver,	   Kelly,	   French	   Feminism	   Reader	   (Rowman	   and	   Littlefield	   Publishers,	  2000)	  	  Orbaugh,	   Sharalyn,	   'The	   Body	   in	   Contemporary	   Women's	   Fiction',	   in	   The	  
Woman's	   Hand:	   Gender	   and	   Theory	   in	   Japanese	   Women's	   Writing,	   ed.	   Paul	  Schalow	   and	   Janet	   Walker	   (California:	   Stanford	   University	   Press,	   1996),	   pp.	  119-­‐64	  ———,	   'Arguing	  with	   the	   Real:	   Kanai	  Mieko',	   in	   Ōe	   and	   Beyond,	   ed.	   Stephen	  Snyder	  and	  Philip	  Gabriel	  (Hawaii:	  University	  of	  Hawai'i	  Press,	  1999),	  pp.	  245-­‐77	  ———,	   'Japanese	   Fiction	   of	   the	   Allied	   Occupation:	   Vision,	   Embodiment,	  Identity',	  	  (Leiden;	  Boston.:	  Brill,	  2006)	  	  Ōshima,	  Nagisa,	  Hakuchū	  no	  tōrima	  [Violence	  at	  High	  Noon]	  	  (Sōzōsha,	  1966)	  	  Otani,	   S.,	   'Okamoto	   Tarō	   no	   "taikyokushugi"	   no	   seiritsu	   o	   megutte'	   [‘On	   the	  Formation	  of	  Okamoto	  Tarō’s	   “Polaroppositionalism”’,	  Bulletin	  of	   the	  National	  
Museum	  of	  Modern	  Art,	  Tokyo	  13	  (2009),	  18-­‐36	  	  
 254 
Ozeki,	   Ruth,	   ed.	   Inside	   and	   Other	   Short	   Fiction:	   Japanese	  Women	   by	   Japanese	  
Women	  (New	  York:	  Kodansha	  International	  Ltd,	  2006)	  	  Pribam,	  Karl,	  Languages	  of	  the	  Brain:	  Experimental	  Paradoxes	  and	  Principles	  in	  
Neuropsychology	   (New	   Jersey:	   Prentice-­‐Hall,	   1971)	  Nō	   no	   gengo:	   Jikken	   jō	   no	  
paradokkusu	  to	  shinkei	  shinrigaku	  no	  genri	  (Tokyo:	  Seishinshobō,	  1978)	  	  Ridgely,	   Steven,	   Japanese	   Counterculture:	   The	   Antiestablishment	   Art	   of	  
Terayama	  Shūji	  (Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  2010)	  	  Sakaguchi,	   Ango,	   'Darakuron'	   [‘Discourse	   on	   Decadence’]	   in	   Kindai	   bungei	  
hyōron	  gyosho	  (Tokyo:	  Nihon	  tsusho	  sentā,	  1990)	  	  Sakai,	   Naoki,	   'Modernity	   and	   Its	   Critique:	   The	   Problem	   of	   Universalism	   and	  Particularism',	   in	   Postmodernism	   and	   Japan,	   ed.	   Masao	   Miyoshi	   and	   H.	   D.	  Harootunian	  (London:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  1989),	  pp.	  93-­‐122	  	  Sakaki,	   Atsuko,	   'Kurahashi	   Yumiko's	   Negotiations	   with	   the	   Fathers',	   in	   The	  
Father	  Daughter	  Plot:	   Japanese	  Literary	  Women	  and	  the	  Law	  of	   the	  Father,	   ed.	  Rebecca	   L.	   Copeland	   and	   Esperanza	   Ramirez-­‐Christensen	   (Honolulu,	   Hawai'i:	  University	  of	  Hawai'i	  Press,	  2001),	  pp.	  292-­‐326	  ———,	   'The	   Iterability	  of	  Memory	  and	  Narration	   in	  Kanai	  Mieko’s	  Yawarakai	  tsuchi	  o	  funde	  (Stepping	  on	  the	  Soft	  Soil)',	  in	  Japanese	  Poeticity	  and	  Narrativity	  
Revisited,	  ed.	  Eiji	  Sekine	  (AJLS,	  2003),	  pp.	  296-­‐310	  ———,	   'Materializing	   Narratology:	   Kanai	   Mieko’s	   Corporeal	   Narrative',	   in	  
Hermeneutical	   Strategies:	   Methods	   of	   Interpretation	   in	   the	   Study	   of	   Japanese	  
Literature,	  ed.	  Michael	  F.	  Marra	  (AJLS,	  2004),	  pp.	  212-­‐26	  ———,	  'Breezes	  through	  Rooms	  with	  Light:	  Kanai	  Mieko	  by	  Roland	  Barthes	  by	  Kanai	   Mieko.',	   in	   Parody,	   ed.	   Sharalyn	   Orbaugh	   and	   Joshua	   Mostow	   (PAJLS,	  Purdue	  University,	  2009),	  pp.	  204-­‐19	  	  Sakazaki,	   Otsura,	   and	  Kanai,	  Mieko,	   'Kaku	   hito	   no	   kanshin	   -­‐	   e	   to	   bungaku	   to'	  [‘The	  Concerns	  of	  Writers:	  Painting	  and	  Literature’]	  Bijutsu	  techō,	  349	  (1971),	  128-­‐33	  
 255 
	  Sartre,	  Jean-­‐Paul,	  Existentialism	  and	  Humanism	  (Frome	  and	  London:	  Butler	  and	  Tanner	  Limited,	  1948)	  ———,	   Being	   and	   Nothingness.	   trans.	   Hazel	   E.	   Barnes	   (London:	   Routledge,	  2003)	  	  Sas,	  Miryam,	  Fault	  Lines:	  Cultural	  Memory	  and	  Japanese	  Surrealism	  (California:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1999)	  ———,	   Experimental	   Arts	   in	   Postwar	   Japan:	   Moments	   of	   Encounter,	  
Engagement,	  and	  Imagined	  Return	  (London:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2011)	  	  Sato,	   Hiroaki,	   'Takiguchi	   Shūzō	   and	   Yoshioka	   Minoru:	   Surrealist	   and	  Nonsurrealist	   Surrealist',	   in	   Confluences:	   Postwar	   Japan	   and	   France,	   ed.	   Doug	  Slaymaker	  (Michigan:	  University	  of	  Michigan,	  2002),	  pp.	  147-­‐63	  	  Sawaragi,	  Noi,	  Kuroi	  taiyō	  to	  akai	  kani	  -­‐	  Okamoto	  Tarō	  no	  nihon	  [Black	  Suns	  and	  
Red	  Crabs:	  Okamoto	  Tarō’s	  Japan]	  (Tokyo:	  Chūō	  Kōronsha,	  2003)	  	  Scarry,	   Elaine,	   The	   Body	   in	   Pain:	   The	   Making	   and	   Unmaking	   of	   the	   World	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1985)	  	  Shibata	  Schierbeck,	  Sachiko,	   'Kanai	  Mieko',	   in	   Japanese	  Women	  Novelists	  in	  the	  
20th	  Century:	  104	  Biographies,	  1900-­‐1993	   (Copenhagen:	  Museum	  Tusculanum	  Press,	  1994),	  pp.	  186-­‐89	  	  Shibusawa,	  Tatsuhiko,	   'Zen'ei	   to	  sukyandaru'	   [‘The	  Avant	  Garde	  and	  Scandal’]	  in	  Shibusawa	  Tatsuhiko	  zenshū	  (Tokyo:	  Kawade	  shobō,	  1993),	  pp.	  356-­‐57	  	  Shigematsu,	   Setsu,	   Scream	   from	   the	   Shadows:	   The	   Women's	   Liberation	  
Movement	  in	  Japan	  (Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  2012)	  	  Slaymaker,	   Douglas	   N.,	   The	   Body	   in	   Postwar	   Japanese	   Fiction	   (London:	  Routledge	  Curzon,	  2004)	  
 256 
	  Standish,	   Isolde,	  Politics,	  Porn	  and	  Protest:	  Japanese	  Avant-­‐Garde	  Cinema	  in	  the	  
1960s	   and	  1970s	   (New	   York:	   The	   Continuum	   International	   Publishing	   Group,	  2011)	  	  Steinhoff,	   P.,	   'Hijackers,	   Bombers	   and	   Bank	   Robbers:	   Managerial	   Style	   in	   the	  Japanese	  Red	  Army',	  The	  Journal	  of	  Asian	  Studies,	  48	  (1989),	  724-­‐40	  	  Suga,	  Hidemi,	  'Kanai	  Mieko:	  Hito	  to	  sakuhin' [‘Kanai	  Mieko:	  People	  and	  Art’]	  in	  
Shōwa	  bungaku	  zenshū	  31	  (Tokyo:	  Shōgakukan,	  1988),	  pp.	  961-­‐64	  	  Suzuki,	  Seijun,	  Koroshi	  no	  rakuin	  [Branded	  to	  Kill]	  	  (Nikkatsu,	  1967)	  	  Suzuki,	   Tomi,	   Narrating	   the	   Self:	   Fictions	   of	   Japanese	   Modernity	   (Stanford,	  California:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1996)	  	  Takahashi,	   Takako,	   'Byōbō'	   [‘Endless	   Expanse’]	   in	  Kanata	  no	  mizuoto	   (Tokyo:	  Kōdansha,	  1971),	  pp.	  113-­‐64	  ———,	  Sora	  no	  hate	  made	  [To	  the	  End	  of	  the	  Sky](Tokyo:	  Shinchōsha,	  1973)	  ———,	  'Onnagirai'	  [‘A	  Hatred	  of	  Women’]	  in	  Tamashi	  no	  inu	  (Tokyo:	  Kōdansha,	  1975)	  ———,	   'Ningyō	   ai',	   in	  Ningyō	   ai	   (Tokyo:	   Kōdansha,	   1978)	   ‘Doll	   Love’	   (trans.	  Mona	  Nagai	  and	  Yukiko	  Tanaka)	  in	  This	  Kind	  of	  Woman:	  Ten	  Stories	  by	  Japanese	  
Women	  Writers	  1960	  –	  1976	  (New	  York:	  Perigee	  Books,	  1982)	  	  Takahashi,	  Takako,	  and	  Tsushima,	  Yūko,	  'Onna	  no	  sei	  to	  otoko	  no	  me	  ',	  Waseda	  
bungaku,	   30	   (1978),	   4-­‐14	   'Female	   Sexuality	   and	   the	   Male	   Gaze:	   A	   Dialogue	  between	   Takahashi	   Takako	   and	   Tsushima	   Yūko',	   in	   Woman	   Critiqued,	   ed.	  Rebecca	  Copeland	  (Hawai'i:	  University	  of	  Hawai'i	  Press,	  2006),	  pp.	  119-­‐34	  	  Takemaru,	  Naoko,	  Women	  in	  the	  Language	  and	  Society	  of	  Japan:	  The	  Linguistic	  
Roots	  of	  Bias	  (London:	  McFarland	  &	  Company,	  Inc.,	  Publishers,	  2010)	  	  
 257 
Takeuchi,	   Kayō,	   'Kanai	  Mieko:	   "Usagi"	   o	  meguru	   kuia,	   "shōjo"	   no	  monogatari	  kara	   "watashi"	  no	  monogatari	  e'	   [‘Kanai	  Mieko:	  The	  Queer	   in	   “Rabbits”:	  From	  the	  Story	  of	   the	   “Shōjo”	   to	   the	  Story	  of	   “Watashi”’,	  Shōwa	  bungaku	  kenkyū,	  56	  (2008),	  163-­‐84	  	  Tanaka,	  Yukiko,	  ed.	  To	  Live	  and	  to	  Write:	  Selections	  by	  Japanese	  Women	  Writers	  
1913-­‐1938	  (Seattle,	  Washington:	  The	  Seal	  Press,	  1987)	  	  Tanaka,	  Yukiko,	  and	  Hanson,	  Elizabeth,	  eds.	  This	  Kind	  of	  Woman:	  Ten	  Stories	  by	  
Japanese	  Women	  Writers	  1960-­‐1976	  (New	  York:	  The	  Putnam	  Publishing	  Group,	  1982)	  	  Tomioka,	  Taeko,	  ‘“Onna	  no	  kotoba”	  to	  “kuni	  no	  kotoba”',	  Fujin	  kōron,	  7	  (1983),	  470-­‐79	   'Women's	   Language	   and	   the	  National	   Language',	   in	  Woman	  Critiqued,	  ed.	  Rebecca	  Copeland	  (Honolulu:	  University	  of	  Hawai'i	  Press,	  2006),	  pp.	  135-­‐45	  	  The	   Committee	   for	   the	   Compilation	   of	   Materials	   on	   Damage	   Caused	   by	   the	  Atomic	   Bombs	   in	   Hiroshima	   and	   Nagasaki,	   Hiroshima	   and	   Nagasaki:	   The	  
Physical,	  Medical,	  and	  Social	  Effects	  of	  the	  Atomic	  Bombings	  trans.	  Eisei	  Ishikawa	  and	  David	  L.	  Swain	  (London:	  Hutchinson,	  1981)	  	  Uno,	  Kathleen	  S.,	  'The	  Death	  of	  "Good	  Wife,	  Wise	  Mother"?',	  in	  Postwar	  Japan	  as	  
History,	  ed.	  Andrew	  Gordon	  (Berkley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1993),	  pp.	  293-­‐320	  	  Vladeck	   Heinrich,	   Amy,	   'Double	   Weave:	   The	   Fabric	   of	   Japanese	   Women’s	  Writing',	  World	  Literature	  Today,	  62	  (1988),	  408-­‐14	  	  Wakamatsu,	   Kōji,	   Kyōsō	   jōshikō	   [Running	   in	   Madness	   Dying	   in	   Love]	  	  (Wakamatsu	  Productions,	  1969)	  	  Watanabe,	  Masahiko,	  'Atarashi	  gūwa	  o	  motomete:	  Kanai	  Mieko	  to	  Ōba	  Minako'	  [‘Kanai	  Mieko	  and	  Ōba	  Minako:	  Seeking	  New	  Fables’]	  Koku	  bungaku	  kaishaku	  to	  
kyōzai	  no	  kenkyū,	  25	  (1980),	  112-­‐15	  
 258 
	  Watanabe,	  Naomi,	  'Kanai	  Mieko	  no	  kyōkai	  sen'	  [‘Kanai	  Mieko’s	  Border	  Line’]	  in	  
Kaku	  mo	  sensai	  naru	  yokobō	  (Tokyo:	  Kōdansha,	  2003),	  pp.	  201-­‐53	  	  Watanuki,	   J.,	   Japan	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  After:	  The	  Politics	  of	  High-­‐Growth	   (Tokyo:	  Sophia	  University,	  1992)	  	  White,	   James	  W.,	  Migration	   in	  Metropolitan	   Japan:	   Social	   Change	  and	  Political	  
Behaviour	  (California:	  University	  of	  California,	  1982)	  	  Whitford,	   Margaret,	   Luce	   Irigaray:	   Philosophy	   in	   the	   Feminine	   (London:	  Routledge,	  1991)	  	  Wilber,	   Ken,	  The	  Atman	  Project:	  A	  Transpersonal	  View	  of	  Human	  Development	  (Illinois:	   Quest	   Books,	   1980)	   Ātman	   purojekuto	   trans.	   Yoshifuku,	   Purabutta	  Shinichi,	  Suga,	  Yasuhiko	  (Tokyo:	  Shunjūsha,	  1986)	  	  Woolf,	  Virginia,	  'Modern	  Fiction	  (1919)',	  in	  Twentieth	  Century	  Literary	  Criticism,	  ed.	  David	  Lodge	  (London:	  Longman,	  1972)	  	  Yamada,	   Hiromitsu,	   'Sakka	   no	   sei	   ishiki:	   Kanai	   Mieko'	   [The	   Sexual	  Consciousness	   of	  Writers:	   Kanai	   Mieko]	  Koku	   bungaku	   kaishaku	   to	   kansō,	   39	  (1974),	  206-­‐13	  	  Yoshikawa,	   Yasuhisa,	   Kaku	   koto	   no	   senjō	   [The	   Battlefield	   of	  Writing]	   (Tokyo:	  Sōbishuppansha,	  2004)	  ———,	   Kanai	  Mieko	   no	   sōzōteki	   sekai	   [The	   Imaginary	  World	   of	   Kanai	  Mieko]	  (Tokyo:	  Suiseisha,	  2011)	  	  Yoshida,	   	   Yoshishige,	   Erosu	   purasu	   gyakusatsu	   [Eros	   Plus	   Massacre]	   	   (Art	  Theatre	  Guild,	  1969)	  	  
 259 




	  The	  Story	  of	  the	  Inflated	  Man	  (A	  Translation	  of	  'Kūki	  otoko	  no	  hanashi')	  	  
	  
	  
I	   was	   introduced	   to	   a	   painter	  who	   only	   painted	   pictures	   of	   caves	   and	   I	  
listened	  to	  his	  story.	  	  The	  following	  is	  what	  he	  told	  me.1	  
	  
Although	  I	  didn’t	  completely	  believe	  the	  story	  of	  the	  circus,	  the	  kidnappers,	  and	  the	   vinegar	   that	   the	   kidnapped	   children	   were	   forced	   to	   drink	   to	   make	   their	  bodies’	  bones	  supple,	  I	  thought	  there	  was	  no	  way	  of	  doubting	  that,	  a	  long	  time	  ago,	  this	  kind	  of	  thing	  really	  happened.	  	  Stories	  like	  this	  used	  to	  hide,	  coolly	  and	  quietly	  in	  the	  ancestral	  ashes,	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  a	  darkened	  room,	  and	  sometimes	  leak	  out	  in	  a	  faint,	  rasping	  voice.	  	  For	  me,	  the	  story	  was	  too	  equivocal	  to	  know	  exactly	   how	   far	   in	   the	   past	   ‘a	   long	   time	   ago’	   was	   supposed	   to	   refer;	   I	   had	  completely	  no	   idea.	   	   It	  was	  an	  age	  that	  crossed	  the	  boundaries	  of	  my	  mind	  to	  imagine;	   I	   can	   only	   describe	   it	   as	   being	   like	   a	   vast	   sea	   of	   grey	   mist,	   an	  unreasonable	  surreality,	  or	  a	  world	  that	  just	  simply	  didn’t	  exist.	  	  As	  a	  still	  small	  child	  I	  also	  didn’t	  realise	  that	  such	  things	  as	  ‘time’	  and	  ‘memory’	  existed	  inside	  of	  me.	   	  While	   I	   reacted	  sensitively	   to	   the	  stimuli	  of	   simple,	  everyday	  reality,	   I	  still	  lived	  without	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘the	  void’.	  	  Which	  is	  to	  say	  that,	  at	  that	  time,	  I	  
                                            1	  That	  which	   is	  printed	   in	  bold	  can	  be	  read	   in:	  Kanai	  Mieko,	   'Kūki	  otoko	  no	  hanashi’,	  
Shingeki,	  21	  (1974),	  138-­‐44	  (p.	  144).	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still	   had	   no	   knowledge	   of	   the	   inflated	  man,	   and	   had	   never	   actually	   seen	   the	  circus,	  not	  even	  once.	   	  But	   the	  circus	   that	   I	  had	  yet	   to	  encounter	  held	  a	  great	  fascination	  for	  me;	  it	  held	  the	  feel	  of	  a	  perfect	  miniature	  world.	  	  I	  suppose,	  if	  a	  museum	   is	   a	   collection	   of	   everything	   from	   natural	   history,	   the	   circus	   is	   a	  collection	  of	  everything	  exciting,	   including	  a	  zoo	  and	  an	  aquarium.	   	  As	  far	  as	  I	  can	  remember,	  the	  first	  time	  I	  saw	  the	  circus	  was	  when	  I	  was	  seven;	  a	  big	  circus	  came	   to	   the	   open	   space	   in	   the	   park.	   In	   the	  wide	   vacant	   park	   premises,	   a	   big	  khaki	  tent	  suddenly	  appeared,	  and	  again,	  suddenly	  disappeared.	  	  What	  kind	  of	  shape	  was	  the	  circus	  tent?	  –	  to	  make	  a	  long	  story	  short,	  there	  is	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  the	  distant	  view	  of	  the	  tent	  about	  which	  my	  memory	  is	  vague	  –	  even	  though	  I	  remember	  quite	  clearly	  the	  inside,	  the	  look	  of	  the	  thick	  khaki	  fabric	  seen	  close	  up,	  the	  thick	  wire	  rope	  firmly	  and	  tightly	  braced	  to	  pitch	  the	  tent,	  the	  seemingly	  robust	  steel	  pegs	  driven	  into	  the	  ground,	  and	  the	  cages	  of	  fierce	  animals	  lined	  up	  at	  the	  rear	  of	  the	  entrance	  –	  my	  memory	  of	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  whole	  tent	  when	  seen	  from	  a	  distance	  remains	  hazy	  and	  ambiguous.	  	  I	  suppose	  for	  children	  who	  live	  in	  the	  kind	  of	  cities	  which	  have	  zoos,	  predatory	  animals	  and	  elephants	  are	  hardly	   objects	   of	   envy;	   but	   for	   children	   like	   me	   from	   the	   country,	   the	   first	  opportunity	  to	  come	  into	  contact	  with	  real	  predatory	  beasts	  was	  at	  this	  circus	  which	  possessed	  the	  character	  of	  a	  moving	  zoo.	  
	  
At	  the	  circus,	  all	  the	  spectators	  turn	  their	  faces	  up	  to	  watch	  the	  trapeze	  in	  mid-­‐air,	  and	  it	  would	  be	  great	  if	  I	  could	  just	  remember	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  tent’s	  ceiling,	  but,	   somehow	  –	   to	   continue	  my	   fruitless	   rambling	   –	  my	  only	   impression	  was	  that	   it	  was	  high	  –	  and,	  at	  the	  time	  the	  tents	  I	  knew	  were	  the	  small	  triangular-­‐shaped	  camping	  tents	  –	  so	  from	  the	  beginning,	  I	  was	  under	  the	  impression	  that	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all	  tents	  were	  that	  shape;	  I	  don’t	  think	  I	  even	  tried	  to	  consider	  what	  shape	  the	  circus	   tent	  was.	   	   It	   also	   struck	  me	   as	   strange	   that	   the	   shape	   of	   something	   so	  large	  couldn’t	  fit	  into	  my	  vision,	  but	  at	  any	  rate,	  I	  entered	  into	  it.	  
	  
Aside	  from	  the	  fantastical	  speed	  in	  which	  the	  circus	  appeared	  and	  vanished,	  for	  me,	  more	  than	  the	  circus	  itself	  (the	  ‘real	  circus’	  which	  my	  parents	  had	  taken	  me	  to	  see)	  I	  was	  bedazzled	  by	  the	  image	  of	  the	  circus.	  	  The	  knowledge	  I	  held	  of	  the	  circus	  was	  quite	  considerable.	  	  However,	  in	  reality	  the	  circus	  was	  exciting,	  and	  little	   children	   don’t	   know	   how	   to	   regulate	   too	   much	   stimulation,	   so	   after	  visiting	   the	   circus	   I	   reacted	   by	   coming	   out	   in	   a	   fever.	   	   The	   khaki-­‐coloured	  interior	  held	  the	  excitement	  of	  a	  primary	  colour	  to	  me;	   it	  was	  a	  world	  of	  wild	  excitement	   and	   tumultuous	   festival;	   a	   world	   that	   was	   extremely	   childish,	  violent,	  and	  ruled	  by	  dizzying	  principles,	   the	  man	  who	  held	   the	   troupe	   leader	  and	  wild	  animal	  trainer’s	  whip	  gave	  orders	  like	  a	  furious	  king.	  	  For	  a	  long	  time	  I	  wondered	  if	  it	  wasn’t	  something	  I	  had	  just	  imagined.	  	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  I’m	  sure	  over	   half	   of	   it	  was	   a	   circus	   composed	   of	   stories	   that	   I	   had	   read,	   about	   fierce	  animals,	  acrobats,	  and	  trapeze	  artists.	  	  At	  the	  present	  moment,	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  a	  microcosmos	  that	  does	  not	  abide	  by	  the	  laws	  of	  time,	  this	  circus	  exists;	  this	  is	  why	  it	  is	  a	  giant	  khaki-­‐coloured	  balloon-­‐shaped	  labyrinth.	  
	  
The	   Inflated	   Man’s	   opinion	   was	   that	   ‘according	   to	   the	   potential	   will	   of	   the	  microcosmos,	   things	   that	   are	   perfect,	   or	   rather,	   aspirations	   for	   perfection,	  approximate	   sphericality,’	   –	   it	   was	   a	   simple	   opinion,	   and	   it	   wasn't	   just	   for	  appearances,	   it	  was	  an	  opinion	  by	  which	  he	  genuinely	   lived.	   	   I	  don’t	  know	  his	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real	  name	  but	  the	  stage	  name	  he	  went	  by	  when	  appearing	  as	  an	  entertainer	  at	  the	  circus,	  or	   rather	  his	  popular	  name,	  was	   ‘Peach,	  The	   Inflated	  Man’;	  he	  was	  also	   called	   an	   appetite	   artist.	   	   Peach,	   of	   course,	   referred	   to	   the	   fruit,	   peach.	  	  Indeed,	   looking	   at	   him,	   he	  was	   a	   light	   pink	   ball,	   covered	  with	   soft,	   sparkling	  gold	  hair	  which	  made	  me	  think,	  not	  of	  the	  hard	  imperial	  peach,	  but	  of	  the	  soft	  pink	  of	  the	  white	  peach.	  	  When	  I	  met	  Peach	  again	  it	  was	  close	  to	  30	  years	  later	  and	  he	  was	  still	  performing	  at	  the	  circus:	  ‘In	  order	  to	  eat,’	  he	  told	  me.	  	  If	  he	  had	  been	  a	  normal	  person,	   the	  expression	   ‘to	  eat’	  would	  here	  mean	   ‘everything	   in	  terms	  of	  living’,	  ‘all	  things	  rolled	  up	  together	  that	  make	  a	  life’,	  but	  for	  Peach,	  The	  Inflated	  Man,	  when	  he	  said	  ‘to	  eat’,	  he	  literally	  meant	  ‘to	  eat’.	  	  If	  he	  didn’t	  eat	  a	  fixed,	  necessary	  amount	  he	  would	  slowly	  lose	  weight;	  if	  he	  lost	  weight	  he	  would	  cease	   to	   be	   ‘The	   Inflated	  Man’.	   	   Putting	   aside	   the	   fact	   that	   The	   Inflated	  Man	  would	  cease	  being,	  he	  said,	  if	  death	  was	  awaiting	  him,	  he	  would	  far	  rather	  burst	  resolutely	  like	  a	  balloon	  that	  has	  the	  tip	  of	  a	  pin	  or	  the	  end	  of	  a	  cigarette	  held	  to	  it,	  than	  let	  the	  light	  but	  heavy	  void	  trapped	  inside	  of	  him	  leak	  out,	  like	  a	  balloon	  which	   slowly	   loses	   strength	  as	   the	  hydrogen	   leaks	  out.	   	  He	  was	   frightened	  of	  letting	  himself	  wither	  away.	   	  Once	  withered,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  way	  to	  claw	  it	  back.	  	  ‘The	  Inflated	  Man’	  that	  he	  had	  ceased	  to	  be	  would	  even	  stop	  being	  a	  man.	  
	  
A	  long	  time	  ago	  I	  actually	  saw	  his	  performance,	  but	  -­‐	  how	  is	  it	  best	  to	  say	  this?	  	  It	  was	   a	   really	  peculiar	   art.	   	  Among	  his	   spectators	  were	   those	  who	  grumbled	  that	  they	  couldn’t	  consider	  that	  it	  was	  a	  unique	  art,	  or	  even	  an	  art	  worth	  paying	  the	  fee	  to	  watch.	  	  Just	  as	  there	  is	  the	  phrase	  ‘an	  unaccomplished	  glutton’,	  in	  the	  past,	  a	  glutton	  was	  like	  all	  gluttons,	  and	  didn’t	  belong	  to	  the	  category	  of	  art;	  in	  other	  words,	  it	  was	  said	  that	  it	  was	  the	  sort	  of	  thing	  that	  only	  proved	  stupidity:	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the	  stupidity	  of	  the	  greedy.	  	  However,	  there	  were	  also	  an	  oppressive	  number	  of	  fans,	   and	   they	   held	   eating	   competitions	   –	   competitions	   in	   eating	   a	   lot	   –	   and	  competitions	   in	   eating	  quickly	  –	   and	   they	   said	   that	   in	   terms	  of	   a	   lay	  person’s	  appetite	  and	  stomach,	  he	  had	  reached	  a	  high	  personal	  achievement.	  	  Supporters	  said	  that	  watching	  him	  made	  them	  feel	  great.	  The	  unbelievable	  appetite!	  	  Even	  a	  whale	  would	  whistle	  (if	  it	  had	  a	  tongue);	  even	  a	  horse	  would	  go	  away	  with	  its	  tail	   between	   its	   legs	   (if	   it	   could),	   or	   take	   off	   its	   cap	   (if	   it	   was	   wearing	   one).	  	  Gargantua	  would	   turn	  completely	  pale;	  even	  a	  one-­‐eyed	  giant	  would	  have	  his	  eye	   opened;	  we	  would	   all	   affirm	   our	   own	   greed.	   	   However,	   from	   Peach’s	   art	  there	  lacked,	  to	  a	  frightening	  degree,	  any	  sexuality.	  	  We	  spectators	  would	  think	  about	  desire	  and	  pleasure,	  but,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  could	  not	  help	  feeling	  pity	  for	  the	  pettiness	  of	  our	  appetites.	  	  This	  was	  more	  or	  less	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  fans;	  for	  those	  who	  weren’t	  fans,	  Peach’s	  huge	  size	  and	  huge	  appetite	  was	  talentless	  –	  he	  was	  artless	  –	   they	   looked	  down	  on	  him	  as	  a	  wasteful	   guzzler:	  with	   such	  a	  huge	  body	  he	  could	  have	  become	  a	  sumo	  player,	  he	  was	  a	  monstrous	  simpleton	  without	  even	  ambition.	  
	  
Watching	  his	  art,	  I	  felt	  sick.	  	  At	  the	  time	  he	  was	  eating	  a	  bucket	  of	  pudding	  as	  a	  post-­‐meal	   sweet;	   for	   a	  while	   after	   this,	  my	   chest	  would	   heave	  when	  pudding	  was	   served	   after	   dinner.	   	   These	   kind	   of	   ‘human	   pump’,	   ‘stomach	   arts’,	   or	  ‘appetite	  arts’	  that	  use	  the	  digestive	  organs	  from	  mouth	  to	  stomach	  are	  always	  haunted	   by	   a	   certain	   dubiousness,	   or	   unnaturalness,	   and	   this	   dubiousness	   or	  unnaturalness	  rests	  on	  the	  excessive	  bizarreness	  in	  that	  which	  the	  entertainer	  eats,	   chews,	   or	   swallows.	   	   But	   in	   Peach’s	   case,	   the	   excessive	   bizarreness	  was	  completely	  missing.	  	  It	  wasn’t	  as	  if	  he	  strangled	  chickens	  or	  snakes,	  sucked	  live	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blood,	  or	  devoured	  raw	  meat;	  nor	  swallowed	  small	  light	  bulbs	  in	  order	  to	  show	  us	  his	  belly	  through	  his	  flesh	  and	  skin,	  switching	  the	  light	  on	  and	  off;	  nor	  did	  he	  eat	   flames,	   nor	   gulp	   down	   glass	   and	   swords;	   he	   just	   innocently	   ate	   normal,	  everyday,	   common	   sense	   food	   –	   it	   was	   simply	   that	   he	   ate	   an	   astonishing	  amount.	   	  If	  we	  take	  breakfast	  as	  an	  example:	  (circus	  performances	  were	  twice	  daily,	  so	  Peach	  performed	  brunch	  and	  dinner)	  if	  it	  was	  Japanese	  style	  he	  would	  have	   a	   bathtub	   of	   rice,	   the	   same	   of	   miso	   soup,	   roughly	   five	   dozen	   eggs,	   one	  whole	   salted	   salmon,	   three	   sticks	   of	   pickled	   radish;	   if	   it	  was	   English	   style	   he	  would	   lightly	  conquer	  a	  bucket-­‐full	  of	  orange	   juice,	   three	  buckets	  of	  porridge,	  twenty	   slices	   of	   toast,	   one	  pound	  of	   butter,	   one	  pound	  of	   orange	  marmalade,	  three	  dozen	   eggs,	   two	  kilograms	  of	   either	   bacon	  or	   ham,	   and	   four	   buckets	   of	  milk	  tea;	  actually	  seeing	  this	  kind	  of	  marvellous	  appetite	  struck	  me	  as	  strange	  even	  though	  at	  the	  time	  I	  was	  a	  child	  –	  you	  may	  say	  there	  is	  no	  art	  in	  it	  –	  indeed	  it	  does	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  story	  without	  art.	  	  You	  could	  even	  say	  it	  had	  a	  certain	  direct	  obscenity	  about	  it.	  
	  
At	  the	  time	  he	  had	  a	  completely	  perfect	  round	  body	  and	  his	  body	  was	  light,	  so	  he	  was	  called	  The	  Inflated	  Man.	  	  Although	  he	  was	  light,	  it	  wasn’t	  as	  if	  he	  could	  do	  any	  great	  acrobatics,	  he	  could	  only	  bounce	  about	  on	  a	  large	  trampoline	  like	  a	  giant	  ball.	  	  His	  bounce	  was	  exactly	  like	  a	  ball	  that	  had	  been	  pumped	  up	  with	  lots	  of	  air	  –	  once	  he	  was	  chosen	  by	  a	  group	  of	  three	  male	  dwarf	  clowns	  to	  play	  the	  football	   in	  a	  skit	  about	  a	   football	  match	  (they	  dressed	  him	  in	  clothes	  that	  had	  football-­‐like	  black	  and	  white	  checkers).	  However,	  his	  real	  art	  was	  persistently	  eating,	   and	   actually,	   this	   attracted	   a	   lot	   of	   people.	   	   I	   could	   only	   think	   that	   he	  was,	   beyond	   doubt,	   like	   a	   big	   ball,	   a	   big	   ball	   inside	   of	   which	   something	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mysterious	   was	   stuffed.	   	   What	   had	   been	   stuffed	   in	   him?	   	   I	   imagined	   a	   large	  cavern	   inside	   his	   body.	   Jonah’s	   whale,	   or	   its	   pastiche,	   Pinocchio’s	   whale,	   I	  thought.	  	  If	  the	  Inflated	  Man’s	  innards	  were	  like	  a	  cavern,	  I	  would	  easily	  be	  able	  to	   fit	   inside,	   all	   curled	   up.	   	   Wasn’t	   he	   made	   from	   that	   hull-­‐like	   skeleton,	   a	  skeleton	  that	  had	  those	  dark	  cavern	  innards,	  a	  skeleton	  around	  which	  flesh	  and	  skin	  had	  been	  stuck	  on?	   	  Around	  twenty,	   I	  worked	  extremely	  hard	  to	  develop	  my	   technical	   skills	   and	   I	   drew	   a	   diagram	   of	   the	   inflated	   man’s	   innards.	  	  Colouring	  it	  with	  watercolours	  and	  pencils,	  I	  drew	  a	  man	  whose	  curved	  bones	  formed	  a	  ball	  shape,	  and	  inside	  of	  this,	  I	  tried	  drawing	  myself	  curled	  up	  asleep.	  
	  
For	  that	  reason,	  my	  relationship	  with	  The	  Inflated	  Man	  was	  not	  a	  shallow	  one	  (at	  least	  not	  in	  my	  world	  of	  imagination).	  	  You	  might	  think	  that	  this	  is	  the	  end	  of	  my	  story	  –	  but,	  the	  reason	  I	  became	  an	  artist	  was	  because	  of	  the	  circus’	  Inflated	  Man.	  
	  
When	  I	  saw	  the	  inflated	  man	  thirty	  years	  later,	  he	  was	  of	  course,	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  circus	  tent.	  	  He	  was	  sat	  in	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  tent’s	  circle	  getting	  more	  and	  more	   full	   as	   an	   aging	   roundly-­‐fat	   dwarf	   ran	   round	   him	   in	   circles	   in	   order	   to	  serve	   him	   food,	   exactly	   like	   the	   earth	   and	   the	   moon:	   the	   moon-­‐dwarf	   went	  around	  the	  earth-­‐giant	  at	  a	  dizzying	  speed.	  	  After	  the	  spectators	  had	  left,	  I	  spoke	  with	  him	  in	  the	  deserted	  tent.	  
	  
‘Owing	  to	  surface	  gravity,	  water	  endeavours	  to	  become	  like	  tiny	  beads,	  and	  all	  the	   stars	   in	   the	  universe	   are	   round,	   therefore,	   it	   is	   as	   if	   there	   is	   some	   sort	   of	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huge	  will	  with	  regard	  to	  everything;	  I	  feel	  there	  is	  this	  huge	  will.	  	  	  If	  god	  existed,	  wouldn’t	   he	   be	   perfectly	   round	   in	   shape?	   	   In	   order	   to	   approach	   becoming	  complete	  –	  my	  spherical	  body	  is	  a	  shape	  which	  ought	  to	  be	  pure;	  I	  don’t	  mean	  this	  as	  a	  metaphor.	   	   I’m	  not	   talking	  about	  having	  a	  rounded	  personality	  –	   I’ve	  become	  like	  this	  by	  eating,	  but	  for	  whatever	  reason,	  I	  haven’t	  been	  able	  to	  make	  people	  understand	  this.	   	  I	  think	  if	  I	  was	  intending	  to	  make	  myself	  into	  a	  god,	  I	  guess	   I	  would	   eat	   everything	  without	   discrimination.	   	   The	   circus	  master	  was	  always	  propositioned	  me	  by	   saying	   that	   there	   are	   arts	   in	   eating	   raw	  meat	   or	  such	  like,	  so,	  how	  about	  it,	  and	  perhaps	  you	  too	  are	  wondering	  why	  I	  don’t	  try	  these,	  but	  if	  I	  ever	  start	  that	  sort	  of	  thing,	  it	  will	  be	  the	  end	  of	  me	  –	  I	  think	  I	  will	  end	  up	  cramming	  absolutely	  everything	  inside	  my	  body.	  	  My	  body	  will	  become	  like	  Noah’s	  Ark.	  	  By	  the	  way,	  because	  I	  have,	  as	  you	  had	  the	  insight	  to	  see	  a	  long	  time	   ago	   –	   even	   when	   you	   were	   a	   small	   child	   –	   or	   perhaps	   I	   ought	   to	   say	  because	   you	   were	   a	   child	   –	   a	   cavern	   inside	  my	   body,	   I	   am	   something	   like	   a	  blown-­‐up	   ball	   or	   balloon.	   	   Food	   is	   something	   that	   should	   become	   blood	   and	  flesh;	  but	  in	  my	  case	  I	  suppose	  I	  should	  say	  it	  becomes	  a	  kind	  of	  air,	  a	  void	  that	  has	  no	  substance,	  that	  continues	  to	  expand.	  	  My	  skeleton	  is	  made	  of	  something	  akin	  to	  a	  flexible	  rubber	  and	  for	  the	  reason	  that,	  like	  a	  rubber	  balloon,	  I	  can	  be	  stuffed	  with	  a	  lot	  of	  void.	  	  I	  am	  frightened	  of	  deflating,	  and	  I	  am	  even	  frightened	  to	   think	  what	  would	   happen	   if	   I	   continue	   to	   inflate,	   balloons	   that	   inflate	   too	  much	  burst	  in	  the	  place	  where	  the	  rubber	  has	  become	  weakened	  and	  thin.’	  
	  
It	   is	  true	  that	  he	  was	  easily	  over	  a	  size	  bigger	  than	  when	  I	  saw	  him	  as	  a	  child.	  	  This	  means	  that	  he	  must	  have	  kept	  on	  getting	  bigger	  and	  bigger:	  the	  size	  that	  I	  felt	  him	  to	  be	  as	  a	  child	  would	  have	  used	  my	  own	  body	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  means	  of	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comparison,	  moreover,	  the	  fact	  that	  I	   thought	  that	  he	  had	  expanded	  (and	  let’s	  face	   it,	   I	   had	   also	   continued	   to	   inflate	   his	   body	   –	   or	   I	   should	   say	   –	   his	   ball)	  means	  that	  he	  himself	  had	  easily	  surpassed	  even	  my	  inflated	  ball.	  
	  
I	  felt	  as	  if,	  just	  like	  Jonah,	  I	  had	  been	  swallowed	  up	  into	  his	  cavern.	  	  His	  strange	  aspiration	   was	   ridiculous;	   it	   was	   a	   childishly	   selfish,	   violent	   ambition	   that	  above	  all,	  I	  think,	  ridiculed	  people.	  	  	  For	  whom,	  is	  a	  sort	  of	  empty,	  round-­‐shaped	  human	  necessary?	  	  Of	  course,	  as	  a	  spectacle,	  that’s	  different,	  but	  from	  his	  point	  of	  view	  it	  was	  not	  inevitable	  that	  he	  would	  become	  a	  spectacle.	  	  I	  suppose	  there	  was	   the	   fully	   persuasive	   reason	   that	   if	   he	   didn’t	   perform	   at	   the	   circus,	   he	  wouldn’t	  be	  able	  to	  be	  supplied	  with	  huge	  amounts	  of	  food,	  but	  even	  then,	  that	  he	  would	  be	  seen,	  that	  people’s	  eyes	  (or	  their	  gaze)	  would	  be	  necessitated;	  for	  instance,	  because	  he	  was	  different	  from	  that	  famous	  hunger	  artist,	  in	  that	  sense,	  he	  was	  not	   an	   artist;	   his	   existence	  made	   a	  mockery	   of	   artists.	   	   In	   order	   for	   a	  hunger	  artist	  to	  prove	  that	  he	  has	  definitely	  not	  taken	  even	  one	  morsel	  into	  his	  mouth,	  discerning	  onlookers	  are	  necessary	  at	  evey	  moment	  during	  the	  fast.	  In	  order	   to	   prove	   his	   fasting,	   others	   must	   be	   present.	   	   But	   in	   Peach’s	   case,	   I	  wonder	  if	  it	  is	  it	  really	  necessary	  to	  be	  seen	  by	  others?	  
	  
What	  was	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  prove	  the	  cavern?	  What	  was	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	   gain	  people’s	   approval	   that	   all	   food	  became	  a	   kind	  of	   air	   that	   resembled	   a	  void-­‐like	   thing	  as	  he	  continued	  to	   inflate?	   	  However,	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  day,	  he	  completely	  lacked	  the	  desire	  to	  make	  people	  approve.	  	  By	  chance,	  I	  was	  the	  one	  who	  realised	  his	  wish.	  
 269 
	  
Above	   is	   the	   story	   I	   heard	   from	   the	   painter.	   	   He	   added	   that	   he	   only	  
realised	   at	   that	   time	   that	   the	   void	   which	   filled	   the	   cavern	   inside	   the	  
Inflated	  Man	  and	  the	  inside	  of	  the	  unpopular	  circus	  tent	  were	  exactly	  the	  
same	  as	  the	  skeleton	  (precisely	  like	  a	  hull	  –	  the	  ship’s	  womb	  –	  stood	  on	  its	  
head).	   	   ‘The	   Inflated	  Man	  was	   the	  circus’,	   I	  nodded	  as	  he	  continued.	   	   ‘So,	  
rather	   foolishly,	   I	   was	   inside	   of	   a	   world	   contained	   within	   a	  man	   called	  
Peach.’	   ‘What	   did	   you	   intend	   to	   do	   if	   he	   inflated	   too	  much	   and	   burst,’	   I	  
asked	  the	  painter.	  	  ‘Would	  you	  have	  become	  the	  Inflated	  Man?’2	  
	  
	  
                                            2	  That	  which	  is	  printed	  in	  bold	  can	  be	  read	  in:	  Kanai	  Mieko,	  'Kūki	  otoko	  no	  hanashi',	  
Shingeki,	  21	  (1974),	  138-­‐44,	  p.	  144.	  	  
